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2A B S T R A C T
(The Industrial Development of Bengal 1900-1939:ran 
Examination of the Economic Features of an Underdeveloped 
Area by Abu Zaher Muhammad Iftikhar-ul-Awwal)
This thesis examines the industrial experience of Bengal 
during the period from 1900 to 1939 with particular 
emphasis on the role of the government as the main 
instrument for growth*
While Chapter I builds up the case for industrial 
development, Chapter II examines in detail the industrial 
policy of the Bengal Government in the light of its own 
limitations as a subordinate authority to the Government 
of India and that of Whitehall. Chapter III is an 
investigation of the labour market in Bengal with 
particular emphasis on the supply of labour to jute, 
tea and coal industries in relation to wages and conditions 
of work. In Chapter IV, we have examined the rates of 
profitability and security of industrial investments. In 
this chapter, we have also examined the various financial 
institutions of the time and their role in the industrial 
development of the province. Chapter V points to some 
of the handicaps experienced by Indian entrepreneurs, and 
in the above light looks at their contribution to the 
larger industrial establishments of Bengal. The next 
two Chapters, VI and VII examine the growth and 
development of the two biggest manufacturing industries 
of our period - jute and handloom cotton weaving industries. 
The concluding chapter, which is Chapter VIII, is an 
estimate of the industrial progress made in the province 
during the period under review.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, an 
intensive debate began on the relative economic conditions 
of the Indian people prior to British rule and as they 
were then. There were two schools of thought - one was 
always referring to the increasing prosperity of the 
country and people, and claiming unstinted praise for 
England as the creator of this prosperity; the other was 
incessantly dilating upon the rapidly-growing and 
alarming impoverishment of both the country and the
A
people. While due to lack of statistical data a
perfectly satisfactory answer to this vexed question
remained unsolved, it however became obvious from the
various estimates put forward in the course of the
debate that India still remained one of the poorest
countries of the world. The gross annual income per
2
head calculated by Dadabhai Naoroji was Rs. 20. The 
official figure calculated by Sir E. Baring was Rs. 27. 
These figures when compared with other countries were
(1) William Digby, 1 Prosperous1 British India (London, 1901), 
p. xix.
(2) C. S. Deole, The State in relation to Indian Industries 
(Bombay, 1916), p. 2.
(3) Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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found to be the lowest in the scale. If India*s per 
capita income was low, that of Bengal was still lower. 
Compared to oust over Rs. 30 in the case of Central 
Provinces and Bombay, Bengal's estimate was only
A
Rs. 22-8. And if account was taken of the unequal 
distribution of wealth among the different sections 
of the community, it needs but little imagination to 
comprehend the miserable existence of the great mass 
of people in India. At a meeting of the Indian Section
of Arts in London, Mr. 0* Connor described the economic
2
condition thus:
"... India remains in a very elementary 
condition compared with the poorest of 
European countries... The great mass of 
people are occupiers of extremely small 
holdings, imperfectly cultivated by 
reason of their poverty, and landless 
labourers, living in conditions so far 
below the standard of this country 
^England 7 that it is difficult to make 
you realize the difference... men whose 
garments are limited to an unclean rag 
round their loins and another round their 
heads, whose miserable huts possess not 
even the rough rope-strung frame which in 
India does duty for a bedstead, who eat an 
insufficient meal from an earthenware 
platter or a large dry leaf, who are 
unconscious of luxuries, and happy if they 
can get a full meal of the coarse, inferior 
grains which are their staple food".
It was this destitution of the people which first 
turned the attention of the thinking people towards
7
industrialization. They saw before them countries like
(1) The Statesman and Priend of India (weekly edition), 
March 28, 189^* p. 1. ’ 1 '
(2) Industrial India. Vol. I, No. 6 (June, 1904), pp. 
155-56* See also, pp. 123-24 for an introductory note 
on Mr. O'Connor and his paper.
(3) See, for further illumination on this point, Bipan 
Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in 
India (New Delhi, 1966), Chapter II.
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Table 1.1 Gross earnings per head of certain selected 
countries, c. 1916
Gountry Average per capita Country Average per
income (in £) capita income
Cin £)
Scotland 45 Norway 20
Australia 40 Switzerland 19
United States 39 Spain 16
Belgium 28 Austria 13
Prance 27 Italy 12
Canada 26 Russia 11
Germany 22 Turkey 4
Holland 22 India 2
Source: C. S. Deole, The State in relation to Indian
Industries (Bombay, 1916), p. 3*
Japan and Germany being industrialized in a matter of 
few decades and improve the material conditions of the 
people immeasurably. Moreover, when they looked back 
they saw all the ingredients that are necessary for 
successful industrialization present within the economy. 
There were available in India the raw material requisites 
for almost every form of industry and the idea that the 
country ought to be able to produce most of the manufac­
tured articles which it required was not one which its 
natural resources rendered utopian, "People argue - and 
argue rightly that these resources should be utilised for 
the benefit of India itself and not for that of other
A
countries". Similarly, India possessed vast sources of 
potential labour-force. So far as rural industrialization
(1) Hon'ble Mr. Hewett, Member for Commerce and Industry, 
at the Indian Legislative Council on 28 March, 1906.
See, Report of the Second Indian Industrial Conference 
held at Calcutta, December 1906 (Calcutta, 1907)» Part II,
1Brief Account of Industrial Activity in India in 1906 
January to October*, pp. XX-XXI.
was concerned there were excellent artisans ready at 
hand without training new ones. This wealth and 
treasure in the shape of trained labour was lying idle 
and a vast quantity of national prosperity was wasted. 
These millions of skilled labourers were starving 
instead of being prosperous. As to capital, it was 
asserted, there was no dearth of it either. "There
A
is capital ready to hand awaiting secure investment".
What was really needed was the task of reorganizing 
credit, both real and personal, on a sound and progressive 
basis which had already been undertaken by Continental 
statesmen and thinkers during the last fifty years, and 
they had succeeded in bridging the gulf which separated 
the saving few from the producing many in a way which 
commanded attention. If this task was undertaken in 
the same spirit by those who felt its importance here 
in the promotion of national well-being, and a modus 
operandi established by which people looking for secure 
investment could be brought face to face with those who 
needed their help and were prepared to offer that security 
the nation would soon start upon a new phase of life
with its power invigorated, and its energies awakened
2
in a way no other single agency could accomplish. Thus 
the country had all the requisites of an industrial power
(1) Hon'ble Rao Bahadur M. G. Ranade, 'The Reorganization 
of real credit in India1, Report of the First Industrial 
Conference held at Poona. August 1891 (Poona, 1891), p# 61
(2) Ibid.. pp. 61-62.
- raw materials, labour and capital; and yet the country 
was one of the least industrialized nations of the world. 
The Swadeshi movement which originated in Bengal towards 
the beginning of this century thus sought to call into 
existence the directing capacity, the technical skill, 
and the requisite capital "so that our own labour and 
money may convert our raw materials into the commodities
A
which we now import". This they thought would substan­
tially add to the wages of the workmen here and the 
profits of the capitalists, and depress, to an appreciable 
degree, the misery of the lower orders.
But what was it that restrained the country from 
being industrialized in the nineteenth century in spite ^ 
of the fact that India had the potentiality to do so?
The answer to this question does not lie so much on the 
point whether India could or could not industrialize but 
mainly on the political and economic thinking of the 
period which revolved round the classical theory of free 
trade and the Adam Smithian doctrine of international 
trade as a dynamic force generating a great upward surge 
in the general level of productivity of the trading 
countries. According to this theory each country need 
only concentrate its productive effort along lines of 
greatest comparative advantage, and participate freely 
in the trading pattern that thereupon evolved of necessity.
(1) Presidential address of Dewan Bahadur Ambalal Sakerlal 
at the Third Indian Industrial Conference held at Surat 
on 30 December, 1907» See, Report of the Third Indian 
Industrial Conference (Madras, 1908), p. 27#
This would maximise total world income, and the income 
of each participating country would also be maximised.
To the question which goods a country should import and 
which it would export, the classical theory gives the 
following answer. Each country will produce those goods 
for the production of which it is especially suited on 
account of its climate, of the qualities of its soil, 
of its other natural resources, of the innate and 
acquired capacities of its people, and - this must be 
given special emphasis - of the real capital which it 
possess as a heritage from its past, such as buildings,
A
plant and equipment, and means of transport. In 
accordance with this idea, India was chosen to be a 
raw material producer in view of her bountiful soil, and 
her climate, ordinarily so propitious. to agriculture.
The role of the state came to be concentrated on the 
improvement of communications and on facilitating the flow 
of trade, which continued under the above conditions 
described, to consist mainly of exports of raw material 
and imports of foreign manufactured products and not 
unnaturally on the development of agriculture. Any 
departure whereby the state was called upon to expend 
money on the development of industries was thought to be 
unnatural. In the words of the Hon'ble Sir C. E. 
Trevelyan, Einancial Member of the Council of the Governor'
(1) Gottfried Von Haberler, The Theory of International 
Trade, with its Application to Commercial Eoilcy 
translated by A. Stonier and E. Benham and. printed in 
Great Britain by William Hodge and Company, Ltd, Eighth 
impression, 1961), p. 125#
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q
General:
"It is a misdirection of the resources of 
India to enter into competition with 
England in this branch of industry# On 
the other hand, India has, on the 
cultivation of the rich products of her 
prolific soil and climate, resources of 
her own, the development of which is 
limited only by the insufficiency of 
labour and capital# To divert these 
elements of production from a profitable 
to an unprofitable employment, is surely 
a mistake# Our true course is to adhere 
to the great division of labour which 
nature herself has established... If the 
Burwai or any other Iron Works in India 
are profitable, there is no want of private 
enterprise and unemployed capital to 
undertake them".
But private enterprise as Sir E. C. Buck later pointed
out was always more or less checked by dread of the
cost of initial experiment, and not having any object
in view but quick dividends (the advantage of the
country being no consideration), holders of capital
preferred to put their money into assured business
and held back from new undertakings to which government
2
gave no direct or indirect support# Under the above 
circumstances, industrial development of the country was 
minimal, rather as S. S. Thorburn in his lecture to the 
Fabian Society in London pointdout "our commercial policy 
from first to last has been to destroy her few industries 
and prevent the establishment of new manufactures, which
7
may interfere with our trade"#^
(1) IOR: MSS. Eur. F. 78, File No. 59/8B, Sir Charles 
Wood Collection. See, Minute by the Hon'ble Sir C. E. 
Trevelyan, Financial Member of the Council of the 
Governor-General on the Burwai Iron Works, dated Calcutta, 
13th June, 1863*
(2) Sir E. C. Buck, Report on Practical and Technical 
Education (Calcutta, ^901), pp. 37-36* '
(3) See, the Indian Agriculturist# March 1, 1902, p. 81.
Table 1.2 Mean density of population in Bengal, 1872 to 
1931 (per square mile)
Year No. of people per 
square mile
1872 422
1881 450
1891 484
1901 521
1911 563
1921 578
1931 616
Source: Census of India, 1931* Vol. V, Bengal and Sikkim, 
Part I, Report (Calcutta, 1933)* p. 66.
Nor did agricultural specialization in India fulfill
the expectations of the political and economic thinkers
of the nineteenth century. On the contrary, it has been
the root of much misfortune. This was basically due to
certain peculiar circumstances of the country of which
2very little was previously thought of. The population 
of the country which was already fairly dense at the time 
of the inauguration of this policy began to go up by 
leaps and bounds (see Table 1.2). Even after making
(1) However, at the initial stages of the establishment
of wider commercial contacts with the West, the propulsive 
effects of international trade possibly led to an increase 
in the per capita national income in different proportions 
among the different sections of the community. See,
M. M. Islam, Agricultural Development of Bengal: a 
quantitative study, 1920-194-6 (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, 
London University, 1972), pp. 24-25.
(2) One of the very few exceptions who predicted and 
pointed out the severe effects of such economic laws, if 
applied to India, was Nassau Lees. See, W. Nassau Lees, 
The Land and Labour of India. A Review (London, 1867)*
pp. 6-10.
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allowance for the recurrent losses from scarcity and 
famine, an increase of one per cent per annum was being
'I
admitted by the optimists. This population increase
exerted tremendous pressure on the limited natural
resources of the province and particularly on land.
It was now only by buying out other tenants, or in
some other way acquiring the right of cultivating
previously occupied land, or occasionally, by bringing
inferior land under cultivation, that the tenant could
any longer add to his holding; and, as a matter of fact,
though here and there a more than ordinarily prosperous
tenant might have done this, the tendency, in most parts
of the country, owing to the ever-increasing pressure
of population on the soil, had long been not towards an
increase, but towards a progressive diminution of the
2
average area of individual holdings. In other words 
since there was no alternative employment to agriculture, 
the increasing population progressively fell back on the 
limited land. So far as this was the case, the result 
was that the part of the population which was in excess 
of the requirements of agriculture ate up the profits 
that would otherwise spring from the industry of the 
community. "It is not surprising", observed the Famine 
Commission (1880) "that in a country thus situated
(1) The Statesman and Friend of India (weekly edition), 
February 4, 1893* p. 8.
(2) The Indian Agriculturist. August 1, 1898, p. 232. 
The average area actually cultivated by a cultivator 
and his family did not even reach 3 acres in 1921.
I OR: Vol. 10971, BFP (Commerce), April 1921 103.
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material progress is slow". Moreover, the rapid increase
in population was gradually absorbing the surplus of raw
materials which once formed the bulk of the outward trade.
Thus in his Narrative of the Famine of 1896-97* Holderness
pointed out that, whereas seventeen years ago the total
food production of the country was 51*530,000 tons, as
compared with requirements of 47,165*000 tons, so that
there was a surplus of 5*165*000 tons available for export
and storage, this surplus had by then dwindled down to
1,700,000 tons, or barely sufficient to provide for the 
2exports alone.
There were other considerations as well which made 
the development of agriculture difficult. Agriculture, 
apart from the personal skill of the farmer, being dependent 
on the conjunction of meteorological conditions and natural 
fertility, was exposed to many hazards. Thus the years 
1891-9?* 1896-97* 1899-00, and 1907-08 were unfavourable
7
due to unseasonable and deficient rainfall. The cumulative 
effect of such unfavourable years coming one after another 
not only dislocated agricultural production but also caused 
severe strain on the resources of the provincial government. 
The Bihar famine of 1873-74 (so called from the part of the 
Bengal province most seriously affected) alone cost the 
State £6,000,000; while at the height of 1897 famine, no 
less than three-quarter of a million persons were on relief
(1) Report of the Indian Famine Commission. Part I, Para 
103 (PP LII of 1880), p. 442.
(2) The Indian Agriculturist. August 1, 1898, p. 232.
(3) L. Datta. Report on the Enquiry into the Rise of 
Prices in India. Vol. I (Calcutta, 1914), p. 127.
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in the permanently settled districts of Bengal, costing 
the Bengal Administration Rs. 1,08,04,000 or £720,266.^ 
Moreover, famines had also a deplorable effect on cattle, 
the mortality of which brought misery and ruin upon 
classes who were not usually compelled to seek relief.
Agricultural specialization with a view to overseas
exports also created a certain element of instability in
the economic life of the province. This arose due to
extreme sensitivity of raw materials to external occurances
beyond its control. The violent fluctuations in the
prices of raw jute in Bengal compared to manufactured
2
jute in Bengal is a case in point. The effect of such 
fluctuations in exports not only caused hardships to 
individual ryots but also had an adverse effect on nation 
building activities of the government as imports essentially 
depended upon the quantum of exports. Furthermore, there 
was the overriding question of the freedom of the seas 
from molestation. A war in which England for six months 
failed to hold command of the seas would plunge India 
into the most grave distress. The cotton, opium, jute, 
seeds and wheat industries would be disorganized for 
years, while a prolongation of the blockade would mean 
financial ruin to the Empire.
(1) See, Resolution of the Government of India on "Certain 
recent criticisms of the Land Revenue Policy of the Indian 
Government", the Indian Agriculturist« February 1, 1902,
??> S f c c l . 1  I»t,lll8,n0. St.Urtic,
Index Numbers of Indian Prices. 1861-1951 (Delhi, 1933)* 
Graph V.
When agriculture failed to improve the economic 
condition of the people and created a certain element 
of uncertainty in the economy, the demand for industria­
lization was intensified. It was held to he a mistake 
to treat the two apart and the argument was that "the 
only way to add to the material well-being of the mass 
of mankind is by increasing the production of wealth 
... in a word, how to make two blades of grass grow 
where but one grew before" and to "secure a really 
satisfactory result it is necessary that Indian industries 
as well as Indian agriculture should be developed".
By diversifying the economy thus, industrialization was 
expected to create new sources of wealth side by side 
with agriculture. Nor, as we mentioned earlier, did 
Bengal lack in raw materials. Raw jute which was produced 
in Bengal was mostly exported in that state to other parts 
of the world to be manufactured into gunny bags and sacks, 
so that the profit of capital and labour went abroad. 
Likewise, hides and skins amounting to millions of rupees 
(the value of exports amounted to over 56 millions of
rupees in 1900-01 alone) were annually exported from 
2
Bengal. Other raw materials like paddy, tobacco, raw 
silk, etc., also could have been brought forward a stage 
or two. Nor did Bengal lack in mineral resources like 
coal and iron and hence there was the opportunity of
(1) The Friend of India and Statesman (weekly edition), 
February 22, 1900, p. 5.
(2) Statistics of British India for 1909-10 and preceding 
years. Part II. Commercial (Calcutta. 1911). p. 21.
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establishing engineering industries as well.
There was also the possibility of wealth creation
through the revival and regeneration of cottage industries.
The opportunity arose as a result of a great reaction in
India against foreign made materials, particularly cotton
goods at the turn of the twentieth century. The market
for such products within the province was also large.
If properly organized, there was thus a good possibility
of substituting imports in this direction. Nor could
the possibility of overseas exports in such materials be
>1
overlooked. As Hon'ble P. A. Nicholson pointed out:
11
There is a vast market in Europe and 
America for Indian Art goods with which 
Irish and European Art goods are not in 
competition; and the demand can be 
increased almost indefinitely by a properly 
organized supply of tasteful goods..."
A secondary aspect, though very important result of the
wealth created by industries would be its effect on
2
the public revenues. Moreover, the whole economy being 
less dependent on foreign markets would be much more 
stable.
Industrialization, including the revival and 
regeneration of cottage industries was also advocated 
to provide employment to hundreds and thousands of 
"idlers" who having nothing to do were seen moving freely
(1) The Indian Agriculturist. December 2, 1901, p. 37^ •
(2) Report of the Indian Fiscal Commission. 1921-22 
(PP II of 1922} Second Session), p. 357•
1
during the hours of labour# The establishment of 
manufacturing industries thus could at least afford 
avenues of employment to a portion of those engaged in 
agriculture# It was only by such divertion of a part 
of the population that one could hope for any very 
substantial improvement in the material well-being 
and the standard of living of the masses.
Finally, as the Fiscal Commission so emphatically 
puts it:^
uone of the most important results that may 
be anticipated from a development of indus­
tries in India is one that cannot be 
measured in terms of money# A country 
industrially undeveloped tends to suffer 
from a certain intellectual deadness.
The outlets for diversity of talents are 
few. Those who might have shone in a wider 
sphere have their energies and ambitions 
cramped in the mould of uniformity. It is 
hardly too much to say that a certain 
measure of industrial life and opportunity 
is an essential condition for building up a 
vigorous national character. And with 
regard to India the effect on the national 
character is likely to be particularly 
marked and particularly beneficial".
(1) Thus James Caird who by reason of his wide agri­
cultural and economic knowledge was especially invited 
to tender advice to Her Majesty*s Government on 
questions affecting the agricultural population of 
India had this to say on this point: "In no agricultural 
Country that I know of are so many people to be seen 
stalking idly about during the hours of labour as in 
India. The streets and court-houses and yards are full 
of idlers; the roads are never empty, and the railway 
stations and natives* railway carriages are crammed with 
people. Entering a village at any hour of the day you 
are surrounded by idlers. Much of this arises from the 
absence of other occupation than agriculture..." See, 
Report on the Condition of India (PP LIII of 1880),
pp. 138-39.
(2) Report of the Indian Fiscal Commission. 1921-22 
(PP II of 1922, Second Session), p. 338.
But the process of industrialization could hardly
be undertaken without the active assistance of the
state which the protagonists thought should create the
essential pre-conditions for "take-off". They certainly
did recognize the importance of the extension of roads,
railways and canals, the improvement of seaports, the
placing of machinery on the free list of customs tariff,
and the abolition of internal customs duty. But they
also wanted a change in the government's commercial
policy which, as we mentioned earlier, had a devastating
effect on the indigenous industries of the province, and
prevented others from being naturalized. "The commercial
difficulties, ... are the crux of the whole matter, and
even a partial solution of them would probably lead to
an industrial expansion in India which would materially
contribute to establish her prosperity". They also
demanded a change in the Stores Rules which required
virtually all goods for government consumption to be
purchased by indent on the Secretary of State for India.
Similarly, the demand for technical and industrial
education arose which they thought "will infuse new life
2
into this grand old country, teeming with resources".
The state was also expected to provide information as to 
markets, and set up the necessary machinery for the
( 1 ) The Indian Agriculturist. May 1 , 1901, p. 14-5* See, 
Memorandum on the industrial revival of the indigenous 
manual industries by Alfred Chatterton.
(2 ) The Friend of India and Statesman (weekly edition), 
January 2 , 1895* p. 15# See, Letter to the Editor by 
J. Bowles Daly.
collection and dissemination of commercial intelligence 
which it had sometimes opportunities of securing, not 
available to private persons. The state was also urged 
to provide, or at any rate facilitate the provision of 
industrial finance; and to take steps to provide 
especially cheap transport for manufactures made under 
certain conditions, either for internal consumption or 
for export. It was also urged to introduce improved 
processes; to demonstrate the use of small engines for 
factories; and to improve the organization of home 
industries. In asking for such active co-operation 
of the government, it was pointed out, they were only 
following the proposition which had already been laid 
by some civilized countries like Germany and Japan and 
hoped that "by the joint co-operation of the Government 
and the people, there appears to be no reason why India, 
with all its natural advantages, should not reach equal, 
if not a higher standard" among the manufacturing nations 
of the world.
In this thesis an attempt has been made to study 
statistically, whenever possible, the growth and develop­
ment of industries in Bengal over the period 1900 to 
1939* Although such studies have been undertaken for 
other regions and on most provinces of India and on 
all-India basis, it is surprising that no similar work
(1 )  Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola in the Indian Legislative 
Council on 21 March, 1916 . See, IOR. L /E /7 /8 5 5 *
on the industrial development of Bengal has been
a
carried out so far. This study is, therefore, a pioneer 
work to fill in a major gap in the economic history of 
Bengal. However, since the scope of such work is 
virtually unlimited, the main focus of the work has 
been directed towards the growth and development of 
the major manufacturing industries with special emphasis 
on the policies of the government, and the two major 
factors of production - labour and capital. It is only 
by such an unified approach that, we believe, full 
justice can be done to the subject.
Considerable difficulties had to be obviated in 
preparing this thesis on account of paucity of material 
on the subject and the lack of any recognized series for 
such a study. Industries Department of Bengal was only 
organized on a proper footing after the First World War 
and that was only interested in the development of small 
and cottage industries. As a result we have virtually 
no material on the growth and development of large-scale 
industries as well as on matters relating to labour and
(1) Similar works have been done on Madhya Pradesh,
Mysore, Hyderabad, Rajasthan, Central Punjab, Vidarbha, 
Travancore-Cochin, Punjab, Madhya-Bharat and Kathiawar.
All these original research works were carried out in 
various Indian Universities excepting one on Mysore by 
R. Balakrishna in 1939 from the University of London.
See, A Preliminary Check List of Theses for a Comprehen­
sive Annotated Bibliography on the Economic History of 
India (1500 A. D. to 194-7 A. D. ) in the Supplement to 
the Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol. X,
No. 1 (March, 1973)• Xt appears, however, that the only 
published work among these is that of Balakrishna. See,
R. Balakrishna, Industrial Development of Mysore (Bangalore 
City, India, 1940J:
industrial finance. Moreover, even the material that 
is there in the Bengal Revenue Proceedings (Industries) 
are none too encouraging as it provides no information 
about the structure, size, production and distribution 
of the various cottage and small-scale Industries of 
the province. Bengal General Proceedings are also 
barren. However, it does throw a little light on the 
stores policy of the Government of India. One or two 
surprising documents, normally not expected there, 
could also be found. But the most useful proceedings 
are the Bengal Financial Proceedings (Commerce) which 
in addition to providing valuable material for labour, 
also throw some light on the financial problems of the 
province aggravated by the depression in the 1920*s and 
1930*s, and a few other useful documents on the existing 
industries of the province and their relationship with 
the government. Unfortunately, the financial proceedings 
prior to 1920 also lack in richness on industrial matters. 
Moreover, none of the proceedings mentioned so far cover 
the entire period of our study. For our purpose, we have 
also gone through relevent Economic and Overseas Department 
Collections and Collections of Provincial Government 
Records. While the former is useful so far as the stores 
and tariff policy of the Government of India was concerned, 
the latter provided an insight into the financial condition 
of Bengal since *Meston Award* which as we shall see 
restricted the government of Bengal from taking a more 
positive role in matters of industrial development.
Published works of the government likewise could 
not be said to shed either much light on the various 
aspects of individual industries. Various annual reports, 
i.e., Industries Department reports, factory reports, 
mines reports are of limited use in view of the scope of 
such work. But it will be too much to belittle the 
importance of such work as these at least give a continuity 
and link to the gradual growth and development of indus­
trial enterprises. Bulletins published by the Industries 
Department of Bengal and also by the Government of India 
are also of limited use as these dealt mostly on the 
prospects of various industries rather than on the 
various aspects of existing industries. However, important 
exceptions are there which provide useful information 
which are otherwise unavailable elsewhere. Nor did the 
industrial surveys of Collin, Cumming and Gupta are of 
any great value excepting possibly in furnishing us with 
an over-all picture of the industrial panorama of the 
period. The importance of such documents simply lie in 
the fact that in the absence of relevent government 
documents for the period prior to First World War, they 
provide us with the vital link necessary to understand 
the subsequent era better. More important than these 
documents and throwing new light on such matter as labour 
and capital are the Indian Industrial Commission Report 
and the provincial and central banking enquiry committee 
reports with their evidence. Other government publications 
which we have made use of are the various district 
gazetteers, census reports, Tariff Board reports, tea and
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coal statistics and various other statistical documents 
published by the Department of Commercial Intelligence 
and Statistics, Government of India. It might be noted 
that the statistics provided in these government publica­
tions suffer from serious defects, i.e., they do not 
always provide statistics in the same form as in the 
previous years or sometimes they simply disappear 
altogether or cease from publication. Furthermore, the 
statistics provided are always deficient. Thus we do 
not have statistics on the investment of capital by 
banks on industries, or the rate of profitability of 
various industries or the share of Indians in the invested 
capital in various industries or the particulars of 
share capital or statistics regarding the ownership of 
industrial enterprises. Likewise, we do not have much 
statistics on the wage structure in various industries 
or composition of workforce, figures on mortality, 
absenteeism, labour turnover, etc.
Since material from published and unpublished 
government sources are not always sufficient to throw 
light on all aspects of organized and unorganized 
industries nor did various industries necessarily publish 
their annual reports showing all aspects of their business 
organization and dealings, it has been necessary for us 
to look into contemporary newspapers, journals and perio­
dicals. Among those consulted, the names of three stand 
out prominent. Capital, a weekly journal published 
from Calcutta has been extremely useful in providing 
information about Calcutta share markets and their 
quotations and on all matters relating to capital and
investment, and not the least on the jute manufacturing 
industry on which it had a particular^ interest# The 
Friend of India and Statesman (weekly overseas edition, 
title varies), also published from Calcutta, is important 
as it does contain substantial information on the jute, 
tea and coal industries of Bengal particularly as regards 
their supply of labour and capital and not the least on 
market conditions for those products# Of special value 
on the tea industry has been the Indian Planter1s 
Gazettee, also published from Calcutta and without which 
no study on the tea industry of the period could be 
complete. All that material has been supplemented 
by private papers, parliamentary proceedings and debates, 
various non-official publications, pamphlets, and 
contemporary works.
From these sources with their inherent limitations, 
we have tried in this thesis to evaluate the performance 
of the manufacturing industries of Bengal. We hope, in 
spite of our manifold difficulties, we have been able to 
contribute some knowledge on this hitherto unexplored 
aspect of Bengal*s economic history for the period under 
review.
Chapter II
THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY OP THE GOVERNMENT OP BENGAL
The industrial policy of the Government of Bengal during 
the period 1900-1939 has been studied here in two parts. 
Part I deals with certain limitations under which the 
provincial government had to function and it analyses 
their implications on the industrial development of Bengal. 
Part II is a general study of the industrial policy of the 
Government of Bengal, its achievements and failures.
In this chapter, we have tried to bring to the surface 
those limitations which to a great extent circumscribed 
the activities of the provincial government and hindered 
the optimum development of manufacturing industries. It 
is because of these limitations - both external and inter­
nal which restrained the Government of Bengal from taking 
a "forward” and "bold" industrial policy and made it to 
restrict its field to the development of cottage and small 
industries. One such external limitation was the tariff 
policy of the Government of India, on which no provincial 
government had any say. The tariff policy of India, on 
the other hand, was dictated from Whitehall and the policy 
that it prescribed for India was that of free trade under 
which goods were imported free of any duty (sometimes of 
course for revenue purposes minor duties were imposed on 
selected imports). In the year 19?3* however, with the 
granting of fiscal autonomy, the Government of India
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adopted a policy of ’Discriminatory Protection1 whereby 
certain industries were protected by imposing suitable 
duties on foreign products. The second external limita­
tion was that on the purchase of stores. The rules were 
framed by the Government of India which allowed only cer­
tain products of local origin to be bought locally (if 
these satisfied certain laid down conditions) and no 
preference whatsoever was extended to local manufactures.
The third limitation was as regards the financial problems 
of the Government of Bengal, which was as much an external 
limitation as an internal one. It was an external limita­
tion because the Central Government decided the level of 
provincial expenditures. It was done before the Reform 
Schemes by periodical 'financial settlements' and later 
on by the inequitable 'Meston Award'. In one sense it was 
also an internal limitation because after the settlements 
it was left to the provincial government to distribute the 
sum among different departments of the government. After 
having studied these limitations of the provincial govern­
ment, in Part II we have tried to attempt an estimate of 
the Bengal government's industrial policy carried out 
under the guidence of the Department of Industries.
Part I
When the British Government decided to adopt free trade as 
its official policy, it gave considerable latitude to her 
Colonies to legislate their own tariff regulations. The 
British Colonies in Canada, for example, were permitted
by an Imperial Act in 184 6 to reduce or repeal by their
own legislation duties imposed by Imperial Acts on foreign
goods imported from foreign countries into the Colonies in
question, and advantage of this was taken by Canada when
in 1849 the remaining of the navigation laws were repealed
and the St# Lawrence was thrown open to vessels of all 
q
nations. As regards Australasia, the Colonies at their 
establishment were given power by an Imperial Act of 1852 
to raise customs duties, subject to the proviso that they 
should not be contrary to treaty, or differential, or
imposed on goods for the use of the Imperial forces in
2the Colony. As regards the South African Colonies, no 
limitations were imposed on their powers with regard to 
customs duties when self-government was accorded; nor was 
their any limitation imposed on New Zealand under the 
Imperial Act of 1852. Only in two cases had their been
4
an exception, Ireland and India.
The basis of the tariff policy followed by Whitehall 
with regard to India was that of free trade and it re­
mained in force till the origin of the fiscal autonomy 
'convention1 in 1919. Under such a system of free trade 
between two unequal partners, India got little or no 
opportunity to develop her manufacturing industries.
Great Britain by virtue of her early industrialization,
(1) Economic and Overseas Department Collections, IOR. 
L/E/9/1144. See, 'Note on the Question of Fiscal Autonomy 
in the Dominions'.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) W. Cunningham, The Case against Free Trade (London, 
1911), p. 86.
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and indeed being the first industrial nation was in a 
preponderantly superior position as regards technical 
skill and experience as a result of which she completely 
dominated the Indian market. Even infant Indian indus­
tries which possessed great natural advantages, i.e.,
q
cotton textile industry received no sympathy from above.
The whole policy of the British Government at this time 
v/as rather concentrated towards the further development 
of commercial relations the basis of which was the export 
of agricultural raw materials from India and the importa­
tion of finished products from England. The net result 
of such a policy was the insignificant development of 
large scale industries in India and the destruction of 
more or less completely many of the old handicrafts and
thereby rendering the occupations of the people more
2predominantly agricultural than they were before.
(1) Even free traders were not unmindful of the special 
cases where manufacturing industries might be established 
by regulations, if such industries possessed great natural 
advantages. Adam Smith, for instance, was of the opinion 
that: "By means of such regulations, indeed, a particular 
manufacture may sometimes be acquired sooner than it could 
have been otherwise, and after a certain time may be made 
at home as cheap or cheaper than in the foreign country". 
See, Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations (Edited by Edwin Oannan) (London, 
1904j, Vol. i, pp. 4R2-23. John Stuart Mill also felt 
that protective duties were sometimes justified if imposed 
temporarily especially in a young and rising nation, in 
the hopes of naturalizing a foreign industry. To him : 
"The superiority of one country over another in a branch 
of production, often arises only from having begun it 
sooner. There may be no inherent advantage on one part, 
or disadvantage on the other, but only a present supe­
riority of acquired skill and experience. A country which 
has this skill and experience yet to acquire, may in other 
respects be better adapted to the production than those 
which were earlier in the field..." See, Collected Works 
of John Stuart Mill (University of Toronto Eress, n9Lp),
Vol. in, p. (m .—
(2) Minutes of the Evidence recorded by the Indian Fiscal
Commission, Vol. I (Calcutta, 1925)< P« 260.
Among the large scale industries which Bengal 
possessed till the beginning of the First World War, 
jute and tea were certainly the two most important ones 
from the noint of view of Bengal's export trade. Even 
these industries came to be heavily dependent upon 
foreign supplies. This dependence of Bengal industries 
on foreign imports had best been described by J. C. K. 
Peterson, the then Controller of Munitions, Bengal. He
q
wrote in the Englishman in March, 1918:
"The two chief industries in Bengal for ins­
tance the jute and tea industries are almost 
entirely dependent on supplies from Europe.
When war broke out if the supply of raw hide 
pickers from England had stopped most of the 
mills on the Hooghly would have had to shut 
down...Most of the other leather stores used 
in the mills such as picker bands, roller 
skins, leather belting, etc., and all the 
machinery and machinery stores also come 
from Europe.
Much of the Indian tea crop was, and still is, 
packed in boxes obtained from foreign 
countries. Patent chests are imported from 
Russia, Canada or Japan and the metal 
fittings required from England or America.
Hoop iron, nails, clips for fastening the 
patent chests also come from foreign coun­
tries. Without these supplies it would be 
impossible to pack tea...The prunning knives, 
hoes, forks, and kodallies used in the gar­
dens and practically all the machinery re­
quired for the manufacture of tea are also 
imported. These instances show the danger 
to India of our dependence upon external 
supplies."
The above description of Peterson brings to light 
the state of Bengal's industrial development under free 
trade conditions. In fact, political pressure had long 
been focussed on this point, and in 1916, in the early
(1) J. C. K. Peterson, 'Industrial Development in Bengal', 
The Englishman (Annual Financial Review), March 4, 1918, 
d. 11.
days of the war, it had led to the appointment of the 
Indian Industrial Commission. The consideration of the 
tariff policy was, however, expressly excluded from the 
terms of reference of the Commission by the proviso that 
their recommendations should not be incompatible with the 
fiscal policy of the Government of India. As a result, 
in spite of the Commission1 s far reaching recommendations 
including greater participation by the Government of India 
on matters of industrial development, fiscal policy re­
mained unchanged. However, in 1919 important pro­
nouncement came from the Joint Select Committee which was 
appointed to consider the Government of India Bill (1919)* 
It gave a careful consideration to the relations between 
the Secretary of State and the Government of India and 
through it with the provincial governments and came to the 
conclusions that continued dictation of India's fiscal 
policy from Whitehall was likely to endanger the "good 
relations between India and Great Britain" and recommended 
that the Secretary of State for India should "as far as 
possible avoid interference on this subject when the 
Government of India and its Legislature are in agreement... 
This was the origin of the famous Fiscal Autonomy'Conven­
tion' which was accepted subsequently by the Secretary of
State in a despatch to the Government of India, dated the 
2
30 June, 1921* The Government of India at once took the
(1) Report from the Joint Select Committee on the Govern­
ment of India Bill, Vol. I. Report and Proceedings CPP IV 
of 1919), p. 11, Clause 33.
(2) See, Economic and Overseas Department Collections, 
IOR. L/E/9/1144, Note on the "Tariff Policy in India",
No. 8322 of 1931.
36
liberty of this declaration and on 7 October, 1921 
appointed a Fiscal Commission "to examine with reference 
to all the interests concerned the Tariff policy of the 
Government of India..."
The Indian Fiscal Commission came out in favour of 
discriminatory policy so as to make the inevitable bur­
den on the community as light as was possible with due 
regard to the development of industries. In choosing 
which industries to be protected and which not to be, it 
laid down three fundamental conditions. Firstly, the 
industry must be one possessing natural advantages, cheap 
power, a sufficient supply of labour and a large home 
market. Secondly, the industry must be one which without 
the help of protection either was not likely to develop 
at all or was not likely to develop rapidly as was desi­
rable in the interests of the country and thirdly, that
the industry must be one which would eventually be able
2to face world competition without protection. The 
Government of India accepted the recommendations and in 
June, 1924- anpointed a Tariff Board to give effect to the 
uolicy. Its main task was to study the applications for 
protection and refer its recommendations to the Government 
of India after it had made enquiries on the possibilities 
of granting protection.
(1) Report of the Indian Fiscal Commission%1921-22 
(PP II of 1922), pp. 335-36.
(2) Ibid., p. 384-.
The Tariff Board studied many applications and 
recommended the cases of the suitable ones to the Govern­
ment of India who ultimately accepted or rejected the 
proposals. Many of the industries granted protection 
showed excellent results. The cotton textile industry, 
for example, was granted protection in 1926-27 and since 
then the number of mills and the production capacity
increased greatly. In the year 1931 there were in Bengal
1 2 21 cotton mills which increased to 46 in 1936. As regards
the production capacity, in 1926-27 Bengal cotton mills
spun 31*54 million pounds of yarn and 31*8 million yards
of piece-goods of all kinds which increased to 37*62
million pounds of yarn and 79-4 million yards of piece-
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goods by 1931-32. The principal varieties of goods turned 
out were dhuties, the production of which had increased 
from 17*9 million yards in 1926-27 to 65*1 million yards 
in 1931-32, i.e., an increase of 47.2 million yards or 
264 per cent; longcloth and shirting; and coloured piece- 
goods the production of which had increased from 1 million 
yards to 3*9 million yards, i.e., an increase of 290 per
h.
cent. Th e over all increase in the production of cloths 
of all sorts during the period 1926-27 to 1931-32 had 
been 149.69 per cent.^ By 1936-37 ike grand total of woven
(1) Out of these 21 cotton mills, 4 were spinning mills,
4 weaving, 7 spinning and weaving, 4 in course of erection 
or recently registered, and 4 were idle. Report of the 
Indian Tariff Board regarding the grant of protection to 
the Cotton Textile Industry (Calcutta. 1932;. pp. 9-10*
(2) Out of these 46, 24 mills were in course of erection 
or recently registered, 11 were spinning and weaving mills,
6 only weaving, 2 spinning and 3 were idle. DOIB: Bulletin 
No. 75. Cotton Mill Industry in Bengal (Alipore. 1937)* P* 6.
(3) Tariff Board Report on Cotton Textile. 1932, pp. 13* 19*
(4) Ibid., pp. 19-21.
(5) Ibid., p. 21.
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Table 2;1 Cotton mill production of yarn and woven 
goods in Bengal, 1925-26 to 1938-59
Year Yarn 
(000 lbs)
Woven goods 
(000 lbs)
1925-26 24,123 8,708
1926-27 31*537 7,495
1927-28 34*347 8*307
1928-29 30,022 9,959
1929-30 37,053 14,357
1930-31 37*763 16,748
1931-32 37,620 17,204
1952-33 40,821 20,852
1933-34 39,912 23*642
1934-33 41,056 32,368
1935-36 40,991 32,601
1936-37 38,065 34,986
1937-38 38,303 36,855
1938-39 45*695 43,808
Sources: Statistical Abstract for British India with 
statistics, where available. relating to certain Indian 
States from 1921-22 to 1950-51 (65th number) (London. 
1933). pp. 754-57: Ibid.. 1930-31 to 1939-40 (72nd 
number) (London, 19*557 ppJ 523^59.
goods manufactured in the cotton mills of Bengal had 
increased to 156.2 million yards consisting of 153.2 
million yards of grey and bleached piece-goods; 2.94 
million yards of coloured piece-goods and small quan­
tities of miscellaneous other products like coloured 
goods, hosiery and mixed products.
Similarly, due largely to foreign competition not 
a single modern sugar factory existed in Bengal till 
1932, i.e., the year in which the industry was granted 
protection. Yet by 1938-39* Bengal possessed 10 sugar
(1) Grey and bleached piece-goods included chadars; 
dhuties; drills and jeans; cambrics and lawns; printers; 
shirtings and longcloth; T-cloth, domestics and sheets; 
tent cloth; khadi, dungri or khaddar; and some other 
sorts. D0IB: Bulletin No. 75« Cotton Mill Industry in 
Bengal, p. 47.
mills having a total crushing capacity of 5,000 tons 
a day. The number of sugar mills would probably have 
been much higher but for internal competition from sugar­
cane growing provinces of the United Provinces and Bihar 
who having the advantages in the cost of sugar-cane
2cultivation were largely benefitted from protection.
Iron and steel industry was another industry which
really got a very big boost due largely to protection,
first granted in 1924 and since then continued till the
partition of 1947 and even after it. The Tata Iron and
Steel Company was by far the greatest benefactor of this
legislation. It increased its share of the available
Indian market for rolled steel from 30 per cent in
1927-28 to 72 per cent in 1932-33.^ In Bengal, Messrs.
Sir Sarupchand Hukumchand & Company started Hukumchand
Electric Steel Works, situated at Ballygunge, a short
distance from the Ballygunge Railway station. The steel
produced here was of the highest quality and was expected
to comply with grade "A” of the British Engineering
4Standard Specification. Two other big iron and steel
(1) Sugar Technologist's Association (of India) Year Book. 
'1939-40 (Cawnpur. n. d.)« Appendices on the List of Sugar 
Factories and Refineries existing in India in the year 
1938-39, List A, pp. 14-15.
(2) See, Chapter V of this thesis for further elucidation 
on this point.
(3) The Indian Railway Gazette, August 1934, p. 172.
(4) Ibid.. June 1925. PP. 212-15. The Hukumchand Electric 
Steel Works was established with a view to meeting the 
demand for steel castings which was mainly required by 
the great Indian Railways for their rolling-stock and 
also by the firms engaged in carriage and wagon building. 
Till then railways had to keep considerable capital idle 
in the form of stock of spares to replace breakages.
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companies also benefitted in Bengal. The first was the 
Bengal Iron Company which specialized in the production 
of pig iron and the production of cast iron pipes, 
fencing posts and sockets, railway chairs and sleepers 
and similar castings and in this section of the trade,
Bengal could hold its own against any country in the
2
world. The other was the Indian Iron and Steel Company 
which came into existence in March 1918 with an authorised 
capital of three crores of rupees.^ The two were later on 
amalgamated in 1936 and the capacity of the amalgamated 
company was 8,50,000 tons of pig iron and 1,00,000 tons 
of cast iron pipes, sleepers and general iron castings 
per annum.^ In 1937, a new company called the Steel 
Corporation of Bengal was formed for the manufacture of 
steel from pig iron produced by the amalgamated Indian 
Iron and Steel Company. The steel plant of the Steel
(1) The Burrakpur Iron Works of Bengal Iron and Steel 
Company were originally established in 1875* But as this 
private enterprise was not a financial success, they were 
closed down in 1879- A few years later, the Government 
took up the venture, and carried it for 8-J- years when the 
Bengal Iron and Steel Company took it up in 1889* See,
The Indian Railway Gazette. March 1911, p. 84 . The 
Bengal Iron and Steel Company was reconstituted in 19^9 
as the Bengal Iron Company with an authorised capital
of £2,500,000. See. RAB, 1921-22, p. 41.
(2) The Englishman (Annual Financial Review), March 4,
1918, p. 9.
(3) RAB, 1921-22, p. 41.
(4) Report of the Indian Tariff Board on the continuance
of protection to the Iron and Steel Industry (Bombay. 1947)* 
p. 9.
Corporation was set up adjacent to the blast-furnace of
the Indian Iron and Steel Company near Asansol, and the
Corporation took hot metal from the latter Company under
an agreement. It produced structurals, heavy rails,
sheets (black and galvanized), bars and spring steel
2
and tool steel to certain specifications. Due largely 
to the protection, iron and steel industry was able to 
stand firmly on its own foot ”except against dumping”.
Not only that, under its influence, the ship-building 
industry also prospered. The total number of joint- 
stock iron, steel and ship-building companies working in 
1920-21 was 29 and it rose to 39 in 1923-26, 59 in 
1930-31 and in 1935-36 no less than 69 such companies
lL
existed in Bengal.
But in many cases the recommendations of the Tariff 
Board were not accepted or only partially accepted by the 
G overnment of India. One such case was the enquiry on 
the heavy chemical industry appointed in July 1928. The 
The basis of the whole group of chemicals considered was 
sulphuric acid. The Board found a high natural protection 
to the manufacture of sulphuric, hydrochloric and nitric 
acids in India due to the heavy sea freights on acids.
(1) Report of the Indian Tariff Board on the continuance 
of protection to the Iron and Steel Industry (Bombay,
1947;, p. 10.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.« p. 6.
(A) DOIB: Bulletin No. 83. Report on the Growth of Joint- 
Stock Companies in Bengal (Alipore, 1^39) V p *
But since the salts dependent upon the acids did not 
enjoy the same natural protection it had proved difficult 
for the Indian manufacturers to compete against imports 
from other countries in which the industry was highly 
developed. Examination of the industry1s claim to pro­
tection led the Board to recommend favoured duties at 
various rates on a number of heavy chemicals, with a 
bonus on super-phosphate fertilizer manufactured in India 
which it was hoped would lead to an increase in the out­
put of this product and enable the sulphuric acid indus­
try to be put on a paying scale. There were other mis­
cellaneous recommendations such as a specially reduced
2railway freight rate for super-phosphates.
The Government took a long time in considering the 
Report (the Report was submitted in May 1929 by the 
Tariff Board and Government published it for general 
information in September 1931) and was ultimately un­
able to accept in full the recommendations of the Board. 
The Government agreed to the duties recommended as a 
measure of protection to give the industry a chance to 
reorganize, but it was not satisfied as to the scheme 
for the encouragement of super-phosphates which required, 
according to the Government, further expert examination. 
Nor did the Government accept subsidisation of chemical 
industries by means of freight reductions on the plea 
that railway rating policy did not fall within the scope
(1) Economic and Overseas Department Collections, IOR. 
L/E/9/1027.
(2) Ibid.
1
of the Board’s enquiry, Moreover, the proposed new pro­
tective duties were imposed for a period of two years 
until 31 March 1933* The Government of India, accor­
dingly allowed the whole scheme to be lapsed after the
2expiary of the temporary duties at the end of the period. 
On the whole the Tariff Board had successfully 
carried out its reference terms. It had made realistic 
studies on the industries under enquiry and recommended 
far reaching proposals for their development. It could 
probably have done more had it been an independent body 
without certain limitations on its path. These limita­
tions seriously affected its working, and in the end 
brought the entire mechanism of granting protection under 
severe criticism. These limitations were four-fold.
Though the Board had been in existence since its incep­
tion in 1924 (except for short periods in 1933 and 1934), 
it had never been a permanent body. Its continuation 
depended on the policy of the government, who usually 
extended it from year to year or rather for periods of 
two years at a time. The result was that the members 
suffered from periodical scrutiny and an apprehension 
that their services might be terminated if they failed 
to satisfy the government. This was a great hindrance 
to the successful working of the Board. Secondly, there
(1) Economic and Overseas Department Collections, IOR. 
L/E/9/1027.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid., IOR. L/E/9/994.
was no machinery during the period the protective duties 
were in force as a result of which the Tariff Board could 
not examine the progress of the industries and make fur­
ther recommendations from time to time as to whether a 
revision of the policy of protection or the quantum of 
protection might or might not be needed with reference 
to the protected industries. However, the most important 
criticism was the manner in which the Government of India 
interpreted the laid down conditions. Sometimes the inter­
pretations were harsh and rigid so much so that the glass 
industry in India was deprived of protective duties simply 
because soda-ash, a raw material for its manufacture had
A
to be imported. The Government did not look to see the 
innumerable examples where one or more of the component 
parts of a particular industry had to be imported before 
manufacturing orocesses could begin. Fourthly, the 
Government also made unnecessary delay in announcing 
whether a particular industry could or could not get 
protection. The decision to refer the question of pro­
tection to the glass industry was taken by the Govern­
ment of India in 1923 and it took no less than eight 
years to request the Tariff Board to take up the enquiry, 
which it finished in one year and the Government of India
took another three years before reaching its final deci- 
2
sions in 1933* It was only in 1944 that the Government
(1) BLCP, February 27, 1939, Vol. I, p. 333.
(2) Economic and Overseas Department Collections, IOR. 
L/E/9/1030.
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decided to liberalize the existing protective policy and 
eliminate some of the conditions attaching to the grant
A
of protection to industries.
The stores rules framed by the Government of India 
from time to time (with the sanction of the Secretary of 
State for India) for purchasing its various requirements, 
viz., clothing for the army, machinery for the railways, 
stationery for offices, etc., was of vital importance to 
the development of industries, especially in view of the 
fact that government was the chief purchaser of manufac-
p
tured goods in India. A definite policy of systematic 
patronage as such could stimulate the local industries 
by injecting in them the element of demand. However, an 
examination of the official policy would show that there 
were gross anomalies both as regards the prescription of 
the policy and the manner in which it was administered.
Till 1908 only certain high officials of the Govern­
ment of India and Local Governments were authorised to 
purchase stores of local origin not exceeding rupees 
fifty in value. This rule was also applicable in the 
case of local boards of Bengal. They were required to
(1) Economic and Overseas Department Collections, IOR.
L/E/9/994.
(2) The various goods purchased by the consuming depart­
ments of the Government of India were called ’’Stores” in 
the Accounts of the Home Treasury of the Government of
India. Prior to 1876, sfones |es (- ^^4
there was no question of purchasing any kind of 
Indian manufacture in the Indian market. Sunil K. Sen, 
’Government Purchase of Stores for India (1858-1914)1,
Bengal Past and Present, Vol. LXXX (1961), pp. 47-48; 
and also Bunil Kumar Sen, Studies in Industrial Policy 
and Development of India, '1838-1914 (.Calcutta, 1964),
p • 12. ^
(3) IOR: Vol. 7861, BGP (Misc.), November 1908,/^p. 455*
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obtain articles worth above that value from England 
direct by indent upon the Secretary of State for India, 
even if such articles were available in India, It was 
in 1908 that the Governor-General in Council amended the 
earlier rule and revised the amount to Rs. 250 for such 
purchases in Civil Departments as could be procured in 
India by Heads of Departments, Commissioners of Divisions,
and other officials of or above the rank of Collector
2
whom the Local Government might select. As such many of
the important offices which were held by officers below
the rank and status indicated above had no purchasing
power whatever. These included among others the Chief
Inspector of Factories, Bengaltand the Collector of
Customs, Chittagong,
Moreover, the rules themselves were far from being
clear as regards its contents, or in other words these
were cast in a permissive form and did not require that
*
preference should be given to locally produced goods.
In addition to this, practical difficulties were experi­
enced in giving effects to the rules which required a
(1) BLCP, December 15, 1906, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 198.
(2) ICE7 Vol. 7861, BGP (Misc.), November 1908,‘pT9455.
(3) This was the verdict of a Committee appointed in 
1906 by the Government of India to enquire into the 
procedure prescribed for the purchase of stores for the 
use of Government Departments in India. It might be 
noted that the Committee's Report was not allowed to be 
published but a summary of the conclusion was given. 
See, IOR: Vol. 8139, BGP (Misc.), August 1909,
comparison to be made in respect of price and quality 
between the locally manufactured article and tbat obtained 
from England. No less was the complexity regarding the 
interpretation on the condition that an article manufac­
tured in India from imported materials must not have 
been imported into India in a finished or partly fini­
shed state. The result was that the home indents of the 
railways, for example, prior to the Eirst World War
consisted only in such articles as earthenware, sorais
2for holding water, bricks and limei
During the Eirst World War, Britain found it extre­
mely difficult to keep up its export trade with India 
due to "paramount necessity of economising freight".^
To reduce the load on the United Kingdom, stricter rules 
were framed for export from the United Kingdom into India 
of materials on the prohibited list. Goods could only 
be imported on Priority Certificates issued by the
ii
Government. This awkward situation was, however, a 
blessing in disguise for India. It resulted in the 
temporary relaxation of the stores rules. Munitions 
Boards were set up at the Centre with Controller of 
Munitions in the different Circles with the object of 
arranging supplies from India to the armies overseas.
Mos. 12- IS,
(1) IOR: Vol. 8139, BGP(Misc.), August 1909,AP. 187.
(2) Capital, October 29, 1930, p. 819.
(3) IOR: Vol. 10431. India Commerce and Industry Procee­
dings (Home Indents), March 37-
(4) Priority Committees were set up in this connection. 
Thus there were tea, Jute, coal, general engineering 
and electrical priority committees. See, DOIB: Annual 
Administration Report, October 1917 to December 1919, 
pp. £-3.
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This led to the growth of some manufacturing industries 
the products of which were mainly required by various 
governments for their use internally, and for external 
supplies overseas. In Bengal, the Munitions Board was it­
self purchasing two times as much as all other departments, 
municipal corporations and Railway Companies put together.
In the working of the rules, the officers also 
showed indifference and apathy. This indifference on 
their part to buy local products had been brought to their 
notice by no less than the Secretary of State for India 
himself. In 1903 he wrote to the Governor-General of
p
India in Council:
”1 am not satisfied that the general policy 
which has been recognised as applicable to 
the purchase of stores has been carried out 
as completely as is to be desired. That 
policy...is that, as far as possible, the 
purchase of stores of local manufacture 
should, be encouraged. . .The information 
furnished in your letter under reply does 
not point to any progress in the desired 
direction."
The Secretary of State again drew their attention just 
prior to the First World War. One probable reason for 
this indifference on the part of the bureaucracy to 
carry out the official policy could be the absence of 
suitable purchasing agencies in India prior to 1922.
In its absence officers empowered to buy local products 
had to be on the look out for goods the quality of which
(1) J. C. K. Peterson, 'Industrial Development in Bengal', 
the Englishman (Annual Financial Review), March 4, 1918,
P* 11. Mo,S-V—
(2) IOR: Vol. 6791, BGP (Misc.), July ,1904,*pp. 11-12.
(3) IOE: Vol. 9370, BFP (Commerce), April 1914,” pl'MI.
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were suitable and the price not unfavourable. Therefore, 
the officers probably thought it more convenient to order 
stores from Home than to be on the look out for it. Cen­
tralized purchasing agency existed only in the case of 
medical stores and of stationery, the purchase of which 
depended more on the personal disposition of the pur­
chasing officers than otherwise. It was to a large 
extent due to the enthusiastic support by the Controller 
of Printing, Stationery and Stamps, Government of India 
that improvements in the manufacture of pencils, pen and 
pen-holder, leather goods, writing ink, carbonic paper, 
etc., were manifested during the Swadeshi movement.
After the war, in pursuance of the recommendations 
of the Indian Industrial Commission, a Stores Purchase 
Committee was formed to enquire into the measures re­
quired to enable the departments of the Government of 
India and the Local Governments to obtain their require­
ments as far as possible in India; to study the relations 
between such agencies as might be formed for the purpose 
of purchase and inspection with one another and with the 
Stores Department of the India Office and to recommend 
the modifications of the stores rules necessary for the 
purpose. The Committee (headed by P. D. Couchman, Member, 
Railway Board) recommended the setting up of the Indian
(1) IOR: Vol. 9023, India Commerce and Industry Procee­
dings (General), 191 69-70.
(2) IOR: Vol. 10749, BFP (Commerce), February 1920, Mo .s 8, 
pp. 117-19.
Stores Department which would act on behalf of all Im­
perial departments of the Government of India and such 
as might desire to avail themselves of its assistance - 
provincial governments, company-worked railways, corpo­
rations, port trusts, municipalities, etc., so as to 
prevent the purchase of imported stores so long as goods 
of indigenous production of suitable quality and price
A
was available. In accordance with the recommendations 
of the Committee, the Government of India set up the 
Indian Stores Department in January 1922 for the pur­
pose of purchasing various classes of stores required
2
for the public service. It consisted of four main bran­
ches at the headquarters(administration, inspection, 
purchase and intelligence sections), in addition to the 
Provincial Purchase Circles, the Provincial Inspection 
Circles, the Government Test Houses at Alipur and Bombay 
and the Metallurgical Inspectorate. Each of these orga­
nizations rendered service of some sort or other directly 
or indirectly connected with the development of industries. 
Though its services had been utilized by several Depart­
ments of the Central Government as well as of Provincial
(1) Report of the Stores. Printing and Stationery Sub- 
Committee of the Retrenchment Advisory Committee, Sep­
tember, 1952 (Simla. 1932), p. 9.
(2) Administration Report of the Indian Stores Depart­
ment , 1929-30, p. 1.
(3) Economic and Overseas Department Collections, IOR. 
L/E/9/939.
(4) Ibid.
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Governments, Company Railways, Indian States and quasi­
public bodies, in an appreciable and gradually increasing 
degree, recourse to the Department had been entirely op­
tional.^
It was only in 1929 that the Government of India 
recommended that certain departments (i.e., the Indian 
Posts and Telegraphs Department; the Director, Geological 
Survey of India; the Chief Inspector of Mines, etc) must 
purchase their stores through the Indian Stores Depart­
ment, Delhi (henceforth called ISD, Delhi) if these were
available in India and in conformity with the rules for
2the sunnly of articles for the public service. However, 
the most important change of the stores rules came in 
December 1929 which revised all previous rules and adop­
ted the Rupee Tender System (as the rules were popularly 
called) and which finally came into operation on 1 January 
1931. These rules were framed to give effect to the policy 
of the Government of India of making purchase of stores 
for the public service in such a way as to encourage the
development of the industries of the country to the utmost
4possible extent consistent with economy and efficiency.
These rules prescribed that in purchasing stores prefe­
rence should be given in the following order:-
(1) Administration Report of the Indian Stores Depart­
ment , 1929-30, p. 1.
rffibid.
(3) Ibid., '1933-54-. p. 1.
(4) Administration Report of the Indian Stores Depart­
ment, 1929-50» p. 2.
Firstly, to articles which were produced in India in the 
form of raw materials, or were manufactured in India from 
raw materials produced in India, provided that the quality 
was sufficiently good for the purpose;
Secondly, to articles wholly or partially manufactured in 
India from imported materials, provided that the quality 
was good for the purpose;
Thirdly, to articles of foreign manufacture held in stock 
in India, provided that they were of suitable type and 
requisite quality;
Fourthly, to articles manufactured abroad which needed to 
be specially imported.
As a result of this new Rules purchase abroad had 
become an exception; whereas under all the rules in force 
previously purchase in India was the exception (see Table 
2.2). After the formation of the ISD, Delhi; it even 
purchased such articles by Rupee Tender as wheels and 
axles, spare parts for motor vehicles, boiler tubes, 
transport flat and ferry staging, lighthouse equipment, 
and electrical equipment for Telegraph Department which
p
were formerly purchased from abroad. This process of 
buying local products kept on increasing and by the year 
1938-39 goods worth almost nine crores of rupees were pur­
chased annually by the ISD, Delhi and most of these stores
(1) See, Department of Industries and Labour (Government 
of India), Resolution No. S. - 217* dated 12 December 
1929* in the Economic and Overseas Department Collections, 
IOR. L/E/9/939* Also, Administration Report of the Indian 
Stores Department, 1929-30, pp. 2-3.
(2) Administration Report of the Indian Stores Depart­
ment , 1931-32, p. 2. The value of such articles purchased 
in India amounted to Rs. 48,44,400.
Table 2.2 Value of stores obtained from Indian firms,
1905-06 to 1910-11 (figures of value in £)
Year Purchased from Payment to the Grand total Percentage
India India Office (D  + (2) of (1) to
(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1905-06 473,340 4,468,670 ,4,942,010 9.57
1906-07 498,342 5,020,44-3 5,518,785 9.02
1907-08 512,464 4,181,379 4,693,843 10.91
1908-09 477,534 5,013,618 5,491,152 8.69
1909-10 482,578 3,447,293 3,929,871 12.27
1910-11 461,350 3,072,565 3,533,915 13-05
Ho- H,
Source: IGR: Vol. 9370, BIT (commerce), April 1914,Ap* 12#
were purchased from Bengal (see Table 2.5), the products 
of which were mainly textile and leather goods, enginee- 
ring, hardware and miscellaneous items.
Though in the year 1926 the Secretary of State for 
India gave the Governor's provinces the right to frame 
their own stores rules, the Bengal government preferred 
to use the rules governing the purchase of stores for 
Central Departments promulgated by the Government of 
India subject to certain modifications necessary to meet 
the local requirements of this province. The underlying 
policy of the new rules published by the Government of 
Bengal in August 1926 was the encouragement of local 
industries. Simultaneously with the promulgation of the 
Stores Purchase Rules of 1926 the departments and officers
(1) Administration Report of the Indian Stores Depart- 
ment, 1951-32, pp. 65-64-, Appendix Vll.
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Table 2.3 Purchase of stores through the Indian Stores 
Department, Delhi, year by year since its constitution 
and the value of stores purchased from Bengal (Rs. *00,000)
Year Total value of stores 
purchased through ISD, 
Delhi 
(1)
Value of stores 
purchased from 
Bengal 
(2)
1922-23 1,65 N. A,*
1923-24 1,67 N. A.
1924-25 2,59 N. A.
1925-26 2,67 N. A.
1926-27 3,99 N. A.
1927-28 3,73 1,38
1928-29 3,60 1,35
1929-30 4,29 1,74
1930-31 3,77 1,28
1931-32 3,60 1,27
1932-33 3,31 1,38
1953-34 3,60 1,44
1934-35 4,76 2,09
193c-36 5,59 2,57
1936-37 6,49 3,37
1937-38 7,89 3,99
1938-39 8,77 5,66
Sources: Administration Report of the Indian Stores
Department/ 1938-59 (Delhi, 1939)% Appendix XIX, p. 132 
for column (1); and Ibid.. 1926-27. p. 41; Ibid.. 1928-29%
p. 47; Ibid.. 1932-33% p. 60; Ibid.. 1935-36. p. 68; and 
Ibid.. 1938-39% p. 82 for column (2)
* N. A. » Not available
of this government were instructed to utilize to the 
fullest extent the services of the Indian Stores Depart­
ment, which was sanctioned that year on a permanent
1
basis by the Secretary of State. In the year 1933 the 
Government of Bengal revised its own rules to suit the
N o -2.2.,
(1) IOR: Vol. 12049, BRP (Industries), September 1935,aP. 57.
55
Rupee Tender System, the main features of which were the 
removal of financial restrictions on local purchase and 
the allowance of a limited degree of preference in res­
pect of price to articles produced or manufactured in 
*
Bengal. Due largely to changes in the rules, the Bengal 
Government's own purchase on stores produced in India 
increased from Rs. 3i17*838 in 1914-15^ to Rs* 23,81,000 
in 1929-30.5
With the growth of the ISD, Delhi the fortunes of 
the India Stores Department, London underwent a tremen­
dous change. The first change was initiated with the 
introduction of the reformed constitution when the res­
ponsibility for controlling stores expenditure in England
tiwas devolved on the High Commissioner. Previous to this, 
no effective control had been exercised in London and 
demands were generally complied with without question, 
provided that they were received from officers duly em­
powered to indent on the Department.^ The India Stores 
Department, London usually obtained the required goods 
by public advertisement in newspapers and technical 
journals (of U. K. only) ^ or in the case of speciali­
sed stores such as surgical instruments by invitation
(1) IOR: Vol. 12049, BRP (Industries), September 1935*/vP. 57*
(2) IOR: Vol. 9882, BPP (Commerce), March 1916^.’'8. mo-2.2-,
(3) IOR: Vol. 12049, BRP (Industries), September 1935*/vP- 57.
(4) Report on the Work of the India Store Department.
London. 1924-25 (London, 1929)* P# 9.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid., p. 10.
56
from manufacturers known by experience to be capable of
A
supplying reliable stores of assured quality.
However, the most important change was brought about
by the Rupee Tender System. The India Store Department
of London now became a subordinate body to the ISD, Delhi
and on whose behalf it obtained tenders in London and
transmitted those to India for final adjudication. On
request from Delhi, it also inspected materials under
2manufacture in U. K. and in the continent. Most of these 
manufactures consisted of equipment entirely of those 
categories of munitions of war which required close co­
ordination with the Admiralty, the War Office and the Air 
Ministry.^ The decline suffered by the India Store Depart­
ment could be seen from Table 2.4. In about three years 
from 1929-30 to 1932-33 the purchases through London fell
from over £5 million to nearly £-J a million a year. This
also resulted in the reduction of the staff - 84 in the
year 1931-32 alone, consisting of 24 administrative and
clerical officers, 11 technical officers and 49 members
4of the warehouse staff.
(1) Report on the Work of the India Store Department, 
London. 1924-25, p- 2.
(2) Ibid.. 1932-33, P. 3.
(3) H H * ,  35SES. P- 3.
(4) Ibid., 193*1 -32. p. 3.
Table 2.4 Value of stores purchased through the India
Store Department, London, 1922-23 to 1938-39 (figures in £)
Year Total value of stores
1922-23 5,005,765
1923-24 3,205,360
1924-23 4,159,679
1923-26 5,178,908
1926-2? 9,235,635
1927-28 4,879,018
1928-29 5,065,711
1929-30 5,013,957
1930-31 2,683,608
1931-32 1,328,261
1932-33 497,575
1933-34 417,947
1934-33 501,017
1935-36 978,243
1936-37 799,110
1937-38 1,112,543
1938-39 814,336
Sources: Compiled from Report on the Work of the India 
Store Department. London. 1924-23: 1928-29: 1932-33:
1934-35: and 1938-39. These figures do not include 
stores obtained through Departments of His Majesty*s 
Government or small purchases by the Director of Inspec­
tion.
Financial stringency was another limitation which
restricted Bengal government*s spending in nation-building
activities of which industrial development was one. Pre-
1vious to the 'Meston Award* all revenues raised m  any
(1) The Government of India by their Resolution No. 306 -F, 
dated the 27 January 1920 in the Financial Department set 
up a Committee "to advise on the financial relations 
between the Government of India and Local Governments 
under the Reforms scheme, and more particularly on the 
question of the contributions to be paid by the Local 
Governments in aid of the central exchequer"• The 
Committee was set up under the presidentship of Lord 
Meston with two other members and a secretary. See,
IOR: MSS. Eur. F. 136, File No. 30, Serial No. 23, Meston 
Collection. The Committee's recommendations have. Since 
been known as 'Meston Award'.
province from whatever sources belonged to the Government 
of India and the local governments got what they were 
allowed by the Supreme Government. This division of 
revenue was known as 'financial settlement', which in 
some provinces were settled for a period of five years 
and in others for lesser periods. Under this system, 
some provinces actually had to pay much larger propor­
tion of their income to the central exchequer than others. 
Bengal, for example, under financial settlements had to 
pay about 20 crores out of a total income of Rs. 27-J 
crores to the Imperial Government, while Madras paid 
Rs. 11-J- crores out of Rs. 20 crores; Bombay Rs. 19-J
crores out of Rs. 30 crores while the United Provinces
o
paid about Rs. 5? crores out of Rs. 13£ crores.
As a result some provinces were economically better 
off than others. Moreover, if we take into consideration 
the factor of population in each of the provinces, the 
unjust distribution of wealth becomes more clear • In 
the year 1917-18 the average per capita expenditure of 
the major administrative areas of British India could 
be seen in Table 2.5* Column (1) of the Table shows a 
glaring defect in the distribution of wealth among differ­
ent Local Governments without sufficient justification
(1) BLCP, February 9, 1921, Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 142-43.
(2) Ibid., July 1, 1920, Vol. LII, p. 700.
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Table 2.5 Per capita expenditure of certain Indian 
provinces and of Burma, 1917-18 & 1931-32
Administrative Per capita expen- Per capita expen-
Area diture in 19*17-18 diture in 1931-32
(1) (2)
Rs. Annas Rs. Annas
Burma 3 3 N. A.
Bombay 3 0 6 12
Punjab 3 0 4 3
Madras 2 2 3 7
U. P. 1 15 2 5
Bengal 1 10 1 13
Sources: Column (1) from BLCP, February 9» 1921, Vol. I, 
No. 2, pp. 14-2-4-3? and. column (2) from IOR. L/F/9/22, 
Indian Financial Enquiry (Niemeyer), 1936, Vol. IV, Pro­
vincial Government Finances: Bengal and the United Pro­
vinces. See, "Note on Federal Finance" by B. Mukherjee,
p. 2.
to their reasons. Burma, Bombay and the Punjab were eco­
nomically much better off than Bengal or the United Pro­
vinces. Due to this low grant to the Bengal government, 
its activities were also circumscribed. In January 1920, 
the Meston Committee was appointed (in accordance with the 
authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford report) to work out a 
system of financial relations between the Centre and the 
Local Governments. The Government of Bengal accordingly 
submitted its representations to the effect that the 
standard of expenditure laid down for Bengal by the 
Government of India was far too low and that Bengal with 
its population of over 45 millions should have a much 
higher level of expenditure. The Meston Committee, far
(1) BLCP, November 21, 1921, Vol. V, pp. 3-4.
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from listening to the arguments of Bengal, recommended a
sliding scale of contributions, imposing a contribution
of 6-J per cent in the first year and rising upto 19 per
cent in the seventh year for the Bengal province as its
direct contributions in view of Bengal’s "size, intrinsic
wealth and general economic possibilities". On the other
hand certain heads of expenditure, viz., customs, income-
tax, duties on salt were kept exclusively for the benefit 
2of the Centre.
The recommendations of the Committee generated tre­
mendous heat in Bengal. The Bengal Legislative Council 
at once recorded "its deep sense of disappointment" and
was of the view that this was "likely to jeopardise the
*
successful working of the reforms m  the Presidency".
The Government of Bengal telegraphically protested against
4
progressive increases of contribution and the Committee 
fearing uproar objected to the publications of the evi-
5
dence unless a note was forwarded with it. However, with
(1) Report of the Financial Relations Committee (Delhi, 
1920), pp. 9 a 12.
(2) Ibid., p. 10.
(3) STOP. July 1, 1920, Vol. LII, p. 697-
(4) ±6fe:MSS. Eur. F. 136, File No. 32, Meston Collection. 
See, Copy of telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, 
dated 15 June, 1920.
(5) The Secretary of State telegraphically communicated 
to the Viceroy on 29 April 1920 that there were "grave 
objections" to publications of evidence unless accom­
panied by some such note:- "Owing to difficulty in obtain­
ing competent stenographers the record of evidence is 
very incomplete and the Committee trust that it will not 
be read as more than a rough indication of the topics 
touched upon in the course of examining the witnesses".
See, IOR: MSS. Eur. F. 136, File No. 32, Meston Collection.
minor modifications by the Joint Select Committee of both 
Houses of Parliament, the report was accepted by the 
Government.1
The main criticisms against this Award so far as 
Bengal was concerned were as follows. Firstly, the cen­
tral government had under its control by the division 
heads of taxation, the yields of which were constantly 
on the increase. These heads of taxation included customs, 
excise (other than alcohol and narcotics), income-tax and 
super-tax, salt and opium. In 1922 the contributions of
the Government of Bengal to the central treasury amounted
2
to Rs. 23 crores which increased to nearly Rs. 27 crores 
by the year 1928-29, the highest paid by any single pro­
vince in India (see Table 2.6). Secondly, the yield of 
revenue from the provincial heads, i.e., land revenue, 
excise of alcohol and narcotics, stamps, a share in the 
future of income-tax and registration fees were not the 
same in different provinces. The result was that some 
of the provinces had received proportionately more than 
others. As far as Bengal was concerned she had very 
little prospect of revenue expansion as her land revenue
(1) The modifications were that in future some share in 
the growth of revenue from taxation on incomes be given 
to the provinces and that the Committee also took to 
note the peculiar financial difficulties of Bengal which 
they commended to the special consideration of the Govern 
ment of India. BLCP, November 21, 1921, Vol. V, p. 4. 
Accordingly, Bengal’s contributions to the Centre was 
remitted with effect from 1922-23, but the contributions 
payable by the other provinces were also remitted in
1926-27.
(2) Capital, November 24, 1932, p. 775.
Table 2.6 Provincial revenues and central revenues collec 
ted in the provinces, 1928-29 (figures in lakhs of Rs.)
Name of the 
province
Provincial Central (collected 
in the provinces)
Madras 1,753 765
Bombay 1,522 2,484
Bengal. 1,097 2,677
U. P. 1,143 422
Punjab 1,113 101
Burma 1,055 887
Bihar & Orissa 578 94
C. P. 536 36
Assam 274 39
Source: Collections of Provincial Government Records 
transferred to London, IOR. R/3/2/69* See, Memorandum 
by the Government of Bengal on Pederal Pinance in its 
relation to Bengal, p. 3*
which was the mainstay of provincial finance under the
settlement, was strictly circumscribed by the Permanent
Settlement. Due to this the revenue earnings of Bengal
was more or less static over the years. In 1922-23
her revenue receipts amounted to 986 lakhs of rupees
and ten years later in 1932-33 it totalled only 938
a
lakhs of rupees - a fall in the revenue. Thirdly, the
1Meston Award* gave no power to the provinces to tax
industrial activities and had therefore handicapped the
industrial provinces as contrasted with the agricultural 
2ones.
(1) Collection of Provincial Government Records trans* 
ferred to London, IOR. R/3/2/71• See, Note regarding 
Bengal Pinance, p. 1.
(2) Capital, August 7* 1930, p. 270.
The tale of financial bungling did not end there. 
Even jute from which Bengal earned considerable export 
duty was singled out for the benefit of the Centre, 
while at the same time leaving out wheat, salt, cotton- 
goods, sugar and so forth entirely for the benefit of 
the producing provinces. Anderson, the then Governor 
of Bengal thought this as "utterly anomalous" and was 
of the opinion that the Centre could have no moral claim 
to any part of the jute tax except so far as there might 
be a disposable surplus after the legitimate require-
p
ments of the province had been met. It was only after 
considerable exchange of personal and official corres­
pondence that Anderson could procure for Bengal half of 
the proceeds of the jute tax in 1934.
The new financial arrangement led to drastic 
retrenchment both at the initial stages of the Reformed 
scheme and during the early 30*s. In spite of all these,
the government found itself virtually impossible to carry
4.
on its functions. Its view was loud and clear:
(1) Collections of Provincial Government Records trans­
ferred to London, IOR. R/3/2/71 • See, Letter of Sir 
John Anderson to Rt. Hon. Lord Eustrace Percy, dated 
the 27th July, 1933-
(2) Ibid., IOR. R/3/2/70. Anderson to Grigg, dated 
17th June, 1934.
(3) Ibid., IOR. R/3/2/71. See, Letter No. P. 3(7)- 
B-34, dated Simla, the 30th June 1934. From the Hon’ble 
Sir Alan Parsons, Secretary to the Government of India, 
Pinance Department to the Secretary to the Government of 
Bengal, Pinance Department.
(4) Ibid. See, "Question of making an appropriate pro­
vision in the Constitution Act regarding Deficits on 
Revenue Account", p. 4.
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"It is impossible to balance the budget by- 
retrenchment, To do so expenditure would 
have to be cut down by over 2 crores (about 
20 per cent). This is an impossible task 
if Government is to continue to function. 
Retrenchment of this nature on the reserved 
side would produce chaos and on the trans­
ferred side would mean extinction..."
In the Industries Department itself, which was made per­
manent in 1920 with ten gazetted officers, five had to 
be retrenched after preliminary training, viz., those 
of the Inspector of Technical Schools and the Industrial 
Engineer. The post of the Assistant Inspector of Weaving 
Schools had to be abolished and local bodies had to be
asked to increase their contributions towards the cost
2
of peripatetic weaving parties. Mining classes were done
away with and the grant to Kanchrapara and the Calcutta
*
Technical Schools had been reduced. The financial strin­
gency also led to the stoppage of the State Technical
Zl
Scholarships since 1931-32. In short,out of the scanty 
allocation of funds to the Industries Department (see 
Appendix I),a retrenchment of over seven lakhs of rupees 
had to be made.^
(1) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1923* p# 1.
(2) Collections of Provincial Government Records trans­
ferred to London, IOR. R/3/2/71* See, the "Statement 
showing the savings effected by Government through 
retrenchment", p. 10.
(3) Ibid.
(4) BLCP, March 26, 1936, Vol. XLVIII, No. 2, p. 312.
(3) Collections of Provincial Government Records trans­
ferred to London, IOR. R/3/2/71. See, Council Question 
by Mr. Syamaprosad Mookerjee regarding reduction in 
provincial expenditure by Government since after the 
appointment of the Bengal Retrenchment Committee. Re­
trenchments in the Industries Department were made in the 
following years, the amount showing against it:-
1921-22 Rs. 1,40,000
1922-23 Rs. 2,96,846
1024-23 Rs. 1,12,348
1930-31 Rs. 86,869
1931-32 Rs. 11,603
1932-33 Rs. 97,606
The financial condition of the province somewhat 
improved in 1936 when Sir Otto Niemyer in his report on 
the Indian Financial Enquiry, awarded Bengal 10 per cent 
of the entire income tax (including corporation tax) 
raised in India together with that of another 12-J- per 
cent of the Jute tax (which itself amounted to Rs, 4-2
A
lakhs annually). About the same time the Government of 
India also came forward with grants-in-aid to the hand- 
loom industry, which became operative from 1 November 
1934- for a period of five years, i.e., till 31 October 
1939.2
Part II
Having considered the limitations of the Government of 
Bengal, we now venture to look at its industrial policy. 
Prior to the establishment of the Industries Department 
in 1917, there was no such thing as an industrial policy 
of the Government. The development of indigenous pro­
ducts was left entirely to private enterprise in which 
the government took no particular interest. Its main 
emphasis was on the export trade to which the government
(1) IOR. L/F/9/20. See, Indian Financial Enquiry, Report 
by Sir Otto Niemeyer, pp. 14—13, & 19-20. Mc.s.5-
(2) IOR: Vol. 12049, BRP (Industries), November 1935»AP* 5
1
devoted its entire energy# However, during this period 
the Government of Bengal on its own initiative undertook 
large scale surveys of cottage industries and prepared 
several reports# The primary object of such reports 
were to ascertain the existing conditions of the indi­
genous industries with the object of enabling the govern­
ment to determine what practical measures might be adopted 
to encourage and develop the most promising amongst such 
industries# But in most part, these reports remained
only in paper and sometimes even remained confidential
2
and hence unavailable to the public. The main reasons
for not implementing the recommendations appear to have
been the unwillingness of the State to sanction any fund
for creating new industries unless these were strictly
limited to industrial instructions and avoided the
*
semblance of a commercial venture.^ The Government of 
India was only prepared to come forward in familiarizing 
the people with such improvements in the method of
(1) Although in 1905 the Government of India established 
its Industries Department, its object was not the pro­
motion of industrial development or to galvanize moribund 
industries but to do everything in its power to facilitate 
the transaction of business as between the Government
and the commercial community, and to provide all facili­
ties which it legitimately could for the more rapid, 
and cheaper, conduct of business# IOR: MSS. Eur# P. 111, 
No# 5^ 4-1 Summary of the Administration of Lord Curzon of 
Kedleston, in the Department of Commerce and Industry, 
March to November 1905* p# 4#
(2) As was E. W. Collin’s Report on the Existing Arts
and Industries in Bengal# See, J. G; Cumming, Technical
and Industrial Instruction in Bengal# 1888-1908# feart I 
of Special Report (Calcutta, 1908), p# 2.
(5) See, A. G# Clow, The State and Industry (Calcutta, 
1928), p# 4; and India Office Revenue Departmental Papers, 
L/E/7/855, No# 8417 of 1915.
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production as modern science and practice of European 
countries could suggest. Further than this the State 
would not go, and it was left to private enterprise 
to demonstrate that these improvements could be adopted 
with commercial advantage. This implied that the pro­
vincial governments could only go as far as technical 
education and industrial education was concerned and as 
far as its financial resources permitted.
However, it would be of interest to know what these 
reports were and what they recommended, not the least 
because those were the very first reports prepared by 
the government as regards the extent and value of indi­
genous industries in Bengal. The earliest report was 
prepared by E. W. Collin in 1890. The report investi­
gated the principal arts and industries of the province 
and recommended suggestions for the improvements of these.
The recommendations included the training of mechanical 
engineers in the workshops connected with State Railways, 
the institution of improved industrial schools and the 
encouragement of industrial classes, the stimulation of
native industries by the purchase of materials for public
2
works in India, etc. But Collin ruled out the question 
of any large schemes for technical education on the ground 
that the native industries were scattered and unimportant 
and that it would be much easier to depute men to Europe
(1) See, Despatch No. 51 of 1915* Government of India, 
Department of Commerce and Industry to the Right Hon’ble 
Austin Chamberlain, His Majesty’s Secretary of State for 
India, India Office Revenue Departmental papers, L/E/7/855* 
No. 8417 of 1915.
(2) E. W. Collin, Report on the Existing Arts and Indus­
tries in Bengal (Calcutta, 1890), p. 31*
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to study the improvements which had been made in the
<1
system of manufacture* By 1908 the Government of Bengal 
had adopted a system of apprenticeships in all the large 
Railway workshops, i.e., Kanchrapara, Jamalpur and Kharagpur 
but large scale training in the workshops belonging to
p
the State had not yet started. The Government had also 
started mining schools for mining students in connection 
with the coal mining.industry.
In the year 1908 two important reports were pub­
lished. The first was the Special Report prepared by J.
G. Gumming, officiating Commissioner of the Presidency 
Division and it contained two parts. Part I dealt with 
the progress of technical education in Bengal between 1888 
and 1908 while the second brought upto date the industrial 
survey of the province carried out by Collin in 1890. His 
main recommendations were widely welcomed by all sections 
of the public and included such proposals as the appoint­
ment of an expert Superintendent of Industries or Director 
of Industrial Enquiries; the improvement of technical 
instruction by larger expenditure on central institutions; 
the subsidizing by government of the associations for the 
industrial or scientific education of Indians; the pre­
paration or purchase, as far as possible, of materials for 
public works in India, and not in England; the giving of
(1) Collin, op. cit., p. 14.
(2) Cumming, Technical and Industrial Instruction in 
Bengal, p. 2.
(5) Ibid.
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greater encouragement to district exhibitions of indus­
tries and industrial arts; and more dissemination among 
the public of information on industrial matters.
The other important report was prepared by G. N. 
Gupta in 1907-08 for Eastern Bengal and Assam. This 
report for the first time suggested the creation of a 
new department of industries; the creation of a central 
Technological Institute (which was considered by Collin 
as useless); the opening of factories instead of schools 
with apprentice classes for imparting education regarding 
the process of manufacture and the idea of a direct state 
assistance by "pioneering” new industries and by ren­
dering pecuniary assistance to firms or persons who were
2willing to engage in any profitable industry.
Although very little of the recommendations of these 
reports were translated into practice, one of the steps 
that the Government of Bengal took was, however, the 
appointment of a Superintendent of Industries for Bengal 
in 1910. But due to the duality of his works not much 
was achieved.^ In 1915* on the cessation of imports from
(1) J. G. Cumming, Review of the Industrial Position and 
Prospects in Bengal in 1908 with special reference to the 
Industrial Survey of 1890* Part II of Special Report 
(Calcutta, 1908), pp. 45-47*
(2) G. N. Gupta, A Survey of the Industries and Resources 
of Eastern Bengal and Assam for 1907-08 (Shillong, 1908), 
pp. 112-17*
(3) The nost of a Superintendent of Industries and Ins­
pector of Technical and Industrial Instructions in Bengal 
was sanctioned in April 1909, and one Dr. Denning was 
appointed to the post in June 1910 but in November 1911 
he went on leave and retired in the following year. The 
next officer was W. H. Everett, who was a professor of 
Electrical and Mechanical Engineering at the Civil Engi­
neering College, Sibpur. An arrangement was made with him 
to look after the department and for which he was paid an 
allowance of Rs. 200 a month. Due to this duality of his 
work development of local industries had been practically
in abeyance. IOR: Vol. 9635, BPP (Commerce), June 1915,>*P* 21.
hostile countries (due to war) and on the recommendation 
earlier made by the District Administration Committee in 
1913-14, the Government of Bengal thought it appropriate 
to appoint a Director of Industries. Accordingly, it 
wanted the sanction of the Government of India who re­
fused it on grounds connected with financial considera- 
-1
tions. However, on being reprimanded by the Secretary 
of State for not sanctioning the post, the Governor-
p
General gave approval and accordingly a temporary
Director of Industries was appointed in October 1917 with
a temporary Department of Industries. But till the end
of 1919 the post of the Director of Industries was held
by the Controller of Munitions and the combined officer
was known as Combined Controller of Munitions and Direc­
ts
tor of Industries.
An indirect contribution of the Government of Bengal 
during this period (prior to First World War) were the 
publications of annual monographs so as to facilitate 
the private individuals interested in the industry to
(1) IOR: Vol. 10221, India Commerce and Industry Procee­
dings (Industries), 1917,A0p.7133*
(2) Ibid^^pp’. 133-34. The Secretary of State had 
written that "... everything that makes for the develop­
ment and diffusion of industry in Bengal appears to have 
urgent claims, alike for political and economic reasons, 
and I should not have regarded a definite recommendation 
as inopportune"•
(3) DOIB: Annual Administration Report. October 1917 to 
December 1919, p. 1.
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"1
benefit by its study. These monographs were written by 
qualified Indian (mostly) and British officers on the 
basis of reports submitted to them by various district 
and subdivisional authorities and by personal tours and 
research.
These monoyraphs were of special interest as these
were written to cover almost to the minute detail on the
subjects under study. Thus, for example, in the case of
iron and steel works, it studied the extent of the industry,
the methods of production, the raw materials used, condition
of labour and wages and the prospect of the industry. In
this particular case, the reporter brought to the notice
of the prospective investors the benefit of the modern
iron and steel industry in place of the primitive methods
2
practised by the village blacksmiths. However, it would 
have been much better had these monographs been written 
in vernacular rather than in English which was unintelligible 
to the vast majority of the people. Moreover, these reports 
were hardly available in the mufassal as there were no 
publicity or propaganda media.
(1) The monographs for the various years were as follows: 
Brass and Copperware (1893-94), Pottery and Glassware 
(1894-95)* Pyes and Dyeing (1895-96), Cotton Fabrics 
(1896-97)9 Woolen Fabrics (1897-98), Silk Fabrics (1898- 
99)* Ivory Carving (1899-^900), Wood Carving (1901-02), 
Tanning and Leatherwork (1902-03)* Gold and Silverware 
(1903-04), Stone Carving (1904-03)* Carpet Making (1905- 
06), Iron Work (1906-07)* Paper Making (1907-08), and 
Ware and Tinsel Industry (1908-09). The publications of 
annual monographs seem to have stopped after this period.
(2) E. R. Watson, A Monograph on Iron and Steel Work in 
the Province of Bengal (Calcutta, 1907j+ P* 53.
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As has been said the creation of the Department of 
Industries in 1917 was solely due to war conditions. ^ 
During this time restrictions v/ere placed on shioping 
space and on trade as a result of which goods needing 
immediate delivery had to be procured with Priority 
Certificates (issued first by the Secretary to the 
Government of Bengal, Financial and Commerce Departments 
till 1 April 1917 and later on by the provincial Director
A
of Industries). This shortage of goods on the one hand,
and ready money price available on the other for a wide
range of commodities, including a large variety new to
the manufacturing economy of India focussed the attention
2
of the people on the development of industries. To guide 
such development on sound lines as was possible within 
the capacity and interest of Government., in other words 
it was to mobilize information regarding the availability 
of raw materials for industrial purposes, to institute 
special programmes of research and to give the' required 
technical advice, and also to organise the training of 
personnel, both labour and executive; that the Department 
of Industries was established.
After the war, two new developments took place. The 
first was as regards the implementation of the report of 
the Indian Industrial Commission, or better known as the
(1) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, October 1917 to 
December 1919* pp# 2-3- From 1 April 1917 to 28 October, 
the duty was transferred to the Controller of Munitions.
(2) Ibid., 1935-36, p. 3.
(3) Ibid.
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Holland Commission after its President, Sir T. H. Holland.
The Commission was appointed in 1916 to ascertain "upon 
the possibilities of further industrial development in 
India" and to submit its recommendations as to 
" (a) whether new openings for the profitable employment 
of Indian capital in commerce and industry can be indi­
cated;
(b) whether and, if so, in what manner, Government can 
usefully give direct encouragement to industrial deve-
'l
lopment..."
The report of the Commission was submitted in 1918
and it made certain radical propositions "quite different
2
from the laissez faire that had come before". It pro­
posed far-reaching state intervention compared with past 
policy. Its recommendations included, among other things, 
the constitution of permanent department of industries, 
direct state aid to industries, establishment of pioneer 
and demonstration factories, the creation of an Imperial 
Industrial Service and of an Imperial Chemical Service, 
the creation of a central organization for the purchase 
of stores under the Imperial Department of Industries
(1) IIC (PP XVII of 19^9), p. 25.
(2) Clive Dewey, 'The Government of India's New Industrial 
Policy, 1905-25* a Study in Failure1, a paper presented
at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies (Postgraduate 
Seminar) on 10 July 1975. Ike work has been used subject 
to the approval of the author.
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-1
and the local Department of Industries m  each province* 
Although the recommendations went a long way, most of 
these could not be implemented owing to the intervention 
of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of However, one
of the few proposals that was implemented was the estab­
lishment of a permanent Department of Industries in Bengal 
in 1920 with an Advisory Board of Industries to advice on 
the main questions of industrial development throughout 
the province.
The second change was brought about by the adminis­
trative reforms of 1919. It introduced the division of 
subjects as "reserved" and "transferred". The "reserved" 
departments were administered by the Members of the 
Governor's Executive Council who were not responsible for 
their actions to the Legislative Council. On the other 
hand, the responsibility of working the "transferred" 
subjects were left to Indian ministers, who were to be 
responsible both to the legislature and to the Governor. 
Generally speaking, government departments which were not 
of sufficient importance and whose actions were not likely 
to Jeopardise the peace and stability of the province were 
left to the Indians. As such, the nation-building
(d) By 'pioneering' the IIC meant the establishment of 
an industry on a small commercial scale in order to as­
certain and overcome the initial difficulties, and to 
discover if the industry could be worked at a profit.
On the other hand 'demonstration factories' were those 
industries which would pass successfully through the 
pioneer stage and would prove a useful training ground. 
The object was to use those as schools for the training 
of men as operatives, foremen or manager under strictly 
commercial conditions. IIC (PP XVII of 1919)* PP* '166-67.
departments like education, agriculture, industries, etc., 
were in Indian hands.
However, it was not before November 1922 that the
-1
Department of Industries became entirely transferred.
Prior to this, the Department also looked after the 
reserved subjects of Factories, Boilers, Electrical 
Licences and Inspection, Stores Purchase, Industrial
p
and Commercial Intelligence and Labour. After 1922, it 
dealt with two subjects only - (a) the development of 
industries; and (b) technical and industrial education.^ 
Two other additions were made to this list with the 
introduction of Bengal State Aid to Industries Act and 
the inauguration of the Unemployment Relief Scheme. The 
first was to grant financial assistance to the indus­
trialists introduced in 1931 and the object of the 
second was to give relief to the unemployed youths by 
teaching vocations along cottage industries lines.
But as development of industries was a very large 
field and the Department had not the resources and man­
power to tackle these, it had to limit its action to 
the field of small and cottage industries only. In 
making their decisions they thought that the cottage and 
small-scale industries were the ones which needed most
(1) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1922, p. 1.
(2) Ibid.,~ l W - 5 2 , P* 8.
(3) Department of Indian Industries and Labour: Bulletin 
No. 57. State Action in respect of Industries, 1928-33 
(Delhi, 1936), p. 2.
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help in view of their highly disorganized state. On 
the other hand, the large-scale industries were in a 
better position to fully comprehend and organize them­
selves corporately, and to provide for their economic 
and technical needs. Moreover, it was thought that, 
next to agriculture, the economic condition of the lar­
gest number of people in Bengal depended on these indus­
tries and therefore the cottage and small industries 
had a prior claim to demand attention than others.
Hence, in the words of the officiating Director of 
Industries:
”... it was decided that, Bengal being 
primarily an agricultural province, the 
attention of the Department should, pri­
marily, be devoted to the organization 
of such industries as are dependent on 
the products of the soil or for which 
raw material are naturally available.”
Therefore, now onwards the accepted policy of the
Bengal government became the encouragement of local
industries with a view to improve the economic condition 
2
of the masses. Having decided this, the government laid 
down the possible lines of action through which the 
objectives could be realized. These were the supplying 
of correct and up-to-date information on commercial and 
industrial matters; carrying on research for the most 
economic utilization of raw materials available within 
easy distance and demonstrating the results in localities
(1) Journal of Indian Industries and Labour, Vol. I,
Part 3* August 19^1, p. 362.
(2) Bengal Legislative Assembly Debates. March 13* 1940, 
Vol. LVI, No. 4, p. 16.
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where they were likely to strike root; finding markets 
for local industries whenever possible; and making pro­
visions for technical education and training necessary 
to keep the industries well abrest of the times•
Bengal government’s most important work was in the 
field of textile industry and the tanning industry, and 
in this respect it claimed to have placed "these indus­
tries in a much stronger position than they would other-
2
wise have been". The government set up weaving demo­
nstration parties, the main task of which were to demo­
nstrate to the weavers the different methods of weaving* 
In addition to this, the government had established peri 
patetic and district weaving schools the purpose of 
which was to introduce up-to-date and economical methods 
of weaving with improved appliances for increasing the 
efficiency and earning capacity of the workers as well
as for improving the quality and standard of the fini- 
*
shed products* These improved appliances included the 
introduction of fly-shuttle looms by which the shuttle 
was ;jerked backwards and forwards by a string and lever 
instead of being passed between the threads of the warp 
by hand as was done in the case of old throw shuttle 
looms; the supply of fly-shuttle sleys for pit looms;
(1) RAB, 1925-26, p. lv. No
(2) IOR: Vol. 11988, BRP (Industries), Narch 1933»*p. 15.
(3) RAB, -1935-36, p. 166.
warping machines; the introduction of improved dobbies 
for ornamental work which enabled the weavers to weave 
simple and effective designs requiring a number of 
shifts; and even jacquard machines for weaving patterns. 
With a view to make available to the weavers yarn at 
reasonable price, the government also established co­
operative methods of yarn sale in the towns and villages. 
But the attempt to solve the problem of yarn supply and 
distribution as well as of marketing the products was 
far from successful due to financial problems of the 
Bengal government itself. Till 19^5* there were only 
555 weavers* co-operative societies having a total
membership of 5*4-67 persons, which was only 2.5 per cent
1of the total number of weavers m  Bengal.
In the field of tanning, previous to First World 
War, Bengal used to export hides and skins mainly to 
European countries and America and very little use of
2these was made to turn out finished products at home.
But during the war, restrictions were imposed on the 
export of hides and skins and on the import of leather
(1) Bengal Legislative Qouncil Debates. February 17* 194-3* 
First Session, p. 11.
(2) This is apparent from the export figures of hides and 
skins which amounted to nearly 7 crores of rupees and 
leather nearly to rupees one lakh only in 1910-11. See, 
Report on the Maritime Trade of Bengal, 1910-11, p. 15* 
Hides usually refer to undressed skins of big animals 
such as buffalo, cow, etc., and skins to those of smaller 
ones like calf, goat, deer and sheep. See, DOIB: Bulletin 
No. 5. Handbook of Tanning (Calcutta, 1922), p. 1.
>1
manufactures. As a result of which the existing few
tanneries were reorganised and many new ones appeared
2 . .to satisfy the demand for leather goods. Munitions 
Board came forward to help the industry and established 
the Calcutta Research Tannery in 1919,^ which was later 
on turned into Bengal Tanning Institute ”in view of the 
fact that the Tannery is a training institute and a 
centre of research and demonstration”. In addition to 
carrying out research work, the work of the Government 
Tannery included the supply of technical advice and the 
making out of estimates and plans for tanneries; the 
supply of ready made treatment materials such as chrome 
liquors, fat liquors, etc., to facilitate the work of 
inexperienced and unscientific tanners; and the execution 
of machine work - finishing, polishing, etc., for small 
tanners.^ The Institute also provided apprenticeship 
classes to the mufassal chamars and bhadrolog youths. 
These apprentices were sometimes paid allowances varying 
from Rs. 20 to Rs. 30.^ In 1922, out of 16 apprentices, 
two were drawing an allowance of Rs. 30 and two Rs. 20 
each per month.^ Most of these apprentices later on
(1) RAB, 1917-18, p. iii.
(2) The number of tanneries increased to 25 in 1921
against 10 in 1911, situated mainly in the eastern 
suburbs of Calcutta. However, the industry had not
yet been a success. Census of India, 1921, Vol. V,
Bengal, Part I, Report, p. 405.
(3) RAB, 1919-20, Part I, p. viii.
(4) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1926, p. 17.
(5) Ibid., 1921, p. 9. Mo-^5,
(6) TOFT VoTT”Tl155, BRP (Industries), January 1922,aP. 71.
(7) Ibid.
turned to the tanning and allied professions. In 1932-33 
out of 56 past students, 4-6 were known to be connected 
with this industry in one form or the other. The 
Institute's two peripatetic tanning demonstration parties 
besides seeking to bring home to mufassal chamars the 
modern improved methods of tanning, also tried to create 
an interest in the leather trade among the educated and 
wealthy classes(who the Department thought could invest 
capital to start tanneries on modern lines) by holding 
demonstrations of the modern processes of tanning at 
different places of the province. At these demonstra­
tions, the chamars and bhadrolog youths were encouraged 
to do the processes involved in modern tanning with their
ov/n hands under the direction and guidence of the demo-
2nstrator.
But the most fruitful result came from the actual 
research work done at the Bengal Tanning Institute as 
a result of which leather equal, for all practical pur­
poses, to the highest grade of imported leather was manu-
*
factured in Calcutta on a large scale. This improvement 
was made possible due to the introduction of western 
processes of chrome tanning and an improved process of 
vegetable tanning in place of the primitive methods
(1) DOIB: Annual Administration Report. 1932-33, P* 17*
(2) Ibid., 1926. p. 21. nI.s. i-z7
(3) IOR: Vol. 11988, BRP (Industries), March 1933,aP* 15*
-1
used by the chamars of Bengal, Generally, most of the
thick and coarse leathers such as those for sole, harness,
belting were made by vegetable process while the finer
varieties were chrome tanned. The principal varieties
produced by chrome tanning were the shoe upper leathers,
box and willow sides, box and willow calf, glace kid,
chrome sheep skins and chrome patent leathers, chrome
sole leathers, natural chrome sheep skins for lining and
2
industrial leather, viz, chrome picking bands and lacs.
The result of the introduction of improved processes 
of tanning led to the establishment of many small-scale 
and cottage tanning industries in Calcutta which together 
produced fifty lakh square feet of chrome upper leather
(1) In the case of vegetable tanning, the delimed hides 
and skins, technically called the "prepared pelt" were 
treated in infusions of tanning containing vegetable 
matters while in chrome tanning, the delimed hides and 
skins were treated in a solution of basic salt, which 
was called chrome liquor. DOIB: Bulletin No. 3.
Handbook of Tanning (Calcutta, 1922), pp. 5-7*
(2) Box and willow sides were a variety of shoe upper 
leather made from cow hides and known for their softness 
and durability and their products like sandals, boots, 
etc., were cheap. Box and willow calf were made from 
small kips and calf skins, and their skin was principally 
used in making women*s shoes for their smoothness. Glace 
kids were made from goat skins by chrome tanning while 
chrome sheep skins were used for lining. Chrome patent 
leathers were varnished leathers made from cow hides by 
removing the grain surface. Industrial leathers like 
picking bands and lacs were used in textile looms.
DOIB: Bulletin No. 86. Report on the Survey of Leather 
Industries in Bengal (Alipur, 1941), PP« 20-30.
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(crude box sides) valued at about twelve lakhs of rupees 
in 1931-32. In addition to this, large quantities of 
sole leather and varnished leather were also turned out 
by the cottage tanners of Til^ala - a suburb of Calcutta.^ J 
However, the real stimulus to the development of chrome 
leather industry came from the signing of the Ottowa
7
Trade Agreement in 1932* "In it the industry got an 
opportunity to develop to a much greater extent in three
" h.
years that what it did m  thirty years by private attempts .
To improve other cottage industries, viz, pottery, 
cutlery, soap making, bell-metal, the paint and varnished 
industry, etc., on proper scientific lines; the Government 
in December '1921 appointed an Industrial Chemist  ^and
(1) DOIB: Annual Administration Report. 1931-32, p. 20.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Although separate statistical figures are not availa 
ble for Bengal, the effect of the Ottawa Trade Agreement 
on the development of chrome leather industry in India 
could be seen from the following export figures:
Year Quantity of chrome shoe Value
upper leather exported (in pounds)
1931 30,000 square feet 2,000
1932 414,000 " ” 10,000
1933 3,631,000 " " 111,000
1934 A,041,000 " " 130,000
1933 6,317,000 " " 168,000
Similarly, the trade in box calf leather previous to 1934 
was also small. The little that was manufactured and 
exported was shown under box sides. Since 1934, however, 
trade developed to a considerable proportion and was 
shown separately as box calf. The export trade in this 
variety of chrome shoe upper leather amounted to 533,000 
square feet in 1934, and 1,000,000 square feet in 1935#
See, DOIB: Annual Administration Report. 1935-36, pp. 23-24.
(4) Ibid.. p. 23.
(5) DOIB: Annual Administration Report. 1921, p. 2.
1
next year an Industrial Engineer was also appointed.
The work of these officers were mainly to collect all 
relevent information regarding the economic and tech­
nical aspects of the existing industries other than 
tanning and textiles; the design, construction, and 
development of labour saving appliances which would 
eliminate drudgery from cottage industries; and the
assimilation of industrial and commercial intelligence
2
which would lead to the location of markets.
One of the early contributions of the Industrial 
Engineer was the development of an improved variety of 
potter* s wheel. The v/heel which was developed could be 
revolved by hand at a very high speed of revolution by 
means of a bicycle chain and free-wheel attachment in 
place of the traditional potter's v/heel consisting of a 
rough construction of wood, loaded with clay, and working 
on a hand wood pivot, being revolved by means of a stick. 
The newly developed wheel was so arranged as to give 
uniform and steady revolutions at a high speed and for 
a longer duration than was possible with the indigenous 
crude wheel. Moreover, because of its uniformity in 
revolution and the higher sustained speed, the wheel 
could be used for moulding much larger articles with 
thinner walls than was usually possible to the village
(1) IOR: Vol. 11293* BRP (Industries), February 1923, 
p. 34# But the Industrial Engineer resigned his post
on 8 July 1923 (DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1923* 
p. 1) and a new officer joined on 9 October 1923.
DOIB: Annual Administration Report. 1923* p*  ^• Mos. 1-2.*
(2) IOR: Vol. 11988, BRP (industries), March 1933*^p. 15*
(3) DOIB: Annual Administration Report. 1930-3^* P#
/I
potter. The Department also introduced a new kiln and
a new process of glazing for ornamental pottery which
p
proved beneficial to the pottery industry. Attempts 
were also made to induce the kumars to adopt the glazed 
pottery (the market price of which was higher) to in- 
crease their earning capacity.
In the field of cutlery the manufacture of Bengal 
was largely restricted to the manufacture of agricultural 
implements; the manufacture of cooking utinsils and other 
articles of domestic use; the manufacture of tools and 
other articles used in various handicrafts and the manu­
facture of weapons.^ This industry was carried out 
largely by the karmakars (blacksmiths) as a cottage 
industry and was mostly concentrated in rural areas where 
the technique of production remained primitive.^ The 
Department investigated into the field and found the 
methods "very laborious and unscientific and consequently
CL
uneconomical". It drew up demonstration programme and 
exhibited the various aspects of improving the manufac­
turing process. Likewise, demonstrations and public 
exhibitions had also been shown in regard to shellac,
7
bleaching of match wood, umbrella bending, etc.
(1) DOIB: Annual Administration Reoort, 1930-31* P* 17*
(2) RAB, 1934-35, P. 159. ‘ m.j.4-5,
(3) IOR: Vol. 11988, BEP (Industries), October 1933,aP. 7.
(4) DOIB: Bulletin No. 95« Report on the Cutlery Industry 
in Bengal (Alipur, “1941), p. 1.
(3) IbidT, p. 6. hios.io-iit
(6) ibR: Vol. 11784, BRP (Industries), October 1929,^ p. 26.
(7) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1926, pp. •
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However, the most widespread demonstrations of the 
technique of production was carried out under the Un­
employment Relief Scheme, which partially came into 
operation in 1932-33 for a period of three years. The 
main objects of this scheme were two. Firstly, to attempt 
to revive the fortunes of the most important and basic 
cottage industries of the province and secondly, to 
teach the unemployed bhadrolog youths professions along 
cottage industries lines. Accordingly, 28 demonstration 
parties were constituted with a view to teaching them 
boot and shoe making, brass and bell-metal, umbrella
making, soap making, cutlery making, jute and wool weaving 
2
and pottery. For the successful working of the scheme,
District Industrial Associations were set up consisting 
of the public-spirited people of the districts concerned.
It was the responsibility of the district associations 
to draw up programme of demonstrations, to look after the 
safety of the Government properties, to provide residen­
tial accommodation of the staff members, and also to
h.
select the candidates who would join the classes. The 
training periods of such classes were not in excess of 
six months, out of which three to four months were devoted 
to the purely practical side of the industry, viz.,
(1) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1932-33* P*o3*
(2) IOR: Vol. 12018, BRP (Industries), April 1934,/^pp.*1 
7-13.
(3) Ibid., p. 19.
(4) Ibid., pp. 19-20.
teaching the art of manufacturing processes and the 
remaining two to three months in the commercial side 
of the industry. Under this scheme, till 1935-36 over 
a thousand students received training out of which 241 
started independent factories and 166 students found
p
employment (so was it claimed by the Department).
The Government also attached considerable importance 
to industrial research. A sum of Rs. 50,000 was sanc­
tioned in 1924-25 to build an Industrial Laboratory,^ 
the work of which was completed in 1926. In this 
Industrial Research Laboratory, the Industrial Engineer 
and the Industrial Chemist carried out research work 
in connection with intricate problems relating to 
industrial development. The laboratory developed, among 
other things, a new process of heat treatment resulting 
in the increased possibility of the establishment of very
small cutlery factories manufacturing even razors of 
c;
first quality.^ The result of all such researches were 
published in learned brochures of the Department of
C'
Industries. However, it seems highly doubtful whether 
these reports were of any significance to the people
(1) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1932-33* P* 8 . ^ 1 3
(2) IOR: Vol. 12073* BRP (Industries), December 1936,aP. 22
(3) RAB, 1924-25, p. xlv.
(4) DblB: Annual Administration Report, 1926, p. 1.
(5) Ibid.,^ ^ - 3 3 . P. 8.
(6) Such bulletins were 129 in number dating from 1920 to 
1947. In addition to research publications, these also 
included other publications of the Department of Indus­
tries. See, India Office Library catalogue No. ST 281.
at large in view of the language barrier (most of which 
were written in English) which according to a member of 
the Bengal Legislative Council was "uncomprehensible
The engineering section and the chemical section
of the Industries Department also dealt with various
types of enquiries received from the public in general.
The engineering section dealt with the more general
enquiries and the general problems that arose in regard
to the further development and improvement of cottage
craft and small industries while the industrial chemical
2
department dealt with problems of a chemical nature.
In the year 1938-59, the Department received a total of 
989 enquiries and next year the number exceeded over 
1,100.^ Of the 989 enquiries in the year 1938-39, 338 
were received from the public of Bengal, 284 from the 
public of other provinces, 119 from the Government of 
India, 183 from other provincial governments, 35 from 
the various departments of the Bengal government and
4
12 from outside India. As regards the type of enquiries, 
379 related to trade and commerce, 243 regarding small 
and medium sized industries, 90 relating to cottage
(1) BLCP, March 28, 1930, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3, p. 586.
(2) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1930-31, pp. 
14-15. However, from 1938-39 a new section, the 
Industrial Intelligence Section was established which 
took over the duty of industrial enquiries. Ibid..
and unavailable to the general public".
1939Z40, p. 24. 
m  Ibid., 19?9-*0, P. 25
(4) i e .  ------- 
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industries, 33 regarding large and organised industries 
and 242 miscellaneous enquiries.
In the field of marketing, the effort of the govern­
ment was somewhat limited, and it was in this regard that 
the Government could be censured. In the 20's the 
Government tried to solve the problem of the cottagers 
through an annual grant to the Bengal Home Industries 
Association which was founded in 1917 for the promotion 
and development of home industries of the Presidency.
The association had also district committees, the function 
of which were "to circulate the objects of the Associa­
tion, to collect all information with regard to home 
industries in their areas of operations, to act as Agents
2in the matter of carrying out objects of the Association".
But the Association did not reach a high stage of orga­
nization and, in spite of repeated warnings, had not 
been able to effect any appreciable improvement in its 
working with the result that every year a considerable 
sum from its capital resources had to be utilized to meet 
the losses accruing in its working. Hence, the Government 
stopped the grant (which in 1926-27 was Rs. 10,000) from
1927-28 as it "had failed to achieve the purpose which it 
had set before it, i.e., the promoting and developing of
(1) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1939-40, p# 25-
(2) See, Extract of the Rules of the Bengal Home Indus­
tries Association, in Anglo-Indian Home Industries 
(conducted by the Anglo-Indian District Committee) 
(Calcutta, 1917)* P* 6. nIo 14-,
(3) IOR: Vol. 11630, BRP (Industries), April 1927,*pp. 
21-22.
home and cottage industries, and, above all, the vital
service of finding for them a market". Instead, the
Government decided to subsidise and give loan to the
Bengal Co-operative Industrial Society, Limited, with
the definite object of helping in the marketing of
products of cottage industries through the agency of
the Central Sale Depot established in Calcutta under 
2its auspices. But it also failed to achieve any marked 
success due to "various difficulties". In 1935-36, 
the Government granted a sum of Rs. 2^0 per month to 
the "Good Companions", started in January 1934- under the 
approval and patronage of Her Excellency the Countess of 
Willingdon to provide a central depot for the sale of 
the products of Industrial Missions and Associations 
formed for the purpose of encouraging village handi-
4
crafts of all kinds. The Department also claimed to have 
done everything practicable to secure facilities in 
marketing for those who had applied for the same. In
1933-34, the Government appointed a temporary Marketing 
Investigator in connection with the collection of economic 
information relating to demand and supply of indigenous 
products of small and cottage industries with a view to
(1) RAB, 1927-28, p. 52. The grant-in-aid to the 
Association was, however, renewed in 1935-36 again, in 
which year it received a sum of Rs. 18,000 for the pur­
pose of finding a market in Calcutta for the products 
of home or cottage industries. IOR: Vol. 12049, BRP 
(Industries), November 1935,^P? '27. ^os 1-2.,
(2) IOR: Vol. 11988, BRP (Industries), October 1933,^p. 3.
(5) Ibid.
(4) IOR: Vol. 12018, BRP (Industries), September 1934-,Mo-s-l2r
pp. 21-22.
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finding markets. In 1935 & marketing and publicity
2
officer was also appointed. The officer was expected 
to effect a liaison between cottage and small indus­
trialists on the one hand and the markets in Calcutta 
and other cities and abroad on the other. Till that 
time there was no publicity or propaganda officer to 
work for the benefit of cottage and small industries
h
in Bengal. As a result very few industrialists approa­
ched the Department for the solution of their difficul­
ties.^ Even a modest proposal to propagate ideas of 
industrial development amongst the rural population in 
Bengal through the media of cinema displays at the 
agricultural and industrial exhibitions and in schools 
and colleges could not be effected due to financial 
stringency.^
Conclusion
Having studied the limitations of the provincial govern­
ment, we looked into the industrial policy of the Govern­
ment of Bengal. Till 1923* the Government of India had 
no alternative but to follow the policy of free trade as 
was dictated from Whitehall, and under which goods were 
imported and exported virtually free of any duty. This
(1} RAB, 1933-34, p. 184.
(2; Bengal Legislative Assembly Debates, June 22, 1939* 
Vol. LIV, NO. II, p. 2.
(3) See, IOR: Vol. 11988, BRP (Industries), October 1933* 
PP. 3-4.
(4) Ibid., p. 4.
(9) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1926, pp. 9-10.
(6) Ibid.,'"1921, p. 7.
sort of a policy was detrimental to the growth of nascent 
and infant industries as these had to compete with mature 
foreign industries which had already passed through the 
stages of infancy. In fact, this superiority of one 
country over another in a branch of production was simply 
because it had begun earlier and that a country which had 
this skill and experience yet to acquire might in other 
respects be better adapted to the production than those 
which were earlier in the field.
In 1923 the Government of India adopted a policy of 
’Discriminatory Protection* and under its influence many 
industries such as textile, sugar factories, iron and 
steel renewed their expansion. But the recommendations 
of the Tariff Board (which was formed in 1924 to study 
individual cases of industries for protection) were not 
in all cases accepted or only partially accepted. Exam­
ples have been cited in the case of heavy chemical indus­
try and the glass industry. Moreover, the Tariff Board 
had to function under adverse circumstances, such as its 
temporary nature, the strict application of rules and the 
absence of any organization for periodical inquests.
In the case of stores purchase, the whole policy was 
otherwise directed and no patronage was afforded to the 
products of local origin. Till the 20*s the stores rules 
were rigid and comparisons regarding price and quality 
had to be made with foreign products before stores could 
be bought in India. As such the officers empowered to 
purchase stores of local origin found it easier to
requisition for the goods to the India Office in London 
than buy in India. It was only during the First World 
War due to restrictions placed in the movement of goods 
and because of the problems of finding shipping space 
that Indian industries received some natural protection. 
Under its influence, industries in India got the first 
big push to develop, and many new manufactures were 
established. In 1922 Indian Stores Department, Delhi 
was established but it was not till 1929 that compulsory 
purchase of stores of certain departments was ordered by 
the Government of India. A revolutionary change was 
brought about by the Rupee Tender System which came into 
operation on 1 January 1931 and which made it compulsory 
for the Government of India to buy its products through 
the ISD, Delhi. Similarly, the provincial governments 
were granted the same privilege to buy their products 
through it or frame whatever rule they deemed fit for 
the purpose. The Government of Bengal allowed a limited 
degree of preference in respect of price to the articles 
produced in Bengal. Henceforth, the fortunes of the 
ISD, Delhi rose year by year and the decline of the India 
Stores Department, London set in.
In the field of finance, the Government of Bengal 
was very roughly treated by the Government of India, both 
before and after the 'Meston Award1. The financial 
settlements before the’Meston Award’was based on calcu­
lations that the Bengal government had a low level of 
expenditure. The Meston Committee more or less upheld
the same view. The result of these unfortunate decisions 
were ruinous for Bengal. During the First World War, even 
a modest proposal for the appointment of a Director of 
Industries was first turned down by the Government of India 
on the plea that the Government had not the resources.
After the 'Meston Award' when the Bengal government was 
faced with the realities of the creation of a new Depart­
ment of Industries, the increased grant for the Dacca 
University, and other educational institutions; the 
Government of Bengal was unable to sanction any large sum. 
In the Industries Department itself, trained officers had 
to be retrenched, and its policy considerably narrowed 
down. In the words of the Government any more cuts in 
the "reserved" side would have produced chaos and on the 
"transferred" side would have meant extinction.
In the second part of this chapter, we have studied 
the activities of the Government of Bengal towards the 
revival, regeneration and development of small and cottage 
industries. Till the First World War, the activities of 
the Government were limited to the surveys of the existing 
cottage and small industries and preparing monographs.
But very few of the recommendations of the industrial 
surveys were carried out. The primary reason for this 
was that the Government of India was not prepared to 
come forward directly to develop industries, it was only 
prepared to familiarize the people with the technique of 
western production. During the First World War, the 
government became aware for the first time that India was
vulnerable to foreign powers and was almost totally 
dependent on Britain for her manufactures. It led to 
the appointment of the IIC which in its report proposed 
radical changes, quite different from that of laissez 
faire that had come before. The Government of India 
accepted most of the proposals but could not carry it 
out due to the intervention of the Montagu-Chelmsford 
reform of 1919 which transferred industries department 
to the provinces.
However, in accordance with the recommendations 
of the IIC, the Bengal government established its per­
manent Department of Industries in 1920 with an Advisory 
Board of Industries to advice the Director on important 
aspects of industrial development. But due largely to 
the lack of finance from the very beginning the Depart­
ment became a lame duck. It had to cut its projects 
down and finally decided to concentrate on the develop­
ment of cottage and small industries. In this respect 
the Government's main strategy was to demonstrate the 
improved methods of production and supplying information 
regarding it. The Government did indeed valuable work 
in connection with handloom cotton weaving and tanning. 
The Department also carried out demonstration programme 
under the Unemployment Relief Scheme started in 1933.
It trained no less than a thousand students in different 
cottage industries among whom, it was claimed, many 
started independent factories and many found jobs. But 
the Department failed to solve the basic problem of
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marketing, which to the village artisans were of prime 
importance. In this respect the occasional financial 
help to the different private organizations and asso­
ciations were of very little use as they miserably 
failed to solve the huge problem of rural marketing.
Moreover, the village artisans, as they were cut off 
from the vast market of Calcutta and other large towns 
were not aware of the changing fashions and fads of the 
day. What government needed was probably a big scheme 
of rural marketing and publicity initiated and carried 
out under its own auspices rather than bringing in 
inexperienced organizations and associations to play the 
part.
On the whole, it can be said that the policy which 
the Government envisaged for the province was quite 
satisfactory in view of the severe limitations under 
which it had to work. Till the end of the First World 
War, in the presence of fierce foreign competition, lack 
of government patronage, financial stringency, and the 
absence of a department of industries; the process of 
industrialization was very slow and halting. In the 20's 
many of these restrictions were removed but one of the 
problems remained - that of financial problem. It was 
indeed because of this that the Government of Bengal after 
the Reforms scheme could not carry out a "forward" or
(1) As late as 1935 the Industries Department of the 
Government of Bengal wrote that "... its work is limited, 
not as a matter of policy, but entirely by financial 
means which can be allocated by Government and placed 
at its disposal". DOIB: Annual Administration Renort,
1934-33, p. 1.
"bold" policy. Had the Government of Bengal been free 
to follow whatever measure it liked without restrictions 
being imposed on her, the economic history of the day 
would probably have been quite different.
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Chapter III
SUPPLY OP LABOUR TO BENGAL INDUSTRIES
Much has been written about the scarcity of labour supply
to mills, factories, mines and plantations in India
during the twentieth century. Such shortages in the
labour supply have been identified with various causes.
One of the commonest was the belief that the Indians were
determinedly immobile and therefore to get adequate supply
of labour they had to be coaxed and humoured all the time.
To this cause was also attributed the growing poverty of
2
the people with which they were threatened. But the myth 
of labour immobility does not stand up to test in view of 
the large emigration of indentured coolies from India to 
overseas colonies like Fiji, Malay States, Natal, Trinidad, 
Jamaica, Dutch and British Guiana, Mauritius, Ceylon, etc., 
where labour was attracted by higher wages and better 
standards of life.^ Nor was it valid to say as was claimed
(1) The Statesman. June 17* 1909* p. 6; Ibid., February 
2, 1921, p. 4.
(2) The Friend of India and Statesman, April 7* 1897* P* 19» 
See, Letter to the Editor by ^A".
(3) The system of indentured coolies for labour outside 
India dated from 184-2, their employment being regulated by 
an Emigration Act passed in 1883« The annual supply varied 
greatly, being dependent on the agricultural conditions 
prevailing in India, but it was officially estimated that 
some 10,000 emigrants were despatched yearly under average 
conditions. A considerable number of coolies settled in 
the countries to which they were sent after the end of their 
term of indenture, only 4,000 to 5*000 returning to India
in any average year (The Times. March 22, 1916, p. 7)« The 
main reason for such large-scale migration was economic and 
their hopes were more than realized (IPG, October 28, 1905* 
p. 525) • The Government of India, however, by their Defence 
of India (Consolidation) Rules, 1915 prohibited the emigra­
tion, except by licence, of all unskilled labour "for the 
purpose of or with the intention of labouring for hire" in 
1917. The Statesman. March 30, 1921, p. 9.
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by Messrs. Bird and Company of Calcutta that Government
of India's famine relief work competed with the supply
of unskilled labour or the claim that Indian labour
2was unresponsive to the stimulus of higher pay. The 
fact was that, as Sir Henry Cotton pointed out, there had 
been no shortages of labour in India but the supply always 
exceeded the demand, and whatever difficulty there might 
have been among capitalists in obtaining labour was due 
entirely to their own reluctance to pay higher market 
rate of wages which the increased cost of living had made
* h
inevitable. In this regard, the Times also pointed out:
"It is often said that, whereas in many 
countries the supply of labour exceeds the 
demand, in India the demand exceeds the 
supply. But this is not strictly accurate.
India has an immense mass of potential 
labour, and the supply is probably more 
elastic than in countries in a more advan­
ced stage of industrial development. An 
increase in the rewards offered to labour 
does not fail to evoke a fairly rapid res­
ponse, and the rewards offered have not 
always been the highest that the industry 
could bear."
Ip addition to wages, labour supply also to a very great 
extent depended upon the conditions of work. Such condi­
tions included a host of factors - a more kindly and sym­
pathetic management, better housing, congenial working 
hours, the healthiness of a place, the supply of good and 
sufficient filtered water, accessibility to a good bazaar, 
and freedom from interference.
(1) The Friend of India and Statesman, July 26, 1900, 
pp. 9 & 19.
(2) The Statesman, May 26, 1920, pp. 3-4.
(3) IPG, August 1, 1914, p. 174.
(4) ffihe Times (Supplement;, November 17, 1921, p. xi.
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In sections I and II of this chapter we, therefore, 
propose to study the question of labour supply in the 
three principal industries of our period; jute, tea and 
coal in relation to wages and conditions of work and will 
endeavour to find out how far those factors were conducive 
to the supply of labour and to what degrees. Section III 
shows the composition of the labour force in those indus­
tries in relation to its origin, caste, and age and sex 
composition.
I
The purpose of this section is to show that the supply of 
labour in a particular industry depended to a very great 
extent on the question of proper remuneration; and the 
one which offered most attractive terms got all the labour 
it wanted while others suffered from its deficiency.
Labour not unlike capital went to places where it was most 
profitable to go. For our purpose of analysis, we have 
selected three major industries; jute mills which employed 
one-third of the total labour force, the tea gardens of 
Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling which employed nearly another
-I
third, and the coal mines.
In our study, however, we are handicapped from the 
start by the lack of proper statistical data on the cost 
of living and wages as no useful record was maintained 
either by the local government or by the Government of 
India. The Government of India prepared an All-India 
index number of prices (almost entirely wholesale prices)
(1) The Statesman. July 3% P* 3*
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for 3°> articles from 1861 onwards and that of wholesale 
index numbers for each of the five ports (Calcutta,
Bombay, Karachi, Madras and Rangoon) since July 1914-; 
these index numbers were of little, if any, practical 
value for our purpose. This is mainly because they 
inculded articles which did not enter into the workman1s 
budget, while they excluded the expenditure on house rent. 
These index numbers, moreover, did not allow for the 
relative importance of cereals, pulses, other articles 
of food, fuel and light, clothing, and house rent in the 
expenditure of the industrial classes. Similarly, in 
the matter of wages, other than the quinquennial wage 
census collected by the Agricultural and Industries 
Department for agricultural workers as also for selected 
artisans, e.g., blacksmiths and carpenters, we have no
A
useful data. Hence, we have to rely on whatever fragmen­
tary data we have been able to obtain from occasional 
government reports and proceedings as well as newspapers 
and journals and on the qualitative evidence we have been 
able to muster to back up our assertions.
(1) That this was so could be understood from the fact 
that when John Davison, MP, asked in the House of Commons
on the 10 March, 1920 with regard to the rate of wages
of workers in the principal industries of India, the 
Secretary of State for India could not give any satisfac­
tory reply and had promised to enquire on the matter 
which ultimately led to the collection of some fragmentary 
data. I OR: Vol. 10?49, BIT (Commerce), June 1920 ~fp3/’77.
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Of the official documents, the most valuable was 
perhaps that of K. L. Datta, a senior and experienced 
officer of the Finance Department, who was appointed 
by the Government of India in 1910 to conduct an enquiry 
into the rise in prices in India. In doing so, he also 
went into evaluating the effect of the rise in prices 
on labourers, including that of industrial workers; and 
examined how far wages had increased for the various 
classes of labour and what the increases in "real" wages 
had been in comparison with the money wages. From his 
report we have some data on jute and coal. Datta, however, 
ignored Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri labour. Moreover, his 
data are available only up to 1912. In 1960, K. Mukerji 
also prepared a wage census of jute mill workers. In 
preparing the average wage rates he depended upon the 
Government of India’s publication, Prices and Wages in 
India and some other sources like that of the Report on 
the Royal Commission on Labour. The working-class cost- 
of-living index was also constructed from the wholesale 
and retail prices available from Prices and Wages in 
India and from the Calcutta Municipal Gazette. Although 
we shall be using Mukerji1s findings, we need not however 
be blind to their limitations in view of marked differ­
ences in wages existing according to the particular 
district the factories were located in, i.e., Sealdah 
group, Titaghur group, Howrah group, Kankinarrah group, 
Bradreswar group and Budge Budge group. Wages also
Mo 37,
(1) IORs Vol. 107^9, BFP (Commerce), June 1920,App. 81-100
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differed according to the fabrics produced and the type
1 . . .of accommodation provided. Such limitations arise as
Mukerji*s findings were based upon a slender basis, 
particularly for the period from 1900 to 1914- where he
relied on the wage data of one single jute mill repre-
2senting the whole jute mill industry in India.
Mukerji*s findings could be found in Table 3*1 which 
represents the average wages of jute mill workers and in 
Appendix II, Table 1 we can see the average number of 
persons employed in the industry from 1900 to 1959*
Prom Table 3*1 * we can see that the average money
wages of jute mill workers was Rs.12 in the early years 
of this century. The money wages continued to go up till 
1927, whereafter industrial disputes and depression inter­
vened to reduce the money wages of workers. However, it 
must be stressed that in spite of increases in money wages, 
it did not mean any increase in real wages until the 
depression lowered the prices of agricultural foodstuffs 
sufficiently to allow the workers a real increase in 
wages. Nevertheless, in comparison with the other two 
large-scale organized industries of Bengal - tea and coal, 
money wages in jute mills were throughout relatively 
higher. It was about three times what the tea-industry 
workers could earn in the beginning of this century and 
more than double the amount of an average colliery worker 
(as we shall see later).
(1) Capital» August 8, 1929? P* 306.
(2) A. K. 'Ba'gChi, Private Investment in India (Cambridge, 
1972), p. 123.“'
104
Table 3.1 Average monthly money wages and real wages in 
the jute-textile industry, 1900-1939
Year Wages in Rs. 
per month
(D
Working class cost 
of-living index 
number for Calcutta 
1944=100 
(2)
Index of real 
wages 
1951-100
(3)
1900 12.0 33.5 62.3
1901 12.0 34.1 61.2
1902 12.0 34.6 60.3
1903 12.0 30.7 68.0
1904 12.7 32.3 68.4
1909 12.8 34.4 64.7
1906 12.8 38.4 57.9
1907 12.8 41.8 53.2
1908 13.5 48.2 48.7
1909 13.5 43.9 53.6
1910 13.5 40.3 58.3
1911 13.7 37.6 63.3
1912 13.2 41.8 55.0
1913 14.4 45.9 54.6
1914 14.3 45.8 55.1
1915 14.6 47.8 53.0
1916 14.6 48.2 52.7
1917 14.8 45.9 56.0
1918 14.8 49.5 52.0
1919 16.4 61.2 46.9
1920 18.4 65.8 48.7
1921 19.9 64.7 53.6
1922 19.9 63.6 54.4
1923 19.6 62.2 54.8
1924 19.4 62.5 53.9
1923 19.8 57.5 59.8
1926 19.2 54.5 61.2
1927 19.3 55.8 60.2
1928 17:7 55.0 56.0
1929 16.5 54.6 52.5
1930 14.3 48.8 51.0
1931 16.2 42.1 67.0
1932 15.4 43.0 62.3
1933 14.6 41.1 61.7
1934 14.6 37.5 67.7
1935 14.6 38.8 65.4
1936 16.9 37.4 78.6
1937 18.3 38.3 83.0
1938 19.6 39.3 86.8
1939 19.6 39.0 87.5
Source: K. Mukerji, 'Trends in real wages in the Jute 
Textile Industry from 1900 to 1951f* Artha Vijnana, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, March 1960.
Although such wage differentials between industries 
narrowed down considerably since the end of the World 
War I, jute mill labour was better paid than almost any 
other industry in Bengal. The higher rates of wages 
prevailing in the jute mill industry were, not, however, 
due entirely to the philanthropic disposition of the 
employers but was due to two probable reasons. Firstly, 
jute mill industry was easily the most profitable indus­
try in India and as such it could pay higher rates of 
wages to their workers than others. Being also the 
largest organized industry in Bengal, public attention 
was always focussed on it and hence, employers had to be 
vigilant against possible charges of exploitation as 
was so often directed against it by nationalist politi­
cians from within and vested interests from Dundee and 
elsewhere. Secondly, in comparison with coal or tea, 
trade union organization (registered or otherwise) in 
the jute mill industry was stronger. It was the jute 
mill industry which launched the biggest ever industrial 
strike till then in Bengal in 1929 on account of certain 
unfavourable wage alterations by the IJMA and which 
ultimately led to the victory of the Bengal Jute Workers' 
Union under the able leadership of its President, Probha- 
bati Das Gupta.
i\L o - 16.
(1) IOR: Vol. 11866, BFP (Commerce), April 1930,/*pp. 
355-389; RAB, 1928-29, pp* xxii-xxiv.
The comparatively better pay offered by the jute mill 
industry did not fail to get a sufficient response from 
the labouring classes. From Appendix II, Table 1, we 
find that the number of workers doubled in the first 
decade of this century from over one lakh to over two 
lakh workers. With the exception of 1912, the rise con­
tinued unabated till 1925 in which year the industry 
employed 538,297 workers or more than three times that 
of the year 1900-01. The reason for the decline in 1912 
was possibly due to the agreement of the mills to work 
five days a week with some variations with the result 
that many workers left those mills working only four 
days a week unless they could obtain work in mills working 
five days. Similarly, a limited drop which took place 
in the number of workers in the years 1926 and 1927 was 
due mainly to the change-over of large number of mills 
(17 in 1926 alone) from multiple shift system to single
A
shift system. The dramatic drop in 1931 was due to the 
abolition of the multiple system of shifts ^
p
with effect from March 193^* During the period from 1926 
onwards, we also find the gradual decline in child labour 
till it was almost extinct by the year 1936. This had, 
however, nothing to do with the non-avail«.bility of chil­
dren but was due to the policy of the mills to dispence 
with them on account of its exploitation by time keepers 
and sirdars, the responsibility for which had to be 
shouldered by the managers.
(1) APE, 1926, p. 4.
(2) Ibid.. 221I, P« 10'
(3) Ibid., 1930, p. 19; and RAB, 1925-26, p. 91.
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The qualitative evidence that we have also shows 
that labour had been plentiful in the jut© mill industry. 
In 1895* the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce writing 
on the conditions of labour in mills and factories 
commented
"... though no compulsion is brought to 
bear on them, they spontaneously seek the 
employment and invariably prefer it to 
other occupations of the kind... Labourers 
from all directions flow into those places 
for employment, and this, more than anything 
else, clearly shows that they find their 
tasks both remunerative and delightful."
Writing a report on trade in jute manufacture in 1900-01,
the managing agents of the Shamnagar Jute Factory Company,
Limited, also commented that "labour has been plentiful
p
all through the period". A. Wighton, Chairman of the 
IJMA in his evidence before the Factory Labour Commission 
(1908) expressed his confidence that if two or three new 
mills were started they could be staffed without any 
trouble^ and in 1926 similar views were forthcoming from 
the then Chairman of the IJMA that the supply of labour
4.
was almost invariably more than the mills could absorb.
The complaint that jute mill labour was generally scarce 
in the hot weather months also does not seem to be 
absolutely true, as replacements could be found not only 
from Bengal but also from other parts of India.
(1) The Friend of India and Statesman, July 50, 1895* P. 19*
(2) iOR: Vol. 6087, BGP (Misc.;, November 1901™p. A9A.
(3) The Friend of India and Statesman, February 6, 1908, 
p. 9.
(A) The Statesman, February A, 1926, p. 16.
(5) B« fooley, Report on Labour in Bengal (Calcutta, 1906), 
pp. 15-16.
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Among the organized industries of Bengal, tea 
ranked only second to jute in the number of persons 
employed. The two principal districts which contained 
virtually all the tea plantations were Darjeeling and 
Jalpaiguri. Ever since tea plantations started in 
Bengal in the 1850*s, its growth had been phenomenal 
(the industry was first started in Bengal as a commer­
cial enterprise in Darjeeling in 1856). In 1870, there 
were only 56 gardens with 11,000 acres under tea culti­
vation, employing some 8,000 labourers in Darjeeling 
district and by 1905* there were 148 tea gardens with 
an acreage of over 50,000. The number of persons em- 
ployed in 1901 amounted to 64,000 coolies. The growth 
of Jalpaiguri gardens was even more spectacular. Erom 
13 gardens with an acreage of 818 in 1876, the total
number of gardens rose to 235 in 1901 with an acreage
2
of 76,403 and employing some 90,000 persons.
In the early stages of its development, however, 
the tea gardens of Bengal did not face much of a diffi­
culty in securing adequate supplies of labour. Darjeeling 
could always count on the Nepali coolies while Dooars 
recruited aborigins from the Chota-Nagpur division in 
addition to its local supplies. As years passed, this 
equilibrium was however tilted against it by severe 
competition for labour supply from private and public
(1) Bengal District Gazetteers, Darjeeling (Calcutta, 
1907), p p . 7^-75.
(2) Bengal District Gazetteers, Jalpaiguri (Allahabad, 
1911), pp. 102-03.
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bodies, including the government. As one correspondent
commented regarding Dooars in 1900:
“Good coolies, as any one who keeps his 
eyes open can see, are yearly becoming 
more and more difficult to get. Railway 
and other contractors are competing for 
the same class of labour as the tea gar­
dens employ, and their competition is 
even more seriously affecting the very 
limited sources of supply, than Assam or 
other tea districts."
Against this sort of competition, the only alter­
native was to pay sufficiently attractive wages, which 
however the tea industry was not willing to offer or as
was claimed "the scarcity of money has hitherto acted as
2
something of a set-off to the scarcity of labour". The 
actual rate of money wages was already low as could be 
seen from Table 3*2. Even this nominal amount could not
Table 3*2 Actual prevailing monthly money wages in the 
tea gardens of Bengal, c. 1900
Darjeeling Terai Duars
Rs. As. Rs. As. Rs. As.
Men 5 8 6 0 6 0
Women 4 8 4- 8 4 5
Source: IOR: Vol. 5851, BGP (Emigration), October 1900,
P. 187.
be earned by an average coolie as was reported by the 
Deputy Commissioner of Jalpaiguri, Nr. Forrest. Accor­
ding to him, the average earnings of a male coolie
(1) IPG, December 15* 1900, pp. 596-97* See, Letter to 
the Editor by "Shareholder".
(2) Ibid., February 9, 1907, p. 151*
amounted to Rs. 4—14- annas which included overtime pay­
ment of Rs. 1-0-3 pies or in other words the mean per­
centage of his extra earnings on hajiri earnings was 
26. Similarly, women coolies earned on an average 
Rs. 3-2-7, which included overtime payment of Rs. 0-8-5*
On the other hand, the average earnings of a child was 
Rs.1-3-3 and overtime of Rs. 0-2-9, or a total of 
Rs. 1-6-0. In calculating their average earnings it 
must also be remembered that they also paid the expenses 
of their journey from their own pocket. The rate of 
wages prevailing in 1900 did not undergo any major 
changes till 1914- when it was resolved in a meeting of 
the Dooars Planters' Association that "greater liberality 
in recruiting terms seems called for in view of the 
extension of free labour in other tea districts, and the 
consequent increase in competition", and it was left to
the individual garden to decide for itself what further
2inducements it could offer to its labour. But next year 
it was finally agreed by the Dooars Planters' Association 
that 4 annas, 3 annas and 1-J annas hajiri should be 
considered as a maximum which should be exceeded by no 
garden save by general agreement. The rates fixed m  
1915 appear to have remained stationary till 1919* On 
the other hand, the changes in the wage structure in
Mo S.ZI+-Z&
(1) IOR: Vol. 5851, BGP (Emigration), October 1900,Ap. 190
(2) IPG, August 15, 1914, p. 254.
(3) Ibid., November 20, 1915, P* 549*
ill
Darjeeling and Terai, if anything was nil or insignificant.
The Darjeeling rate of wages for men which was below that 
of Dooars and Terai was made at par at Rs. 6.
While money wages in the tea gardens remained almost 
stationary, the real wages of the coolies had been dropping 
fast, specially since 1906 owing to the high prices of 
foodgrains. Rice formerly obtainable at Rs.3 per maund
was now usually as high as Rs. 7» and had even touched
2
the famine rate of Rs. 10. Likewise, bhoota price which 
was about As. 12 per maund at the cheapest season rose to
>5
Rs. 2-4 during similar period. Under these conditions it 
was naturally impossible for a family earning perhaps 
Rs. 16 to Rs. 20 per month, and consisting of four working 
members, with say two non-working children, to live on 
their pay. The result was that due to the inability of 
the coolies to earn a living wage, there was a great exodus 
of labour to Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan to grow crops for 
which there was a demand in the Indian market. As was
(1) Bengal District Gazetteers, Darjeeling (Calcutta, 1907), 
p. 84.
(2) IPG,'March 7* 1908, p. 309.
>5) Ibid., September 26, 1908, p. 443.
(4) To off-set the effect of price spiral, many of the tea 
gardens like the Teesta Valley, gave their coolies small 
plots of khets to cultivate which not only gave an increase 
to their wages but attached them to the soil* But such 
concessions were severely opposed by a good number of tea 
gardens which did not have sufficient land to give and as 
a result of which they already faced additional difficulty 
in procuring labour.
rightly pointed out:
"The terms on which work is to be had are 
no longer tempting enough to bring coolies 
of the right stamp from Nepal, for the 
increase in necessary expenditure is such 
as to leave them no better off on tea gar­
dens than they would be in their own homes."
Theoretically, such a state of affairs - demand for 
labour on the one hand and scarcity of supply on the 
other - should have led to higher wage rates, until by 
the extinction of the least profitable gardens and an 
increase in the supply of labour, an equilibrium were 
established. That this did not take place was due to a 
number of reasons- the imperfect mobility of labour, 
combination of a formal or informal character among the 
managers,and finally the "superintendent" system which 
was almost universal in the Dooars.
The imperfect mobility of labour in the tea estates 
can be assigned to the facilities offered in individual 
gardens. Although a certain percentage of coolies moved 
freely enough from garden to garden, there was a very 
considerable residium, more especially in the long- 
established gardens, who did not find it necessary to 
move. In these gardens one found numbers of coolies who 
had become permanent residents. They had been living in 
the same plot of land for a number of years and had a 
house superior to those found in the coolie lines, with
(1) See, "A Note of the Crying Evils of Darjeeling Labour 
and their necessary Remedies", IPG, March 7* 1908, p. 309- 
In effect on account of the difficulties of transport the 
price of foodgrains in Nepal was exceedingly low - as low 
as 12 annas a maund for rice. It was therefore not un­
natural that the Nepalese in their own valleys should 
have preferred to stay at home. IOR: Vol. 8139* BGP 
(Emigration), October 1909^’p-' 102.
a v/ell cultivated ulot of land of their own on the garden 
property. Migration to another garden would have en­
tailed the loss of all this, and naturally it took a 
great deal of inducement for them to move. Another factor 
which militated against movement was that most of the 
garden coolies were indebted to their sirdars (who ob­
tained loans from mahajans or garden propriftors) and there 
fore could not go elsewhere till such loans were cleared. 
Moreover, it was also a common practice in most gardens 
to provide advances to their coolies on recruitment. To 
protect the industry against fraud on the part of the 
indebted labour (and to protect gardens from enticement 
of labour by their neighbours), the various tea district 
associations also drew up "Labour Rules" which ensured
A
the gardens against the movement of coolies. The monopoly
(1) A typical "Labour Rules" was that of the Darjeeling 
Planters1 Association, which was as follows:
" 1. Coolies bolt from garden called "A" to a garden 
called "B".
2. (a) A writes within three months requesting the 
coolies to be returned. B must return the coolies. If 
they refuse to go, B must see that they are not allowed 
to work on his garden.
(b) A writes within three months, but says that if 
the coolies are not willing to return, he will accept the 
money owed by them. B may then turn the coolies out or 
pay the money owed, whichever he prefers, but he must do 
one or the other.
3. A does not write until more than three months have 
elapsed. B may pay the money owed or turn out the coolies 
whichever he prefers, but he must do one or the other.
4-. If more than six months elapse before A writes, B is 
not bound to assist in any way.
3. Should any case come up which is not covered by the 
fore-going rules, or should the two parties concerned not 
be able to agree, the question is to be referred to the 
Members of the Committee elected in the Sub-District 
concerned from whose decision there is to be no appeal." 
See, IPG, May 8, 1909, p. 626.
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powers claimed by the Darjeeling Planters' Association
made matters worse. This they claimed in view of the
fact that since labourers from the plains were unwilling
to come to the hills for outdoor work of any kind, Nepal
had been the only recruiting ground possible from which
they could obtain their labour. But the Nepalese saw
it otherwise, as a result of which "the district is
seething with dissatisfaction, the coolies at not being
allowed to go to the, as promised, El Dorado and the
2
planters are losing their labourers".
When we turn to formal and informal combinations,
we find that the wages of coolies were fixed by the
Calcutta agency houses in conjunction with the members
of planting organizations. Those which did not belong
to such organizations usually had an understanding with
the neighbouring gardens as to this. Therefore, it was
virtually impossible to act alone in the matter of wages
even if one wished so. In this regard, the Deputy
Commissioner of Jalpaiguri had this to say:^
"Managers of neighbouring gardens as a 
rule tacitly or explicitly agree to give 
a certain rate for a certain quantity of 
labour, and this is usually adhered to; 
and of course those gardens which belong 
to the Duars Tea Association have to 
conform to the general rates fixed by 
this body. The greater number of gardens 
in the Duars do belong to the Association."
Mos.iS-Z9,
(1) IOR: Vol. 8139, BGP (Emigration), October 1909,Ap. 97.
(2) The Statesman. December 19, 1912, pp. 7-8. See,
Letter to the Editor by "A Darjeeling Planter". m0s sh-jza,,
(3) IOR: Vol. 3831, BGP (Emigration), October 1900,Ap. 183.
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Not only did the planters keep the wages low and uniform
throughout the tea districts by combined action, they
even did not like others (i.e., government) to recruit
from within the tea districts and thereby cause labour
discontentment as government rates were far better than 
q
theirs*
The "superintendent" system was most prevalent in 
the Duars* A company owing 10 to 20 different gardens, 
or a combination of private proprietors, appointed a 
planter of experience and ability on a large salary to 
superintend a number of gardens and put him in a position 
of authority over the individual managers* The superin­
tendent was constantly travelling and inspecting the 
gardens in his charge, he compared the nirikhs of one 
garden with another, and this comparison enabled him to 
cut down expenses to the lowest possible limit* The 
system was a great check on the effect of competition 
for labour among managers, as any attempt on the part 
of an individual manager to raise the price of labour 
in his garden was severely scrutinized by the superin­
tendent who required a full explanation of any difference 
in the nirikhs of the various gardens under his super­
intendence*
After the war, however, some changes in the wage 
structure seemed called for. Already the coolies were 
feeling the effect of the rise in prices which war brought
(1) See, Minutes of the proceedings of an extraordinary 
meeting of the Committee of the Darjeeling Planters1 
Association, IPG, June 6, 1914, p* 880.
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about in the daily necessities of life like cloth and
salt and which often led to the looting of private and
q
government bazaars by garden coolies. To off-set 
rising costs of living, new scales were introduced in 
the Duars with effect from 1 January 1920, enhancing
wages to a daily rate of four annas for men and three
2
annas for women. Likewise, in Darjeeling rates were
also improved.^ The wages went up further in the 1920's
as the Royal Commission on Labour (193*1) found the
average monthly earnings in Duars in 1929 to be Rs. 14-4-1
for men, Rs. 10-5-8 for women and Rs. 2-14-5 for children.
In Darjeeling the minimum earning of an ordinary worker
was about 7 annas 6 pies a day for men, 6 annas for women
4.
and 2 annas 9 pies for children. These later wage 
increases were probably on account of increased cost of 
living and more effective competition for labour from 
all quarters, including Assam which now recruited upon 
the same free labour sardary system under the control of 
a semi-official organization with a senior government 
official as its chairman. The increased rate of wages 
also seemed to have minimised the problem of labour 
scarcity so often complained of by the planters till
(1) IPG. February 9* 1918, p. 158.
(2) Ibid., December 20, 1919* P* 732.
(3) The Statesman. June 1, 1922, p. 15#
(4) beport of the Royal Commission on Labour in India 
(PP XI of 1930-31), P- 1013# After 1920. the hajiri 
rate of payment at least so far as Duars was concerned 
remained stationary - 4 annas for a man and 3 annas for 
women and children. The increased average earnings was 
due to the policy of the gardens to decrease the tasks 
by introducing a system of second and even a third 
hajiri. Percival Griffiths, The History of the Indian 
Tea Industry (London, 1967)* P* 3*10.
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the middle of the 1920's.^
The growth of the coal industry was no less spec­
tacular than that of tea. From 77 mines in 1891* the 
number increased to 206 in 1899 and to 458 in 1908.^ 
Such large increases in the number of mines obviously 
required large numbers of additional labour force. But 
as one of the miners pointed out "there is the greatest 
difficulty in getting a supply of labour for the collie­
ries... outside the Santals and Banris ^”sic7 we have no
*
available supply of labour..."^ Such shortage as was 
complained of by the coal mine owners was confirmed by 
the Labour Commission of 1896* which among other things, 
undertook to ascertain the extent of the labour require­
ments of the coal mining industry, and the reason why, 
the employers of labour had not succeeded in getting a 
sufficient supply of it. It attributed labour scarcity, 
however, to comparative sparseness of population in the 
mining districts and that of increased competition for
4
labour in the tea gardens of Assam. What it ignored or 
failed to point out was the question of proper remunera­
tion on which the supply of labour largely hinged.
(1) In 1924 , the'Dooars and Terai agency houses also made 
arrangements under which the task of recruiting was dele­
gated to the Tea Districts Labour Association and the 
industry placed itself voluntarily under the supervision 
of a Committee of Control in Calcutta with ample powers 
to put a stop to anything in the way of recruiting that 
was not entirely satisfactory (The Statesman, March 19*
1925, p. 12). Earlier only a few Dooars concerns used
to recruit through this Association. One of the princi­
pal deterrents that influenced certain Dooars interests 
from joining the Association was that they were not 
willing to pay higher recruiting costs involved in such 
operations. The Statesman, October 12, 1921, p. 19*
(2) The Friend of India and Statesman, August 18, 1896, 
p. 18; AMR, 1899, p. "IS and Ibid., 19'08, p. 40.
3) The Friend of India and Statesman, July 10, 189^, P- *15*
4) ITtlcLT". "August" 16,' 'TB96", pp. 18-19.
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In no other large-scale organized industry except 
tea were the wages so depressed as that of coal. Even 
after considerable wage increases in the 1890’s the 
average daily wages of the principal categories of wor­
kers in the "Bengal Southern and Western" Circle (which 
included the districts, among others, Birbhum, Burdwan, 
Bankura, Hooghly, Howrah and Midnapore) were as follows 
(see Table 3*5)* Women workers earned even less - one
Table 3#3 Average daily money wages of certain categories 
of colliery workers in the years 1900, 1904, 1908 & 1912
Category of worker 1900 1904 1908 1^12
Rs. a. P. Rs. a. P. Rs. a. P. Rs. a. P
Surface coolie 0 3 3 0 3 6 0 4 0 0 4 6
Miner (underground) 0 
Skilled surface
8 0 0 8 0 0 9 0 0 10 0
labour 0 7 0 0 7 0 0 8 0 0 8 0
Miner (above ground) 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 7 0 0 7 6
Source: K. L. Datta, Report on the Enquiry into the Rise 
of Prices in India. Vol. Ill (Calcutta, 1914), pp. 68-69.
anna and a half for surface and two annas for underground
2
work in hajiri or daily labour system. From Table 3#3* 
we find that the underground miners were the highest wage 
receivers in the coal industry but even their v/ages com­
pared unfavourably with that of weavers in the jute textile 
industry and also somewhat lower than spinners, beamers
(1) AMR, 1903, P. 5-
(2) Ibid.. 1902. p. 3.
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and winders. After the war, although there had been 
an increase of miners* wages, it was no more than was
p
justified by the rise m  the cost of living. In com­
parison with other colliery workers of India, the average 
wages of Bengal miners were lower and if a comparison 
was made with that of miners employed in gold, tin, 
lead, and salt;it was not half as much (see Table 3.4).
It was perhaps more than coincidental that the coal and 
mica mining industries were chiefly controlled by local 
firms of managing agents, whilst the gold, tin, lead 
and salt mines were financed and directed by larger
corporations with head-quarters in England; or, in the
7;
case of salt, by Government.
The low wages prevailing in the coal mining industry 
was not condusive to the evolution of a mining class.
The majority of the miners regarded mining only as a 
means of adding to their income, and which work they were 
prepared to perform if it were in accordance to their own 
time and convenience. They frequently travelled long 
distances from their villages, worked off and on for a 
certain number of hours or days until the required sum 
of money had been earned and then went away for two or 
three days. Majority of them were in effect cultivators 
or agricultural labourers who commonly occupied a plot 
of land upon which he could raise enough food to provide
( D  K. L. Datta, Report on the Enquiry into the Rise in 
Prices in India. Vol. Ill (Calcutta, 1914), pp. 28-29,
66-67.
(2) Capital, July 11, 1929, p. 88.
(3) Ibid.
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for his modest wants. The result was that the labour 
supply in mines varied according to season. Thus in 
the Asansol subdivision labour supply in the months of 
July and August was poor owing to the cultivation of 
winter rice and hence collieries were severely affected 
by a shortage of labour in those two months. There was 
again a good supply from September till the beginning of 
November, but again, there was an appreciable shortage 
in the latter part of November and in the two following 
months owing to the cutting and harvesting of the paddy 
crop. Not only did labour supply vary according to 
season but also from year to year on the state of the 
harvest. A good harvest meant a diminished supply of 
labour, and if there was a failure it meant a temporary
over-supply of labour, leading to lack of employment.
2
On this, the Government of Bengal commented:
"In the coal-mining areas... the supply of 
labour varies inversely with the quantity 
of the harvests. A good harvest means a 
bad labour supply, as there is less need 
for the villager to seek extra means of 
sustenance, and a bad harvest the opposite. 
Famines and bad harvests thus lead to 
unemployment in the sense that there is 
a surplus of labour asking for employment."
(1) Apart from cultivators, a substantial portion of its 
work force deserted mines during cultivating seasons in 
search of higher wages. On this the Commissioner of 
Burdwan observed: "In the mining area of the Asansol 
subdivision of the district of Burdwan the supply of 
labour was fairly good except during the cultivating 
season when the labourers generally migrate to other 
places in search of higher wages." IOR: Vol. 11961,
BFP (Commerce), December 1932,X'p^’69.
(2) IOE: Vol. 11866, BFP (Commerce), April 1950,„p. 21.
Nor were the colliery owners unaware of the factors 
affecting the supply of colliery labour. But the 
employers simply choose to ignore the reality and 
followed a short sighted policy of convenience not 
the least because wage increases involved a reduction 
in profits for themselves and their investors. It was 
also principally because of this reason that the colliery 
owners time and again opposed the government proposal 
to put a stop to the employment of women underground.
II
While wage differentials remained the principal arbiter 
in differential labour supply, conditions of work also 
determined the flow of labour into industries. However, 
it must be emphasised at the beginning that the three 
industries under study - jute, tea and coal were differ­
ently affected and in various degrees by those conditions 
sometimes one significant factor playing a larger part 
than all the rest put together as was in the case of tea 
industry.
Not only were the average wages better in the jute 
textile industry than tea or coal; it was also claimed 
by J. C. Kydd that the conditions of labour generally 
were also superior in this industry than in any other in
p
India. The same sentiment was also expressed by D. P.
(1) ANR, 1927, PP. 6-7; & IOR: Vol. 11632, BPP (Commerce) 
August 1927£ p'?'39.
(2) The Statesman, August 18, 1920, p. 7*
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McKenzie, Chairman, IJMA, when he proclaimed at its
annual meeting "... we pride ourselves on the fact that
in no industry in India is labour better cared for than
at our mills,.."
Although in the matter of housing the jute mill
industry was handicapped due to its urban location which
invariably raised the price of land to almost prohibitive
rates, several mills took measures from the early parts
of this century in constructing "excellent pucka built 
2
quarters". The profits which the jute mills gained dur­
ing First World War were also reflected in the construc­
tion of additional quarters of a good sanitary type for 
the housing of their coolies. In the year 1916-17» it 
was estimated that dwelling accommodation was provided 
for 100,000 workers by the larger textile factories as 
compared to 80,000 in 1915»^ A. R. Murray reported in 
1919 that the mills in four different municipalities up
the river alone had also agreed to spend Rs. 8,00,000
4on bustee improvement in the very near future and m  
1929 it was estimated that the jute mill industry acco­
mmodated approximately 50 per cent of the total mill 
operatives. "Practically all the houses are pucca; one 
or two mills only have kutcha houses, and a few have both
(1) The Statesman. February 2, 1922* P« 18.
(2) C. A, Walsh, Special Inspector of Factories to the 
Secretary, Government of Bengal, General Department. 
See. IOR. F. 5. VII. 1904.
(3) RAB, 1916-17, P. 68. ........
(4) The Statesman, February 5* 1919* PP* 17-18.
(5) ‘A'FRY 19'^; p. 9-
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pucca and kutcha. Excluding 5 mills, the rents charged 
for pucca houses range from 'rent free* to Rs# 1 per 
month, the average being approximately 12 annas per 
month." But it must, however, be remembered at the 
same time that the other half of the workers lived in 
bustees in the most unhygenic conditions. "The conser­
vancy, ventilation and general sanitary conditions are,
in most instances, extremely bad, though the rents are
p
higher than the companies' quarters".
As regards sanitation of the place, the jute mills 
did not have to face particularly unhealthy conditions 
like that of the tea districts or the collieries which 
suffered from malaria and cholera respectively in an 
intense form. Moreover, the frequent visits of the 
factory inspection staff kept the mill sanitation upto 
mark, although surrounding villages were constant sources 
of outbreaks of epidemics. Furthermore, with increasing 
prosperity the mill dispensaries were modernized by 
bringing in surgical instruments, microscopes, diathermy 
and X-ray apparatus. As a result of these factors, the 
general mortality rate of the jute mill population appears
lL
to have been low.
(1) APR, 1929, P. 9. ' M..9, ■
(2) IDEs Vol. 11938, BFP (Commerce), April 1931,*P. 43.
(3) AFR, 1927, p. 12. m .-ia,
(4) TUE: Vol. 11866, BFP (Commerce), April 1930,*p. 117.
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Working conditions as laid down by the Factories 
Acts, however, did not go far enough. The Indian Fac­
tories Act, 1891 did not limit any working hours for men 
as a result of which large numbers of operatives were 
being regularly worked for fifteen hours a day or even
A
longer. This caused physical deterioration owing to the 
severe strain thrown on the constitution of the workers 
and was probably responsible for the high rate of absen-
p
teeism and labour turnover. Similarly, children’s health
was also probably affected as no special provision was
made as to the hours of commencement of work by them,
and as such they had to leave their homes daily at 4-30
A. M. in order to commence work in the mills at 3 O'clock
*
whether in the hot or cold season. The Indian Factories 
Act, 1911 which came into force from July 1912, however, 
made it illegal to employ children before half-past five
ii
or after 7 O'clock in the evening. Likewise, provision 
was also made whereby no person could work for more than 
12 hours in any one day.^ The Indian Factories (Amendment) 
Act, 1922 (II of 1922) was a further improvement in the 
right direction. It made it illegal to employ any child 
below the age of 12 years and for a period of more than 
6 hours in any one day (whereas till then children of 
9 years or above were allowed to work as part-timers).
M  o 5 . S’ I - S Lj. j
(1) IOR: Vol. 8416, BGP (Misc.), January 1910,Ap. 64.
(2) Report of the Indian Factory Labour Commission,
Vol. I, Report and Appendices (PP 7^ of 1908), pp. 636-39# 
See, Note of dissent by Dr. T. M. Nair.
(3) 0. A. Walsh to Secretary, General Department, Govern­
ment of Bengal. IOR. F. 3* VII. 1904.
(4) See, Indian Factories Act, 1911 (XII of 1911)*
(3) Ibid.
(6) The Indian Factories (Amendment) Act, 1922, section 2.
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As regards actual working conditions inside the
factories, those were generally pleasant. In this regard
G. M. Broughton, who had studied the subject, had this to 
1say:
"The workers have, at any rate, on the 
whole a healthy environment in which to 
work. The mills, unlike those in Bombay, 
are built only one storey high. Ventila­
tion and lighting can therefore be more 
easily arranged. These are not always 
entirely satisfactory, but are a great 
improvement on what one finds in Bombay.
The jute mills are generally situated in 
large spaces of open ground. A good 
drinking water-supply is provided and the 
sanitary septic tanks that have been 
installed have been found to be satis­
factory" •
On the other hand, conditions of work in the tea 
plantations were not always pleasant. The single most 
predominent factor, apart from wages, which militated 
against the supply of labour was undoubtedly the question 
of the sanitation of the place. The tea districts of 
Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri had been regarded as particu­
larly unhealthy districts due to widespread prevalence 
of malaria. To the superficial observer the connection 
between malaria and inadequate labour supply might not 
be apparent, but planters who had studied the question, 
and the general body of medical men, were convinced that 
one of the main reasons for this inadequacy was the
intensely malarious nature of the climate in the prin-
2
cipal tea growing districts. "Among the permanent 
residents", observed the Dooars Planters* Association
(1) G. M. Broughton. Labour in Indian Industries (Bombay, 
1924), p. 132.
(2) The Priend of India and Statesman, December 10, 1908, 
P* 5.
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"attacks of malarial fever are frequent; among visitors
i
to the Duars in the malaria season there are but few
who can boast that they got scathless away... even if
a fatal termination be avoided, result in constitutional
debilitation or permanent loss of health". This, from
an economical point of view was more important than
deaths, for it was the amount and duration of sickness
rather than the mortality that tell on the prosperity 
2of a community.
In addition to malaria, there existed other fevers,
probably enteric fever, kala-azar, pneumonic and even
phthisis for which there had been no specific remedy 
t;
till then. All these diseases, together with others 
like dysentry and cholera brought a heavy death toll on 
the coolies (see Table 3*5) which acted as a deterrent 
on the minds of others "for no man comes gladly to a 
district of such evil repute; and this cause must mili­
tate against efficiency of administration and industrial
(1) Memorandum by the Dooars Planters* Association to His 
Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal and 
Assam, IPG, January 19* 1907, p. 73*
(2) Census of India, 1911, Vol. V, Bengal, Bihar and 
Orissa and Sikkim, Part I, Report (Calcutta, 1913), V* 70. 
In some of the gardens, overwhelming proportion of the 
coolies were afflicted with malaria (like that of Chalouni, 
Debpara, Gur^angjhora, Moortee, Toorsa) as could be seen 
from the statistics of malarial treatment. See, Annual 
Report on the Working of the Jalpaiguri Labour Act, 19*1 P. 
for the year ending 30th June 1913. Appendix, Table III, 
pp. vii-viii. The series is henceforth referred to as 
Jalpaiguri Labour Report.
(3) Jalpaiguri Labour Report. 1913-14* P« 3*
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Table 3*5 Annual mortality rate (per mille) in the tea 
districts of Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling, 1898 to 1904-
Year Provincial death 
rate
Jalpaiguri Darjeeling
1898 26.57 33.40 39.73
1899 31.21 34.45 40.30
1900 36.63 45.20 49.67
1901 31.04 33.05 39.15
1902 33.43 33.67 36.10
1903 33.33 33.15 39.20
1904- 32.45 34-.85 39.54
Source: IOR, V/14-/76, Twenty Years1 Statistics, V.- 
Sanitation, pp. 2, 28-29.
development. The prevalence of the feeling of alarm, 
the widespread notoriety of the Dooars, are facts too 
patent to demand confirmation”. If Dooars mortality 
rate was high, Darjeeling’s was only higher as the hill 
coolies (Paharias) were more susceptible to diseases
p
than the Madesis (Plains coolies).
To improve the health conditions of the Dooars, the 
Government of Bengal passed the Jalpaiguri Labour Act,
1912 which came into force in April 1913 and under which 
the civil surgeon of the district was made the Inspector 
of tea estates. Prom his annual reports, it appears 
that public health had gradually improved, especially 
in the years from 1920 onwards by the appointment of 
medical personnel in most gardens and by regular treatment
(1) IPG, January 19, 1907, p. 75.
(2) Jalpaiguri Labour Report, 191:4--'15, P* 3.
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of malaria and other fevers. The death rate which had 
been appreciably higher started to climb downwards.
Working conditions in the tea industry were also 
not always pleasant. In the rainy months, wet grounds caused 
ulcers of the feet and legs which resulted in more sick-
2
ness than malarial fever and an enormous loss of labour.
There was also the cruel practice fortunately not general, 
of keeping labour out all day, when it was excessively 
wet or cold. This greatly disheartened the coolies and 
the resultant sickness distressed and frightened them.
Nor were the conditions of work within the factories 
entirely satisfactory. In many cases, the atmosphere 
was impregnated with tea dust and fluff and the women 
and children employed therein worked with a cloth tied 
round their mouths and nostrils. These conditions ob­
tained more in hill factories where windows had to be 
closed on account of mist and dampness which would
(1) This could be seen from the figures of mortality 
(per mille) noted below:
Year Deaths in tea gardens
1918-1 9 4-7*86
19^9-20 31.75
1920-21 29.15
1921-22 24.93
1922-23 25.54
1923-24 29.21
1924-25 26.72
Bee, Report on the Working of the Jalpaiguri Labour Act 
for the year ending 30th June 1919 (Calcutta. 1919) and 
subsequent annual issues till 1924-25*
(2) Jalpaiguri Labour Report. 1913-14, p. 4.
(3) IPG, January 21. 1905. P. 58.
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otherwise spoil the tea. Such dust, acting as an
1
irritant, probably caused throat and lung diseases.
Other factors affecting labour supply were probably the 
bad state of housing in Jalpaiguri, which were in effect 
nothing but primitive huts without plinth; and inter­
ference in their way of life, i.e., working labour on 
bazaar day, restricting leave on festivals etc. The 
explanation for the desertion of a large numbers of coo­
lies, sometimes in batches just after despatch could 
perhaps be found in the prevailing conditions of work 
in the tea estates.
However, of the three industries under study, 
conditions of work was probably the worst in the case 
of coal mining industry in Bengal. Unlike in the West 
where mechanical appliances had been in use in the coal
mines, miners in Bengal had to do all their functions 
2
physically. This meant a tough day's job for all
(1) AFR, 1928, p. 7.
(2) Although the question of securing mechanical applian­
ces as a panacea for labour shortage had been raised as 
early as 1898 at the sixth annual general meeting of the 
Indian Mining Association, little progress was made in 
this direction till the middle of the 1920's (The Friend 
of India and Statesman, August 4, 1898, p. 20). The 
principal reason which went against its use had been the 
high cost of production and this was "not unnatural" as 
the Chief Inspector of Mines in India commented as 
"machines in use in England do the work of men earning 
eight to twelve shillings a day, while in this country 
they replace men earning only eight annas a day at the 
most", (AMR, 1909, p# 21). Mechanical and electrical 
equipments, however, began to be installed at mines in 
the 1920's with increasing labour costs and greater 
depths at which coal had to be mined. Capital, January 
9, 1930, p. 51.
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concerned - men, v/oraen and children. The physical con­
dition of work inside the mines was made worse by in­
adequate ventilation facilities as a result of which 
smoke from the kerosene oil filled the galleries to such 
an extent that it was impossible to see, and the want of 
sufficient air and the effects of other emanations were
sometimes so terrible that a light would not burn and a
q
man felt that he could not long live in such a place.
When such were the general conditions inside the mines,
it does not need much of an explanation to see why
labour shunned collieries unless driven to despair.
Failing to attract sufficient local labour, colliery
owners even tried to import miners but experiments in
this direction also proved a complete failure in view
2of the new and startling nature of the work. The hard
and suffocating environment under which coal cutters
had to work was equalled if not surpassed by the rigour
of duties performed by their wives, who usually carried
the coal to the surface in baskets. In this regard the
Chief Inspector of Nines wrote:-
"The miner and his wife commonly work 
together, the man cutting the coal, and 
the woman carrying it to the surface in 
baskets. The man will only cut 13 cwts. 
of coal for the dayfs work - a very poor 
result - but the woman will carry the coal 
to the surface up a road-way 750 feet long 
with an inclination of 1 in 10. She will 
thus walk over five miles, and for half 
the distance carry a load of 80 lbs., and 
will have raised 13 cwts. to a height of 
75 feet. This is a remarkable day's work 
for a woman".
(1) AMR, 1899, pp. 6-7.
(2) The Statesman. May 25, 1921, p. 20.
(3) AMR, 1905, p. 2.
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Nor were there any consideration for the children (many 
of whom only seven or eight years of age) who were em­
ployed by the hundred as water-balers, gate-boys, etc#, 
and generally in shifts of from 12 to 2b hours# Again, 
there were the miners1 children whom their parents took 
with them underground to help to carry the coal. The 
appalling physical hardship which these children had to
bear at this tender age is best described by a contem- 
1porary:
"As for the children, one sees these mites 
staggering and panting along with a huge 
basket of coals on their heads, with a 
flickering oil lamp to see their way with, 
or worse still, a quarter-candle-power 
safety lamp. This they have to keep up 
hour after hour, so long as there is any 
ready-cut coal at the face... He, the 
inhuman brute, squats down and rests most 
of the time, and is apparently quite in­
different to the sufferings of his 
offspring"•
These physical conditions in the mines were equalled 
by the ill-treatment and oppression which some colliery 
owners and their understrappers perpetrated on their 
workers. Such unfair treatment included assaults on 
labour by those in authority at the collieries; the 
stopping of pay; and defrauding them of a portion of
p
their earnings. Indeed, some contemporaries ascribed
(1) The Statesman. August 7* 1913* P* 7• See, Letter to 
the Editor by "A Chota Sahib".
(2) See, the presidential speech of J. H. Pattison at the 
Annual Meeting of the Indian Mining Association, in the 
Statesman, March 23, 1922, p. 21; The Friend of India and 
Statesman, November 27, 1893? P* 11; and the proceedings 
of a special general meeting of the Indian Mining Federa­
tion,^ the Statesman, December 7* 1917* P* 20.
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the inadequacy of labour supply in mines to this parti­
cular cause. "If the staff treated the men like men", 
observed one "they would have ample labour on the spot; 
but when an ignorant Englishman is permitted to stop the 
pay of a poor miner who has worked for six full days to 
earn a single rupee, simply because he is a 'sahib1, it
_  A
is obvious that abourers,^~si£7 will shun such tyrants".
There was also the lack of proper housing facilities 
in the mining concerns. The few that existed did not con­
form to the tastes and desires of the tenants, and in most
2cases, the almost necessary verandah was not provided. 
Moreover, the rooms were so small that it was virtually 
impossible for a worker and his family (consisting pro­
bably of 5 or 6 persons) to stay together.
"Small wonder then that the coolies turns 
his nose in disgust bn finding that he and
his family ... will be crowded into a small
dingy hut no bigger than a sentry box, with 
the usual leaky roof, without windows, and 
without a door unless the cavity through 
which the occupant has to crawl in monkey 
fashion may be distinguished by that title".~
The general standard of housing probably began to improve
only in the 1920's owing to the insistence of the Asansol
Mines Board of Health for the construction of quarters
according to their own standard specifications. Even then
(1) The Friend of India and Statesman, February 1 0 , 1898, 
p. 1 l7  See, Letter to the Editor by "Capital".
(2) AMR, 1906, p. 4.
( 3 ) The Friend of India and Statesman, May 31* 1906, p. 
11. See, Letter t o  the Editor by A. P. Bramley.
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a census taken three years later in 1923 showed that only
y\
14 per cent of the houses conformed to the standard plan. 
Another return covering 104 mines and employing 37,738 
labourers showed that collieries provided accommodation
p
to 59 per cent of their labour force.
On the top of all these, there was the great question 
of public health and sanitation caused by a lack of good 
supply of filtered water at the mines. Some collieries 
put down installations to filter the water down from the 
wells and tanks but their number was few and far between. 
The vast majority of the workers had no choice but to drink 
and use water as they got it from the tanks. The result 
was that in years of drought, the scarcity of water was 
reflected in outbursts of cholera which killed or drove 
away the labour from the mines. In 1906, in the case of 
one of the largest mines, 73 per cent of the workpeople 
left owing to the cholera, and the desertion in many other 
cases were most serious. The loss of output was estimated 
at no less than 200,000 tons of coal. But probably the 
worst outbreak came in the year 1908 and of which the Chief
iL
Inspector of Hines had this to say:
(1) Roval Commission on Labour in India. Vol. V, Part I, 
Evidence (London, 193'')* p. "181. no-6,
(2) IOR: Vol. 11632, BFP (Commerce), May 1927,App. 17-18.
(3) AMR, 1906, p. 16.
(4) Ibid.. 1908. p. 17.
"At the collieries alone nearly 5*000 
deaths occured, and in the adjoining 
villages, from which it is impossible 
to obtain any reliable statistics, the 
loss of life was probably much more.
Work was stopped at mines because the 
labour fled. About the middle of May 
while inspecting one mine I found only 
250 people employed; a few weeks before 
the number at work was 2,000. This state 
of things was reflected all over the 
Jharia coal-field, and the gruesome sights 
that were witnessed are not likely soon 
to be forgotten".
Along with deaths and desertion, alarming rumours 
about unhealthy conditions of the mining districts 
were quickly spread over large tracts of recruiting 
grounds, and thus increasing the difficulty of obtain­
ing labour for the mines enormously. To combat such 
deadly occurances and to improve the general healthi­
ness of the place, the Asansol Mines Board of Health 
was constituted under (Bengal) Act II of 19^2 and it 
finally came into active existence in the early part of
A
'1916. With its establishment, things seemed to have
2
improved a great deal.
Ill
Looking at the composition of the labour force, the fact 
which at once strikes the attention of an observer is the
(1) I OR: Vol. 1-1866, BFP (Commerce), April 1930r pV'l^5. 
The Mining Settlement Area covered 413 square miles of 
territory in the district of Burdwan and included the 
greater part of the Asansol subdivision.
(2) During the years 1926-27 and 1927-28, the death rate, 
for example, in the Asansol Mines Board Area were 18.48 
and 17*14 per mille respectively. Ibid., p. 127*
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relative disproportion of the outsiders to Bengalis in 
the principal organized industries of the province. 
According to the Census of 1921, in the jute mill in­
dustry, less than a quarter of the labour force were 
Bengalis. Similarly, in the tea industry, 68,912 were 
locals against a grand total of 215*611 or the percentage 
of locals was only 51#96. In the coal mining industry, 
which was the third largest organized industry of the 
province, native-born labourers numbered 22,904 out of a 
total labour force of 40,543 or 56.77 per cent (see Table 
3.6). This disproportional participation of the Bengalis 
in their own province is perplexing in view of the fact 
that Bengal itself was a heavily populated province.
Why was it that the Bengalis shunned industrial life?
Was it simply prejudice or there were deeper reasons 
peculiar to Bengal itself which motivated such an action 
on the part of the Bengali population?
The aversion of the Bengalis to manual labour is 
incomprehensible in view of their early association with 
the jute mill industry. The real reason, therefore, seems 
to lie in the relative economic prosperity of the Bengalis 
in comparison with immigrants from other parts of the 
country. Early in the century, the development of the 
jute manufacturing industry gave a considerable encoura­
gement to the cultivators which not only brought an
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increased return for themselves but also for agricultural
'I
labourers. With the possible betterment of the standard 
of living it was perhaps sufficient to enable him to live 
from harvest to harvest without adding to his earnings 
elsewhere. Therefore, to attract Bengali labour, he had
2to be paid higher wages than other parts of the country. 
The only exception in Bengal which supplied industrial 
workers to the metropolitan manufacturing area were 
Midnapore and, to a smaller extent, Bankura. "The exodus 
from Midnapore is evidence of the very heavy pressure 
of the population on the soil in that district. The 
bulk of emigration from the Bankura district arises from 
agricultural reasons", observed the Government of Bengal.^ 
In addition to the higher standard of living of the
(1) As a matter of fact, the higher wages prevalent in 
the agricultural districts of Eastern Bengal brought 
large numbers of upcountrymen into Bengal every year.
These emigrants especially went to the jute districts 
of Dacca and Mymensingh and remitted back home substan­
tial sums of money. See IOR: Vol. 7036, BGP (Emigration), 
August 1905^$?'^4. Not only were they employed in the 
jute fields but also in the paddy fields, railway cons­
truction and earth work under railway, in assorting and 
pucca baling, etc., as unskilled labourers. The precise 
reason for such employment was that foreign labour was 
cheap and amenable. IOR: Vol. 10503* BPP (Commerce),
May 1919 9, 15-17. On the relative prosperity of
the Bengalis also see, Census of India, 1911* Vol. V,
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and Sikkim, tart I, Report 
(Calcutta, 1913)9 pp. 168-69; IIC* Vol. II, Evidence 
(PP XVIII of 19^9), p. 14-2; and feeport of the Land Revenue 
Commission, Bengal, Vol. I (Alipore, 194-0), p. 112.
(.2; it was also found that females of Muhammadans, as a 
rule, and also those of the Bengali Hundus were mostly 
dependents and not wage earners. Hence, for their main­
tenance they required still higher wages which the em­
ployers were not willing to pay in view of cheaper sources 
of supply. IOR: Vol. 11938, BPP (Commerce), April 193^?M°-^ 7 
pp. 2A-25. No.?,
(3) IOR: Vol. 11866, BPP (Commerce), April 1930,a p. 23.
Bengali population; the fixity of the tenure and of rent 
stood in the way of an adjustment between the supply and 
demand for labour in the province# He could not be 
expected to sacrifice these rights and go in search of 
work to industrial centres except in the last extrimity# 
The recruitment policy followed by some mills was also 
to a certain extent responsible for the gradual decrease 
in the percentage of Bengali population in the jute mills# 
It was alleged that the Bengali was slack in his atten­
dance, had not the application and would not work in the 
heat#^ Whether such allegations were justified or not is 
difficult to prove or disprove due to lack of statistical 
data but the fact remains that some mills pursued a pre­
ferential policy towards men from the United Provinces 
and Bihar against Bengali population and which in its 
turn must have had also a discouraging effect on them 
towards industrial vocation. The poor communication 
existing in this period between Calcutta and much of the
province is also sometimes blamed for the restricted rate
4
of migration to the city by Bengali population#
(1) Census of India, 1921_, Vol. V, Bengal, Part I 
(Calcutta, 1923), p# 383*
(2) In the early mills, the workers were mostly Bengalis 
(Foley, Report on Labour, p. 14-). In 1902, Bengalis 
formed 28 per cent of the whole labour force in certain 
mills (The Statesman# March 12, 19^9, P* 20) and in 1921, 
they formed only 24.07 per cent of the jute mill labour 
in Bengal.
(3) Foley, Report on Labour, p. 15; and the Friend of 
India and Statesman, February 6, 1908, p. 9* See, evi­
dence of D. K. Wallace before the Factory Labour Commi­
ssion#
(4) Kenneth MCPherson, The Muslim Microcosm: Calcutta# 
1918 to 1955 (Wiesbaden, 1974), P- 3*
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On the other hand, the explanation for the pre­
dominance of the non-Bengali population in the indus­
trial labour force of this province must be sought mainly 
in their own economic background. The land from whence 
they came (mainly U.P, Bihar and Orissa and Chota-Nagpur 
plateau) was relatively less fertile; pressure of popu­
lation was high; and the cumulative result was large- 
scale immigration from those areas into Bengal. They 
were furthermore attracted by the growing economic 
opportunities which Bengal offered, and which were better 
known because of the communication system existing 
between those area and the metropolitan districts.
Bengal received an accession of population from Bihar 
and Orissa of 1,086,987 in 1911* 1,110,657 in 1921 and 
981,326 in 1931# Prom the United Provinces, she received 
a net accession of 379*877 in 1911* 324,461 in 1921 and 
317,449 in 1931* Prom the Central Provinces she. received 
a net total of 15*179 in 1911* 51*536 in 1921 and 38,898 
in 1931. The increasing immigration from the Punjab 
resulted in a net accession of strength to Bengal of 
20,466 in 1931 against 12,654 in 1921, although the 
figure of 1921 was less than that of 19H  when it reached 
^4,557# It must not be, however, implied that all those 
people were engaged in employment in the organized 
industries. But that a substantial number did could
(1) Census of India. 1931. Vol. V, Bengal and Sikkim, 
Part I, Report (Calcutta, 1933)* P* 92.
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be seen from Table 3*6 which shows the birth-place of 
skilled and unskilled labourers in the jute, tea and 
coal industries of Bengal. In the jute mill industry, 
for example, out of 279*854-* 32.25 per cent of the total 
labour force were Biharis, 23*23 per cent from the 
United Provinces and 11.4-3 per cent from Orissa. Among 
the skilled labour, no less than 74-. 12 per cent were from 
outside Bengal, Bihar and the United Provinces contri­
buting 38.8 per cent and 24.35 per cent respectively.
In the tea industry, Chota-Nagpur plateau contributed 
4-6.36 per cent of the grand total and "other parts of India" 
(almost all from Nepal and employed mainly in the 
Darjeeling district) contributed 18.95 per cent. Chota- 
Nagpur plateau also supplied a third (31*64- per cent) 
of all the colliery workers of Bengal, almost all as 
unskilled labourers.
Prom the above figures, we find that labourers from 
Bihar and Orissa and the United Provinces were to be 
found mainly in the jute mills of Bengal. On the other 
hand, labour from the Chota-Nagpur plateau flowed towards 
the coal mines of Burdwan and the tea districts of 
Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri. The employment policy of 
industries in general coupled with the socio-economic 
background of the recruits was mainly responsible for 
such a spatial distribution. Mr. Foley in his Report 
on Labour in 1906 mentioned that jute mills would not 
employ certain classes of labourers and that they had a 
preference for "Hindustanis from the United Provinces
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and Bihar, These men have been found more regular, 
stronger, steadier and more satisfactory generally, 
so that at present in most of the mills two-thirds of 
the hands are composed of up-countrymen. In many mills 
it is the custom that the hessian weavers should be
A
up-country Muhammadans”. In some jute mills it was 
also found that a large body of labourers came from a 
very closely circumscribed area, often a few adjoining 
villages only, in some up-country district. The recruit­
ment policy of jute mills was again responsible for 
such agglomeration. A sirdar, whose home was in one
!
of those districts would bring with him a gang of rec- \/ 
ruits from among the poorer of his co-villagers. He 
maintained some sort of a control over them while they
were employed and generally looked after them till he
2retained or send them away. Tea gardens of Darjeeling,
on the other hand, had no choice but to recruit whatever
labour they could procure on account of their low wages.
Darjeeling Planters* Association had, however, another 
*
explanation
"Experience has proved that labourers from 
the plains are unwilling to come to the hills 
for outdoor work of any kind involving 
manual labour. Under these circumstances,
Nepal has been the only recruiting ground 
possible from which to obtain labourers for 
the tea estates".
(1} B. Poley, Report on Labour, p. 14.
(2) Census of India, Vol. V, Bengal, Part I,
Report (Calcutta, 192^3, p. 143.
(3) IOR: Vol. 8139* BGP (Emigration), October 1909,aP. 97.
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It was precisely because of low wages that Jalpaiguri 
tea gardens had also no alternative but to import 
various aborigins from the Chota-Nagpur plateau who 
had a lower standard of living than other plains peo­
ple and who by nature also preferred outdoor agricul­
tural life# On the other hand, in spite of their 
choice for North West Provinces and Oudh labour, the 
coal mines had to employ aboriginal people from Chota-
Nagpur as the imported labour from those places "did
1
not take kindly to the work".
Of the castes or races engaged in the organized
industries, Muhammadans formed a substantial number
in the tjute mill industry. In 1911, the four groups -
Sheikhs, Saiyads, Pathans, and Jolahs together formed
2
32*78 per cent of the labour force# The proportion 
of Muhammadans, however, seems to have fallen in 1921 
when they numbered 80,096 out of 279*854 or 28.62 per 
cent. Among the skilled workmen, they were more nume­
rous, forming 37*8 per cent in 1921 and were mainly 
engaged in the weaving and spinning departments (see 
Table 3.7). Among the numerous Hindu castes, the most 
important ones in 1911 were the Chamars and Chasi- 
Kaibarttas who were principally engaged as unskilled
(1) IPG, March 3* 1900, p. 189.
(2) The respective numbers in each group were as follows: 
Sheikhs 41,029; Saiyads 1,824; Pathans 3*^18; and Jolahas 
19,7a5* Together they numbered 65*7^6 out of a total 
labour force of 200,446 in 191^. See, Census of India, 
1911# Vol. V, Bengal, Part II, Tables (Calcutta, §^13), 
PP. 343, 383.
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labourers. Brahmans formed the third largest group, 
numbering nearly 9,000 in 1911 tut their number had 
fallen by 1921 to nearly 7,000 and were numerically 
superseded by such castes as the Jali Kaibarttas, Teli, 
Goala, Tanti and Bagdi.
Oraons, Santals and Nundas were the three prin­
cipal ,iats of coolies to be found in the tea gardens 
of Jalpaiguri. Together they numbered 84,142 out of 
a total Jalpaiguri labour force of 134,041 or 62.77
p
per cent in 1911. On the other hand, the three prin­
cipal Nepalese castes in Darjeeling in that year were 
the Jimdars (or Khambus), Murmis and Mangars, who 
accounted for over 20,000 or nearly two-fifths of the 
workers. The principal caste and race composition of 
the year 1921 for the tea gardens of Bengal could be 
seen in Table 3«7* It still shows the pre-dominance of 
the Oraons who constituted over a quarter of all the 
tea garden labour of the province. Nundas were a remote 
second with 9#3 per cent and Santals 4.4 per cent. 
Although the Table does not give the percentage figures 
of the principal Nepalese castes, we know (from else­
where in the Census Report) that Jimdars and Nurmis 
numbered nearly 15,000 and 10,000 respectively in 1921
ZL
in the Darjeeling district and Nangars just over 5,000.
(1) Ibid., p. 383, and Table 3*7 of this thesis.
(2) Census of India, 1911, Vol. V, Bengal, Bihar and
Orissa and Sikkim, Part 1, Report, p. 538; and Ibid.,
Vol. II, p. 342. ----
(3) Census of India, 1911 % Vol. V, Bengal, Bihar and
Orissa and Sikkim, Part I, Report, p. 538.
(4) Ibid.. 1021. Vol. V, Bengal, Part II, Tables, p. 438.
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In the coal mining industry at Ranigunge, the
earliest miners were the Bauris, a native low caste
of mixed Hindu origin. They had "been cutting coal
for several generations "so much so that they are
beginning to look upon it as their traditional occu-
pation". Although possessed of great skill and mental
ability, they were as a rule very thriftless, lazy and
fond of drinking and were gradually replaced by hardier
types of miners, the most attractive of the latter
2
were the aboriginal Santals. They displayed many of 
the same defects as the Bauris, but were found to be 
steadier as a result of which they were "preferred to
-z
any other kind of labour by the majority of Managers".
The preponderance of these two castes could be seen 
from Table 3*7* Among the unskilled labourers, these 
two castes formed 59*59 per cent, while among the skilled 
workmen they constituted 38.11 per cent in 1921. Among 
other Hindu castes, mention may be made of the Chamars 
and Muchis, and Goala. In addition, there was also a 
small leavening of Muhammadans, locally known as Meahs 
or Julahas. The proportion of the latter was so small 
that no communal disturbances had been experienced in
4
the coalfields.
(1) Ibid., Part I, Report, p. 351*
(2) Poley, Report on Labour, p. 30.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Capital, July 11, 1929, p. 88.
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As regards the age and sex composition of the 
workers, we have much less information; and those sta­
tistics that have survived suffer from ambiguity on 
account of its uneven classification. Thus in the 
jute mills, there were till 1910-11 four categories of 
workers - adult males, females, young persons and chil­
dren. The mode of classification was changed to adult 
males, females and children from 1912 onwards till 
1934- and again from 1935 a fourth category of workers 
called "adolescents" was introduced. That such changes 
in the classification procedure bring unnecessary and 
unexplainable shifts in the data could be seen from 
Table 3.8. From this Table, however, the general trend 
that emerges is clear. The percentage of adult male 
workers was overwhelming. It had increased from about 
67 per cent in 1904-05 to over 86 per cent by 1939*
This increase in the adult male population of
the labour force was undoubtedly at the expense of the 
children whose share fell very sharply from about 17 
per cent in 1904-05 to around 1 per cent or below by 
the year 1931* The decrease in the amount of child 
labour could partly be attributed to stringent measures 
adopted by the Government of Bengal. A partial
(1) For example, till 1908 the Special Inspector of 
Factories, Bengal was the only person who was solely 
entrusted with the task of factory inspection not only 
of Bengal but also of the United Provinces. In between 
1908 and 1912, two more factory inspectors and a certi­
fying surgeon was added to the factory inspection staff. 
IOR: Vol. 9139, BGP (Misc.), July 1913?*
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Table 3.8 Average daily employment of men, women and 
children in the jute mill industry, 1904-5 to 1939^
Year Men
0 0
Women
0 0
Children
00
1904-05 66.95 16.52 16.52
1905-06 67.61 16.19 16.20
1906-07 67.69 16.56 15.75
1907-08 67.88 16.14 15.98
1908-09 67.94 16.13 15.94
1909-10 66.75 16.03 17.22
1910-11 65.41 15.74 18.85
1912 72.79 15.69 11.52
1913 73.14 15.72 11.14
1914 72.78 15.96 11.26
1915 72.95 16.35 10.70
1916 73.25 16.16 10.59
1917 73.71 15.84 10.45
1918 73.80 15.97 10.23
1919 73.70 15.81 10.50
1920 73.93 15.89 10.17
1921 73.77 15.86 10.57
1922 75.56 15.53 8.91
1923 75.23 15.97 8.80
1924 75.32 16.37 8.31
1925 75.77 16.40 7.83
1926 77.53 16.13 6.35
1927 77.85 16.24 5.91
1928 78.44 16.17 5.39
1929 78.82 16.10 5.09
1930 80.57 15.88 3.55
193*1 82.96 15.75 1.29
1932 83.56 15.84 0.60
1933 84.41 15.13 0.46
1934 84.97 14.67 0.36
1933 84.83 14.24 0.92
1936 85.15 14.00 0.84
1937 85.76 13.05 1.18
1938 86.47 13.09 0.44
1939 86.04 13.35 0.61
(1) See, Appendix II, Table 1 for absolute figures and 
sources.
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explanation lay in the raising of the age of children 
from 9 years to 12 years with effect from July, 1922.
The proportion of women also seems to have fallen, but 
only to a limited extent from around 16 per cent to 13 
per cent. In this industry, children were mainly em­
ployed for the shifting work on spinning frames on 
account of their height. On the other hand, women were
to be found mainly in the preparing, sewing, batching
2and winding departments as unskilled workers.
The age and sex composition of the tea garden labour 
are difficult to come by. From the fragmentary reports 
that we have on the subject, it appears that the male- 
female proportion on the whole was mo^e evenly balanced 
than in the jute industry. According to the 1901 Census, 
out of 154*120 labourers and subordinates engaged in the 
Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling districts, 72,209 or 48.15 
per cent were females, although the proportion of females
(1) AFR, 1930, p. 19.
(2) M. I. Balfour, who conducted a survey on women wor­
kers in jute mills in 1931-32 found the proportion of 
female employees in the various departments as follows: 
Preparing Department roughly 53 per cent
Sewing " " 18 " 1
Batching M " 1 2  " "
Winding " ” 8 "
Spinning " " 4 " "
Sweeping " " 3 " " isfo-6,
See, IOR: Vol. 11961, BFP (Commerce), June 1932,^p. 98. 
At the beginning of this century, according to another 
report,women were only employed in the preparing, sew­
ing and winding departments. See, IOR: Vol. 7861, BGP 
( Misc . ) , November 1908|A,^?'4510•
f
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was slightly higher (50*43 per cent) in the latter.
The proportion of female labourers continued to be more
in the Darjeeling district according to the next two
Census reports but in 1931 they formed only 38.57 per 
2cent. The increased supply of male labourers m  the 
district was probably a reflection of the higher un­
employment problem of the period coupled with improved 
pay and conditions of labour. In the Jalpaiguri dis­
trict there were 100,532 males and 86,4-21 females in 
1931* The proportion of children under 14- in those 
two districts were 23.03 in 1911 and 34.83 in 1921.
The work of women and children was mainly plucking as 
they were quicker with their hands than men, but men
were employed when there was a rush of leaf and it was
*
important to get it off the bushes quickly.
Unlike in the West, in view of the labour scarcity, 
the employment of women and children in the mines was 
considered a necessity. The arguments against the pro­
hibition of women and children from the mines is clear 
from Mr. Grundy1s (who was then the Chief Inspector of
(1) Census of India. 1901, Vol. VIA, the Lower Provinces 
of Bengal and their Peudatories, Part II, the Imperial 
Tables (Calcutta, 1902), pp. 344—4-5.
(2) For absolute figures, see, Census of India, 1911 ■>
Vol. V, Bengal, Part II, Tables (Calcutta, 1913) * P* 34-2; 
Ibid., 1921, Vol. V, Bengal, Part.II, Tables (Calcutta, 
1923)9 p. 438; and Ibid.4 193^< Vol. V, Bengal and Sikkim, 
Part II (Calcutta, 1933)9 pp. 84-85.
(3) Bengal District Gazetteers, Jalpaiguri (Allahabad, 
1911), p. 106.
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Mines) remarks:
"Labourers are already scare, prohibition 
would lessen the number, and it is probable 
that the prohibition of females would, at 
least temporarily, lessen the number of 
male workers as well as females. The employ­
ment in mines of wives and dependents is 
a great inducement for males taking to this 
kind of work".
The arguments advanced by Mr. Grundy were propagated no 
less enthusiastically by the employers and the press.
In 18.99* when the Government of India introduced its 
Mining Bill, the clauses restricting the employment of 
women and children came under fire and those had to be
p
withdrawn. As late as 1925 the Indian Mining Federation
opposed the prohibition of employment of women in mines
on the ground that under a family system, her labour
was only complementary and not additional to the labour
of the man and hence its withdrawl from the mines would
*
mean "an entire breakdown of the industry".
Hence, in the Bengal coal mining industry, females 
and children constituted a significant proportion of the 
labour force. In 1911, women constituted 28.09 per cent 
of the entire colliery labour of Bengal, and their pro­
portion among unskilled labour (above 14 years of age) 
was 51.50 Per cent.^ The number of children below 14
(1) The Friend of India and Statesman. December 26, 1894* 
P. 19.
(2) Ibid., September 7, 1899, P. 4; and I OR: Vol. 11422, 
BFP (Commerce) , January 1924,1 p]3. 13-14.
(3) The Statesman, July 30, 1925* P« 15*
(4) Census of India, 1911, Vol. V, Bengal, Part II,
Tables (.Oalcutta, 1913)* P* 342.
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years of age was 3*288 or 8.72 per cent. Due probably 
to outside pressure, the Government of India by its 
Indian Hines Act, 1923 (Act IV of 1923) banned the 
employment of children below the age of 13 with effect
p
from 1 July, 1924. Amidst severe opposition, the Govern­
ment of India also finally decided that after 1 July 1929* 
the percentage of women working underground would annually 
be reduced by 3 per cent till it was completely eradicated 
by July 1939# Under the circumstances, the proportion of ‘ 
females to males fell progressively, but was by no means 
eliminated as women continued to work in the surface 
and in the areas not situated beneath the superjacent 
grounds.^
(1) Ibid.
(2) One of the recommendations of the International 
Labour Conference held in Washington in 1919 and of 
which India was a participent was that the age of chil­
dren should be raised. RAB; 1919-20, p. xi; and the 
Statesman, November 5. 1919* P. 4.
(3) AM&, 1929* p. 7.
(4) That it fell considerably could be seen from the' 
figures below which were compiled by the Chief Inspector 
of Hines in India on a selected day in February of each 
year:
Year Grand total in No. of males No. of
the register females
1934- 38*942 48,313 (81.97#) 10,629 (18.03#)
1933 66,066 53*304 (83.71#) 10,762 (16.29#)
1936 72,028 61,371 (85.20#) 10,657 (14.80#)
1937 57,182 49,310 (86.23#) 7,872 (13.77#)
1938 76,199 69,111 (90.70#) 7*088 ( 9.30#)
1939 77*079 69*647 (90.36#) 7*432 ( 9.64#)
Figures from the AHR,1933* pp. 96-97 and subsequent annual 
issues till 1938.
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Summary and Conclusion
From the above discussion, it is abundantly clear that 
the supply of labour in Bengal depended essentially on 
the question of proper remuneration. Jute mills where 
average wages were better than either coal or tea had 
little difficulties in attracting sufficient labour.
On the other hand, there were perennial shortage in 
the coal and tea industries. To earn their living, 
colliery workers had combined their work with that of 
agriculture, and, therefore, labour supply in mines 
was irregular and seasonal. On the other hand, tea 
gardens which offered the lowest wages had to resort to 
all kinds of measures akin to serfdom (i.e., Labour 
Rules, Monopoly powers of employment in Darjeeling, 
etc) and in spite of all these, could not command the 
full complement of coolies. While wage differentials 
remained the principal arbiter in differential labour 
supply, conditions of work also affected the supply of 
labour into industries. In this regard also, conditions 
on the whole were better in the jute manufacturing 
industry than either tea or coal. Although in the 
matter of housing, the jute manufacturing industry 
failed to provide residential accommodation to all its 
employees, the quarters built were superior to those 
built either by the tea or coal industry. In the matter 
of sanitation, while collieries suffered from periodic 
outbursts of cholera and tea districts from that of 
malarial climate; jute manufacturing industry did not 
suffer from any particular disadvantages of this nature.
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Actual working conditions were also superior in this 
industry than the appalling conditions of dust and 
filth existing inside the collieries or the exposure 
that the coolies in plantations had to undergo in the 
rainy seasons resulting in ulcers of the feet and legs. 
Cruel practices, including that of physical assualts 
in some of the collieries on their labour force, must 
also had its adverse influence on the supply of labour.
It was only from about the middle of the 1920fs when 
wages and other conditions of work had substantially 
improved in the tea and coal industries that the problem 
of inadequate labour supply seems to have been overcome*
A striking feature in the composition of the indus­
trial workers of Bengal had been its non-Bengali pre­
dominance. This was principally due to better economic 
conditions of the people of this province than those 
from which labour generally migrated into Bengal indus­
tries, i.e., United Provinces, Bihar and Orissa, Nepal 
and Central Provinces. The flow of labour from those 
regions into various industrial centres, however, depen­
ded on the employment policy of industries and the socio­
economic background of the recruits. Of the principal 
castes or races, Muhammadans could only be found in large 
numbers in the gute mills while most other workers in 
the same industry were from the lower Hindu castes like 
Chamars, Muchis, Chasi-Kaibarttas, Teli, Bagdi, Goala, 
Jali-Kaibarttas. In the tea industry, aboriginal tribal 
people constituted the largest segment, the most important
of which were the Oraons, Mundas and Santals. Nepalese 
castes like Jimdars, Murmis and Mangars were in a majo­
rity in the Darjeeling tea estates. In the collieries, 
Bauris and Santals predominated. As regards age and 
sex composition of the workers in the jute mills the 
overwhelming proportion of the labour force remained 
adult males from the beginning, and their proportion 
increased gradually till it reached 86 per cent of the 
labour force in 1939# This gradual increase was due to 
the abolition of child labour from most of the mills.
The sex distribution in the tea industry was, however, 
much more even especially in the Darjeeling gardens.
In the collieries, on the other hand, the proportion of 
adult females which was substantial was brought down to 
around 10 per cent of the labour force by 1939 by legis­
lative interference on the ground that underground employ' 
ment of women involved risk.
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Chapter IV
PROBLEMS OP PROFITABILITY AND CAPITAL SUPPLY
Ever since the question of industrial development came 
to the forefront of public attention, it had been a 
constant complaint of the Bengali industrialists that 
sufficient capital was not forthcoming for this pur­
pose. The various committees and commissions set up 
to investigate the question of industrial development 
also came out with the same view. Thus Swan in his 
Report on the industrial development of Bengal pointed 
to "insufficient capital" as one of the two major 
bottle-necks for the failure of industries in Bengal.
The Indian Industrial Commission also pointed out that 
money for investment in industries "whether on loan 
or by way of subscription to capital, is not readily
p
forthcoming". However, it was quick to point out that 
this was not due to the insufficiency or inaccessibility 
of money but due to "the opinion which its possessors 
hold of the industrial propositions put before them".^ 
The opinion expressed by the investors, it need not be
(1) J. A. L. Swan, Report on the Industrial Development 
of Bengal. Part I. The other deficiency was inefficient 
management.
(2) Report of the IIC (PP XVII of 1919), P. 214.
(3) Ibid:
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elaborated, was that industrial investments in general 
were risky and less attractive than other alternative 
avenues open to them. This proposition at once raises 
the question of profitability and security of industrial 
investments, which we propose to study in Part I of this 
chapter.
Pinancial institutions and capital markets play an 
important role in making available the supply of capital 
to industries. In Part II, therefore, we shall be 
analysing the role of the principal financial institutions 
that existed in Bengal and see how far those were ade­
quately developed to meet the needs of industry. These 
agencies were the banks, the state and the managing agency 
system. In Part III, we shall discuss in detail how the 
various industries raised their fixed capital expenditure 
and working capital.
I
Profitability and Security 
Private investment essentially depends upon two factors - 
(a) the rate of return and (b) security. In this section, 
an attempt has therefore been made to find out the rates 
of return in various industries and the security it offered 
to the investors.
(a) The rate of return
Most of the data on the rate of return has been compiled 
and computed from the section on the "Calcutta stock and 
share list", in Capital, a weekly commercial and financial 
paper published from Calcutta. In the tables, which we
would soon be analysing, the rate of return has been 
shown in two columns - dividends and yields. This has 
been done to avoid a commonly-held but mistaken idea 
that a high dividend necessarily meant a high profit.
In actual effect, dividends were only a convenient term 
of reference for values and were expressed on the par 
value of shares and were thus not a measurement of the 
shares value except at a time when a company was formed 
and shares issued. The real value changed with each day's 
profits and loss. As such it is a misleading idea to 
assume that a dividend rate of, say 4-0 per cent in any 
year was a big profit without a concurrent reference to 
the percentage return that the dividend represented on 
the value of the ordinary shareholder's actual property 
and assets in the business at the beginning of the year.
If he was a new shareholder, he had probably to pay for 
his share chiefly on the basis of that value. On the 
other hand, if he was one of the original shareholders, 
the difference between that value and par value represen­
ted additional capital that he had put into the business 
from time to time.
This difference between the dividend rates and yields 
could be seen from the tables. The yields, which represen­
ted the true rate of return have been calculated from the 
market quotations and par value of ordinary shares and 
from dividend rates in the following manner:-
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where, D = dividends declared 
SP = share price, and 
MQ « market quotation.
Por our purpose of analysis, we have selected two 
periods, 1914-19* and 1928-33* The first period coin­
cides with the Pirst World War when industry was believed 
to be in general prosperity; and the second period covers 
two normal years, that of 1928 and 1929* and four years 
of economic depression, 1930-33 when industry was rather 
in a low key.
Jute Mill Industry
To find out the rate of return, we have randomly selected 
11 jute mills of various sizes for the period 1914-19 
(see Appendix III, Table 1). The smallest of these was 
the Albion Jute Mills which represented only 34-0 looms 
and the biggest one Port Gloster had 1*350 looms in 1919*
The total loomage of these mills varied from 8,263 in 
1914- to 8,393 looms in 1919 which represented 21.67 per 
cent and 21.27 per cent respectively of the total loom 
capacity of jute mills. For the next period 1928-33* we 
added three more mills - Birla, Hukumchand and Anglo- 
India, so that the total mills analysed stood at 14- (see 
Appendix III* Table 2). Their combined loomage formed 
27*15 per cent in 1928 and 26.95 per cent in 1933* The 
biggest of these mills - Anglo-India had a total loom 
capacity of 2,561 in 1933 or 4.24 per cent of the entire 
jute mill loomage.
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Table 4.1 Average rate of return in the jute textile
industry, 1914-19, 1928-33
Year Average dividend Average yield
1914 7*31 5*07
1915 27*09 11.87
1916 65*00 19*05
1917 71*39 17*73
1918 169*54 26.57
1919 158.63 26.44
1928 72.02 10.95
1929 52.26 9*52
1930 26.19 3*17
1931 14.82 4.20
1932 11.96 4.24
1933 16.50 3.93
Average 57*74 12.06
Source: see Appendix III, Tables 3 & 4.
From Table 4.1, we can form a general idea of the 
jute industry*s profitability. It can be distinct^ 
seen that the return was highest during the war years, 
reaching a maximum yield of 26.57 and 26.44 per cent in
1918 and 1919 respectively and declining gradually during 
the economic depression of the 1930*s when it reached as 
low as 3*93 per cent in 1933* On the average, the yield 
was 12.06 per cent which could be said to be a good rate 
of return. On the other hand, if we count the average 
dividend rate, the return on par value was much higher, 
reaching as high as 57*74 per cent, almost five times the 
actual yield of shares. In some years the average divi­
dends declared was over 150 per cent as was in 1918 and
1919 when it amounted to 169*54 and 158.63 per cent 
respectively. In no year did it fall below 10 per cent.
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Tea Industry
For the period 1914-19, we have analysed the rate of 
return of 13 tea companies which produced on the ave­
rage 7*5 per cent of the total tea production of Bengal 
(see Appendix III, Table 3)* The tea companies were 
selected at random from all the major tea producing areas, 
and they varied in size and output greatly. For the next 
period 1928-33, our list consisted of 16 tea companies 
which included all the former ones in addition to three 
more - Lingia, Ambari and New Terai. Their contribution 
to the total tea production of Bengal varied from 7*42 
per cent in 1933 to 8.39 per cent in 1928, the average 
for the whole period being 7-83 per cent (Appendix III, 
Table 6).
The rate of return of the tea companies could be 
seen from Table 4.2 which has been prepared from 
Appendix III, Tables 7 & 8. A glance at the table would 
show the great variation in the rates of return for the 
various years. Taking first the dividend rates, we find 
that in the war years of 1914-19, the tea companies had 
declared a dividend of no less than 23.19 per cent on the 
average but for the next period which also covered a part 
of the economic depression of the 1930's, it fell to 16.86 
per cent. This difference in the rate of return could 
also be marked in the actual yield of the shares. The 
yield of the war years were much higher than the later 
period. For the first period 1914-19, it averaged 9.42 
and for the later period only 4.42 per cent, the average 
for the two periods being 6.92 per cent.
Table 4.2 Average rate of return in the tea industry,
1914-19, 1928-33
Year Average dividend Average yield
1914 22.30 9.48
1915 30.19 12.47
1916 26.15 10.49
1917 19.61 7.74
1918 23.46 10.24
1919 17.45 6.13
1928 26.90 4.86
1929 23.64 5.70
1930 15.21 4.27
1931 7.18 2.79
1932 6.71 2.64
1933 21.50 6.28
Average 2XJ703 6.92
Source: Appendix III, Tables 7 & 8.
Coal Industry
The rate of return of 8 joint-stock colliery companies 
have been calculated for the period 1914-19. But due 
to lack of statistical data regarding the output of each 
colliery company, it has not been possible to know their 
share of output to Bengal's total coal production. For 
the next period, 1928-33, we analysed the rates of return 
of 10 colliery companies whose total output averaged 
between 42.03 per cent in 1930 to 49.29 per cent in 1933 
(Appendix III, Table 9). The rate of return of all those 
colliery companies could be seen from Table 4.3. For the 
first period 1914-19, the average dividend rates varied 
from 32.83 per cent in 1917 to 42.14 per cent in 1919.
As regards the actual yield of shares, it varied from 4.81 
per cent in 1917 to 6.25 per cent in 1914, the average 
being 5*79 per cent. Both the dividend rates and yield
Table 4.3 Average rate of return in the coal industry,
1 9 1 4 -1 9 ,  1928-33
Year Average dividend Average yield
1914 35.92 6.25
1915 34.13 6.02
1916 39.67 6.98
1917 32.83 4.81
1918 35.17 5.02
1919 42.14 5.70
1928 13.10 3.99
1929 14.57 3.31
1930 17.53 4.09
1931 13.35 8.99
1932 10.13 6.27
1933 6.11 3.23
Average 24.55 5.38
Source: Appendix III, Tables 10 & 11.
would have been much higher but for Dhemo Main and North
Damuda which did not declare dividends for the entire 
1
period.
The next period 1928-33 does not appear to have been 
economically prosperous years for the coal industry. The 
average dividend never rose above 17*53 per cent and went 
as low as 6.11 per cent in 1933* The average for the 
period being only 12.46 per cent against 36.64 per cent 
for the earlier period. The yield of the shares Were 
likewise depressing, varying from 3.23 per cent in 1933 
to 8.99 per cent in 19319 the average b£ing only 4.98 for
(1) If we discount these two coal companies, the average 
dividend and yield of the remaining ones would have been 
like this:
Coal Company Average dividend Average yield
Bengal 55.83 6.79
Equitable 32.50 7.43
Aldih 9.83 5.54
New Beerbhoom 36.66 7.17
Seebpore 39.23 6.32
Katras Jherriah 100.83 9.93
Average 45.81
See, Appendix III, Table 10.
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the period against 5*79 for 1914-19. If we add the two
periods together, the average dividends come to 24.55
per cent and yield to 5*38 P®r cent only.
In actual effect, the rates of return of the coal
industry as a whole was possibly much lower as a result
of the existence of hundreds of small private collieries
whose individual coal production was insignificant.
Since the cost of production of these collieries was
relatively higher, they could only survive if the price
of coal was remunerative. Such concerns, the Indian
Industrial Commission remarked, "are readily closed down
if prices fall too low, and are as readily started again
q
when the market improves". But as the coal industry was 
suffering from severe depression from about the mid­
twenties due to the "loss of equilibrium of demand and
2 3supply", prices tumbled^ and a large number of small
t±
collieries closed down. The case of small joint-stock 
colliery companies were no better. According to one 
estimate, out of 114 coal companies in Bengal in May,
1918 while 8 were new companies, 49 made no distribution 
of dividends at all^ 20 distributed 5 per cent and 
under, 14 distributed between 5 and 10 per cent, 11 
between 10 and 20 per cent, 6 between 20 and 30 per cent,
4 distributed between 30 and 40 per cent and 2 distribu­
ted over 40 per cent.^ If this was true, the condition
(1) Report of the IIC (PP XVII of 1919), P. 45.
(2) I0R: Vol. 12019, BFP (Commerce), April 1934,^p. 36.
(3) Prices of coal fell from Rs. 9-2 annas per ton in 
1923 to Rs. 3-4 annas in 1532. I0R: Vol. 12019, BPP 
(Commerce), August 1934?^ p.' 251#
(4) Ibid., p. 190.
(5) Capital, June 7, 1918, p. 1309-
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of the smaller ^joint-stock colliery companies must have 
been worse during the economic depression which lasted 
almost throughout the 1930's in Bengal.
Cotton Mill Industry
The average rates of return for the cotton mill industry 
in Bengal have been calculated from only 4 mills for the 
first period and from 6 mills for the second period 
covering 1914-19 and 1928-33 respectively. This limita­
tion is because of the fact that only the shares of these 
cotton mills from Bengal were quoted by the Calcutta 
Stock Exchange and as such statistical data regarding the 
rest are not available. The average rates of return for 
the cotton mill industry have been calculated for the 
various years and these could be seen in Table 4.4-.
However, great caution is necessary in interpreting 
these figures as both the dividend rates and yields were 
extremely uneven throughout. A glance at the.table shows 
that the most abnormal years were the period 1917 to 19^9 
when both the dividend rates and yields soared very high.
The explanation behind this high profitability of the 
mills during these years was the abnormal rise in the 
prices of cotton goods due to the scarcity of tonnage 
and increase in prices of ocean freights for both piece-
p
goods and yarn. As such, the rates of return of these 
three years should not be taken to reflect the profitability
(1) Taking the rate of July, 1914 as 100, the wholesale 
price of cotton cloths had risen to 261 by the end of 
December, 1917. IOR: Vol. 10298, BPP (Commerce), March 
1918,1"]?« 12. The rise for the later periods was still 
higher. See, IOR: Vol. 10298, BPP (Commerce), November
11.
(2) IOR: Vol. 10298, BPP (Commerce), October 1918,AppJ 3-4.
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Table 4.4 Average rate of return in the Cotton textile
industry, -19-14.19, 1928-33
Year Average dividend Average yield
1914 3.25 2.98
1915 7.50 4.96
1916 2.50 1.70
1917 11.00 10.05
1918 17.50 15.90
1919 65.00 3^.28
1928 0.50 0.28
1929 3.13 2.60
1930 0.83 1.28
1931 2.50 2.64
1932 1.87 2.02
1933 Nil Nil
Average 9.63 6.31
Source: Appendix III* Tables 12 & 13#
of cotton mill industry in Bengal. If these years are 
omitted, the average dividend of the remaining years 
come to 2.45 per cent only and yield 2.05 per cent.
This rate of return was much less than all the three 
major industries in Bengal - jute, tea and coal. 
Engineering and Metal Industry
For our purpose of analysis, we have examined the rates 
of return of 9 engineering and metal industries for the 
period 1928 to 1933. The earlier period has been omitted 
as engineering industry in Bengal was only at its infancy 
during this time. An analysis of Table 4.5 clearly shows 
that the industry was not doing well during the depression 
of the 1930* s. While in the two years preceding the 
depression, the average dividend paid was 7.07 per cent 
and yield 5*18 per cent; it fell sharpfyfrom 1930 onwards.
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Table 4.3 Average rate of return in the Engineering 
and Metal Industry, 1928-33
Year Average dividend Average yield
1928 7.7 7 6.09
1929 6.38 4.28
1930 3.61 3.12
1931 1.78 3.94
1932 2.83 2.91
1933 0.83 0.32
Average 3.87 3.47
Source: Appendix III, Table 14.
The average dividend of the firms in the period 1930-33 
was only 2.26 per cent and yield 2.62 per cent. Taking 
the whole period, the average dividend of the engineering 
and metal industry in Bengal comes to 3*87 per cent and 
yield to 3.4-7 per cent only, which was far less than 
other major industries of the province.
Apart from these large-scale industries on which 
statistical data are available, we are absolutely in the 
dark regarding the profitability of medium sized and small- 
scale industries in Bengal. One of the reasons for this 
was that these being mostly proprietorships or partner­
ships, their shares were not quoted in the stock exchange 
nor were these industries well organized in themselves 
like the larger ones and published no yearly reports or 
bulletins from which some idea could be had of their 
economic health. If,however, the establishment of large 
number of concerns in any one industry over a period of 
time is a measure of its success and profitability, the 
rice mill industry of Bengal could be said to be one of 
those. The industry was first established in Bengal in
Table 4.6 Progress of rice mill industry in Bengal, 
1903-39 (with intervals in between)
Year Numbered registered Total employed
1903 1 33
1916 35 1,531
1918 40 2,039
1920 80 3,604
1922 101 4,023
1924 132 6,185
1926 235 9,711
1928 286 10,778
1930 315 12,225
1932 —
1934 343 13,509
1936 381 16,305
1938 411 18,635
1939 400 18,742
Source: B. P. Adarkar, Report on Labour Conditions in the 
Rice Mills (Delhi, 194-6), pp. 28-29.
1903 with only 33 employees. Over the period it had
increased its number, and in 1939 there were 400 rice
mills working in Bengal and employing some 18,742
persons on the average. The phenomenal development
of rice mills could be accounted for by the large supply
of raw materials and a ready local market for finished
products in addition to the requirement of small invest-
1
ment of capital on fixed assets.
(1) DOIB: Bulletin No. 33« Rice Milling Industry (Calcutta 
1928), 3, 8-10.
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(b) Security
To the investor, security of his investment was probably 
as important as that of rates of return, if not more.
It would be quite natural for him to put his money only 
on those avenues where there was relative security and 
comparatively high yield. It is for this reason that 
we would like to find out how secure industrial invest­
ments were in Bengal. This we intend to do from Table 
4.7, which shows among other things, the total number of 
factories brought annually under the Indian Factories Act 
in Bengal and the number of factories struck off annually 
from the said register on account of their closure for 
more than two years consecutively or having reduced their 
number of workers to below twenty. If we add up column
(3), we find that from 1901 to 1939 (with the exception 
of the years 1905 and 1908 for which figures are not 
available), no less than 2,558 factories were brought 
under the Act. On the other hand, column (4) shows that 
during the same period (with the exception of 1905),
1,005 factories were removed from the register, almost
in all cases factories so removed were closed down 
2
permanently. In other words, taking the whole period, 
we find that out of every 100 factories registered in 
Bengal from 1901 to 1939, no less than 38.54 per cent 
of the factories were closed down. The number of removal
(1) From 1936 onwards, however, factories which remained 
closed for more than twelve months consecutively were 
removed. See, AFR, 1936, p. 2.
(2) Ibid., 1923. p. 1; Ibid., 1924, p. 1; Ibid., 1927, p. 1.
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Table 4.7 Number of factories annually registered and 
liquidated, and also the total number of factories 
together with their workforce in Bengal, 1901-1939
Year Total No. at 
work (Pere­
nnial and 
seasonal)
(1)
No. of workers 
employed
(2)
No. brought 
under the 
Factories 
Act
(3)
Number
removed
(4)
1901 253 200,019 38 2
1902 259 203,152 10 4
1903 259 213,014 18 18
1904 267 234,802 34 26
1903 185 234,725 — —
1906 190 266,203 9 4
1907 204 293,490 16 2
1908 223 301,727 — 3
1909 250 309,680 32 5
1910 256 — 12 6
1911 258 — 8 6
1912 322 320,087 14 12
1913 347 341,820 35 10
1914 361 354,886 20 6
1913 383 378,235 28 6
1916 492 407,318 113 4
1917 322 410,769 36 6
1918 570 439,961 52 4
1919 614 446,541 57 ■13
1920 680 464,713 82 16
1921 720 465,412 51 11
1922 975 517,080 271 16
1923 1 ,040 523,635 91 26
1924 1 ,104 543,123 94 30
1923 1,215 551,342 129 18
1926 1,293 550,923 119 41
1927 1,384 559,759 120 29
1928 1,446 571,079 93 31
1929 1,482 589,860 71 35
1930 1,555 563,877 100 27
1931 1,603 480,439 72 24
1932 1,615 454,007 62 50
1933 1,649 455,018 69 35
1934 1,672 479,388 84 61
1935 1,739 513,199 113 46
1936 1,667 531,235 97 169
1937 1,694 566,458 108 81
1938 1,735 562,791 91 50
1939 1,752 571,539 89 72
Sources and Notes: AFR (tabulated from annual issues). The above 
mentioned figures do not include mines as these were 
subject to the operation of the Indian Mines Act while 
tea factories were included only from 1922 onwards.
See, The Factories Act (XXV'of 1934), Chapter I, 2(j) and 
AFR, 1922, statement 11, pp. viii-ix.
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was maximum during the period of the economic depression 
of the 1930*s when a total number of 615 factories were 
removed against 885 being brought under the Act. From 
the figures shown above, it is quite clear that indus­
trial ventures were far from steady and secure and were 
subject to extreme uncertainities.
Apart from vicissitudes of trade cycles, the various 
reasons which contributed to the unsteadiness of indus­
trial ventures were voluntary winding up according to 
pre-determined plan, insufficient capital, inefficient
or dishonest management, lack of technical knowledge and 
*
experience. No less was the want of business morality 
giving rise to 1 adventure companies' which were inevitably 
closed down within a few years of their inception. Such 
concerns, according to the Bengal National Chamber of 
Commerce, not only entailed loss involving crores of 
rupees to the unwary investors but also "acted as a 
definite hindrance to the commercial and industrial
up
development of the country through joint-stock enterprise.
Having studied the rates of return and the security 
of industry, it now remains for us to see its effect upon 
the investing class of Bengal. From our analysis, we 
have found that jute, tea and coal industries were the 
most profitable ones among those. In reality also, we 
find that these were the most developed industries in
(1) DOIB: Bulletin No. 83* Report on the Growth of Joint- 
stock Companies in Bengal (Alipore, 1959J, p. 32. ^  x^~
(2) IOR: Vol. 12077, BFP (Commerce), August 1936, Ap. 290.
the region and their shares were often quoted at a 
premium in the stock exchange. Moreover, these indus­
tries were also considered to be relatively secure and 
hence the investing public had little hesitation in 
purchasing their shares and debentures. On the other 
hand, industries like cotton textile and engineering 
and metal works had yet to prove their success. Public 
naturally .felt shy to subscribe in such risky enterprise 
as these, more so when the rates of return were in general 
lower than the existing bank rates and where people were 
traditionally bound to land purchase and in money-lending.
II
Institutions of Industrial Finance 
The close relationship between financial institutions and 
industry needs no emphasis. Without a sufficient supply 
of capital - both long term and working - there could be 
no industrial development and hence no economic progress. 
In this section, therefore, we propose to study the 
principal financial institutions that existed in Bengal 
and see how far those were adequately developed to meet 
the needs of industry. These agencies of industrial 
finance were the (a) Banks (B) the State and (c) Managing 
Agents.
(1) The Allahabad Bank Ltd gave A-J- per cent on Savings 
Bank; the Central Bank of India - 4- per cent; and the 
Bengal National Bank Ltd - 4--J per cent. See, Thackers 
Indian Directory, 1927* PP* iii-v. The Post Office 
Savings Bank allowed at 3 per cent per annum on all 
deposits at call. Ibid., p. 16. On fixed deposits for 
a year, the rates of interest varied from 6 per cent to
8 per cent. Thus the Chittagong Commercial Bank gave 8 
per cent and Rangpur and Jessore Loan Offices 6 per cent. 
BPBEC, Vol. II (Evidence, Part I) (Calcutta, 1930), p. 378
Banks and Industry
Among the commercial banks, the Presidency Bank of 
Bengal (amalgamated in 1921 with the other two Presidency 
Banks of Madras and Bombay to form the Imperial Bank of 
India) occupied the premier position in the banking 
system of Bengal. Although formed in accordance with 
the Presidency Banks Act of 1876, the Bank of Bengal 
was an ordinary commercial bank with private share­
holders and it competed in business with all other banks 
for dividends. However, since the Government of Bengal, 
native states and semi-government bodies kept their 
money with this bank for little or no interest (because 
of its stature), it could offer terms which were far 
more advantageous than other Indian banks. But it is 
only necessary to glance at the records relating to the 
Bank of Bengal (and later that of the Imperial Bank) to 
realize how inconsistent their official policy on loans 
was. Despite its access to cheap capital, directors of 
the bank pursued an ultra conservative policy making 
little or no effort to assist new enterprises. The 
Imperial Bank gave loans to established industries only. 
No facilities were available at the initial stages of an
enterprise, while such facilities as were given were
2
liable to be withdrawn by the bank at any moment. 
Moreover, the advances made by the bank had always to be
(1) ICBEC, Vol. II (Evidence) (Calcutta, 1931). P. 528
(2) Ibid.
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secured by stocks of raw and other manufactured goods.
Before such loans was granted, the Imperial Bank also
needed by their Act, the signatures of at least two
persons or firms unconnected with each other to
promissory notes. This meant that before industrial
concerns (however sound and flourishing tkej might have
been) could get any ad vane e,!^ had to get a guarantor,
which in this particular case invariably was that of
managing agents. As a result, smaller and medium sized
firms on partnership or proprietory ownership were at
a disadvantage regarding loan facilities. Further, in
advancing loans, distinctions were made between industries
for reasons unexplained. In the case of jute mills, the
Imperial Bank did not require a mortgage of the block
against loans but in the case of cotton mills such a
2mortgage was deemed essential. Another limitation was 
that loans by law were given for a period of six months 
only  ^and in 1934 extended this to nine months but made
h.
this a procedure applicable only to special cases.
Next in importance were the exchange banks. These 
banks whose main business were to finance the import and 
export trade of India in addition to carrying out the 
ordinary banking business. Numbering 18 in 1929, they
(1) ICBEC, Vol. I, Part I, Majority Report (Calcutta, 1931)* 
p. 237
C2) Ibid., Vol. II (Evidence) (Calcutta, 1931)« P. 528.
(3) TOeT"Imperial Bank of India Act. 1920 (XLVII of 1920),
Schedule I, Part II.
(4) The Imperial Bank of India (amendment) Act. 1934 (III
of 1934), Clause 15* Sub-clause 2 &, 3•
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financed their foreign trade with Indian money deposited
withn\c»v\in the course of ordinary banking business but
would not give loans for construction of factories
however, as they thought it highly improper for such
banks to lock up any large part of their funds in such
capital expenditure. They would finance industries
only with a part of the working capital for short periods
on the security of stocks of raw materials or other
stores. Even here they kept an eye on the industrialist
lest he should turn such capital as they advanced into
channels not specified and sink it into capital goods
like machinery or buildings. They would also not give
capital required to start an enterprise nor would they
underwrite industrial concerns as they considered such
2activities beyond the scope of banks. Their main
emphasis was upon giving loans on such securities as
would sell easily in the market in case they failed to
realize the loans at due date.
Detailed statistical data relating to joint-stock
banks working in Bengal are not available but it is known
that such banks other than loan offices were few in
number. Although these banks had enough capital to
finance industries, they would not take upon themselves
the element of risk which was involved in lending for 
*
long periods. Their view was that if government would
(1) lie, Vol. II (PP XVIII of -1919), P. 747.
(2) TjjJEKI!,'Vol. Ill (Oral Evidence) (Calcutta, 1931), 
pp. 327-28.
(3) IIC, Vol. II (Evidence) (PP XVIII of 1919), p. 132.
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guarantee to help banks to the extent they had invested
A
they might then put their money into industry. Since
no such guarantee was available, the joint-stock banks
preferred to invest a large part of their deposit in
2
government and "other securities". But it is quite 
unlikely that "other securities" involved any large 
amount of industrial investments, especially in the light 
of the above remarks. However, such banks advanced short­
term loans against various kinds of securities, mainly 
that of stock-exchange shares; discounted bills of 
exchange and also opened cash credits. But as most of 
the industries other than the larger ones did not 
possess attractive securities, they failed to obtain 
short-term loans, more so as many banks insisted upon 
an additional security. 1
Numbering more than a thousand in 1935? the loan 
offices of Bengal were scattered throughout the length 
and breadth of the province. These were owned by the 
Bengali-speaking people and their chief business consisted 
in lending to landholders, mainly on the security of their 
landed property and other valuables and hence cannot be 
said to have served the interests of indigenous industries. 
Moreover, these indigenous banks had small paid-up capital, 
so small that in 1929 all but 13 offices had less than
(1) 110, Vol. II (Evidence) (PP XVIII of 1919)? p. 132.
(2) In the year 1938, for instance, the 43 Indian joint- 
stock banks having a minimum paid-up capital and reserves 
of Rs. 5 lakhs and over invested a sum.of Rs. 41,71 lakhs 
in government and other securities. See, Statistical 
Tables relating to Banks in India, 1938 (Delhi, 1941), p. 2.
(3) BLCP, August 19? 1935, Vol. XLVI, No. 2, pp. 165-66.
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A
Rs. 100,000. With the oncoming of the depression in
the 1930* s, the loan offices were "in a state of suspended
animation, hovering between liquidation and the possibility 
2of survival" as the agriculturists to whomU*ej gave long 
term loans failed to repay their debts and the loan offices 
on their turn failed to pay back the deposit of their 
creditors.
At the bottom of the scale were the indigenous bankers. 
These bankers were of two classes - the maha.jans and the 
shroffs.^  The mahajans were usually the petty village 
money-lenders and mainly dealt with small loans to 
agriculturists. But there were also some Marwari maha.jans 
who carried on their money-lending business along with 
their retail trade, both in Calcutta and in the mufassal.
On the other hand, the shroffs mainly confined their 
business operations to Calcutta and the main towns. In 
the City of Calcutta, the principal indigenous banking 
firms were the following:*'
Tarachand Ghanshyamdas 
Bansidhar Abirchand 
Sadasukh Gambhirchand 
Hursukhdas Balkissendas 
Kanayalal Daga, and 
Ramkissen Bajri
(1) M. L. Darling, Report on the Loan Offices in Bengal, 
p. 1. The Report is available in the IOR: Vol. 12077* 
BDP (Commerce), May 1936^^^61-7^.
(2) Ibid., p. 3.
(3) BPBlC, Vol. II (Evidence, Part I), p. 359.
(4) Ibid., p. 384.
(3) Ibid.. p. 421.
1
178
Their main business consisted of receiving deposits 
and dealing on hundis or lending money. Besides, they 
also financed the internal trade of the province and 
provided the necessary banking facilities to small 
industries like oil mills, hosiery manufactures, saw 
mills, rice mills, tanneries and founderies - in all 
cases secured by the personal securities of the proprietors. 
The two main indigenous firms of Dacca, Budhunath Sukhlal 
Poddar and Late Jagabandhu Poddar and his sons, however, 
did not finance any industry. Their main business was 
financing cloth and hide merchants. As a whole, the main 
criticism against the shroffs was that their services were 
more readily available to their own class of people than 
to others and that they failed to come out of this narrow 
limit, perpetuating their monopolistic hold over the 
province. They did not pull their resources together 
to form any joint-stock company but preferred to deal upon 
an individual level. Moreover, the rate of interest was
p
also high, usually between 15 and 36 per cent per annum.
It is clear from our discussions above that banks in 
Bengal did not stretch their hands far enough. No money 
was forthcoming whatsoever for block capital expenditure.
Even in the case of short-term borrowings there were 
numerable obstacles before industry was in a position to 
secure advances. The result was that industry was starved
(1) BPBEC, Vol. II (Evidence, Part I), pp. 410 & 412
(2) Ibid.« Vol. I, Report (Calcutta, 1930), p. 122.
for finance. This was quite in contrast to the great 
commercial banks of Germany and that of France and 
Japan where closer relationship between industry and 
banking existed.
State Aid to Industries
In the absence of a well developed banking system and 
such institutions as Investment Banks, Investment Trusts, 
Issue Houses, Acceptance Houses, etc., small and medium 
class industrialists found it extremely difficult to 
raise sufficient financial resources. To remove this 
difficulty, the Indian Industrial Commission in its 
report proposed the setting up of an industrial bank 
which it considered "would be a potent means of removing 
these difficulties and of affording help to industrialists 
With this aim in view, a committee was supposed to be 
appointed which would, among other things, consider the 
question of Government assistance and control. But 
before the recommendations of the Commission could be 
carried out, industrial development was made a provincial 
subject by the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919.
(1) See, Hubert F. Schiffer, The Modern Japanese Banking 
System (New York, 1962), pp. 17-19; Phra Sarassas, Money 
and Banking in Japan (London, 194-0), pp. 256-58; J. H. 
Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, 
1815-1914- (Cambridge, 194-5), p. 590; and Bertrand Gille, 
'Banking and Industrialisation in Europe 1730-1914-', 
Carlo M. Cipolla (edited), The Industrial Revolution, 
1700-1914, Vol. 5 (Harvester Press/ Barnes Noble, 1976).
(2) Report of the IIC (PP XVII of 1919), p. 217.
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The Government of Bengal in its turn tried to handle 
the question of industrial finance through state aid.
But due to financial and practical difficulties in 
framing the rules, it was not before 1931 that the State 
Aid to Industries Act was passed. This Act made provisions 
for aid to be given in the form of (a) loans (b) guarantees 
of cash credit, overdraft or fixed advance with a bank
(c) taking the shares or debentures (d) guarantees of 
interest on preference shares or debentures (e) guarantees 
of a minimum return on the whole or part of the capital 
of a joint-stock company (f) grants on favourable terms 
of land, raw materials, firewood, water or any other 
property of the local government (g) payments of a subsidy 
for conduct of research, purchase of machinery and (h) 
supply of machinery on hire purchase system.
To enquire into the various applications, a Board 
of Industries was formed in October 1932 ? and certain 
rules were framed by the Board in November, 1932. These 
were sent up to Government for sanction, and these rules, 
as amended by Government were published in July 1933*^
However, when these rules came up to the Board, it found 
grave objections to the procedures which required, for 
instance, that every application for aid to be advertised 
in the Calcutta Gazette and the daily newspapers and that 
every application had to be sent up for final acceptance 
or rejection by Government. The Board was of the opinion 
that some measure of financial responsibility might
(1) The Bengal State Aid to Industries Act. 1951 (Bengal 
Act III of 1931), Section 19#
(2) B1CP, Narch 28, 1935, Vol. XLV, No. 2, pp. 678-80.
(3) Ibid., p. 680.
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Table 4.8 Grant of loans under the State Aid to Industries
Act in Bengal, 1933-34 to 1938-39 (figures in Rs. )
Year No. of appli- Total amount Number Total amount
cations asked for sanctioned sanctioned
received
1933-34 9 589,000 3 6,900
1934-35 41 262,000 11 59,600
1935-36 28 129,001 11 41,125
1936-37 55 631,725 20 39,200
1937-38 28 117,675 8 38,600
1938-39 52 321,700 22 31,650
Source: BISC (Alipore, 1948), p. 166. 
reasonably be given to them. In this connection they 
noted that in the United Provinces the local government 
had decided with the approval of the legislative council 
to place a sum of money at the disposal of the Board of 
Industries of that province for non-recurring grants-in- 
aid to industries. In the absence of any financial power, 
the Board was more or less a committee for the disposal 
of loan petitions. Moreover, the length of time taken 
by the Government to reconsider the recommendations of 
the Board, and then the length of time again taken to 
arrange the preliminaries, mortgage, etc., simply dis­
heartened the applicants. To the end of January, 1935, 
nearly 27 months after the first sitting of the Board, 
not a single applicant had received any aid and by 
1938-39 only just over two lakhs of rupees had been given 
as financial help (see Table 4.8) and in no case had the
(1) BLCP, March 28, 1935, Vol. XLV, No. 2, p. 678.
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sanctioned amount exceeded Rs. 10,000 to an individual 
or a company.
In March, 1937 the Government of Bengal had also 
established a state-assisted industrial bank - the 
Industrial Credit Syndicate to make finances available 
to small and cottage industries in general. The general 
features of the Syndicate were as follows:
(a) The Syndicate was registered under the Indian Com­
panies Act for the purpose of making loans to approved 
applicants to enable them to establish small industries 
in Bengal.
(b) Government was to contribute towards the administrative 
expenses of the Syndicate a sum of rupees 20,000 for a 
period of five years.
(c) Government undertook to make good one-half of any loss, 
up to an amount not exceeding Rs. 10 lakhs, in respect of 
the first loans issued from public funds. The Government 
similarly accepted the liability for one-half of the loss 
incurred for subsequent loans which would be paid from the 
sums set free by those to whom the first loans were sanc­
tioned.
(d) Undertakings established with the assistance of loans 
were to be systematically inspected under arrangements to 
be agreed upon between the Government and the Syndicate; 
such inspection to include the giving of technical advice 
and guidance.
(1) BLCP, September 29, 1942, Vol. I, pp. 208-09
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(e) The position of the Syndicate to be reviewed after 
ten years with a view to a decision whether it should 
be continued with or without government assistance or 
be wound up.^
But the Syndicate could not be a success due to 
organizational deficiency and the expectations which
were entertained about its role as a financial agency
2
for small-scale industries did not materialize.
The Managing Agency System
The system of managing agency in industry is a unique 
contribution of India to institutional developments.
In the absence of Issuing Houses and firms of under­
writers, they performed valuable service to the cause 
of industrial development, especially in the early years 
of its existence. Among their manifold functions, the 
three principal ones were, first, the pioneering of new 
enterprises, secondly, financing of industries in respect 
of both fixed and working capital and thirdly, the day 
to day management of industries. But here we axe con­
cerned only with its second function, viz., managing 
agency system as an institute of industrial finance.
In Bengal, financing of industry by the managing 
agents was done by the purchase of shares and debentures, 
by the grant of loans from their own resources and by 
obtaining loans from banks on their signatures to the
(1) RAB, 1935-36. p. xxii; and BISC, p. 326
(2) ETSC. p. 326.
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Table 4.9 Share of Managing Agents to the total capital 
issued and subscribed in certain tea companies, 1927
Name of the Total No. of No. of shares Percentage of 
Tea Go. shares held by Mana- total capital
ging Agents held by Mana­
ging Agents
(1) Killcott Tea
Company (Messrs.
Duncan Bros. & 45,000 4,498 10.00
Co., Ltd)
(2) Ranicherra Tea
Company, Ltd (Messrs. 
Begg, Dunlop & Co., 48,000 2,940 6.15
LtdJ
(5) Singell Tea Co.,
Ltd (Messrs. Hoare 6,250 105 1.68
Miller & Co., Ltd)
(4) Jaybirpara
(Dooars) Tea Co., Ltd 
(Messrs. Andrew Yule 55,000 900 2.57
& Co., Ltd)
Source: Pat Lovett, The Mirror of Investment (Calcutta. 
1927), PP. 445-46, 448-49, 468-69, 475-76.
prommissory notes. So far their contribution to the 
share capital is concerned, it appears, however, that 
the managing agents did not contribute any significant 
amount on this score. An analysis of the list of prin­
cipal shareholders of the 42 jute mills contained in the 
Mirror of Investment shows that although they held the 
largest individual shareholdings in Alliance, Bally,
Port Gloster, Fort William and Hukumchand and the second 
largest in Gourepore, Khardah, Nuddea and Waverley; their 
total shareholdings on the whole were not high. Basu 
who studied this aspect of the managing agents in the case
(1) See, Pat Lovett, The Mirror of Investment, 1927 
(Calcutta, 1927), Section IV, pp. 257-312.
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of the Calcutta $ute mills also came to the same 
conclusion. In the case of the tea companies also, 
the situation was more or less the same. This is borne 
out from Table 4.9. The table shows that in none of 
these companies did the managing agents* had a share- 
capital of more than 10 per cent and in the case of 
Singell it was as low as 1.68. It is somewhat unlikely 
that the general picture would be any different in the 
case of other industries in Bengal. But it is quite 
possible that in the initial stages of their floatation, 
the managing agents might have contributed substantially 
and then gradually unloaded those during boom periods 
when prices of shares rose high as was during the World 
War I.
However, the managing agents did also provide loans
to their client-concerns in times of need. This financing
they did out of their own private resources or by helping
to secure the necessary advances from the banks on the
strength of their signatures to the promissory notes.
As regards the extent of their self financing, we have
no information due to lack of proper statistical data.
But it is believed that such advances made by the managing
2
agents in normal times were "considerable". In periods 
of distress also, like that of the economic depression 
of the 1930's, they saved many companies from definite r u m /
(1) Saro^ j Kumar Basu, Industrial Finance in India (Calcutta, 
1939), PP- 168-69.
(2) ICBEC. Vol. I, Part I, Majority Report (Calcutta, 1931), 
pp. 279-80. M0 .\j,
(5) XOR: Vol. 12077, BPP (Commerce), Aujus-t 1936,^p. 292.
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But since the capability of extending such monetary 
help essentially depended on the financial strength 
of individual managing agents it was seen that in bad 
times many agents failed to cope with the require­
ments of companies under their managements Moreover, 
in such times the managing agents quite often disregarded 
the interests of their investors and converted such loans 
advanced into debentures as a result of which many 
concerns had passed into their hands causing shareholders 
to loose all their maney.
Another acknowledged defect of the managing agency 
system was the practice of inter-investment of funds.
This meant that the surplus funds, or funds raised on 
the credit of one company were sometimes invested in 
other companies under the same managing agent. There 
was no inherent disadvantage so far as these funds were 
cautiously invested in sound companies, but in many cases 
just the opposite was done. Thus, for example, Messrs. 
Mackinnon Mackenzie, the managing agents of the India 
Jute Company, Limited, invested no less than Rs. 50,68,500
in Megna Jute Mills Limited, another firm under its own
2management. But the investment sustained great loss as
*
the shares of Megna considerably depreciated in value.
This questionable method of finance practiced by some 
managing agents entailed serious unfairness to share­
holders in the concerns whose funds were thus transferred
(1) ICBEC, Vol. I, Part I, Majority Report, pp. 279-80.
(2) See, Pat Lovett, op. cit., pp. 285-86, 296-97*
(3) Saroj Kumar Basu, op. cit., pp. 183-84.
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and at the same time perpetuated thoroughly insolvent 
concerns which it would have been better in their own 
interest and in the interest of the industry as a whole 
to have closed down.
In conclusion, we can say that although the managing 
agency system as a financial institution performed 
valuable services to the cause of industry, it was far 
from perfect. It tended to disregard the interests of 
shareholders and was over-cautious about their own money. 
Moreover, their funds being limited, financial support 
could not always be relied upon especially in times of 
distress when it was needed most. The importance of the 
managing agency system in Bengal rather seems to lie in 
their function as company promoters rather than as 
financiers.
Ill
Raising of Capital 
As we observed earlier, industries required capital mainly 
for two purposes - for its fixed capital expenditure or 
block, and working capital to finance floating assets.
Block capital was required for newly started industries 
for fixed assets; such as land, buildings, machinery and 
other appliances of a durable and permanent character.
It was also required for purposes of extensions and 
replacements. Working capital, on the other hand, was 
required to defray its current expenses such as the 
purchase of raw materials and stores, the payment of 
wages, salaries, rents and rates, expenditure for marketing 
the manufactured goods and other incidental charges like
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taxes, repair and maintenances, insurance, etc. The 
relative proportion between the block and working capital, 
however, differed greatly from one industry to another.
As industrial enterprises become more * roundabout* or 
capitalistic, the proportion of its block capital tends 
to increase in relation to its working capital. It is 
because of this fact that the modern industrial entre­
preneurs of Bengal found it very difficult in most cases 
to raise sufficient capital to finance their projects.
In Bengal, as a general rule, the fixed capital was 
raised out of the paid-up capital. Most of th,i£ paid- 
up capital was made up of ordinary shares of various 
denominations varying in the main from Rs. 5 to Rs. 500, 
but usually shares of Rs. 100 wcrt the most common. 
Debentures were issued only in exceptional cases to 
raise a part of the working capital or for extensions.
An analysis of the capital issued and subscribed by the 
47 jute mills having rupee capital shows that 55-67 
per cent of the capital issued and subscribed was raised
(1) A short summary of the various component elements
of the capital issued and subscribed are as follows:-
Total No. of Companies
having rupee capital - 47
Paid-up capital
ordinary - Rs. 10,20,55*305
% to total capital - 55-67%
Preference shares -Rs. 5*07*52,950 
% to total capital - 27-69%
Debentures issued -Rs. 3*05*07*800 
% to total capital - 16.64%
Figures computed from Capital, August 28, 1920, pp. 576-77-
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from ordinary shares* Preference shares were issued by 
no less than 40 jute mills and which formed 27*69 per 
cent of the capital issued and subscribed. In this 
particular industry, debentures were also common, and 
in 1920, no less than 24 jute mills had issued debentures 
which formed 16.64 per cent of the capital. One of the 
probable reasons for the relative popularity of debentures 
in this industry was the nature of its security and the
-I
attractive yield of its shares. As to the subscribers,
they belonged to both the communities - Indians and
British. However, in the absence of statistical data,
it is not possible to estimate the relative percentage
2of shares held by the two communities. But it is gene­
rally believed that the Indian share in this industry
*
would be over 60 per cent by the middle of the 1920*s.
The Indian capitalists in this industry belonged mostly 
to the Marwari and other upper Indian trading communities
h
in addition to some rulers of princely states.
There was also hardly any problem as regards the 
working capital of jute mills. Most of the established 
jute mills had substantial reserve funds accumulated over
(1) ICBEC, Vol. II (Written Evidence), p. 682.
(2) This is so as the shareholders1, lists which were 
deposited in the Office of the Registrar of Companies, 
Calcutta,have been destroyed because of lack of space; 
lists are now preserved for ten to fifteen years 
preceding the current date. Bagchi, Private Investment, 
p. 192.
(3) Pat Lovett, op. cit., p. 245. Some, however, put 
the total share of the Indians in the jute industry to 
about 75 per cent. Capital, May 5* 1932, p. 667*
(4) See, List of Principal Shareholders in the Jute Mill 
Industry, Pat Lovett, op. cit., pp. 257-312.
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the years. This money, together with the financial 
backing of managing agents made them virtually free 
from all worries as regards their current expenditure. 
Moreover, as the jute mills could offer good security 
of stock and other liquid assets built up by the 
industry, they could always secure short-term borrowings 
from various joint-stock banks including the Imperial 
Bank of India.
The initial expenses of tea gardens which was 
required for the acquisition of land, laying out the 
garden, construction of buildings and quarters and 
purchase of machinery was raised from paid-up subscrip­
tion of shares and from admission fee charged on the 
shareholders or by the system of providing money on 
private account by an individual or partnership. Of
the capital stock of 62 tea companies of Bengal whose
q
names appear in Capital no less than 91.32 per cent 
of the amount was raised from ordinary share capital. 
Preference shares amounted to 8.68 per cent of the 
capital issued and subscribed while not a single tea 
company issued any debentures. One of the likely reasons 
for the non-issuance of debentures could perhaps be the
(1) The details of the capital stock of the 62 tea 
companies are as follows:- 
Total Capital stock
(including debentures) - Rs. 2,19,54,454 
Paid-up capital ordinary - Rs. 2,00,49*454
# to total capital - 91*32#
Preference shares - Rs. 19*05,000
# to total capital - 8.68#
Figures computed from Capital, March 51* 1938, pp. 494-95* 
500-01.
failure of the gardens to provide reasonable security 
in any liquid form so that the money could be realized 
in case of non-payment of loans or in case of liquida­
tion or it could well be the fact that as temporary 
loans for tea gardens were easier to secure, the promo­
ters did not wish to issue debentures. The admission 
fee raised from the shareholders, likewise, was also 
used for block and was realized along with the applica­
tion money. This amounted from 20 per cent to the full 
face value of the share, and was treated as a sort of
loan and generally repaid before distribution of any 
1interest. The idea behind this admission fee was not 
to make the capital of the company too high. As regards 
private gardens, these depended for their block capital 
on the proprietors and directors themselves, and their 
close associates, friends and relations. The raising 
of working capital of tea gardens for the older concerns 
was no problem. But in the case of new gardens some 
difficulty was faced in the initial years as it was not 
till the expiry of at least four years that production 
commenced and income started flowing. Naturally money 
had to be borrowed till then, and this was obtained 
from diverse sources such as managing agents, money­
lenders, and other capitalists on the mortgage of the 
gardens and appurtenances at a rate of interest varying
(1) ICBEC, Vol. II (Written Evidence), p. 658.
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from 9 to 15 per cent. From the fourth year onwards,
however, money could be obtained on the hypothecation
of crop from the managing agents, various joint-stock
banks including the Imperial Bank of India and from
firms of tea brokers on the guarantee of managing agents.
The rate of interest charged for such finances was from
1 per cent to 2 per cent over the bank rate with a
minimum of 7 to 8 per cent. Frequently, when money
had to be secured promptly and finances were not available,
the promoters and directors had to resort to money-lenders
and Marwari merchants in which case the interest rates
were higher than those of banks and loan offices, varying
2
from 9 to 25 per cent.
The joint-stock coal companies like that of jute and 
tea companies raised their initial expenses or block from 
the paid-up capital of shares and debentures. The average 
capital stock of the 62 coal companies quoted in Capital 
in 1938 amounted to Rs. 10,60,277*^ Out of this amount,
89*11 per cent was raised from ordinary shares of the 
value between Rs. 2-J and Rs. 100, shares of Rs. 10 being
(1) ICBEC, Vol. II, p. 658.
(2) BflBEfl, Vol. I, Report, p. 120.
(5) ^he break-down figures of the capital stock of the 
coal companies are as follows 
Total capital stock of
62 coal companies - Rs. 6,57,37*185
Paid-up capital Ordinary- Rs. 5,85,76,385 
% to total capital stock - 89*11%
Preference share - Rs. 38,11,800
% to total capital stock - 5*80%
Debentures - Rs. 33,49,000
% to total capital stock - 5*09%
Figures computed from Capital, March 31, 1938, pp. 496. 
All the coal companies were not necessarily working in 
Bengal but due to the indivisibility of each company^s 
capital which worked in more than one province, we had 
no alternative but to work out the entire list. We have 
also excluded from our computation 'East India1 which 
had sterling capital.
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common. Preference shares were issued by only 7 
companies and their aggregate amount formed only 5*80 
per cent compared to 27*69 in the case of jute and 8.68 
for tea. Debenture issues were also somewhat unpopular 
in this industry and amounted to Rs. 33*4-9*000 or 5*09 
per cent of the total capital. This unpopularity of 
debentures indicates that the investing public were very 
cautious as regards their choice of investments, and 
preferred only sound debentures like that of jute mills 
which had an attractive yield, and a very large margin 
of safety in addition to its property being readily 
saleable. The working capital or current expenses of 
colliery companies were usually met from their reserve 
funds which in some companies ran to over crores of 
rupees. Thus Bengal Coal Company and Burrakur's 
reserve and depreciation funds amounted to over two crores
A
of rupees and that of Equitable to one crore.
However, as most of the enterprises in this industry 
were either proprietory or partnership as distinguishing 
from public limited companies, their resources were 
slender. In such enterprises the initial expenses, e.g., 
lump sum considerations payable to the royalty receivers, 
cost of machinery, rails, tubs and buildings, etc., was 
found by the owners and partners of the colliery. But 
as coal mines required constant capital on block to keep
(1) Capital. March 31, 1938, p. 4-96
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the extracting facilities unimpaired, quite occasionally 
money had to he borrowed from the indigenous money­
lenders at a rate of interest varying from 12 to 18
4
per cent per annum. These enterprises also faced
considerable strain on their working capital as it was
not uncommon for trade bills to be left unattended for
four to six weeks as the banks, according to the Bengal
National Chamber of Commerce, were reluctant to handle
these, and where cash credits were given, these did not
exceed 70 to 80 per cent of the account of the bill.
This reluctance on the part of the banks, according to
them, was on the plea that the drawers were not parties 
2of standing.
Apart from these three large-scale industries - 
jute, tea and coal which had a number of successes, 
most other industries found it exceedingly difficult 
to raise their fixed capital expenditure or block.
One of the examples was that of the cotton mill industry 
in Bengal. According to the Bengal Industrial Survey 
Committee, the minimum economic size of a cotton mill 
was 500 looms and 17*500 spindles and a capital of at 
least Rs. 20 lakhs.^ Smaller units than this, according 
to it, were at a disadvantageous position as regards 
purchase of raw materials and stores, and the sale of 
finished goods. Moreover, the cost of smaller units 
were bound to be high as it would not be able to secure
(1) ICBEC, Vol. II (Written Evidence), p. 504-. See, *A 
Note by the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce on the 
finance of the Coal Industry*•
(2) Ibid., pp. 504—05-
(3) ITscT. p. 40.
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the services of a properly trained and well-paid 
technical staff. Besides, the establishment costs 
and other expenses were also proportionately higher.
An analysis of the Bengal cotton mills in 1937 shows, 
however, that only seven mills - Bengal Luxmi, Bowreah, 
Dhakeswari, Dunbar, Kesoram, Mohini, and Sree Radha 
Krishna had the requisite number of looms and spindles, 
and in the case of Acharya Profullah Chandra, it was 
working with only 50 looms and Victoria had only
4
spindles. As regards their capital, the picture was
more dismal - only Dhakeswari, Kesoram and Sree Radha
Krishna had over Rs. 20 lakhs and many were working with
a total capital of less than Rs. 5 lakhs as was in the
case of Acharya Profullah Chandra, Bangeswari, Bangadaya,
2
East India and New Ring. In many cases, the promoters
could not even proceed with their constructional work
*
due to inadequacy of funds.^ However, it should be 
stressed that this inadequacy of capital was not due 
to the poverty of the people but due to the failure 
of the promoters to create confidence in the minds of 
the investing public.
The cotton mill industry also faced problems as 
regards their current expenditure or working capital.
This was due to two factors, firstly, in the case of new
(1) DOIB: Bulletin No. 75- Cotton Mill Industry in 
Bengal (Alipore, 19370« PP- lS-^9.
(2) Ibid;
(3) T5I5C. p. 4-1,
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mills they did not have sufficient reserve funds and 
secondly, the banks followed a policy of discrimination 
as regards the granting of loans to cotton mills unlike 
that of jute or tea. Thus in the case of jute and tea, 
the principal security was the hypothecation of stocks 
but in the case of cotton mills, the Imperial Bank, for 
example, demanded the mortgage of the block also.
The middle-sized industries like that of mills for 
husking rice, pressing oils, match factories, printing 
presses, soap and chemical works, etc., faced, however, 
greater problems as regards their block capital expendi­
ture and working capital than the larger ones. This 
problem was acute as most of the enterprises in this
category were either proprietary or partnership with
2some joint-stock companies of course. In the case of 
partnerships or proprietory ownership, capital being 
limited, many entrepreneurs even failed to raise 
sufficient initial expenses and hence were unable to 
start their concerns or were working with an uneconomic 
plant. Thus Babu M. N. Ghose, manager and proprietor 
of Jessore Comb, Button, and Mat Manufacturing Company, 
Limited, testified before the Indian Industrial Commission 
that with great difficulty he was able to raise a sum 
of Rs. 25,000 only in three years when he required a 
sum of Rs. 50,000. Again, Babu Bhupendra Nath Basu,
(1) ICBEC, Vol. Ill, p. 385.
(2) BtBECJ, Vol. I, Report, p. 121.
(3) IIC, Vol. II (PP XVIII of 1919), p. 88.
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who claimed to possess considerable experience in 
raising capital for indigenous concerns including 
the Bengal Hosiery, Limited, the Bengal Luxmi Cotton 
Mill, Limited, found great difficulty in raising capital 
for those concerns as people in general preferred to 
invest in alternative channels like land. Only the 
more enlightened among the masses, claimed Babu Rajani 
Kanto Bhattacharjee, supported financially the cause 
of industrial development. They included, according 
to him, people following the learned professions, i.e., 
legal and medical; service holders, government
2
pensioners; and the educated middle class gentlemen.
The problem of raising working capital for these 
industries, be it proprietary or partnership or joint- 
stock company was by far the worst. The IIC in its
7;
report remarked:"^
”... the difficulties in obtaining loans 
and financial assistance which are felt - 
and of the reality of these we have 
plenty of evidence - are experienced 
chiefly in the case of the middle-class 
industrialists, who are unable to offer 
the security of approved names, or of 
stocks which could be readily disposed 
of. Indians suffer in a special degree 
from this deficiency; for, among other 
reasons, they find it difficult to satisfy 
a bank, whose directorate and superior 
staff are entirely European, as to their 
financial position".
In the virtual absence of existing banking facilities, 
owners had to borrow money from indigenous money­
lenders who charged much higher rates of interest than
(1) IIC, Vol. II (PP XVIII of 1919), p. 141.
(2) Ibid., p. 71.
(3) Report of the IIC (PP XVII of 1919), p. 213.
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the banks would have allowed. Usually the rates of
interest in such cases varied from 15 to 36 per cent
per annum and was obtained by the personal security
of the owners. S. N. Dutt of P. N. Dutt and Company
(mechanical engineers and bucket manufacturers),
however,complained of some Marwari money-lenders who
sometimes charged even higher rates of interest than
2
36 per cent per annum.
This difficulty in raising adequate capital for 
middle-sized industries led to the liquidation of many 
industrial enterprises and in many others cut the 
margin of profits and unduly delayed the dividend- 
earning stage. The Industries Department of Bengal, 
for example, reported in 1922 the closure of a steel 
factory which had just started manufacturing high grade 
steel on account of financial difficulties.The 
Boolbool Soap Factory of Dacca could not be worked 
for want of funds and the Indian Soap Factory of Nimtoli 
could not even purchase the necessary plant for want of
Zi
capital. In another case, "a company” was floated with 
a share capital of rupees four lakhs. Of these,
Rs. 85,000 was subscribed and only Rs, 65*000 was paid- 
up. The plant was purchased but from the outset it had 
to borrow money "at high rates of interest". Thus the 
enterprise was hampered from the onset, and it had 
never been able to free itself from the incubus of debt.
(1) BPBEC, Vol. I, Report, p. 122.
(2) ild, Vol. II (PP XVIII of 1919), p. 61.
(3) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1922, Appendix I, p. 1.
(4) IOR: Vol. 9780, India dommerce and Industry Proceedings 
(Industries), . 1 915,aP«2’,38.
(5) J. A. L. Swan, Report on the Industrial Development 
of Bengal, Part I, p• 1.
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Conclusion
From our study, we find that industries which were 
long established and relatively profitable had little 
difficulty in attracting public deposits irrespective 
of their ownership. Thus jute, tea and the larger 
coal companies which were earning between 5 per cent 
and 12 per cent had little difficulty in tapping their 
resources. Not only that, their shares were also 
selling at a premium at the stock exchange. On the 
other hand, the rest of the industries including the 
cotton mill industry and engineering industry which 
were paying only 2 to 4 per cent annually found it 
extremely hard to attract sufficient capital.
In the absence of adequate public subscription and 
specialized financial institutions, banks were expected 
to play an important role by advancing liberally to the 
cause of industry. But these followed a very conserva­
tive approach as regards their grant to industries.
They advanced but only short-term loans, that too after 
satisfying themselves regarding their numerable laid 
down procedures. Naturally, the demand for state aid 
became urgent. But the Bengal government, probably 
because of its financial plight followed a delaying 
tactics and till 1938-39 sanctioned no more than just 
over Rs. 2 lakhs by way of state aid to industries.
The state assisted Industrial Credit Syndicate which 
was established in 1937 was only at its infancy.
However, in the absence of properly developed financial 
institutions, the managing agency system played an 
important role. Although their share in the fixed capital
expenditure could not be said to be substantial, it is 
probable that they contributed quite liberally at times 
of economic distress by providing short-term loans.
But being mostly partnerships their funds were also 
limited* In short,it can be said that there was no 
well developed financial institution to meet the needs 
of industry. The result of such absence was disastrous 
many companies in need of money had to be closed down 
and many more could not even see the light of day.
Chapter V
SUPPLY OF INDUSTRIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN BENGAL
Whether manufacturing industry is likely to establish
in a country or not depends essentially on the presence
or absence of a special factor - the spirit of enterprise
British officials and others in India alleged that this
factor of enterprise (the pre-requisites of which are
energy, venturesomeness, the faculty of organization and
good economic judgement ) was more or less absent amongst
the natives of Bengal. This absence of enterprise, they
further alleged was accountable for the limited degree
of industrial development of the region, and the main
cause of Bengali economic ills. Thus in 1890, Collin
in his Report on the Existing Arts and Industries in
Bengal accused the capitalists of Bengal for "wanting
In enterprise" and failing to introduce "new manufactures
The same theme was voiced later on by Capital, which in
1929 commented that "the Bengalee, owing to his lack of
interest in, and lack of proficiency for, industrial
4pursuits" was wholly responsible for his poverty. Still 
later, a member of the Bengal Legislative Assembly 
commented that the "inhabitants of this territory is not 
industrially inclined" as they were in the past^ and in
(1) Capital, April 19* 1928, p. 844.
(2) Ibid*
(3) E. W. Collin , Report on the Existing Arts and 
Industries, p. 14.
(4) Capital, February 21, 1929, p. 389.
(5) Bengal Legislative Assembly Debates, March 13, 1940, 
Vol. LVI, No. 4, p. 43.
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1942 another member finds that "the industrial instinct 
has become dead" and calls upon the Government to infuse 
that spirit in them. But before we ascribe any blame 
to the natives of Bengal for their disinterest in indus­
trial pursuits, we ought to question ourselves: Were the 
natives best fitted by education and training to be 
industrial leaders? Were there sufficient opportunities 
and inducements for them to venture into industrial field?
In this chapter, therefore, an attempt will be made to
*
find out the answers to the above queries and in the 
light of it a general study will be made to bring out the 
share of native participation in various major organized 
industries in Bengal.
According to Alfred Chatterton, the qualities of an 
industrial leader could be acquired in three stages, 
firstly, he could acquire scientific and technical know­
ledge, then practical experience in technology and finally,
p
business experience and aptitude in handling affairs. To 
him the Education Department provided the first through 
science colleges and technical institutions; the second 
could be obtained only in workshops, mills and factories; 
while the third was usually picked up in a haphazard way 
in the office of industrial concerns or was obtained, in 
the course of conducting business.
(1) BLCP, February 27. 1942* First Session, No. 9, p p. 
259- ^57“
(2) Sir Alfred Chatterton was Director of Industries, 
Madras, 1908; Director of Industries and Commerce, Mysore, 
1913-16; and a Member of the Indian Industrial Commission, 
1916-18.
(3) Sir A. Chatterton, *Indian Industries*, Capital, 
February i3, 1929, p. 327-
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In Bengal, the opportunities for industrial and 
technical education were very limited. The Government 
of Bengal emphasised its importance in the education 
curricula, but could not decide whether the desired 
objects could best be attained by the creation of a
2
separate branch of the Education Service or otherwise.
It took no less than ten years before a decision was 
taken to transfer the control of technical and industrial 
education to the Department of Industries in 1920. The 
net result was that technical education was treated until 
then as a branch of general education and was entrusted 
to the regular educational authorities. They naturally 
concentrated on the literary type of education in which 
they possessed expert knowledge, and even when they 
realized the importance of technical education, their 
complete unfamiliarity with the needs and methods of 
industry made it impossible for them to guide the move­
ment along practical lines. Even after the transfer of 
the technical and industrial schools, most of these 
institutes remained merely preliminary training grounds
(1) The words "technical education" and "industrial 
education" were loosely used. What was described as a 
technical school in one province would be classified
as an industrial school in another; and even within the 
same province there were cases of a "technical school" 
in one district giving precisely the same training as 
an "industrial school" in another. See, A. G. Clow,
The State and Industry (Calcutta, 1928), p. 45. However, 
m  general, "tecnnicai education" meant "the instruction 
necessary for the foreman and the manager, the employer 
or the director; while "industrial education" was that 
which was necessary for the artisan. See, J. G. Cumming,
Technical and Industrial Insturuction in Bengal, 1888-1908,
Harr l of Special Peporr* p. 1. : 1 :
(2) BLCP, March 21, 1908, Vol. XL, p. 21.
(3) t>0lB: Annual Administration Report, 1920, p. 4.
204
for various professions like blacksmithy and carpentry# 
After passing out from these schools, their pupils were 
engaged in local jobs as they did not even get the 
proper training to make a saleable article except for 
the roughest products of the village artisans.
At the advanced level, as late as 1939* there
existed only two engineering colleges in Bengal, the
2
Bengal Engineering College, Sibpur and the Ahsanullah 
School of Engineering, Dacca where only overseer and 
sub-overseer courses existed.^ Higher engineering training 
leading to B. E. degree was confined to the Sibpur 
College only, where a course of four years was followed
4
by one year’s practical training. In the year 1938-39*
(1^ DOIB: Annual Administration Report. 1926, p. 4.
(2) The Sibpur College was originally built in Calcutta 
in 1856 by the Public Works Department with the object 
of training engineers and subordinates for their service. 
In 1864, it was placed under the Education Department 
and transferred to the Presidency College. In 1880, it 
was removed to the site of the old Bishop’s College at 
Sibpur in Howrah district. See, J. G. Cumming,
Technical and Industrial Instruction, p. 11. The Bengal 
Engineering College, Sibpur opened its degree course in 
Civil Engineering in 1880 and that of Mechanical 
Engineering in 1932. In addition to these, it had Diploma 
courses in Mechanical and Electrical Engineering (opened 
in 1922) and that of Associated Course in Mechanical 
Engineering (opened in 1925). See, ’Memorandum furnishing 
particulars of Industrial Development, etc., in the 
Presidency of Bengal from 1928 to 1934', .in. I OR: Vol. 
12049* BRP (Industries), September 1935*^ l>.iZA43. The 
three senior technical schools, Kanchrapara (in connection 
with the Eastern Bengal Railway); Calcutta Technical 
School (in connection with the Calcutta firms); and 
Kharagpur Technical School (in connection with Bengal 
Nagpur Railway) acted as its feeder institutions. DOIB: 
Annual Administration Report. 1926, p. 25.
(5) Ibid.. 1928-29. P. 29. Sub-overseer classes were also 
held at Pabna, Rajshahi and Burdwan.
(4) Progress of Education in Bengal. 1917-18 to 1921-22: 
Sixth Quinquennial Review (Calcutta. 1925). p. 50.
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Table 5.1 Technical training institutes in Bengal on 
1 January, 1935
Type of institute Total No.
A. Engineering Colleges - 2
B. Other specialized
institutions of
collegiate rank - 2
C. Technical and
industrial schools owned
by Government - 49
D. Technical and
industrial schools owned
by local bodies - 5
E. Private-aided
technical and industrial
schools - 76
Source: IOR: Vol. 12049, BRP (Industries), September 1935* No.LZ, 
p. 42.
in all thirty four students had obtained B. E. degree
in Civil, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering. In the
field of commerce, advanced education was imparted by the
two universities of Calcutta and Dacca and by a Calcutta
college. Science education was more common but arts was
the rule. In the year 1932-33* for instance, 661 students
had obtained science degrees in Bengal as against over 
o
2,100 in arts.
But the opportunities of practical training were 
again virtually nil. Even the students of the Bengal 
Engineering College, Sibpur found very little encouragement
(1) Report on Public Instruction in Bengal. 1938-39 
(Alipur, 1940), p. 17» :
(2) Ibid., 1932-33 (Alipore, 1934), p. 80. The totals
are that of fe. A./B. Sc. (Pass and Honours) and M. A./M. Sc.
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from the employers of industries. It was the opinion 
of the large employers that the Sibpur youth usually 
forgot quickly all that he learnt in the workshop and 
that he was afraid of hard work and hence not suitable 
for a responsible position. Even the railways where 
they provided training facilities, followed a policy of 
discrimination. Thus in 1920, out of seventy-two Indians 
who applied to the Kanchrapara Railway Workshop, only
one was admitted as against three Anglo-Indians out of
2eight who applied. The workshop*s pay-scales were also
unfair to the Indians.(see Table 5*2). The Bengal
Nagpur Railway Technical School was even more discriminatory.
Until 1931* only Anglo-Indian apprentices (thirty-five
annually) were trained to the complete exclusion of all
others. In that year it was decided to admit Indians
as well and the number of intakes was increased to seventy,
4
thirty-five for Anglo-Indians and thirty-five for Indians.
(1) J. G. Cumming, Review of the Industrial position and 
prospects in Bengal m  1908. Part II of Special Report. 
p.
(2) BLCP, December 19, 1921, Vol. VI, pp. 23-24. The 
fact that seventy-two students applied for higher tech­
nical training demonstrates that the Bengalis were not 
unwilling to acquire technical knowledge. The same trend 
was marked at the Dacca School of Engineering, as a 
result of which seats had to be increased. Quinquennial 
Report of the Ahsanullah School of Engineering, Dacca 
for the years 1922-23 to 1926-27 (Calcutta. 1927). p. 2. 
This was contrary to popular believe that the natives 
were prejudiced towards such education. See, for example, 
DOIB: Annual Administration Report. 1926, p. 36.
(3) Eighth Quinquennial Review on the Progress of Education 
in Bengal for the years 1927-1932 (Calcutta. 1933). P. 117.
(4) Ibid.
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Table 3*2 Stipends of Anglo-Indian and Indian apprentices 
(per month in rupees) in the Kanchrapara Railway Workshop 
in the year 1921
Year For Anglo-Indian For Indian 1st Class
apprentices apprentices
1st 30 22
2nd 60 26
3rd 70 30
4th 80 34
5th 100 38
6th 120 N. A.
Source: BLCP, December 19, 1921, Vol. VI, pp.'23-25.
See, answer to Question No. 11 (h) of Rai Radha Charan 
Pal Bahadur by the Hon'ble the Nawab Saiyid Ali 
Chaudhuri Khan Bahadur.
The third ground of management training was in the
offices of industrial concerns and in the course of
conducting business. This practical training was of
vital importance to the would-be-entrepreneur as it
acquainted him with the real facts of life, helped him
to form sound business judgement and at the same time
gave him the chance to learn the processes at first
hand. But the opportunity for a Bengali to acquire such
practical training in the offices of industrial concerns
was very restricted indeed. In fact, a constant theme
against the employment of foreign capital in Bengal had
been this: that they provided little or no chance to the
natives and preferred their own men as directors and 
q
supervisors. However, the Bengalis could gam some
(1) Report of the External Capital Committee' (Simla. 
1925). P. 8: The Bengalee. Nay 27. 1932. p. 7; and also, 
Report of the Indian Fiscal Commission. 1921-22 (PP II 
of 1922, Second Session), p. 488.
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practical experience from conducting trade and commerce, 
as the Marwari and some other up-country communities 
like the Bhatias, and the Chettiars, the Borahs and the 
Parsis did, and who became highly successful in this 
line. But the Bengalis would not go into trade and 
commerce after their initial failure in the Jprvstv half 
of the nineteenth century.
With . . limited technical knowledge, commercial
education, and practical experience the native entrepre­
neurs had to face modern technology. They had not only 
to acquire efficient technological equipment, secure 
adequate financial resources, develop a market for their 
products and maintain an efficient organization, but also 
to devise new products to meet anticipated consumer 
demands and maintain good public relations. They had to 
take decisions as regards the size of the plant and 
install new machinery when those become obsolete, 
calculate costs of production, and not the least surmount 
innumerable obstacles as regards supply of skilled labour, 
power plant, transportation links and repair shops.
(1) The reasons for the failure of the Bengalis in these 
lines were that of fraud and deception and over-specula- 
tion on the part of their British partners. Thereafter, 
according to N. K. Sinha, "Bengali businessmen 
practically withdrew from any adventrous business 
activity in Calcutta... a distrust among European 
Business became a part of Bengali thinking". See, N. K. 
Sinha, ‘Indian Business Enterprise: Its Failure in 
Calcutta (1800-1848)', in Bengal Past and Present (Diamond 
Jubilee Number, 1967)* P- 120.
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Naturally from the beginning the native entrepreneurs 
were at a disadvantage compared to their European 
counterparts who had years of practical experience 
and knowledge in the field in addition to technical 
knowledge.
The smallness of the market also somewhat restricted 
the entry of entrepreneurs into industries. Since most 
of the people living in the villages of Bengal were 
economically poor, their demands were also limited, perhaps 
restricted to such consumer products as cotton goods, 
salt and kerosene - the products for which there were 
no substitutes. In cases, where substitutes existed, 
as in the case of sugar, ordinary people used those.
Thus gur and rub were in general use as a sweetening 
ingredient in food and drink, and Bengal manufactured 
these (from the juice of the date palm) to an estimated
A
extent of 100,000 tons a year. The price of gur was
2
also lower than sugar. The demands for other such 
simpler products like socks, mufflers, combs, buttons, 
stationery and the like were also small. Many such 
factories producing these goods, like Messrs. Dass and 
Co. of Calcutta (producers of office stationery), the 
Calcutta Knitting and Woollen Mills Company, Limited 
(producers of socks and stockings, mufflers, etc.,) or
(1) Report of the Indian Tariff Board on the Sugar 
Industry (Delhi. 1938). p. 24.
(2) In 1935-36, gur price per maund in Calcutta was 
Rs. 4-5 annas (ibid., p. 52) and the price of sugar
per maund (wholesale) Rs.9# See. Ibid., Vol. II. p. 290.
21U
that of Calcutta Box Manufacturing Company had to
obtain the help of the Department of Industries to
q
secure markets for them*
A handful of foreigners, some twenty-thousand,
2
living in Bengal plus a few more high ranking government 
officials and businessmen and the bigger landlords 
possibly required such advanced industrial products as 
electric fans, bulbs, knives and forks, radios, bicycles 
and cars and the like* The establishment of manufacturing 
industries for such goods were economically unsound or 
only limited as the Government of India, various local 
governments, and other administrative bodies used to 
purchase their products by indent to the India Office 
(till the end of the 1920fs). Such industries as cement 
also suffered from the lack of sufficient demand, and the 
few that were established in India, competed with each 
other for the market.
The only way by which entrepreneurs could be made 
interested in industrial development was by raising the 
demand of their products* This could be done in two ways; 
either factory costs were lowered, an extraordinarily
(1) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1923* P* 15; and 
Ibid*, 1924* pp* ^2-13* " '
(2) Out of this number, over two-thirds lived in Calcutta. 
See, IOR: Vol.12019 * BFP (Appointments Department),
July 'l934-;lV.‘f"l9.
(3) Economic and Overseas Department Collections, File No. 
L/E/9/999* Thus the demand for cement in India was 
approximately 390,000 tons per annum around 1923* whereas 
Indian factories were already producing 350*000 tons per 
annum, and this figure could rise to 600,000 tons.
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difficult proposition in view of the already low level
of wages and taxation, or the purchasing power of the
rural community had to be increased. Lord Linlithgow
very rightly pointed out:
"The prosperity of India rests, in the 
main, upon her agriculture, and her 
commerce and industry are both founded 
on that same agriculture. Raise the 
purchasing power of the ryot, and in 
one stroke you will give to industry, to 
manufacture, and to commerce in general 
an extended field for service and so 
far legitimate gain11.
But how to raise the real income of the ryot was the
problem which to this day remains unsolved.
In addition to the difficulties as regards markets, 
technical knowledge and practical experience, the path 
of the native entrepreneurs was made more difficult by 
a policy of free trade which the Government of India 
followed till 1923* and from internal competition from 
other Indian provinces as was in the case of cotton and 
sugar. The late start that the natives made in industries 
further restricted the field of operation. In spite of 
all these shortcomings, the natives tried their best to 
involve themselves as much as possible in their country*s 
industrial development.
II
In Part II, we shall study the supply of industrial 
entrepreneurship in the larger organized industries of 
Bengal with a view to bringing out the amount of native 
participation in them vis-a-vis other non-Indian
(1) Lord Linlithgow, in Capital. April 19, 1928, p. 842.
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communities, i.e., the British (and other foreigners).
The Jute Industry
Jute industry was one of those large-scale export indus­
tries in which the British had an early start. The 
pioneering effort in this line was undertaken by a group 
of British managing agents, who having the knowledge of 
world market could foresee the demand for this article.
Nor did they lack in technical training and in organiza­
tional ability. No wonder till the end of our period 
of study, they were able to hold the virtual monopoly 
of this industry. The natives having only a brief span 
of industrial experience (to be precise from the Swadeshi 
Movement onwards) and having none of the advantages of 
technical knowledge and market, naturally could not 
undertake such huge industrial projects as jute industry, 
when in the smaller ventures they were having trouble.
However, it did not deter the Indian entrepreneurs, 
especially some of the Marwaris from coming into this 
field. During the war many of them had been actively 
engaged in jute trade and had seen the high profitability 
of this industry. No sooner was the war over, many 
Indians ventured into this field.
Sir Sarupchand Hukumchand of Indore, Birla Brothers 
of Calcutta and the Maharaja of Durbhanga had established 
jute mills by the early part of the 1920*s. In the 
second part of the 1920*8, we find the establishment of 
such mills as the Adamjee Jute Mills by Adamjee Hajee 
Dawood and Company, Limited (1927); Agarpara Jute Mills 
Limited by B. N. Elias and Company, Limited (1927);
Premchand Jute Mills Limited by Raja Janoki Nath Roy and
II
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Brothers Limited (1928); and the Jute Manufacturing 
Company, Limited by Dayaram ans sons (1929). Along with 
the establishment of jute companies by native entrepreneurs, 
the inter-war period also saw massive investment by the 
Indians in this industry. As a result of this, the 
management of the jute companies also underwent a change.
Thus in 1911* all the 50 companies were controlled by
"I
European directors only. The situation had improved by
1921 when out of 62 mills, there were six mills with mixed
2
boards and one was purely an Indian concern. The situationI
V  improved further in the late 1920*s and there were a good
many Indian directors on the board. Thus Sir Onkarmull
Jatia was the director of no less than nine mills, Rai
Bahadur Goenka Bahadur of at least four, and Rameshwar
Nathany, Hazarimull, Doodwawalla, Chandmull Kanoria,
Ram Kumar Bangur and Chhajuram of at least two concerns 
*
each.
The entry of more Indian entrepreneurs into the jute 
industry was only restricted by the fact that by about the 
middle of the 1920*s the industry was already possessed of 
a capacity (for production) far in excess of any demand
4that had arisen for the article it manufactured. The 
price of jute products were only artificially kept high
(1) Census of India. 1921. Vol. V. Bengal. Part I. Report 
(Calcutta, 1923)* p. 404.
(2) Ibid.
(3) £at Lovett, The Mirror of Investment, 1927* pp. 257- 
3 1 2  ■ M 2 .
(4)*I0K: Vol. 12077, BPP (Commerce), March 1936,Ap. 17.
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Table 5*3 Control of joint-stock jute companies in 
Bengal in '1914 and in 1939
Name of the managing Number of mills Number con-
agent or secretary controlled on trolled on
27 August, 1914- 1 June, 1939
Andrew Yule and Co. 6 11
Begg, Dunlop & Co. 2 4
Duncan Brothers & Co. 1 1
Bird & Co. 8 8
George Henderson & Co. 1 2
James Finley & Co. 1 1
McLeod & Co. 3 4
Kettlewell, Bullen 2 2
Macneill & Co. 1 2
Gillanders & Co. 2 2
Barry & Co. 1 2
Ernsthansen Ld. 2 X
Mackinnon & Co. 1 2
Jardine, Skinner & Co. 2 4
Anderson Wright & Co. 1 1
F. W. Heilgers & Co. 2 2
Thomas Duff & Co. 3 3
A. H. Dawood & Co. X 1
B. N. Elias & Co. X 1
Birla Brothers Ltd. X 1
Dayaram and Sons X 1
Sir S• Hukumchand X 1
Raja Janoki Nath Roy
& Brothers X 1
Babulal & Co. X 1
Dass Brothers X 1
Sources: Capital, August 27* 
June 1, 193$* 831*
1914, p. 557; and Ibid.,
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by a policy of restricting the output of mills in the
'I
membership of the IJMA. But as new Indian mills were
coming up almost every year and few were prepared to
join the IJMA, there were protracted quarrels between
the Association and the mills outside the Association.
Ultimately, the Government of Bengal issued an Ordinance
(Bengal Jute Ordinance, 1938) making it unlawful to
increase the number of looms or to replace any existing
2
looms in any jute mills.
Like jute manufacturing industry, jute pressing was 
also a great industry in Bengal, employing some 36,000 
J workers (seasonal and perennial) in 1937#^  In 1911, out 
of 109 jute presses, more than 50 per cent (fifty-seven 
presses) were owned and controlled by the Europeans and
4
Anglo-Indians. The situation underwent a change during 
the World War I when large number of Indian entrepreneurs 
came into this field, especially the up-country Marwaris 
who were already engaged in jute trade. Thus according 
to 1921 Census, out of 188 jute presses, Indians owned 
113 compared to 52 in 1911. The entry of Indian entre­
preneurs into this line was far easier than jute industry 
itself. It required no great technology as the presses
Nlo-m,
(1) IOR: Vol. 12077, BEP (Commerce), March 1936,^ p. 17.
(2) Star of India, September 10, 1938, p. 4.
(3) department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics: 
Large Industrial Establishments in India. 1937 (Delhi, 
1939), PP. iv & xii.
(4) Census of India, 1911, Vol. V, Bengal, Part II, 
Tables, p. 350.
(5) IBid#, 1921, Part II, Tables, p. 416.
(6) Ibid., 1911« Part II, Tables, p. 350.
could be worked by band or steam power. Some of the 
big Indian enterprises (employing over 500 workers in 
1937) included the Atlas and Union Jute Press (owned 
by Soorajmal Nagarmal), Hooghly Hydraulic Jute Press 
(Managing agent: P. E. Guzdar), and Chitpur Jute Press 
Ltd. (of Hursing Nehalchand and Surajmal Nagarmal).
Here it may also be mentioned that many European 
managing agencies having jute mills under their control 
had also established large jute presses. In this group 
belonged such managing agency firms as Andrew Yule & Co;
Bird and Co; George Henderson and Co; Jardine Skinner 
and Co; and James Finlay and Company. In this branch 
of the jute industry, the Ralli Brothers were also a 
great undertaker having their agencies at Cossipore, 
Narayang^nj and Sarisabari.
Tea Industry
Like jute, tea industry also owed its origin to British
commercial interests in the nineteenth century. When the
East India Company lost its trading monopoly of China
trade in 1833, it became anxious to obtain a source of
tea supply entirely under its own control. Its anxiety
was heightened in the 1830*s by a suspicion that China
like Japan might as well break off trading links with the
a
West and thereby jeopardise its valuable tea trade. This 
resulted in carrying out investigations and experimentations 
on tea culture in India and when it proved successful, 
large regions like that of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri were
(1) Harold H. Mann, 'The Early History of the Tea Industry 
in North-East India1, Bengal Economic Journal, Vol. II,
No. 1 (January, 1918;, pp. 44-45.
brought under tea cultivation.
The lead that the British took in the nineteenth 
century was maintained throughout the period under study. 
Thus when we analyse the tea industry of Bengal in 1937-38 
we find that the industry was still largely dominated by 
the British. Some 27 sterling tea companies had the lion1 
share of the industry. In that year, out of a total
A
cultivated acreage of 201,680 some 86,858 acres or over 
45 per cent belonged to them (see Appendix IV, Table 1). 
Not only that, among the companies operating in Bengal 
and having rupee capital, most were also found to be under 
the control of a group of British managing agencies like 
Kilburn and Go; Williamson, Magor and Co; Davenport and 
Co; Duncan Brothers and the like,(see Appendix IV, Table
2). Among the larger tea gardens in this category having 
1,000 acres or more under tea cultivation in 1937-38, 
sixteen out of . twenty were British controlled. Among 
the Indian owned gardens, only four had 1,000 acres or 
more under tea cultivation in that year, and not many 
having more than 500 acres under tea cultivation (see 
Appendix IV, Table 2).
Why was it that the Indians lagged behind? There 
could be several probable explanations to this. But the 
two most important ones were, firstly, that the native
(1) The figure for the total cultivated acreage of Bengal 
was that of 1937# In 1938, it was 200,84i acres. See, 
Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics: 
Indian Tea Statistics, 1938 (Delhi, 1940), p. 15.
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entrepreneurs being late in entering this field found 
very little opportunity for further expansion in the 
twentieth century. By about the first decade of this 
century, the best available land for tea had already
A
been taken up by the British for tea cultivation.
What was left were the jungles and less attractive
places. Even then the Indian entrepreneurs made a
gradual recovery from 1911 onwards. In 1911, for instance,
Indians owned 56 gardens or 15 per cent of the total
and by 1921 they had increased their share to 109 gardens
or just over 52 per cent of the total number of gardens 
2
in existence. Their aspirations were rather abruptly 
halted in the early 1930's due to over-production of this 
commodity in the world market with consequent fall in the
7
prices of tea. The Government of India m  collaboration 
with Ceylon and the Netherlands East Indies restricted 
the export of tea and also the acreage under tea cultiva-
4
tion from April, 1933 onwards. Secondly, the native 
entrepreneurs were at a disadvantageous position as regards 
knowledge of foreign markets compared to their British 
counterparts who possessed wider commercial contacts 
overseas. The cumulative outcome was that the Indian 
entrepreneurs were lagging behind in this industry 
compared to their foreign counterparts.
(1) Report of the Royal Commission on Labour in India.
1931 '(PP XI of 1930-51) * p. 971. !
(2) There were also 11 companies with mixed boards in 1921. 
Census of India. 1921, Vol. V, Bengal, Part I, Report, p. 589.
(5) See, Economic and Overseas Department Collections, File 
No. L/E/9/1294; and also, Memorandum by the Secretary, Indian 
Tea Association, Calcutta to the Secretary to the Government 
of India, Department of Commerce, in Economic and Overseas 
Department Collections, File No. L/E/9/1296.
(4) See, Report of the International Tea Committee. 1st July, 
1955, to 51st March, 1954 (London, n.d.).The Report could be 
found in Eco. & Overseas Deptt. Collections, File L/E/9/1296.
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Coal Industry
Coal mining was another big industry in Bengal, producing
'I
some one-fourth of the total production of India in 1924.
It was mainly required for the purpose of running railways, 
and large industrial establishments like jute, cotton and 
engineering industries; and for bunkers and inland steamers. 
The pioneering of this industry, like jute and tea, was 
undertaken by the European agency houses like Andrew Yule 
and Company; Maeneill and Company; Balmer Lawrie and 
Company who established joint-stock coal companies soon 
after the East Indian Railways entered the Bengal coal 
fields in 1854. Thus the Bengal Coal Company was estab­
lished in 1858; New Beerbhum Coal Company and Ranigunge
Coal Association in 1873 and Equitable Coal Company in 
2
1895* early ventures of these colliery companies were
highly successful, and they were able to dispose of their 
increasing output without any difficulty and at a fair 
profit. This encouraged others into the field and by 1921 
no less than 202 private and public colliery companies were 
in operation in Bengal (see Table 5*4).
An analysis of the Bengal coal industry in 1938 shows 
that only a few large British controlled colliery companies 
still dominated the industry so far as annual coal production 
was concerned (see Appendix IV, Table 3)# In that year, 
out of a total production of 7*745*372 tons^ no less than 
4,186,572 tons or 54.05 per cent were produced by the 
larger eleven British controlled colliery companies from
(1) Economic and Overseas Department Collections, File No. 
L/E/9/1004.
(2) Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics: 
Indian Coal Statistics, 1938 (Delhi, 1940), pp. 65, 67-69.
(3) Ibid.. p. 18^
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Table 5*4 Particulars of colliery ownership in Bengal, 
1911 and 1921
Number owned by
i
, Companies of which the 
, directors are
t
, Private persons who 
, are
i1 1 i i
, Europeans,Indians JMixed
, or Anglo- ,
, Indians 1 ,
■ 1
t i ....
,Europeans,Indians 
,or Anglo-,
,Indians ,
1911
1921
53 6 21 
, 65 19 18 
1
7 43 
, 8 64
t
Sources: Census of India, 1911, Vol. V, Bengal, Part II, 
Tables (Calcutta, 1913), P* 350; and Ibid., 1921 (Calcutta, 
1923), P. 416;
Note: In 1911, one private concern returned two owners of 
different castes. In 1921, the classification of owners 
of 30 collieries was not available while another two con­
cerns returned, one three owners and the other two owners 
of different class. One colliery was also owner by a 
Russian in 1921.
their 18 bigger ventures alone (the production of their 
smaller collieries producing less than 100,000 tons 
have not been taken into account) (see Appendix IV, Table
3). Of these, the Equitable Coal Company of Macneill &
Co., produced 1,029,173 tons or 13#29 per cent of the 
entire production of that year from their three collieries 
of Bejdih, Dishergarh (west) and Jamuria. This production 
was more than the total output from Bengal*s 21 largest 
private collieries producing over 25,000 tons of coal each 
and whose total production in 1938 amounted to 898,030 tons 
or 11.59 per cent (see Appendix IV, Table 4). Indians 
owned, however, none of the larger ^Joint-stock companies. 
Their ownership was mainly restricted to small private 
collieries, and among these there were only three which 
were producing 30,000 tons or over in 1938.
(1) See, Appendix IV, Table'4.
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The relative smallness of the Indian owned 
collieries, however, does not prove that the Indians 
were less enterprising than their European colleagues.
Unable to attract sufficient capital resources Indian 
entrepreneurs went to float private collieries or small 
joint-stock ventures. This in turn necessarily prevented 
the installation of modern mining equipment and the 
employment of essential technical expertise to run the 
mines on an efficient manner. As a result most of these 
small collieries worked only at or near the surface 
which made it quite impossible to work the coal 
satisfactorily. Consequently, output of each of these 
collieries were small and return less profitable than 
the larger colliery companies under established groups 
of managing agents. The manner of leasing out (by the 
landlords who under the Permanent Settlement were the 
sole proprietors of colliery lands in Bengal and Bihar) 
small patches of land to diverse persons with the object 
of receiving as much money as possible without due 
regard to the economical working of the estate was no 
less responsible for creating small uneconomic collieries 
to which inexperienced Indian entrepreneurs increasingly 
sunk their capital.
(1) A. C. Banerjee, Honorary Secretary, Indian Mining 
Federation, representing the Bengal National Chamber of 
Commerce, Calcutta, in his evidence before the IIC.
See, IIC, Vol. II (PP XVIII of 1919)* p. 286. Also see,
I. Treharne Rees, Report on the Methods of Coal Mining 
in India, IOR. L/E/7/938, File No. 2874.
1
General Engineering Industry
Till the beginning of the World War I, the flow of
entrepreneurs into this industry was extremely limited.
A few foreign companies like Burn and Company and Jessop
and Company existed for about a century or more, but
these were engaged in making various sorts of water
transport like steamers, flats, barges and in the
construction of buildings and bridges and other
2
structurals for mills and workshops. It was the First 
World War which by virtually stopping the import of 
machinery, railway wagons and appliances gave a real 
chance to its development. During this time several 
large engineering firms were established like that of 
Jas. Alexander and Company*s Engineering Works at 
Kidderpore (1915)? Britannia Engineering Works, Titaghur 
(1917)? Angus Engineering Works, Hooghly (1917); 
Hukumchand Electric Steel Works at Ballygunge (1918); 
Indian Standard Wagon Company, Burnpur (1918); and 
immediately after the war, the Bridge and Roof Company’s 
Structural Works at Howrah (1920). This tempo of
(1) By ’general engineering* is meant those workshops 
other than electrical engineering, electricity generating 
and transforming stations, foundaries, iron and steel 
smelting and steel rolling mills, copper smelting and 
copper rolling mills and lead smelting and lead rolling 
mills.
(2) Jessop and Company was started under that name in 
1820 and was carried on before that under another name. 
See, Indian Tariff Board: Evidence recorded during 
enquiry into the Steel Industry, Vol II (Calcutta, 1924), 
p. ^4b. Burn ana Company, on the other hand, was 
originally started in 1781 by Colonel Archibald Swinton. 
It gradually gained a great reputation in connection 
with building and construction work. Arnold Wright (ed.) 
and Somerset Playne (compiler), Bengal and Assam, Behar 
and Orissa (London, 1917)9 p. 91.
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development, however, seems to have suffered when normal 
conditions returned in the 1920!s and due to the 
depression in the 1930's. In 1937* there were only 
152 general engineering firms in Bengal, employing some 
23,700 workers.^
An analysis of the general engineering firms 
operating in Bengal and employing over 250 workers in 
1937 shows that most of these industries belonged to the 
British owners (see Appendix IV, Table 5)* It does not 
need any elaborate explanation as to the reasons why this 
should have been so. Having the required technical 
background, and the possible advantages of securing better 
marketing facilities (due to British domination of large 
purchasing bodies like the railways), they could take a 
lead in establishing engineering firms. On the other 
hand, the Indian entrepreneurs had none of these advan­
tages. Lacking in the required technical know-how and in 
the absence of all round trade knowledge they could not 
possibly venture into engineering establishments. A few 
who went and established big firms like that of Sarupchand 
Hukumchand had to employ foreign technicians and management. 
Moreover, the depression of the 1930's had a generally 
discouraging effect on the entry of new entrepreneurs into 
this field.
(1) This is evident from the aggregate paid-up capital of 
the engineering companies in Bengal. In 1920-21, the paid- 
up capital of the engineering companies stood at Rs. 319 
lakhs and in 1935-36 it had increased only to Rs. 441 lakhs. 
See, DOIB: Bulletin Mo. 83, Report on the Growth of Joint- 
Stock Companies in Bengal (Alipore, 1939)* P« 11#
(2) Commercial Intelligence and Statistics Department:
Large Industrial Establishments in India, 1937 (Delhi,
1939), p. 20. It included all factories which came under the 
operation of the Factories Act (XXV of 1934), as amended by 
Act XI of 1935* See, introductory Note1, Ibid., p. iii.
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Cotton Mill Industry
In spite of having large demand for cotton products,
we do not find the establishment of very many cotton
mills in Bengal till the end of the period under study.
In 1921, there were only 18 spinning and weaving mills
in operation employing some 13*735 workers. However,
an attempt was made to float a number of cotton mills
after the granting of protection to this industry in
1926-27; that too did not make any significant headway.
A question at once looms large: Why was it that the
cotton mill industry could not make sufficient progress
in Bengal? The answer to this question is not, however,
unaccountable. In the first place, Bengal produced
2
only a small amount of raw cotton. Therefore, to 
establish cotton mills, cotton had to be imported from 
outside the province, i.e., Bombay area or from abroad.
This entailed additional costs of transport, securing a 
constant flow of right kinds of cotton, costs as regards 
additional men employed to survey and despatch goods and 
so on. On the top of it, there was the perennial problem
■x
of wagon shortages. Secondly, Bengal cotton mills had to
(1) Census of India. 1921, Vol. V, Bengal, Part II, 
Tables, p. 402.
(2) This could be seen from the following figures of 
cotton production of Bengal:
Year Yield in bales of 400 lbs.
1915-16 30,000
1916- 17 20,000
1917-18 19,000
1918- 19 32,000
1919-20 24,600 No. 2.0 ,
See, IOR: Vol. 10971* BPP (Commerce), March 1921,,p. 17.
(3) See, for instance, Report of the Committee appointed 
by the Secretary of State for India to enquire into the
administration and working of Indian Railways, Report 
(PP X of 1921), p. 931.
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face fierce competition from established and mature 
foreign and internal mills of other provinces. The 
foreign competition mainly came from Lancashire and 
later on from Japan as well. Even when partial pro­
tection was granted to this industry, it did not benefit 
Bengal much. Bombay having the advantages of raw 
materials and considerable experience in the field, 
easily dominated the industry. Thirdly, the native 
entrepreneurs failed to attract sufficient capital 
resources into this industry. This was due to their 
failure in creating confidence in the minds of the 
Bengali investors rather than due to the shortage of 
capital.^
As late as 1937, there were only 26 mills in
p
operation in Bengal. Out of these only 9 could be said 
to be big enough to employ 1,000 workers or more a day.
(1) This lack of confidence among the capitalists was 
because of the registration of large number of bogus 
concerns intended to cheat the public from their very 
inception, want of experienced entrepreneurs, the 
ignorance of the investors as to the nature and condition 
of the business in which they were supposed to invest 
their capital, and almost passive economic attitude of 
the government. IIC, Vol. II (PP XVIII of 1919)* p. 130.
(2) Commercial Intelligence and Statistics Department: 
Large Industrial Establishments in India, 1937 (Delhi, 
1939)9 4-. By August, 1939* the number had risen
to 30 with a total paid-up capital of nearly Rs. 24-0 
lakhs. Capital, February 1, 194-0, p. 138.
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An analysis of these mills (Appendix IV, Table 6) show 
that excepting two, Dunbar Cotton Mills Limited, No. 4- 
and Bowreah Cotton Mills, the rest of the mills were 
owned by the Indians themselves. The biggest of these,
Kesoram Cotton Mills was owned by Messrs. Birla Brothers 
Limited and had a paid-up capital of Rs. 35*00,000. This 
mill was so big that it alone employed over one-fifth of 
the total labour-force engaged in cotton mills in Bengal.
The next two bigger ones, the Bengal Luxmi Cotton Mills 
and the Dhakeswari Cotton Mills, both of which employed 
over 2,500 workers, also belonged to Indian owners.
Why was it that the European managing agency firms did 
not come forward to establish large numbers of cotton 
mills? The answer to this is very difficult to find, 
especially in view of the fact that having wide experience 
and technical know-how they could possibly make a 
significant contribution in this line. The failure 
to come forward may be attributable perhaps to their 
conservatism and fondness for stereotyped businesses 
in which it was easier to make money.
Sugar Mill Industry
Like cotton mill industry, the growth and development of 
sugar factories was limited. This was because of two 
factors. Firstly, Bengal was not a major sugar producing 
area in India. For example, in 1936-37* Bengalfs total 
area under sugar-cane cultivation was only 354-,800 acres
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in comparison with U. P.'s 2.5 million acres during
A
the same time. This supply of sugar-cane was not 
sufficient to run an unlimited number of mills.
Moreover, the cost of sugar-cane cultivation in Bengal 
was also more than in the upper Indian provinces. Thus 
the cost of cultivating one maund of sugar-cane in the 
United Province and Bihar was 4 to 5 annas, in the
Punjab - annas while in Bengal it amounted to no
2less than 7 annas. As such from the point of view of 
raw material supply, Bengal was not happily placed 
against the upper Indian provinces. Secondly, till 
1932 there was hardly any scope for its development 
due to foreign competition. With the granting of pro­
tection to this industry in that year, however, many 
entrepreneurs showed great eagerness to establish sugar 
industries.^ But unfortunately Bengal could not make 
any satisfactory headway in this industry as comparative 
advantages lay with upper Indian provinces. The sugar 
industry in Bengal was also handicapped from transport 
difficulties due to "practically no communication by any
Zf
cartable roads or railway system".
C D  Report of the Indian Tariff Board on the Sugar 
Industry (Delhi, pp. '2\ & 24. The total acreage
under sugar-cane cultivation in India in 1936-37 was 
A.A million acres. Durgaprasad Khaitan, ’Survey of 
Indian Sugar Industry', Supplement to'Capital', December 
1A. 1939, P. 17.
(2) Report of the Indian Tariff Board on the Sugar 
Industry CDelhi, 193&,)« p. 36.
(3; This is evident from the large number of flotations 
of new sugar industries. See, DOIB: Annual Administration 
Report. 1933-34, P* 3«
CAJ Indian Tariff Board: Written Evidence recorded during 
enquiry on the Sugar Industry (Delhi. 1938). Vol. II. p. 277#
An analysis of the sugar-mill industry shows that 
there were only ten mills in existence in 1938-39#
Out of these, no less than eight were owned by the 
Indians themselves. The firm of Messrs. Surajmal 
Nagarmal owning two, the Setabganj Sugar Mills and the 
North Bengal Sugar Mills Limited, both of which were 
started after the granting of protection to this industry 
in 1933. These two factories had a total crushing 
capacity of over 1,500 tons. The rest of the Indian 
owned mills were comparatively small and the six together 
had a crushing capacity of 1,325 tons. Whatever the 
case may be, at least it shows that the Indian entrepre­
neurs were far from shy and were much more willing to 
experiment with new-found opportunities than traditional 
opinion projected them to be.
The Chemical Industry
The chemical industry in Bengal was one of those few 
fields in which Indian enterprise predominated. Out of 
some 69 Bengal chemical and pharmaceutical works mentioned 
in Thackers Indian Directory. 1938-399 the majority were
p
owned by the Indian entrepreneurs. Of the four perennial 
factories employing over 250 work-force in 1937 three 
belonged to the Indians. The biggest of these was the 
Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works, Limited, which
(1) See, Appendix IV, Table 7#
(2) See, Thackers Indian Directory. 1938-39 (Calcutta, 
n. d.), Industries Section, pp. 9-12.
(3) Large Industrial Establishments in India. 1937* P# 75#
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owed its origin (in 1892) to the vision and enterprise 
of Dr. Profullah Chandra Roy (later Sir) who was then 
a professor of chemistry at the Presidency College,
A
Calcutta. In 1901, he incorporated this as a Public 
2
Limited Company and since then it grew in size. In 
1937* it had two factories, one at 164, Maniktolla Main 
Road, 24- Parganas employing some 1,481 men and the
7
other at Panihati, also in 24- Parganas. The remaining 
two companies were the Bengal Immunity Company Limited, 
whose managing director was Capt. N. N. Dutt and the 
D. Waldie and Company's Chemical Works at Konnagar in 
Hooghly. The latter company was also the pioneer in the 
field of chemical industry in Bengal. It was established
IL
in 1853 by a Scottish doctor named, David Waldie.
Pottery. Brick and Tile Industry
The Indians showed considerable enterprise in the field 
of pottery. In 1907, the Calcutta Pottery Works was 
started by Maharaja Maninder Chander Nundy of Cassimbazar 
and Babu Boykonto Nath Sen of Berhampur, with the aid of 
an able ceramist, Satyasundara Deb, who had studied his
(1) Bulletins of Indian Industrial Research: Bulletin 
No. 8. Development of the Heavy Chemical Industries in 
India (by N. N. Sen Gupta) (Delhi. 1937). p. 4.
(2) Ibid.
(3) tiarge Industrial Establishments in India, 1937* P* 75*
(4) Bulletins of Indian Industrial Research: Bulletin 
No. 8, Development of the Heavy Chemical Industries in 
India, p. 5#
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art at the Higher Technological Institute, Tokyo# This
was the first factory in India for the manufacture of
glazed pottery of the superior grade, and could turn
out glazed ware consisting of cups, saucers, insulators,
ink-pots, dolls and figures. Another factory was that of
P. N. Dutt and Co.*s Bengal Potteries, whose shares were
2
quoted at the Calcutta Stock Exchange#
In the field of brick and tile making, the natives
owned the majority of the concerns. According to the
Census Report of 1921, out of some 412 brick, tile and
*
firebrick factories, Indian entrepreneurs owned 387•
In this field, Messrs# Keshoob Chandra Paul and Co. was 
very prosperous. The Company had factories at five 
different places, and their monthly production was over
tL
two lakh tiles. However, in this field Burn and Company 
was far ahead of all others. They perfected the methods 
of production and turned out the best varieties of bricks, 
pipes, tiles and sanitary wares. The value of their 
articles produced at the Pottery Works at Ranigunge was 
estimated at over three lakhs of rupees in the year 
1908-09 compared to over six lakhs of rupees in the 
previous year and that of their Durgapur Brick and Tile
(1) Henry Hemantakumar Ghosh, The Advancement of Industry 
(Calcutta, 1910), p. 91 •
(2) See, Capital. August 28, 1920. The Company had a 
capital of Rs. 7*62,212.
(3) Out of the other 25 factories, 3 were owned by the 
Government or local authority, and in the case of another 
5 companies, the directors came from both the communities. 
Census of India. 1921, Vol. V, Bengal, Part II, p. 417#
(4) BXSC, p. 133.
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A
Works at half a lakh rupees.
Conclusion
From our study of the major organized industries in 
Bengal, it is clear that Indians did not lack in 
industrial enterprise. Wanting in technical and commer­
cial education, business knowledge and "discouraged by 
the political, administrative and financial arrangements
p
maintained by the British rulers” Indians had to struggle 
against heavy odds. In spite of such obstacles, they 
attempted to float large numbers of industrial establish­
ments and in new lines quite in contrast to the Europeans 
who were mostly content by their success in certain
directions only and devoted their time and attention to
*
foreign trade at the expense of indigenous industries.
(1) Miscellaneous Annual Report of the Burdwan Division 
for the year 1908-09. IOR: Vol. 8^56. BRP (Miscellaneous), 
October 1909,^0f>?'vl 50. Ranigunge Pottery Works was 
originally established by a retired engineer by the name
of George Macdonald in 1866. But due to financial trouble, 
the works was sold to Messrs. Burn and Co. in 1870. In 
1894* a Government test found their products superior to 
many imported wares and since then their manufactures had 
flourished. Henry Hemantakumar Ghosh, op. cit., pp. 89-90.
(2) Amiya Kumar Bagchi, Private Investment, p. 423#
(3) Chatterton, however, states that the European merchants 
and manufacturers did try for nearly a century to create
an industrial system but failed due to lack of central 
markets, to the absence of skilled labour, to the intensity 
of foreign competition, to the poverty of the local 
resources, to the cost of internal transport, to the 
inability to obtain a monopoly and finally to an imperfect 
study of local problems. Having tried and failed "they 
are not altogether to be blamed if they have in recent 
years devoted their time and attention and employed their 
capital in creating a big foreign trade at the expense, 
more or less, of the indigenous industries". Alfred 
Chatterton, Industrial Evolution in India (Madras,n. d.), 
pp. 97-98.
If the Indians had failed in most of their attempts 
that was another matter and must not he confused with 
the factor of industrial enterprise* On the contrary, 
it only showed their urge for industrial ventures. By 
the end of our period of study, other than jute, tea 
and coal and engineering concerns in which the Europeans 
had either an early start or were better fitted by virtue 
of their superior knowledge and contact, most others 
were dominated by Indian entrepreneurs. Examples may 
be cited in the case of sugar factories; chemical and 
pharmaceutical works; pottery, brick and tile making 
factories; and also probably rice, soap and match 
factories. Even in the export oriented industries 
where the Indians were handicapped as regards the know­
ledge of foreign markets and their late start, they 
gradually made significant recovery in the '1920*s.
Further entry into these fields (i.e., jute and tea 
industry) from the early ‘1930's was only restricted due 
to over-production of the articles in the world market.
Chapter VI
THE GROWTH OF THE JUTE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
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At the turn of the tv/entieth century, Bengal had only 
one notable manufacturing industry - that of jute# It 
occupied a vital position from the point of view of 
Bengal*s industrial economy employing no less than 
half the total factory labour of Bengal. The export 
value of jute manufactures accounted for nearly 33 
per cent of the entire export trade of Bengal in 1900-01 
and if account was taken of the great quantity of jute 
manufactures exported from Calcutta by rail and coastwise 
for the packing of Indian produce and the quantity used 
in the local markets for the same purpose it is probably 
no exaggeration to say that quite half of the trade of 
Calcutta was dependent on the jute fields of Eastern 
Bengal and the jute mills established along the banks 
of the Hooghly.^
Despite its pre-eminence in Bengal* s economy, the 
growth of the industry was fairly recent. Indeed the 
first jute mill was established only in 1853- Prior to 
that date the fibre was used locally by the handloom jute 
weavers of Bengal to make twines, ropes, coarse fabrics 
for the poor, and also in the fishing industry and for 
mooring small vessels. By the end of the eighteenth 
century, however, it had definitely attracted the atten­
tion of the Board of Trade of the East India Company
(1) RAB, 1900-01, p. ^18.
which sent a consignment of jute samples to England in 
1791. Since that date until 1832 when the fibre was 
first successfully spun mechanically by Messrs. Balfour 
and Melveile at their Chapelshade works in Scotland, raw 
jute of various quantities was being regularly sent for 
experimentations. Once the pioneers were successful in 
spinning yarn by flax machinery, they soon found out 
means to soften the hard and brittle nature of the fibre 
by adding oil and water in the preliminary processes 
which made the fibre more pliable and more easily 
separable, and resulted in the production of a more 
usable thread. The alteration of the existing machinery 
and the construction of the newer forms particularly 
suitable to the treatment of a coarse fibre helped con­
siderably in the production of a good yarn. But it was 
not till 183r that the desired sizes of spun yarn made 
solely from jute were regularly sold in the market.
Three years later, the Dutch Government specified bags 
made of jute instead of flax for moving their East India 
coffee. This helped to establish jute in the eyes of the 
cloth and bag manufacturers and gave a fresh impetus to
'i
the industry. However, it was the Crimean War of 1854-56 
which really set the Dundee jute industry on its feet.
The occasion was caused by the stoppage of flax from 
Russia which forced the military authorities to look for 
substitutes. The American Civil War (1861-65) gave
(1) See, Star of India. July 20, 1934, p. 6.
235
further impetus to the jute trade, for the supplies of 
American cotton was much restricted and consumers had 
to make use of jute. In both these cases, the industry 
acquired new users who did not return to flax or cotton
1when it was again possible to get supplies of the fibres.
The main reason for this permanent change over to jute 
seems to have been its comparative cheapness as a wrapper 
to other fibres in use.
Thus when Bengal had the first jute mill in 1855*
Dundee was already well established and was busy in 
opening up more markets for its products. In spite of 
early vicissitudes, the Bengal mills were able to capture 
the local markets and by the end of the 1860*s one company 
- the Borneo Jute Company in fact tried its hand at exports 
abroad. Though the first attempt was not much of a success 
due to variations in weight and counts, then onwards Bengal 
became a regular exporter of sacking bags. But when 
Bengal began to invade Dundee's valuable Hessain market 
in America, open hostilities broke out. In the ensuing 
struggle that followed Dundee lost to Calcutta but not 
without much bitterness on both sides. The point which 
ultimately settled the score in favour of Calcutta was 
that of comparative costs of production. Calcutta was 
situated in close proximity to jute-growing districts of 
Eastern Bengal and Assam; she had cheap labour, estimated 
at one^third cheaper than British labour; the mills had 
long working hours, said to be from 15 to 16 hours daily
(1) Capital, October 17* 1935* P* 612.
and in some cases, 2? to 24 hours daily on two and three 
shift system, respectively; and not the least the lax 
working and factory conditions were also attributed to 
be one of the advantages of Calcutta compared to Great 
Britain. Thus the clear advantage of Calcutta manufac­
turers in monetary terms was at least £5 per ton, besides 
having a finer quality of jute.
The result was that by the end of the nineteenth
century, Calcutta had become the world's largest jute
manufacturing place supolying not only the Near Eastern
markets but also the United States, Argentine and
Australasia. Dundee, as the Times correspondent observed:
"...only gets a look in when there is a 
failure in the Calcutta supply to foreign 
markets, and particularly when the Argentine, 
finding suddenly that there is a very good 
wheat harvest, require sackings and baggings 
delivered in a hurry, as shipments from 
Calcutta to the Argentine take three or 
four months and from Dundee to the Argentine 
only three or four weeks. The Argentine in 
those circumstances is compelled to buy in 
Dundee; but even then Germany competes with 
Dundee and sometimes outstrips her altogether."
Location
While Bengal's supremacy as a major jute manufacturing 
centre was quite understandable, one could not but wonder 
as to why all the jute mills of Bengal should have been 
located in one particular area - extending along a 60 mile 
stretch on both banks of the river Hooghly, from Bansberia 
Jute Mills (35 miles above the city) to Uluberia (20 miles
(1) The Eriend of India and Statesman (weekly edition), 
February 8, 1906, p. 22.
(2) The Times, May 8, 1908, p. 16.
Map showing the Location of Jute Mills in Bengal 23?
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Source: Report on the Marketing: of Jute and Jute products, 
Second Report {Calcutta, 1941)#
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below on the Howrah) on the North bank of the river, and 
from Hukumchand Mills at Halisahar (28 miles above the city) 
to Birla Mills at Birlapur (22 miles below Calcutta) on the 
South bank. Within that narrow belt lay more than 100 jute 
mills with a total loomage of over 65,000 and an industrial 
labour force of over quarter of a million. This apparently 
perplexing locational factor of this industry needs some 
explanation before we proceed to analyse the record of its 
further growth and development in the twentieth century.
At first glance even though it looks perplexing, there 
was much calculated enterprise in their location. No doubt 
from the point of view of raw material supply only, a jute 
mill situated in Eastern Bengal would have escaped the 
heavy freight charges that was entailed in the transporta­
tion of raw jute from Eastern Bengal (where most of the jute 
was produced) to the West; it must not be forgotten then 
that jute industry was an export-oriented industry and 
therefore needed an outlet. But such an outlet was not
present in Eastern Bengal except through that of Chittagong
1
which was just then developing as a port. Hence, even if 
a mill was located in Eastern Bengal it would have 
necessitated the transportation of its finished products 
to the port of Calcutta for quick and speedy delivery. In
(1) This is obvious from the following figures of the value 
of trade of Bengal that passed through Calcutta in 1900-01 
(000*s omitted)
Merchandise The province Calcutta
Imports i>1,86,91 5^  ,79,44
Exports 55,14,44 54,22,40
See, RAB. 1900-01, p. 115.
other words, whatever gain the mills would have made by 
consuming raw materials locally, had to incur almost the 
same amount in transporting iReVfinished products to 
Calcutta for export purposes.
But there was much more to it than just the question of 
the supply of raw material and its transportation. Jute 
mills required heavy machinery and stores and the freight 
for sending the same from Calcutta to any Eastern Bengal 
district would have to he incurred. On the other hand, a 
mill situated on the Hooghly escaped from such a burden. 
Moreover, when one looked at the difficulties of transport 
which involved such long distances including transhipments 
in the case of Mymensingh, Dacca, Tipperah and other dis­
tricts on the eastern side of the river Brahmaputra, one 
would wonder twice before setting foot on such adventures.
Another great problem for an Eastern Bengal mill 
would have been regarding its power supply and fuel. In 
this regards, the mills at the Hooghly had the special 
advantage of being situated near the coal fields of 
Ranig-ungtwhich had good railway connections with that of 
Howrah. Indeed it was the railway link between Ranigunge 
and Howrah established around 18r5 (by the East India 
Railway Company) which finally set the ground for erection
(1) However, in the process a saving of 5 per cent in the 
freight charge would have been made by an Eastern Bengal 
mill as the processed jute would have been lighter by that 
weight. See, G. N. Gupta, A Survey of the Industries and 
Resources of Eastern Bengal and Assam for 1907-08 
(Shillong, 1908), p. 63•
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of power-driven machinery in that area. As there were
no coal mines in Eastern Bengal, it would have meant
large-scale movements of coal from western Bengal with
consequent addition to the cost of production. Moreover,
the rates of electricity also differed greatly between
'Greater Calcutta' area and the various other mufassal
towns of Eastern Bengal. This was mainly because of the
fact that the 'Greater Calcutta' area could afford the load
which was most desirable from the point of view of power
generation, and also because it had cheaper coal and had
an efficient administration. The cumulative result was
that it could supply power at a cheaper rate than any
place in Eastern Bengal. For example, the average rate
per unit charged for industrial purposes by the Calcutta
Electric Supply Corporation in 1923 was 1.288 annas which
was further reduced to 0.896 annas in 1927 with the
continued cheapness of coal (due to the expensive and
modern appliances which had been provided at considerable
costs). On the other hand, in no place in Eastern Bengal
had the rates been lower than this. Thus in Narayangunj
it was 3*3 annas per unit, in Dacca 3*68 annas, in
Chittagong 3*78 annas and in Chandpur it was as high as
2
5.96 annas per unit. Furthermore, a mill situated in 
Eastern Bengal would have suffered disadvantages arising 
from the absence of large engineering firms capable at a 
short notice of carrying out expensive repairs and altera­
tions of machinery.
(1) Capital. May 31, 1928, p. 1192.
(2) Annual Report on the Administration of the Indian 
Electricity Act, 1910, in Bengal for the year 1938 (Alipore, 
T9T977Appendix IT, p. 32.------------------------
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From the factors discussed it is clear that it would 
have been most unwise to establish large-scale jute manufac­
turing mills in Eastern Bengal. Indeed, one of the early 
mills - Sersjganj was established there but was found un­
workable and when it was damaged in 1897 in an earthquake, 
its machinery was brought to Hooghly to be installed in 
Delta jute Mill. In the twentieth century also, from time 
to time rumours had been rife of the establishment of jute 
mills at various places in Eastern Bengal. One such 
rumour was regarding Narayanganj. The idea behind the 
establishment of such mill was probably to supply local 
needs by manufacturing on the spot and thus eliminating the 
cost of bringing back the manufactured jute products from 
Calcutta. The place also offered probably more attractions 
to an entrepreneur than any other due to ample suoplies of 
labour and raw material. But nothing was heard of the 
project till later Pakistan came into existence in 1947 and 
the first mill was established at Narayanganj.
THE GROWTH OF THE JUTE INDUSTRY
The twentieth century saw an extraordinary leap forward in 
the fortunes of the jute manufacturing industry in Bengal.
The history of this expansion can be studied in three 
distinct phases (1) from 1900 to World War I, (2) World 
War I to 1929 and (3) the period of the depression from 
1929-30 to 1939.
(1) Capital, November 22, 1934, P* 864
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The Jute Mill Industry, 1900-1914
Having extended their markets in both the hemispheres by 
the close of the nineteenth century, the jute mills of 
Bengal were confident of success. Their confidence was 
further strengthened by the fact that still a large per­
centage of raw jute was being exported from India every 
year to be manufactured into jute goods abroad. As a 
result not only did they extend their mills but several 
new ones also came into existence, increasing their total 
loomage from 9»481 in 1895 to no less than 37»316 by 1912.^  
The mills in this regard were greatly helped by a continued
and rising world demand for their products which increased
2
by over 500 per cent between 1895 a*id 1912. This extra­
ordinary growth of the jute trade attracted the attention
*
of a contemporary who wrote:
"In the sphere of commerce it would be 
difficult to find anything more remarkable 
than the recent expansion of the jute 
trade. Prices have risen to an unprecedented 
height, and yet the demand has continued.
Jute has not been made dearer by any 
diminution in the supply, for, on the 
contrary, the production of fibre has 
increased; it is solely the other great 
factor in price, an enhanced demand, that 
has sent up this cheapest of raw materials 
to a figure which almost suggests dearness... 
in spite of everything the producers of 
raw materials throughout the world clamour 
for sacks and sack cloth. Everywhere 
stocks seem to be bare."
This strong world demand for Indian jute goods was,
however, subject to external limitations. Its growth
(1) The Statesman (weekly overseas edition), February 15, 
1913,;--p7"V0“.
(2) Ibid.
(5) frhe Times (Financial and Commercial Supplement), 
September 10, 1906, p. 509*
or indeed its very prosperity depended upon the pros­
perity of world agriculture. A good harvest the world 
over would result in soaring demand, conversely, a bad 
one ■ ould glut the market. In addition to world agricul­
tural condition which itself was subject to fluctuating 
weather conditions, the demand for jute goods depended 
upon the volume of world trade and growth of protectionism. 
• j’j, Since the demand for jute goods depended upon such 
a wide variety of factors, the early pioneers found it 
almost impossible for any single mill to regulate its 
supply to demand without taking unnecessary risks.
Moreover, since the profit margins of mills also to a 
great extend depended upon such internal factors as the 
price level of raw materials, transport charges etc it 
was thought that some sort of a central organization 
which could speak as a body was essential. This resulted 
in the foundation of the Indian Jute Mills Association 
(till ^902 called Indian Jute Manufacturers Association) 
in 1884. Although it looked after all matters relating 
to the jute industry, i.e. collection and classifying 
facts and statistics, opening markets, obtaining the 
removal of grievances, communicating with public bodies 
and kindred associations; its main function was to res­
trict output either by short-time working or by sealing 
of looms. Another method of maximising profits was by 
fixing the minimum rates for different jute products.
Since 1886 when short-time agreement was first introduced, 
it had been a regular feature in the life of the Bengal 
jute industry. In 1906, the method was resorted to from
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1st January to 70th June when raw jute prices soared to 
a level which threatened to make manufacturing profits 
vanish. In 1908, when trade depression set in due to 
the extreme lightness of the money market and which con­
tinued till 1911-12 as a result of the financial crisis 
in America, IJMA prescribed the same course, i.e. five 
days a week for most of the time. Had not the mills 
followed (with one or two exceptions) the IJMA directives 
and acted in unison, it is difficult to imagine how they 
would have braved the storm. The IJMA also from time to 
time fixed the scale of minimum rates, thereby acting as 
a sort of quasi-mono^olistic body. Such prescriptions 
almost amounted to guaranteed profit's for the member mills. 
However, it could do little as regards the unbridled ex­
pansion of mills, partly caused by trade jealousy and 
partly after windfall profits. Indeed one of the additional 
reasons for the jute mill crisis of 1909-12 was caused by 
the augmentation of jute mills after a very successful year 
in 1906-07* New machinery was ordered and existing mills 
extended which actually brought about and further deepened 
the crisis.
Not only did extensions and erection of new mills 
took place in Bengal but as soon as foreign countries rea­
lized that the jute industry was important and remunerative, 
they imposed high import duties on the jute manufactures 
sent to them from India. Thus the duty on jute yarns in 
Germany was from £2 to £6 10s per ton; in France from 
£2 15s to £8 15s; in Austria from £1 10s to £5; in Italy
.from £4 to £21 10s; and in Russia it was as high as
I
£6C per ton. Under such high protective tariffs large 
jute manufacturing industries sprang up in Europe and 
America (and one or two elsewhere); the number of fac­
tories were said to have been no less than 202 towards
2
the beginning of the First World War. The outcome of 
such hasty expansions brought about a problem. Raw jute 
which had so far been cheap and plentiful, began to rise 
in prices. This happened not because there was a shrin­
kage in the total area under jute cultivation or because 
the output had decreased due to low yield or actual 
deterioration of the plant but because the demand for 
this article had been so insistent that supply could not 
keep pace with demand. Consequently, prices of raw jute 
continued to exhibit sudden rises as could be seen from 
Table 6.1. It will be seen that for the ten years 
ending 1903 the average price was about Rs. 30 per bale. 
Then prices advanced and the average price for the last 
eleven years rose to nearly Rs.47.
(1) The Times, May 8, 1908, p. 16.
(2) The mills were located in the following countries: 
United Kingdom 30; Germany 36; Austria-Hungary 17; 
France 32; Italy 25; Belgium 23; America 16; Russia 7; 
Sweden 5; Denmark 2; Switzerland 2; Holland 2;
Brazil 2; Norway 1; Rio 1; Argentine 1. See, BLCP, 19th 
December, 1917* Vol. XLIX, p. 1004.
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Table 6.1 Price of raw jute (M quality) per bale, 1894-1914
Tear October 1 November 1
Rs. An. Rs. An.
189/J 29 0 27 8
1895 30 8 31 8
1896 39 0 33 8
1897 23 0 22 8
1898 29 0 30 8
1899 33 0 33 8
1900 31 8 32 0
1901 27 12 25 0
1902 31 8 31 0
1003 30 4 28 0
1904 30 8 33 0
190 c 43 0 45 0
1906 39 0 37 8
1907 43 0 41 8
1908 42 8 40 0
1909 33 8 34 0
1910 40 0 45 8
1911 50 0 48 0
1912 37 0 63 0
1913 82 8 77 8
1914 34 8 —
Source: Capital, October 29* 1914, p. 973*
The manufacturing industry would probably have been 
only too glad to buy at such extraordinary prices had it 
been possible for them to pass these on to the customers 
and thus ensuring a relatively good margin of profits for 
the industry. But this was far from so. The fear of 
encouraging jute substitutes through such a pricing 
policy had always been a major deterrent to the industry. 
They had earlier seen such monopolies as indigo and raw 
silk vanish from Calcutta's export list and were thus 
naturally anxious not to push the prices of its manufac- 
tures too high. The result was that excepting those mills
(1) The cautiousness of the IJMA could be understood from 
the fact that while the average quinquennial price of raw 
jute had doubled in 70 years ending 1917-14; the price of 
Its hessian products (101 Oz. 40") had only risen by about 
20 per cent during the same period. Capital, April 5* 1918, 
P. 795.
which were fortunate in their purchases, manufacture 
became unprofitable, heavy losses had to be incurred, 
and restricted production became unavoidable in many 
cases. That the position of the industry was not al­
ways promising could partly be gauged from its depressed 
share values; and partly from the average dividends 
declared by ten jute mills (selected at random) prior 
to a period of seven years previous to 1913 given 
below:^
Company Average divi
Alexandra Nil
Alliance 8 per cent
Anglo-India 4-J " 1
Baranagore 6-J " 1
Belvedere 4 " 1
Delta 6-} " I
Port William Nil
Gondolpara 14- " 1
Kelvin 3 " 1
Soorah 31 " 1
(1) The average share value of Rs.100 invested in jute 
mills were as follows:
1907-08 Rs.131
1808-09 Rs.129
1909-10 Rs.116
1910-11 Rs .114
1911-12 Rs.1'19 8 annas
1912-13 Rs.136 13 annas
1913-14 Rs.126
See, Review of the Trade of India, 1910-11, p. 72; Ibid., 
1911 - ^ , p . 74; Ibid.. 1912-15. p . 39; Ibid., 1913-TC7"
P. 47.
(2) Capital, March 13, ^918, p. 616.
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The IJMA had also a second ground for concern. The 
rise in prices of jute had also aggravated the practice 
of adult e r a t i n g  raw jute with sand and water. This prac­
tice, to which was due much deterioration as regards both 
colour and strength (called "heart disease") was generally 
attributed to a certain class of middlemen who bought jute 
more or less in dry condition and then saturated it with 
sand and water to such an extent as to give them a profit 
due to its increased weight.
Therefore, with a view to removing their grievances, 
the industry approached the Government on several occasions.
In dpi2, the IJMA urged the creation of a special depart­
ment for the purpose of supervising the extension of jute
p
cultivation in Bengal. In a lengthy document published m  
1913, the IJMA appealed to the Government to take positive 
steps to increase the cultivation of jute crops in India 
and if this was not done, it pointed out "no efforts will 
be spared to provide substitutes or to discover other 
means of handling the produce of the world". It rejected 
the idea that any increase in the cultivation of jute
(1) The phenomena of "heart disease" was restricted only 
to damp jute, and was so called because it appeared first 
in the centre of the bundle. When damp jute was baled, 
it caused a rise in temperature, sometimes upto AO C 
(104 F) in the interior of the bale. This was due to the 
action of thermoplilic bacteria which attracted the 
cellulose constituent of the fibre and apparently hydro- 
lized it. The result was that a large proportion some­
times approaching 60 per cent of such damaged fibre became 
soluable in water, or in dilute acid, or alkali, causing 
loss of all tensile strength. The fibre would then become 
useless for spinning purposes. Capital, September 6, 1918, 
P. 5*2.
(2.) B L C P , Z Z ,  I S ZI, V„|. X, No .3 , P- ■
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would be at the expense of rice, which was the principal 
crop and chief article of food in the province. In 1914, 
it was the Dundee Chamber of Commerce which was urging 
the government to encourage the extension of jute cul­
tivation. On all these occasions the government refused 
to take direct action for the extension of area under 
jute. This was because of two reasons, firstly, the 
government was of the view that the area under any parti­
cular crop must depend on the profit which the cultivator 
expected to derive from any other crop; and secondly, 
that the government would be exceeding its legitimate
functions if it brought any pressure to bear on the
2
cultivators in this matter. Likewise, pressure was also 
brought upon the government to legislate and put an end 
to the practice of adulteration of jute by mixing sand
7.
and water. The government while admitting to the pre­
valence of the oractice, refused to legislate on the 
ground that the purchasers in this country protected 
themselves to a great extent by rebates in the case of 
excessive moisture; and secondly, legislation would 
cause disturbance in the trade as damaged jute would be 
driven out of the market and hence there would be a rise
(1) Capital, December 24, 1913* pp. 1595-98.
(2) BLCP,February 22, 1921, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 71.
(3) ^he proceedings relating to the jute adultration are 
available in government files. See, IOR: Vol. 7574, BRP 
(Agriculture) , August 1907} ^ os. 1-46, rr- 2.os- 2.<\c>.
C
D
in the nominal price, Moreover, it might alarm the 
cultivators, as was probable, misleading reports of 
the intentions of government could cause diminution 
of production and would thus intensify the danger which 
was under contemplation. A special danger was that if 
legislation was resorted to, it would be necessary to 
fix a limit of permissible saturation of jute, and that 
if this was done the tendency would be strong for all 
jute to be saturated upto that limit. If this was to 
happen, the result would be that, while exceptionally 
bad jute might disapoear from the market the general 
quality of jute supplied would deteriorate, and this 
would, perhaps, be the greater evil of the two, and that 
it would necessitate appointing inspectors of unimpeachable 
integrity and judgement otherwise there would be a danger 
of making mistakes through acting on corrupt evidence 
or misleading information.
The action of the government in refusing to bring
pressure on the cultivators to extend the area under jute
cultivation was correct. The ordinary laws of supply and
demand was enough to look after itself. If the prices
of raw jute had increased, it was mainly due to the
enormous pressure of the sudden expansion of mills,
both in India and abroad. It was not unnatural that 
•j
illiterate and proverbially conservative ryots should 
take some time to adjust to the newly-created situation.
(1) The Friend of India and Statesman (weekly edition), 
January 24, 1907, p« 19#
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Likewise, by refusing to enact legislation for adulterating 
jute, the government had taken the right step. The solu­
tion to this menace did not lie in legislative interference 
which would have brought ryots within the act but in the 
hands of the jute trade itself which could always refuse 
to buy adulterated jute.
The jute industry was also concerned about the 
correctness of the jute forecasts, issued annually by the 
Department of Agriculture. It was of the gravest impor­
tance to the jute industry that the forecasts should be 
correct as upon them prices were calculated, both of the 
raw material and manufactured article. It was largely on 
the basis of government jute forecasts that different mills 
decided when to purchase their seasonal requirements and 
when to sell their cloth and bags which they would manu­
facture during the same period; and mistakes in the fore­
casts necessarily meant widespread loss, confusion and 
disaster. The government jute forecasts during this 
period show much discrepency between the final forecasts 
and the actual outturn of jute at the end of the season.
Thus in 1901-02, there was a difference of 10 per cent and 
next year that of 7 per cent. Although we do not have the 
full statistics for the intervening period, we know that 
in 1908-09, the crop exceeded the government forecast by 
23.8 lakhs, the government forecast being 64,01,700 bales
while the actual outturn was 87*80,500 bales. Since then
2
such erroneous figures were common.
(1) The ffriend of India and Statesman (weekly edition), 
September ?1', 1903, p. 20.
(2; See, for example, the tables relating to jute forecasts 
in the Statesman (weekly overseas edition), September 6, 
1923, p. 5; Ibid., September 30, 1926, p. 16; and Ibid., 
September 30, 1937* P* 6.
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The reasons for such inaccurate jute forecasts are 
not far to seek. Firstly, there was no statistical basis 
for a forecast.in Bengal except where a cadastral survey 
had been made. The result was that the area under jute 
was reported by the police, who got the information from 
the village chaukidars. This, in the words of a former 
director of agriculture, Mr. Gourlay, amounted more or less 
to mere guesswork. Secondly, the yield per acre also 
differed greatly from district to district. But the agri­
cultural department in calculating the outturn multiplied
2the total area by a fixed standard of three bales per acre. 
Thirdly, in compiling the estimated yield due considerations 
were not taken of the weather and crop reports sent periodi­
cally by district officers to the agricultural department.
This v/as further complicated by the vague terms used by 
district officers such as "Good11, "Fair", "Not Good",
"Poor" etc., which the agricultural department interpreted 
as it liked. Thus the word "Not Favourable" was actually 
interpreted to mean anything from 40 per cent to 70 per 
cent; "Fair" from 7? per cent to 9? per cent; "Poor" from
49 per cent to 80 per cent of the normal outturn in the 
*
year 1913* The net result of such compilations was more 
or less a gamble which unfortunately for the industry 
meant financial loss.
(1) Capital, February 26, 1914, p. 302.
(2) The Statesman (weekly overseas edition), July 18,
191?, P. 5.'
(3) Capital, December 24, 1913, p. 1996.
It was during this period that the foundation was laid 
for the speculative market in Jute, what later on came to 
he known as the Bhitar Bazaar or Fatka market. Jewanmal 
Bengani started this speculative business in 1905-06 when 
prices of Jute suddenly rose. But the movement soon cought 
on; so much so that regular contracts, known as "pink” and 
"white" contract had to be provided for the purpose when 
the speculative fever was at its height. Under such con­
tracts no delivery of Jute took place, and indeed none 
was intended for. Provision was made in the concluding 
paragraph of the contract form for the payment of differ­
ences being arrived at upon a comparison of certificates 
to be obtained from several Marwari firms whose names 
were mentioned. To keep up the farce of the contract 
being a genuine one in respect of Jute bought and sold, 
the usual practice was for the buyers to write a letter 
to the sellers for a declaration of the marks to be deli­
vered. Indeed all the formalities in connection with a 
genuine contract were gone through in respect of such 
contracts.
The effect of such contracts was detrimental to the 
Jute industry as a whole. It turned legitimate trade 
into a huge gamble. In 1913* for example, when abnormal 
rainfall threatened great loss of crop and the world 
demand for bags was so insistant that it was believed manu­
facturers would buy at any price, Bhitar Bazaar took good
(1) H. Sinha 'The Jute Mill Industry Today: Jute futures 
in Calcutta1, Capital, January 16, 1930, p. 139-
Table 6.2 Number of mills, looms, spindles and persons 
employed in the Jute textile industry in India, 1900-01 
to 1938-39
Year No. of mills Looms Spindles Persons employed
1900-01 36 13 , 3^0 317 348 111 272
1901-02 36 16 ,119 331 382 114- 795
1902-03 38 17 ,189 352 214 118 904
1903-04 38 18 ,400 376 718 123 869
1904-05 38 19,991 409 170 133 162
1908-06 39 21 ,986 453 168 144 879
1906-07 44 23,284 520 504 166 895
1907-08 54 27,244 562 274 187 771
1908-09 56 29,525 607 358 192 181
1909-10 60 31 ,418 645 862 204 104
1910-11 38 33,169 682 527 216 390
1911-12 39 32,927 677 519 201 *24
1912-13 61 34,033 708 716 204 092
1913-14 64 36,050 744 289 216 288
1914-13 70 38,379 795 528 238 274
191 3-1 6 70 39,890 812 421 254 14 3
1916-17 74 39,697 824 315 262 r.52
1917-18 76 40,639 834 055 266 0*8
1918-19 76 40,043 839 919 275 c00
1919-20 76 41 ,04 5 856 307 280 131
1920-21 77 41 , 588 869 879 288 *01
1921-22 81 43 ,025 908 359 288 4 50
1922-23 86 47 ,528 1 003 179 321 296
1923-24 89 49 ,038 1 043 417 330 408
1924-26 90 50,359 1 067 633 341 723
1925-26 90 30,503 1 063 700 331 326
1926-27 93 31 ,061 1 083 816 333 659
1927-28 93 32,221 1 105 634 335 804
1928-29 93 32,409 1 108 147 3^3 868
1929-30 98 33,900 1 140 435 343 257
1930-31 100 61 ,834 1 224- 982 307 676
1931-32 103 61 ,426 1 220 586 276 810
1932-33 99 60 ,506 1 202 183 263 442 *
193^-34 99 39,501 1 194 405 257 175
1934-35 100 61 ,387 1 221 786 263 739
1936—36 104 63 ,724 1 279 416 2 77 986
1936-37 104 65 ,273 1 300 077 289 136
1937-38 105 66 ,705 1 337 958 295 162
1938-39 107 67 ,939 1 350 465 298 967
Sources: Statistical Abstract relating to British India 
from 1900-01 to 1909-10 (Forty-fifth number; (London, 1911 ) 
p. Pbb and subsequent issues.
** From 1932-33 to 1938-39,the average daily number of 
workers are for calender years from 1932 to 1938.
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care to inflate the prices long before the actual defici- 
ency was estimated. To be on guard, therefore, jute manu­
facturers had to buy their raw material supplies at least 
eight months ahead. This meant the locking up of large 
amount of working capital for which they had to pay bank 
interests. Similarly, it also meant the erection of large 
warehouses and the payment of insurance for the goods 
therein.
The Jute Industry. 1
With the start of the First World War, the jute industry 
also entered into a new phase - a phase which was to place 
the mills then in existence into an unassailable position 
economically. The war by generating a tremendous demand 
for gunny bags and cloth kept the mills busy till the end 
of the war. So insistant was the demand for jute goods 
that the Hon'ble Commerce Member discussed with the trade 
in Calcutta as to how immediate the goods could be pro­
duced end despatched. The result of this conference was 
the placing of huge orders with the mills in Bengal. Not 
only did the British Government buy for itself, but under 
its orders substantial quantity of bags and cloth had also 
been sent to Russia and France. The magnitude of the 
Government orders since 19 5^ can be measured from Table 6.3. 
Along with large government orders, Bengal had her tradi­
tional markets like that of the United States and the 
Argentine Republic also open. Therefore, contrary to 
falling demands due to transport and exchange difficulties
Capital, September i1, 19^3, p. 670.
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Table 6.3 Shipments on Government account, 1915-16 to 
1918-19
Year Bags (millions) Cloth (million yards)
1915-16 297 35
1916-17 385 135
1917-18 391 205
1918-19 221 269
Total 1,294- 644-
Source: Review of the Trade of India in 1918-19 (Calcutta, 
1919), P. 15.
as was expected, jute goods had a steady and rising market 
during the war# "Never in the history of the trade has 
there been such a demand for all classes of jute fabrics 
and even with the resumption of full time working it had 
been difficult to deal adequately v/ith it. Practically 
all markets maintain a firm tone and goods continue to be 
readily absorbed at full prices" - wrote Kanknarrah Com- 
pany in their half-yearly report in 1918# If the 
Kanknarrah expectations had been more than fulfilled, so 
was the case with the rest of the mills in Bengal.
But the story of its prosperity did not lie in the 
demand factor alone. During the war, due to restrictions 
placed by the Government of India on the import of machi­
nery and mill stores, jute mills could not be expanded as 
was desirable. In fact, there had been an increase of 
some 4,000 looms during the period of five years between
1913-14 and 1918-19# The outcome was that increased demand 
for jute goods had to be met by the existing mills in 
Bengal which naturally placed them in a strong position
(1) Capital, August 2, 1918, p. 270.
to bargain for higher prices. Moreover, as government 
orders arrived without much previous notice, it had the 
effect of acute competition which sent the prices still 
higher. During the war years, the raw jute market also 
underwent a radical change, foreign Europe which con­
sumed about a quarter of raw jute export was shut off 
with the consequent result that the prices of raw jute 
took a sharp downward turn. This was, however, a boon 
to the jute manufacturing industry which could now buy 
raw materials at prices highly favourable to them. Cheap 
jute and increased demand thus brought about a prosperity 
which the jute industry could not even think of a few 
years earlier. The industry had also the additional ad­
vantage of not paying any excess profits tax which, for 
example, Dundee had to. This, indeed made a very big 
difference on the profitability of mills so much so that 
out of nine sterling companies (including one at 
Chandernagore) existing from 1914 to 1916, three had 
transformed themselves into rupee companies in 1917 under 
the Indian Companies Act.
Thus a combination of favourable circumstances placed 
the jute mill industry in an enviable position. The index 
of the net profits of the mills rose from 100 in 1914 to 
566 in 1915, 748 in 1916 and 570 in 1917 which amounted to 
10, 58, 75 and 54 per cent of the total paid up capital of
(1) Capital, January 24, 1919, p. 190
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the comnsnies respectively. The net profits of the mills
for the first half of 1918 was almost as high as that of 
2
1916. This high profitability of the mills resulted in 
the declaration of large dividends - sometimes of over 
200 per cent. It also enabled the mills to accumulate 
substantial sums of capital in the reserve and depre­
ciation funds. After the war, Samnuggar, Tittaghur and 
Victoria were in the field as large bonus distributors 
also. This resulted in the distribution of shares at the 
rate of 50 per cent of their holdings. Preference share­
holders, who had as a rule no claim to any such increases, 
were also encouraged by being given an increased rate of
4
dividends. How well the jute mill industry did compared 
to other industries in India during the war could be under­
stood by looking at Table 6.4.
(1) The Times. August 10, 1918, p. 10. The full details 
are as follows:
1914 1915 19^6 1917
£ £ £ £
1. Total profits 982,000 4,820,000 6,309,000 4,831,000
Do; Index Nos.(100) (491) (643) (492)
2. Debenture int.139,000 139,000 134,000 142,000
3. Net profits 
(subject to depre­
ciation) 823,000 4,661,000 6,155,000 4,689,000
Do; Index Nos.(100) (366) (748) (370)
4. Ratio of net 
profits to paid up
capital 10 38 73 33
(2) Capital, January 24, 1919, pp. 190 & 192. The ratio of 
net profits to total paid up capital for the first half of 
19^8 was 73.
(3) Capital, February 15, 19^8, p. 387* For the year 1916-17 
Kinnison,for example, declared a dividend of 223 per cent.
(4) Capital, November 14, 19^9, p. 1292.
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Table 6.4 Index table of prices of securities and shares 
of certain selected industries in India, 1914, 1917 and 1918
July 19^4 July 19^7 March 1918
66 cotton mills 100 132 161
90 coal companies 100 141 137
88 tea companies 100 127 123
32 jute miils 100 311 467
7 flour mills 100 120 162
1 iron and steel
company (Tata) 100 332 293
Source: The Times Trade Supplement, March 29, 19^9, P« 34.
The prosperity that war brought to the jute industry 
continued even after its end, right till 1929* This was
made possible by means of a series of short-time agree­
ments entered into by the mills in the membership of the 
Association. This working agreements had been in force 
in one form or other since shortly after the cessation of 
hostilities. From early 1921 to the 30th June 1929 short- 
time working agreements provided for a restriction of the 
mills' working hours to 54 per week while in February 1924 
a supplementary agreement was entered into providing that 
during the currency of the original working time agreement 
extra productive machinery or relative buildings would not 
be installed or ordered. How effective the IJMA policy of 
restriction was could be understood from the fact that even 
during the post-war depression which lasted from 1920-21
No- ,
(1) IOR: Vol. 12077, BFP (commerce), March 1936,^p. 17-
to 1923-24, the IJMA was able, more or less, to maintain 
its wholesale price level by reducing production to 
world demand.
The prosperity of the war years brought about large 
extensions and additions in the number of mills. No 
sooner the war was over jute mill machinery and stores 
began to arrive and within a period of three years no less 
than ten jute mills came into existence and by 1929 the 
total number of looms of India had increased to over
p
c2,000. An estimate of their gross investment of capital 
is, however, almost impossible to make. The limitations 
of such estimates are numerous. Firstly, we do not have 
the full statistics as regards the block capital and other 
particulars like the total paid-up capital, depreciation
(1) The world demand for jute products during the three 
years ending 1923-24 was less due to several factors.
The primary factor was, of course, the lack of purcha­
sing power of the Central European countries. South 
America also reduced its demand owing to serious restric­
tions placed on bank credits. In Russia, not only were 
the railways dislocated but also due to decimation of 
horses, cultivators could not market their produce and
in Rumania it was the change in the system of land 
tenure, particularly the splitting up of large estates 
into smail holdings which reduced exportable surplus 
(Review of the Trade of India in 1921-22, p. 18). It 
was also said to have been due to the enormous stock 
accumulated over the last three years in the United 
States and the United Kingdom which brought about a de­
creased demand. The Statesman, June 15* 1922, p. 6.
See, Letter to the Editor by nG. 0."
(2) The ten jute mills were the Orient (1920), Ludlow 
(1920), Cheviot (1920), Nuddea (1921), Birla (1921),
Craig (1921). Presidency (1921), Waverley (1921),
Meghna (1922), and Hukumchand (1922).
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funds and reserves etc., in the case of the privately- 
owned mills and in the concerns under the American 
management. Secondly, mills always carried large 
stocks of raw material and other stores, the value of 
which is almost impossible to estimate. In spite of 
such limitations, in Table 6.5 we have attempted an 
estimate of the amounts invested in the jute mills of 
Bengal which were listed in the issues of "Capital” 
dated 28 August, 1920 and 5 April, 1928.
Table 6.5 Investment of capital in Bengal jute industry, 
1920 & 1928
1920 1928
Gross Block Account
Rs (lakhs) 21,65 Rs (lakhs) 38,00
+ +
£3 million £3.45 million
Ordinary Capital
Paid-up Rs (lakhs) 10,21 Rs (lakhs) 11,16
+ +
£1.6 million £1.88 million
Preference capital
Rs (lakhs) 5,08 Rs (lakhs) 5,31
j
£650,000 £650,000
Debenture Rs (lakhs) 3,05 Rs (lakhs) 3,44
£38,052 
Reserve and other Funds,
including deprecistion
Rs (lakhs) 21,69 Rs (lakhs) 32,40
+ +
£2^47 million £2.65 million
Profits and Loss
Balances Rs (lakhs) 1,52 Rs (lakhs) 68
+ +
£282,037 £266,356
Sources: Capital, August 28, 1920; and Ibid., April 5* 1928
From the above table (Table 6.5) it will be seen 
that the gross block account had almost doubled within 
a period of about eight years. This was due mainly to 
the increased cost of installing new looms which pre­
vious to the war was about Rs. 6,000 per loom and had
a
increased to around Rs. 16,000 after it. The sustained 
increase in the reserves and depreciation funds enabled 
the mills to carry out the extensions necessary without 
greatly increasing the total paid-up capital of the 
companies.
Of the capital invested in the jute mills, it is 
believed that over 60 per cent of it was owned by the 
Indians themselves which was quite in contrast to the 
situation prior to 1914 when hardly any Indian had any 
share in the industry. The changed attitude of the 
Indian capitalists towards this industry was perhaps 
brought about by war profits. The European share­
holders finding their shares considerably appreciated in 
value perhaps also took the opportunity of unloading 
these during the war which made it easier for the spe­
culative Marwari investors to increase their shareholdings 
substantially. The period also marked the entry of 
Indians as jute mill entrepreneurs. In 1921 Birla 
Brothers established a mill with 4^0 looms. But the 
finest example of Indian entrepreneurship was the flo­
tation of the Hukumchand Jute Company Limited in May,
1922. Not only was this an Indian concern - much of the
(1) A. K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India (Cambridge, 
1972), pp. ?73-?74.
equipment was also for the first time manufactured in
India. For instance, the looms, of which there were
* 25, and the softners, six in number, were the work of
the Britannia Engineering Company, while the spindles,
numbering approximately 12,000 were manufactured by the
q
Angus Engineering Works.
The prosperity of the period, however, did not mean 
prosperity to the jute ryots. The war meant the closing 
down of raw jute markets of Germany and Austria, which 
consumed more than a quarter of Bengal*s exports of raw
p
jute. Subsequently, more markets were closed either as 
a result of short/age of freight or being declared a pro­
hibited zone. Thus the total exports of raw jute in 
1916 showed a decrease of 19 per cent as compared with 
1915, and 35 per cent as compared with the pre-war year
1913»^ With the fall in exports, prices of raw jute also
4
fell considerably. The situation was worsened by the 
monopolistic hold of the jute manufacturers who would 
only buy at dictated prices. The result was widespread 
distress among the ryots, sometimes leading to looting
(1) The Statesman (weekly overseas edition), May 25, 1922,
p. 1^1
(2) Capital. August 27, 1914, p.535*
(3) Ibid., February 16, 1917, P* 416. See, "Official 
Papers"•
(4) Prices of raw jute (M. Group) in Calcutta at the end 
of March were as follows (per bale of 400 lbs.):
1915 Rs. 40
1916 Rs. 59
1917 Rs. 49
1918 Rs. 40
1919 Rs. 64
See, Review of Trade of India, 1920-21, p.14. For pre­
war prices of raw jute, see, p. 2.46 of this chapter.
"1
of hats and bazaars. The Government of Bengal, however, 
could do little, as it felt that it was extremely diffi­
cult, if not impossible, to enforce any provision of 
minimum prices due to the presence of innumerable number
of middlemen and the different grades and qualities of
2jute that was involved.
However, it would be too much to say that the jute 
industry itself had no problem to contend with during 
this period. The first was as regards the supply of 
coal of which the jute industry required annually 
1,052,000 tons. This supply had been severely inter­
rupted by the shortage of waggons in the early 1920's 
and in spite of the Goal Transportation Officer's earnest 
efforts the stocks at the mills were insufficient to run 
all the mills and consequently several mills had to be
Zi
closed down* The position would have been much more 
severe had not the post-war depression coincided with the 
scarcity of coal.
The problem of jute forecasts also arose again 
during this period. So pitifully inaccurate were the 
government estimates with the actual outturn that the 
whole exercise of issuing forecasts had been reduced to 
a farce. Thus the figures were incorrect to the extent
(1) Capital, January 18, 1918, p. 142.
(?) BLfcjt1, July 4, 1918, Vol. L, p. 744.
(3) Capital. March 23, 1917, P- 677.
(4) The Statesman (weekly overseas edition), February 9, 
1921, p. 19.
of 28 per cent, 76 per cent and 43 per cent in the years 
1920-21, 1921-22, and 1922-23 respectively. Such esti­
mates upset mill calculations very gravely. For example, 
in 1925-26 when the forecast figure put the estimated 
outturn to 79 lakh bales, apparently insufficient for the 
world consumption, jute prices rose to the unprecedented 
level of Rs. 140 per bale for First Marks. But later on 
it was found that the outturn was actually much in excess 
of government forecasts and prices came down sharply to 
Rs. 80. But unfortunately for the manufacturers the 
gunny prices could not keep pace with the jute price.
The Jute Industry in Depression, 1929-50 to 1959 
Since 1921 when the mills within the membership of the 
IJMA adopted short-time working agreement of 54 hours per 
week, Calcutta mills had enjoyed a good measure of pros­
perity. The output of the mills had always commanded a 
ready market at rates which left a handsome manufacturing 
profit. The managing agents, while declaring large divi­
dends to the shareholders, had been able to consolidate 
and strengthen the financial position of the companies 
under their management. But all this was to change radi­
cally with the coming of the world-wide depression which 
was particularly severe in the case of primary products. 
This meant a greatly-reduced demand for jute manufactures. 
Further, as there was little demand from other industries 
and less movement of goods in the international market, 
the demand for jute manufactures slumped very low.
26f
However, since the IJMA was a closely-knit body 
and acted as a quasi-monopolistic group, it could pro­
bably have reduced its production to world demand as it 
did previously; but the situation was quite altered 
against it by the erection of new mills not within the 
membership of the Association. The erection of these 
mills had seriously upset the effects of regulated pro­
duction upon which the profitability of the member mills 
depended. Therefore, with the incoming of the depression 
the first task of the IJMA was to bring those mills 
within the membership of the Association so that it 
could regulate supply to demand as before. In its 
effort, the IJMA was able in 1930 to bring Adamjee,
Gagalbhai, Shree Hanuman and Premchand - four of the six 
of the principal non-Association mills (the other two 
were Agarpara and Ludlow) to become signatories to the 
working time agreement then in force. However, in March 
193^» when the Association mills reduced their hours of 
work to 40 per week, sealed up 15 per cent of their looms 
and continued to observe the principle that no extension 
of productive machinery would be made, the recently 
joined new mills seceded from the Association.
Nor was it a surprise move on the part of the re­
cently erected mills to take such a step. If the older 
establishments within the IJMA were acting with the 
instinct of self-preservation, so were the new mills.
The IJMA mills had behind them large reserves and depre­
ciation funds which enabled them to restrict production
26;
or to seal looms or even to pay dividends out of these if 
need be; but the case was not the same with the newly- 
erected mills. Already the 5^ hour-a-week working 
scheme was hurting them (realizing which, Agarpara and 
Ludlow did not even become signatories to the IJMA wor­
king agreement in the first place) which led to complaints,
off and on, but the Association paid no heed to their
>1
expression of grievances and when the 40 hour-a-week 
prescription with a uniform closing of 1 5 per cent of the 
total looms came, they naturally resigned one by one from 
the IJMA.
But the trading conditions had already touched bottom 
by 1932 and so did the profits of the mills. The pres­
cribed oolicy had failed miserably to improve the situation, 
and over and above that if the outside mills were allowed 
to continue to work for 108 hours weekly on the double 
shift system as some of these were doing, the future of 
the jute industry was indeed very bleak. Moreover, cer­
tain of the Association mills were under the strong temp­
tation to increase their production by nearly two-thirds 
and thereby reduce substantially their overhead costs. It 
was feared that these might break away from the 40-hour- 
argeement unless some effective action was taken against 
them. Under the circumstances, the IJMA had but only 
three options open. The first was to suspend temporarily 
the working agreement, come out into the open market and
(1) Capital, March 31» ^932, P- 482. Letter to the Editor
by R. N. Roy.
fight the non-Association mills. But the financial con­
sequences of such a move were likely to be disastrous.
It would have meant the collapse of gunny prices and 
banks would have been obliged to call in their money 
which they advanced against stocks of goods and shares.
The second alternative was to persuade the non-Associa­
tion mills to adopt some form of restriction in produc­
tion. But this implied the giving of certain advantages 
to the non-Association mills, possibly longer working 
hours and the employment of all looms which it was quite 
unwilling to do. The third alternative was to seek 
government intervention and which it did when Sir John 
Anderson was appointed as the new Governor of Bengal in 
May, 193? and ultimately an agreement was signed which 
was to run for a period from 1st August 1932 to the 30th 
June 1933* The main features of the agreement were as 
follows:-
(a) that the Association mills would work 40 hours a 
week with 15 per cent of their looms sealed;
(b) that outside mills would work 5^  hours a week with a 
full complement of machinery;
(c) that the Agarpara mill would be nermitted to increase 
its loomage by 64;
(d) that during the period of the agreement there should 
be no increase in productive machinery in any other mill; 
and
(e) that the Premchand Jute Mills and the Shree Hanuman 
Jute Mills would continue to be members of the Association,
26£
and would be given the privilege of working with their 
full complement of machinery for 5^- hours per week during 
the currency of the agreement and that the IJMA would be 
at liberty to consider the claims of certain other mills 
within the Association to similar treatment subject to 
the condition that the privilege of working 5^ hours a 
week would not be accorded to more than 4 per cent of the 
total number of looms of the mills within the Association 
including the Premchand and the Shree Hanuman Jute Mills.
Although the new arrangement between the IJMA mills 
and certain other non-Association mills improved the posi­
tion of the industry financially and stocks fell to a cer­
tain eytent, it could not stop other mills from being
2erected, both in Bengal and in other provinces of India. 
Unrestricted by any form of control, these mills were 
working by double and triple shifts anything from 108 to 
120 hours per week and thereby could produce three times 
what an Association mill could do with the same complement 
of machinery. Their profits were consequently much more 
than those of the mills whose output was regulated. It 
was this special advantage of not being subject to any
(1) Review of the Trade of India in 1951-52 (Calcutta, 
1952)i PP* 83-84. It could be seen from the above arrange­
ment that in spite of government intervention, the IJMA 
had to concede certain important advantages to the non- 
Association mills.
(2) Stocks of Calcutta mills fell from 505 million yards 
in 1951 to 14-3 million yards by 1955* Capital, February 
*9 1937 9 P. 185
control regarding output which was providing the 
greatest attraction for those who wanted to start
A
new mills. Moreover, although there was only about 
500 such outside looms in July 1934, there was defi­
nite proof that further expansion, by way of extension 
of existing mills, was contemplated, which would give 
to this group of mills an aggregate of approximately 
1,800 looms, which would be equivalent to about 7*000
to 7*500 Association looms under the present conditions
2
of working hours adopted by the outside mills. This
serious situation led the IJMA to ask the Government
of Bengal for legislative intervention which, however,
the government declined unless the mills themselves
3
adopted a scheme of rationalization.
(1) It was estimated that a membership mill of 600 
looms (400 hessian plus 200 sacking) working 40 hours 
a week would manufacture at least 7*200 tons (3*200 
hessian plus 4,000 sacking) per annum whereas the 
outside mills with the same complement of looms but 
at 62 hours per week would manufacture 10,800 tons 
(4,800 hessians plus 6,000 sackings). Therefore, the 
productive capacity of the outside mills were 50 per 
cent higher. Its cost of manufacture was also thought 
to be Rs. 20 per ton cheaper than that of the member­
ship mill. If the margin of Jute manufacture was Rs. 40 
per ton, the membership mill would earn a yearly profit 
of Rs. 2,88,000 or Rs. 480 per loom (in effect the 
actual profits per loom was even less than this in 1956, 
Capital, June 3* 1937* P* 895) whereas the outside mill 
with its extra production and reduced cost of manufac­
ture would earn Rs. 60 per ton or Rs. 6,48,000 per year, 
i.e., Rs, 1,080 per loom or in other words an extra 
profit of Rs. 600 per loom. The Statesman (weekly 
overseas edition), October 3* 1935* P* 8. See, Letter 
to the Editor by "Anti Speculation".
(2) Letter from the Secretary, IJMA to the Secretary to
the Government of Bengal, Commerce Department. IOR:
Vol. 12077, BFP (commerce), March 1936,Tp.''20.
(7) See, the text of the letter adressed to the Secretary,
IJMA by the Government of Bengal, Commerce Department,
Capital, September 5* 1935* P* 399#
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Having failed to persuade the government to legis­
late and having been confronted with the dangerous 
expansion of outside mills who were unwilling to res­
trictive production, the IJMA decided to employ the only 
means in its power, which was to increase production and 
accordingly it unsealed all its looms by February 1936.
It also decided to terminate its working agreement with 
the non-Association mills with effect from March 31 , 1936. 
Since then there v/as no restriction on the working hours
of mills in India and stocks grew to alarming proportions,
a
far outstripping the needs of the market. Prices of manu­
factured goods fell to its lowest point ever since the war 
and manufacturing profits almost vanished. Many mills
Table 6.6 Profits of fjute mili industry, 1928 to 1937
Year No. of com­
panies
Profits 
(Rs. *000)
Profits,same 
companies, 
previous year 
(Rs. '000)
Chain index 
(Base, 1928; 
100)
1928 47 7,69*30 N. A. 100.0
1929 4 7 6,58,17 7,69,30 85.6
1930 47 2,91,50 6,58,17 37.9
1931 49 68,60 2,99,90 8.7
1932 50 1,02,84 70,49 12.6
1933 52 1,61,92 1,03,66 19.8
1934 53 2,86,70 1,64,71 34.4
1933 53 3,33,29 2,86,70 40.0
1936 53 2,16,33 3,33,29 25.9
1937 54 1,00,75 2,18,41 12.0
Source : Capital, December 8, 1938, p. 823.
(1) Stocks of manufactured goods in India held by the 
major portion of the industry had increased from around 
161 million yards on March 31* 1936 to 331 million yards 
by April 30, 1936. The Statesman (weekly overseas 
edition), May 12, 1938, p. 9*
which did not have sufficient reserves to enable them 
to continue paying losses or did not think it advisable 
to manufacture any longer, closed down. When faced with 
such a situation, the Bengal Government had no alternative 
but to promulgate an Ordinance (Bengal Jute Ordinance, 
1938) whereby it made it unlawful except with the pre­
vious sanction of the Chief Inspector of Factories to
increase the number of looms or to replace any existing
1looms in any jute mill. The maximum working period was 
also fixed at 45 hours per week for all mills, excepting
72 hours a week for the five small mills having 175 looms
2
or less. Under the threat of this Ordinance, the mills 
had no option but to join the IJMA and sign a working 
agreement. The Bengal Jute Ordinance also, having served 
its purpose was withdrawn by the government and the manu­
facturing industry was once again a united Association.
The successful completion of the negotiations was followed 
by large government orders for sandbags which moved the 
prices of manufactured goods sharply on the markets.
The threat to the Bengal jute industry did not come 
only from expanding mills within India but also from 
foreign countries. Thus ever since the close of the war, 
Bengal had been exporting increasing quantity of raw
(1) Star of India, September 10, 1938, p. 4.
(2) Capital, September 15, 1938, p. 397* The decision 
was made by the Advisory Committee appointed by the 
Government of Bengal in accordance with the provisions 
of the Jute Ordinance.
(3) The only mills of Bengal which did not become mem­
bers of the IJMA were Ludlow and Gagalbhai which re­
presented approximately 2 per cent of the loomage in 
Bengal. The Statesman (weekly overseas edition),
March 9, 1939, P* 13*
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material abroad to be manufactured there into finished 
products. Thereby those countries v/ere not only able 
to supply their home requirements adequately but also 
gradually invaded overseas markets (as could be seen in 
Table 6.7)* So far as the supply of their respective
Table 6,7 Exports of jute yarn, jute cloths and jute 
bags from the major European jute manufacturing coun­
tries in 1922 and 1927
Country 1922
Tons
1927
Tons
France 7,832 19,171
Germany 13,319 17,228
Belgium 1,372 14,299
Austria and
Czechoslovakia 7,315 17,887
Italy 5,027 11,589
Poland 138 3,622
Great Britain
(Home made goods) 68,536 81,4 35
T o t a l 103,979 : 163,231
Source: Capital, February 23, 1929, p. 456.
home market was concerned, Calcutta could do but little. 
This was mainly because most of these countries had high 
tariff duty which protected their home industry against 
foreign competition. But it is a sad commentary to note 
that Calcutta itself was no less responsible for the 
increasing growth of overseas mills. By securing an 
artificially high price for its products it encouraged 
foreign countries to set up their own mills. Moreover, 
since those foreign countries had no restriction in
2 7 4
production like the Bengal mills, its cost of production 
per unit was also lower which gave them competitive ad­
vantage abroad. But probably more important was the 
fact that Calcutta lacked salesmanship which was so vital 
in overseas competition. Thus the German mills were at 
all times prepared to allow buyers options ranging from 
25 to 60 inches and even more, without the addition of 
any premium, and would sell any of these sizes in lots 
of 5 bales. But the situation was quite different with 
the Calcutta mills. It was virtually impossible to secure 
any options more than 40-8 oz. option 74 and 36 inches 
or 40-104 oz. option 10 oz. and on very rare occasions 
when it was possible to secure large options a premium 
of Rs. 1 to Rs. 2 was charged. Further, if the quantities 
were anything below 50,000 yards, an additional premium 
was enforced. Another great disadvantage of Calcutta 
mills was the lack of diversity in their products. Excep­
ting a very small quantity of twist and yarn, rope and 
twine, and canvas; the vast majority of their products 
were either sackings or hessian cloth. It paid very little 
attention to commercial research or to new uses to which 
jute could be put to. The Minority Report of the Finlow 
Committee condemned the jute industry of Bengal for its 
"distinct lack of variety" and "the absence of enterprise" 
for restricting its manufacture to the production of 
practically two varieties of goods and reminded it of the
(1) Earnest A. Feldmann, 'The Indian Jute Mill Industry: 
How can the Hessian Industry be Improved?", Capital, 
March 20, 1Q?0, P .  674.
significant fact that the continent of Europe "are not 
only earning profits for themselves by devising new and 
more costly uses of jute as a blending material for silk 
or wool, but also stimulating demand for jute and 
consequently helping the maintenance of its price."
One wonders whether the export duty was not also to a 
certain extent responsible for the increasing growth of 
overseas competition against the jute mill industry.
This will be clear if we look at certain anomalies in 
connection with these duties. In the first place the 
export duty was highest on goods in which the Calcutta 
mills met with the severest competition, namely hessians. 
Thus hessians bore an export duty of Rs. 32 per ton 
against Rs. 25-3 per ton on raw jute. It was no wonder 
that the ratio of jute exported to that of the jute manu­
factured in India tended to increase in the post-war 
period. Secondly, cuttings had to pay an export duty of 
Rs. 7 per ton only which encouraged overseas competitors 
to build up an industry in the manufacture of heavy 
sacking in which cuttings were largely used. Moreover,
it was claimed that a good quantity of raw jute also left
2the country under the description of cuttings.
(1) Report of the Bengal Jute Enquiry Committee, Vol.I, 
Minority Report (Alipore, 193^ -J* p. 79# A similar re­
port on the Bengal jute industry (Eawcus Committee) in 
1939 also urged the manufacturers to divert their finan­
cial resources to specially selected lines of manufac­
ture. This, the report thought would be "an aspect of 
constructive rationalization". It felt that it was the 
only way in which they could permanently increase the 
demand for jute goods, and through them the demand for 
jute. Report of the Bengal Jute Enquiry Committee.
Vol. I (Alipore, 1939), p. 20.
(2) Capital, September 13, '1934, p. 471.
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Table 6.8 Export of jute manufactures from India (all
sorts), 1900-01 to 1938-39
Year Bags Cloths Total value
No. (million) Yards (million) Rs. (lakhs)
'1900-01 203 365 786
1901-02 230 419 871
1902-03 225 493 902
1903-04 206 332 947
1904-05 201 576 994
1905-06 233 659 12,45
1906-07 258 696 15,72
1907-08 293 790 18,30
1908-09 301 770 15,74
1909-10 364 940 17,10
1910-11 361 955 16,99
1911-12 290 871 16,01
1912-13 312 1,022 22,87
1913-14 369 1,061 28,27
1914-15 398 1,057 25,82
1915-16 794 1,192 37,97
1916-17 805 1,230 41,65
1917-18 758 1,197 42,84
1918-19 583 1,103 52,65
1919-20 343 1,275 50,02
1920-21 534 1,353 52,99
1921-22 387 1,121 29,99
1922-23 344 1,254 40,49
192?-?4 414 1,349 42,28
1924-28 425 1,456 51,76
1925-26 425 1,461 58,83
1926-27 449 1,503 53,18
1927-28 463 1,553 53,56
1928-29 498 1,568 56,90
1929-30 522 1,651 51,93
1930-31 434 1,271 31,89
1931-52 389 1,021 21,92
1952-33 415 1,012 21,71
1933-34 402 1,053 21,37
1934-35 423 1,063 21,47
1935-36 459 1,218 23,49
1936-37 621 1,710 29,10
1937-38 612 1,643 29,08
1938-39 598 1,550 26,26
Source: Review of the Trade of India in 1900-01 (Calcutta, 
1901), pi 27 end subsequent annual issues till" "1938-39*
The jute industry had also come under increasing
competition from substitutes during this period. The
basic reason for this was that jute had lost, for the
time being at any rate, its principal recommendation,
namely, its comparative cheapness. Thus paper sacks
which "cost little" came to be increasingly used all 
q
over the world. It was estimated that the loss caused 
to the jute industry in Bengal on account of the change­
over to paper in the United Kingdom and South Africa
o
alone exceeded 20 million cement bags per annum. Chile, 
which also imported substantial number of cement bags 
from Calcutta had practically changed over to paper bags 
made in the country and the few jute bags still used in 
this trade were supplied by the local factory. In 1926 
when burlap prices for a few months approached cotton 
prices, consumers in America began to use cotton sacks 
for packing fertilizers instead of burlap sacks and once 
U.S. consumers became accustomed to the use of cotton 
sacks, they continued to use them even when the price 
was a little higher. Thus prior to 1926, virtually all 
new fertilizer sacks,for instance, were made of burlap.
(1) IJMA: Special Report on Markets for Jute (Calcutta, 
1947), p. 26. For the cost of different types of bags 
used for packing fertilizers in the United States in 
1938,see, B. C. Kundu and others. Jute in India (Calcutta. 
1959;, Table 49, p. 280.
(2) Report of the Bengal Jute Enquiry Committee (Pawcus 
Committee), Vol. II (Alipore, 1939), P* 176. Replies to 
the questionnaire, by the Secretary, British India Asso­
ciation.
(3) Economic and Overseas Department Collections, IOR. 
L/E/9/404.
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By 1937, no less than 12 per cent of the fertilizers were
packed in cotton sacks, and 6 per cent in paper sacks, and
remaining 82 per cent were packed in burlap sacks* In
addition to price and choice of a particular variety, the
desire of certain countries to utilize their internal
resources whenever possible to the elimination of jute
and jute fabrics also led to substitution. Thus with a
view to encouraging flax and hemp cultivation in Poland,
the management of the Polish Salt Monopoly bought 3,700*000
linen sacks from October 1932 to January 1934 to replace
the jute hitherto used for bagging salt at the mines and
2
in the warehouses. The Polish Government also brought 
some kind of pressure in 1934 on the sugar manufacturers 
which led to an order for 700,000 linen sacks instead of
7;
jute sacks used hitherto. In addition to these, the 
development of mechanical contrivances for bulk handling 
also contributed in undermining the demand for jute.
Argentine which had so long used hessian sacks for packing 
and containing grain for transport had initiated a pro­
gramme for erecting 600 grain elevators throughout the 
Argentine in 1931 and in 1937 the legislature of the 
Argentine had passed legislation authorising the provision 
of state funds for the erection of grain elevators to
(1) IJMA: Special Report on Markets for Jute, p. 25.
(2) Economic and Overseas Department Collections, IOR. 
L/E/9/40%
(3) Ibid.
eliminate the use of jute bags as far as possible in the 
grain trade. In Australia also, the bulk handling of 
grain and the extension of the silo system, sponsored
by government of the various provinces deprived Indian
2mills of an outlet for their goods.
The rise of competitive substitutes, however, did
not take the IJMA by surprise. On the contrary, it had
long been exDecting such an event which led it in 1917 to
call jute a conditional monopoly, the condition being 
*
price." What surprises a casual observer, however, is the 
fact that in spite of such long warnings the jute indus­
try failed to take any effective measure by way of qua­
lity control, price and research in allied fields. It was 
only in 1933 that a sub-committee of the IJMA for the first 
time seriously examined the question of substitutes and 
came to the conclusion that unless effective measures 
were taken at an early date to retain the trade which the 
industry then held, and to regain some of the markets 
which had been lost to substitutes, and to explore other 
avenues for new business, the jute industry in Bengal was
faced with the prospect of a gradual but steady decrease
4.
in the use of the fabrics which it produced. But it took 
another four years before another research laboratory of
(1) Capital, June 11, 1931* P• 1075; and Ibid., August 
12. 1937, P. 217.
(2) Report of the Bengal Jute Enquiry Committee (Fawcus 
Committee), Vol. II, p. 99* Replies of the Bengal Cham­
ber of Commerce to the questionnaire.
(3) The Statesman. March 3* 1920, p. 17*
(4) Capital, June 8, 1933, PP* 961-62.
the IJMA was opened in September, 1937* In the same 
year the Government of India also established a committee 
- the Indian Central Jute Committee - to deal with the 
various aspects of the industry.
The gambling operations of the jute futures market 
(Fatka market or Bhitar bazaar) again emerged to the fore­
front during this period. Although in Bombay similar 
operations had been checked by the passing of the Bombay 
Cotton Standards Act, nothing like this had been done by 
the Government of Bengal to establish a properly organized 
jute futures market. Representations in this regard to 
the Government was futile and the trade was told to settle 
their own dispute. The result was the continuation of 
speculative transactions both in raw jute and in jute 
manufactures (futures market in jute manufactures came 
into being after the war) to the detriment of legitimate 
trade. It caused buyers overseas to pay higher prices
for jute manufactures and probably also drove away many
2
overseas buyers from the Calcutta market. Nor did it 
benefit the ryots (as was claimed by the East India Jute 
Association) by way of circulating information as regards 
trade movements through a daily quotation which had very 
little relation to actual dealings in the markets but 
were more the results of the whims of certain speculators.
(1) "Capital” Indian Industries and Transport Supplement 
(December, : 193*0* P» 13* Although negotiations were 
undertaken which resulted in the change of the East India 
Association's Articles and the formation of a Board of 
Control, differences of opinion remained throughout.
See, Capital, May 19, 1938, p. 7^7*
(2) Report of the Bengal Jute Enquiry Committee, Vol. I, 
Ma jority Report (Alipore, 193*0 * P* 28.
(3) Capital, September 28, 1939* P# 4-75*
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Another important issue of the period yjas the rela­
tionship between the mills and the ryots. In normal years 
mills in India and abroad consumed more or less all the 
Jute produced in Bengal. But the depression by lessening 
the world demand for Jute manufactures, considerably 
lessened the demand for Jute. This, coupled with the fact 
that mills had already substantial stocks of raw and manu­
factured Jute in hand, slackened the demand further. The 
cumulative result was severe overproduction of the raw 
material which the mills failed to consume, and conse­
quently prices of raw Jute came down very low, much sharper 
than the prices of Jute manufactures. But since the price 
of other commodities of daily use did not proportionally 
fall, distress among the ryots became severe. Although 
the government carried out propaganda by circulating 
leaflets (and by other means) among the cultivators in the 
Jute tracts of Bengal explaining the causes of the slump 
and urging them to reduce the area under Jute cultivation, 
the propaganda seemed to have had little effect. The 
primary reason for this was the fact that Jute was the only 
money crop of the ryots with which he paid the rent of the 
landlord, bought seed, cloths, bullocks and other nece­
ssities of life. He could not possibly, therefore, reduce 
his acreage under Jute cultivation without bringing fur­
ther distress upon himself.
The situation, however, seemed to have improved 
slightly since 1935-36. But this was not so much due to 
Governments Voluntary Restriction Scheme followed since
Z8Z
Table 6.9 Index number of wholesale prices of raw jute, 
jute manufactures and the annual average index of whole­
sale prices of all commodities, 1914, 1921-I939
Year Jute, raw Jute, manufac. Annual av. index
of wholesale 
prices (all 
commodities)
1914 
(end of
July)
1921 (annual
100 100
average) 83 104 179
1922 110 144 176
1923 90 138 172
1924 102 159 173
1925 154 177 159
1926 120 147 148
1927 93 146 148
1928 100 150 145
1929 95 122 141
1930 63 88 116
1934 49 76 96
1932 45 75 91
1933 41 77 87
1934 39 77 89
1935 50 74 91
1936 50 64 91
1937 56 67 102
1938 49 62 95
1939 80 102. 108
Source: Statistical Abstract for British India with 
statistics, where available♦ relating to certain Indian 
States from 1930-31 to 1939-40 (seventy-second number) 
(London, pp. 475-77.
1935 under the direction of Rural Development Commissioner 
but due mainly to increased world consumption of raw 
materials and falling stocks. Yet by 1939* the price
(1) Actual world consumption of raw jute had increased
from 89 lakh bales in 1933-34 to 93 lakh bales in 1934-33
and in 1933-36, 113 lakh bales in 1936-37 and 111 lakh
bales in 1937-38. See, Report of the Bengal Jute Enquiry
Committee (Fawcus Committee), Vol. II, p. 139. At the
same time world stocks of jute had been decreasing as follows:
1935-36 by 19 lakh bales
'1936-37 ” 12 n M
1937-38 " 11 n 11
See, The Statesman (weekly overseas edition), March 9,
1939, p. 13.
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level of jute failed to come up to expectations even 
when manufacturing industry had recovered under the 
strong demands for sandbags by the British Government. 
Having failed to effect a solution, the government in 
August 1959 promulgated an Ordinance fixing the minimum 
price of jute at Rs. 56 per bale, and from next year the 
government instituted a system of licensing of jute 
acreage under the Regulation of Jute Area Act, 19^0.
Gonclusion
The establishment of jute manufacturing industry in 
Bengal was one of the significant contributions of 
British enterprise in India. The men coming as they 
did from far-flung regions not only pioneered the indus­
try but also developed and organized the industry 
efficiently and opened out a vast market for its pro­
ducts which not only provided jobs for hundreds of 
thousands of their employees but also benefitted millions 
of agriculturists in the jute producing districts of 
Bengal. In their effort they were highly successful 
due to certain locational advantages, the most important 
of these being the close proximity of jute growing 
districts of Eastern Bengal and Assam and a relatively 
cheap labour force.
Once Calcutta was able to capture the American 
market towards the end of the last century, the develop­
ment of this industry was rapid and phenomenal and 
continued to be so till the beginning of the First World
War. The war demands and consequent profits of the 
period gave a further momentum to the industry and 
mills proliferated with resultant overproduction and 
glut in the market. The problem was accentuated further 
due to the shrinkage of world demand in the '1930's as 
a result of depression and the aspirations of certain 
countries to be self-sufficient in this respect. Lack 
of diversity in Calcutta's production and poor sales­
manship also positively contributed to a fall in demand. 
Thirties also brought other problems, the most important 
of which was the growth of substitutes in the wake of 
paper bags and cotton sacks; and the use of mechanical 
contrivances for bulk handling. The only possible solu­
tion to these problems seemed to lie in the rationaliza­
tion of the industry and in co-operation between the IJMA 
and the Indian section of the industry.
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Chapter VII
THE HAND LOOM COTTON WEAVING INDUSTRY IN BENGAL
Before the days of the Industrial Revolution, Bengal 
was not only self-sufficient in the cotton fabrics 
which she consumed but also exported her products to 
overseas markets in Asia, America and Europe. This 
supremacy in the production of handloom fabrics was 
due to two factors - the possession of highly specia­
lized technical skills and lower costs of production
A
per unit. However, the fortunes of this once-flourishing- 
industry in Bengal underwent a dramatic change in the 
nineteenth century with the advent of power-loom. In 
the year 1747* for example, the cloths exported from 
Dacca on account of the Company and individuals, amounted 
to twenty-eight lakhs and a half; in 1792 the exports 
were estimated at twenty-five lakhs; in 1797 at not
p
more than fourteen lakhs and in 1800 at eighteen lakhs.
The average amount of cloths exported by the East India 
Company during the decade ending around 1830 did not 
amount to more than six lakhs annually. Likewise, the
(1) K. N. Chaudhuri, 'The Structure of Indian Textile 
Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', 
Indian Economic and Social History Review. Vol. XI,
Nos. 2-3, June-September, 1974-.
(2) Antiquities of Dacca, No. 4 (London, 1830?), p. 20. 
The British Library copy of the work which I have seen 
does not contain any date of publication, though the 
catalogue indicates it to be 1830 with a note of interro 
gation.
(3) Ibid.
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exports of piece-goods from Lakhipore which amounted 
to over sixteen-lakhs of rupees in 1795-96 gradually 
fell and ultimately disappeared altogether. The Govern­
ment purchases of Santipur muslin, during the first 
twenty-eight years of the nineteenth century averaged, 
from £120,000 to £150,000.2
Not only had there been a decline in the export 
trade in cotton piece-goods but the Industrial Revo­
lution also dislocated the home market of Bengal textile 
workers. Within a few years since 1821-22 when cotton 
yarn and twist was first imported into Bengal, it re­
placed the hand-spun threads universally and the impor­
tation of mass produced cotton piece-goods in increasing 
quantities began to displace indigenous handloom weavers, 
causing wide-spread unemployment and distress in the
(1) IOR. P/174-/15, Bengal Commercial Reports, 1795-1802. 
See, "Abstract Statement of Piece-goods, exported from 
the Calcutta Custom House, from the 1st of June 1795 to 
the 31st of May 1796."
(2) W. W. Hunter, A Statistical Account of Bengal. Vol. 
II, Districts of Nadiya and Jessor (London, 1875)» P* 95*
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1
rural areas.
"Since the introduction of European machine- 
made textiles into this country, it may be 
said that the indigenous industry has prac­
tically died out and the professional posi­
tion of the weavers as a class has become 
very unsatisfactory... great majority of 
weavers have... given up their hereditary 
occupation and now have taken to cultivation 
and other remunerative pursuits... Those 
who still work at the loom are in more or 
less indigent circumstances, and are not 
able to depend upon weaving as the sole 
means of subsistence."2
The decline which set in at the introduction of 
machine made textiles continued throughout the nineteenth
(1) The value of importations of foreign cotton twist 
and yarn as well as piece-goods into Bengal could be seen 
from the following figures (in rupees):
Year Cotton twist and yarn piece-goot
1820-21 Nil 34, 52,851
1821-22 4,930 57, 96,801
1822-23 Nil 73,41,493
1823-24 11,834 42, 15,548
1824-25 1 ,24,811 56, 05,746
1825-26 1 »49,867 44, 16,401
1826-27 8 ,24,362 49, 08,972
1827-28 18 ,84,844 56, 14,047
1828-29 3^ ,82,730 80, 92,809
1829-30 15 ,63,770 54,,29,540
IOR. P/174/41, Bengal Commercial Reports, 1829-30.
See, No. 8, "General Comparative Abstract Annual State­
ment of Imnorts and Exports from 1820/21 to 1829-30."
The English thread, independent of its cheapness, was 
preferred by the natives on account of its uniform size 
and the facility of obtaining any quantity of a parti­
cular quality that might be required. "To procure 
country thread of a certain quality is a task attended 
with considerable labour and expenses; it can only be 
done by visiting the different marts in the district, 
and it is estimated that two-thirds of the time occupied 
in preparing the fine muslins, are spent in searching 
for thread suited for the manufacture." James Taylor,
A Sketch of the Topography and Statistics of Dacca 
(Calcutta, 1840), p. 171*
(2) N. N. Banerjei, ’The Cotton Fabrics of Bengal*, 
Journal of Indian Art and Industry. Vol. VIII (London, 
1900), pp. 68-69.
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"1
century. The main reason was due to the relative cheap­
ness of power-loom cloths in comparison with handloom 
products. The poorer classes naturally preferred to 
buy the cheapest cloths as they had no idea of economy 
in the first place, and if they had they could not 
afford the outlay necessary to buy a more costly, though 
longer lasting article. As regards the local speciali­
ties, the demand for those was due to their superiority 
but their cost, even when unfigured (in the case of 
Dacca muslins) was quite prohibitive and out of all 
proportion to that of machine-made muslins which fell 
not far short of them in appearance to the casual eye. 
Moreover, native tastes had in addition been attracted 
by the brilliant colouring and superior finish of the 
power-loom fabrics. Another, though a comparatively 
minor, cause which contributed to the decline of the 
indigenous handicraft was the disappearance of the 
regal courts scattered over the country, which generally 
maintained a considerable number of weavers. The slow, 
laborious and wasteful methods followed, and the ancient
(1) Ramesh Dutt, The Economic History of India, Vol. II 
(New York, 1970), pp. 3 4 4 - 4 Vera Anstey, The Economic 
Development of India (London, 1952), pp. 207-uy; d . k . 
Gadgil, The Industrial Evolution of India in Recent Times 
(Bombay, 1942), pp. 'ibO-tn ; ‘1‘oru natsui, 'un tne nineteenth 
Century Indian Economic History - A Review of A 
"Reinterpretation"*, Indian Economic and Social History 
Review, Vol. V (1968), pp. 20-21; Bipan Chandra, 
'Keinterpretation of Nineteenth Century Indian Economic 
History*, Indian Economic and Social History Review,
Vol. V (19687, PP. 52-59.-----  --------------------
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appliances employed, in the manufacture of cotton 
fabrics by the handloom weavers had also not been with-
Government towards industrialization is also sometimes
In spite of its decline, however, the handloom 
industry did not die entirely. Although in the medium 
and finer qualities the handloom weaver was beaten 
decisively, weavers continued to have an edge in the 
manufacture of cloths of coarser counts. As the Tariff 
Board said, "the manufacturing charges in this class of 
cloth bear a relatively small proportion to the total 
cost and hence the scope for economies resulting from 
large scale production by machinery is limited.On 
the other hand, a handloom weaver had not to find 
interest for his capital; not to protect his property 
by insurance; not to find power for driving his machi­
nery; not to provide for repairs and renewals of same; 
nor obtain so many articles of stores both to keep the 
machinery going and to prepare the yarn. "It appears 
therefore that handloom production in India is not 
uneconomical and cannot be dismissed as an industry 
which will necessarily succumb to the mill industry."
(1) IOR: Vol. 7^ -07, India Commerce and Industry Procee­
dings (Industries), November 1906,^1’ 3#
(2) An extreme opinion is that of William Digby who says 
that the British Government "deliberately strangled Indian 
manufactured exports and thereby gave English merchantile 
enterprise an opportunity to obtain a footing which, once 
obtained, has led to the whole country being covered with 
the product of English looms." William Digby, 1 Prosperous1 
British India (London, 1901), p. 261.
(3) Report of the Indian Tariff Board regarding the grant 
of protection to the Cotton Textile industry (ualcutta,
q
out their effect. The general apathy of the British
blamed for its decay. 2
2 9 0
Moreover, to a large section of the population, vilayati 
goods were, curiously enough , in discredit* They sus­
pected mixture, false sizing and deficiencies, and from 
which they were comparatively secure in the handloom
A
article. Besides, the coarse cloths turned out by the
handloom were more durable and strong and hence preferred
2
by the common people to machine-made cloths. But probably 
the more important reason for its survival was that the 
people of Bengal still retained a preferential taste for 
hand-woven products, particularly for their clothing on 
ceremonial and festive occasions, as distinct from clothing 
worn in their homes and in domestic seclusion. The 
adaptability of the handloom industry was continually 
utilized to vary particular details of its products in 
order to keep them distinct from the mass-production arti-
7
cles of the weaving mills or imported piece-goods.^ Thus 
with a power-loom only one uniform texture in a piece of 
cloth was possible, while the hand weaver varied both the 
reed and the pick in the same piece at will, and made it 
look fuller at sides and ends. Then there were silk and 
even gold threads woven with the cotton and he had the 
advantage of making solid borders, or head lines of such
(1) Sir E. C. Buck. Report on Practical and Technical 
Education (Calcutta, 1901), Appendix VI, p. xvii. See 
Letter of B. J. Padshah to Sir Buck.
(2) T. N. Mukharji, Art-Manufactures of India (Calcutta, 
1888), p. 195. h®
(5) IOR: Vol. 11960, BRP (Industries), October 1932,-p. 11. 
See, also D. H. Buchanan, The Development of Capitalistic 
Enterprise in India (New York, 1934'), p. 76.
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valuable material, making as little waste as possible.
It was in this way that the handloom products sought to 
escape from the continual encroachment and competition 
arising from the products of Indian mills.
I
Size and Composition of the Working Force 
Before we proceed further to examine the state of the 
handloom cotton weaving industry in the twentieth cen­
tury, we would like to examine the size and composition 
of the workforce engaged in this industry. This will 
give us an idea of the extent of the industry in this 
province and its role in the economy of Bengal. An 
examination of the size and composition would also 
allow us to compare the relative performance of the 
industry in various years and would enable us to gauge 
the trend and movement of the workforce.
The data used have been collected from the decennial 
census reports of the Government of India on details of 
occupations. However, it is not possible to say how far 
the data contained in the census reports are reliable as 
no detailed or systematic collection of similar data are 
available from any other official or non-official body.
But it is probable that some degree of care had been taken 
by the Government of India, especially after 1901 to 
standardize the system of classification of weavers as 
a result of the discovery that the last three enumerations 
had varied greatly because the numbers of certain castes 
the names of which were synonymous with the craft of
fI
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weaving had been numbered as weavers whether they were
A
actually following their hereditary occupations or not.
For our purpose also we had to make certain adjustments, 
territorial or otherwise to make the data meaningful.
Thus in our analysis, only those districts are taken into 
consideration which remained an integral part of Bengal 
throughout and others are omitted which later on formed 
parts of the provinces of Bihar and Orissa. Again, to 
standardize the data, we had no alternative but to give 
the combined figures of handloom weavers, spinners and 
sizers, as only combined data are available for the years 
1911 and 1931.
From the data which we have processed in detail 
(see Appendix V, Tables 1 and 2), some tables have been 
constructed in the following pages. Table 7*1 shows the 
average number of weavers, spinners and sizers (henceforth 
referred to as 'weavers' unless otherwise mentioned) in 
each district for the period 1901 to 193^ and also the 
percentage of weavers to the total weaving population of 
Bengal and the ratio of weavers per 100,000 persons.
From the table it could be seen that handloom cotton 
weaving was practised in all the districts of Bengal al­
though in some it was more extensive than others. Thus 
the eight districts of Dacca, Midnapore, Chittagong, 
Faridpur, Tippera, Pabna, Mymensingh and Jessore together 
accounted for more than 50 per cent of the weaving popu­
lation of the province. Among other important districts
(1) IOR: Vol. 7407, India Commerce and Industry Procee­
dings (Industries), November 1906j^ p*.' 3*
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Table 7.1 Average weaving population and their concen­
tration in each district, 1901-1931
District Average weaving 
population in 
each district
(1)
Percentage of 
Bengal1 s total
(2)
Average number 
of weavers per 
100,000 persons 
in the district 
(3)
Dacca 17*473 8.96 587
Midnapore 15*214 7.80 549
Chittagong 14,095 7.22 899
Faridpur 13*620 6.98 620
Tippera 12,914 6.62 499
Pabna 10,825 5.55 760
Mymensingh 10,577 5.32 225
Jessore 10,547 5.30 597
Bankura 9,275 4.75 846
Backhergung 9,202 4.72 560
Noakhali 9,099 4.66 647
Hooghly 8,218 4.21 759
Nadia 7*090 3.65 449
Burdwan 5,351 2.74 352
Murshidabad 5,258 2.69 400
24 Parganas 5,140 2.65 215
Khulna 5*119 2.62 357
Birbhum 4,799 2.46 526
Malda 4,731 2.42 474
Chittagong 
Hill Tracts 4,396 2.25 2,645
Howrah 3,653 1.87 376
Dinajpur 2,260 1.16 154
Bogra 2,040 1.04 199
Jalpaiguri 1,935 0.99 214
Rajshahi 1,380 0.71 97
Calcutta 518 0.27 50
Rangpur 507 0.26 21
Darjeeling 271 0.14 97
Sources: For the average weaving population of each dis­
trict, see Appendix V, Table 1; column 2 has been calcu­
lated from the average weaving population of the period, 
which was 195*104 (see Appendix V, Table 2) and column 
3 has been constructed from column 1 and 2 of Appendix 
V, Table 1.
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were Bankura, BackhergunJ, Noakhali and Hooghly. In 
other words, if we look carefully we find that all these 
districts either belonged to Eastern or Western Bengal.
The districts in the north like Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, 
Dinajpur, Malda, Rangpur, Rajshahi contributed very little 
to the weaving population of the province.
It is extremely difficult to account for such regional
variations in the distribution of the weaving population
of the province. One of the probable reasons for not
following the profession of weaving extensively in the
northern districts of Bengal could be their inability to
produce good varieties of cloth at a reasonable price.
Eor example, P. W. Strong, the compiler of the District
Gazetteer of Dinajpur mentions in 1912 that there was
little demand for the cloth produced by the weavers in
that district as their products were coarse and compared
"very unfavourably in appearance and evenness of texture
with the imported Manchester cloth." The same case was
probably valid as regards Bogra and Rangpur. In Rajshahi
it was possibly a question of greater specialization in
silk spinning and weaving (perhaps also because it was more
rewarding). O’Malley mentions that in 1916 silk spinning
and weaving supported 3*000 people in Rajshahi of whom
2
half were workers. In the case of the two hilly districts
(1) Eastern Bengal District Gazetteers, Dinajpur (Allahabad,
1912), p. 81. --------
(2) Bengal District Gazetteers, Rajshahi (Calcutta, 1916), 
p. 103.
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of Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling workers were actively-
involved in agricultural pursuits, i.e., in tea gardens.
In this regard they were also perhaps helped by the
absence of functional castes which gave them greater
occupational mobility than the people of the districts
in the plains. On the other hand, the explanation of
higher concentration of weaving population in most
Eastern and Western Bengal districts could be attributed
to their specialized manufactures. G. N. Gupta in his
report on the industries and resources of Eastern Bengal
and Assam observed that:
"... the industry seems to have progressed 
most in Noakhali, Comilla, Pabna and 
Earidpur. All these districts, besides 
producing the usual saris and dhuties, 
turned out a very large quantity of checks 
and chintzes, both thick and thin, and 
suitable for the making of coats, shirts, 
pan,javis and other wearing apparel mostly 
in vogue now."
Such specialized goods in addition to coarser materials
were also woven in a number of other districts as we
shall see later. A secondary explanation lay in the
fact that these districts were historically textile
producing ones. It was possibly because of this that
the East India Company had established their factories
in those places in the first place, i.e., Santipur,
Dacca, Haripur, Kishorgunj, Bajitpur, Jagdia, Charpara etc.
Even as late as 1880, George Birdwood found one-tenth of
2
the population of Tippera employed in cotton weaving.
(1) G. N. Gupta, A Survey of the Industries, p. 10.
(2) George C. M. Birdwood, The Industrial Arts of India, 
Vol. II (London, 1880), p. 83-
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There was also much unevenness in the distribution 
of sexes in this profession. In none of the censuses, 
the proportion of females to males was over 25 per cent. 
Taking the average of the period, we find that out of 
195*104 weavers, some 154*334- or 79*10 per cent were 
males and 40,770 or 20.90 per cent female workers (see 
Appendix V, Table 2). This uneven distribution between 
the sexes was probably due to certain changes in the 
industrial practices. In the first place, spinning 
which was almost the sole preserve of female workers 
became defunct in the nineteenth century. Together with
A
this, it was possible that (like South India ) men had 
also taken the place of women sizers as a result of the 
introduction of long warps. However, when we turn to 
individual districts in Bengal, we find certain varia­
tions to the general picture of the province. Percen­
tagewise the proportion of female workers was higher in 
the districts of Chittagong, Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
Darjeeling, Bogra, Malda than the rest of the districts. 
The explanation to this may lie in the socio-economic 
pattern of the tribal people who constituted a fairly 
large segment of the population of the first three 
districts noted above. Bogra and Malda seems to be an 
exception to the general rule.
(1) See, K. S. Venkataraman, The Hand-loom Industry in 
South India (Madras, 1940), pi 5^
2 9 7
Table 7.2 Proportion of male and female weaving popu­
lation in each district, 1901-1931
District Average Percentage of Average no. Percentage of
number of males to total of females females to
males weaving pop. total weaving
population
('I) (2) (3) (4)
Burdwan 4,^14 84.36 837 15.64
Birbhum 4,220 87.93 579 12.07
Bankura 7,762 83.69 1,513 16.31
Midnapore 11,727 77.08 3,487 22.92
Hooghly 7; W 90.57 775 9.43
Howrah 3,214 87.96 440 12.04
24 Parganas 4,377 85.14 764 14.86
Calcutta 464 89.58 54 10.42
Nadia 5,998 84.60 1,092 15.40
Murshidabad 4,268 81.17 990 18.83
Jessore 9,327 90.14 1,020 9.86
Khulna 4,739 92.58 380 7.42
Rajshahi 990 71.74 390 28.26
Dinajpur 1,922 85.04 338 14.96
Jalpaiguri 1,702 88.00 232 12.00
Darjeeling 172 63.47 99 36.53
Rangpur 452 89.33 54 10.67
Bogra 1,030 50.49 1,010 49.51
Pabna 10,166 93.93 657 6.07
Malda 2,891 61.11 1 ,840 38.89
Dacca 14,080 80.58 3,393 19-42
Mymensingh 8,061 77.68 2,310 22.32
Paridpur 11,595 85.13 2,026 14.87
Backhergunj 7,285 79.16 1,918 20.84
Tippera 10,938 84.70 1,976 15.30
Noakhali 6,687 73.50 2,412 26.50
Chittagong
Chittagong
5,974 42.38 8,121 57.62
Hill Tracts 2,338 53.20 2,057 46.80
Sources: Por the average number of males and females in 
each district, see Appendix V, Table 1. Percentages 
have been computed.
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Another notable feature among a section of the 
weaving population of the province was their involve­
ment in subsidiary occupations, i.e., in agriculture.
But the number of weaving population following sub­
sidiary occupation was by no means so large as was the 
general notion of the period. According to 1901 census, 
only 12.79 per cent of the weavers were partially agri­
culturists. The figure further declined to 10.80 in 
1911 and in 1931 it stood at 10.36 per cent (see Appendix 
V, Table 2). This decline meant that weaving was becoming 
more and more a specialized occupation of particular 
classes of workers as a result of advances in the tech­
nique of the industry. That this was generally so could 
be verified from the fact that the districts which had a
higher proportion of looms with fly-shuttles had a lower
2
percentage of weaving population in agriculture.
(1) For contemporary opinion, see Bengal District Gazetteers 
Burdwan (Calcutta, 1910), p. 123; Hooghly (Calcutta, 1912), 
p. 182; Malda (Calcutta, 1918). p. 65; and Eastern Bengal 
District Gazetteers, Dina.jpur (Allahabad, 1912), p. 81.
(2) The following figures brings this out clearly:
District Proportion of looms Percentage of weaving
with fly-shuttles in pop. following subsi- 
1921 diary occupations,
1901-1931
Hooghly 65 6.92
Howrah 54 4.05
24 Parganas 99 5*54
Nadia 55 5.00
Jessore 84 7.66
Malda 53 7.80
Dacca 54 8.96
Faridpur 75 9*17
Backhergunj 56 7*93
The column showing the proportion of looms with fly-shuttles
is taken from Table 7*5 of this chapter, while percentage of
weaving population following subsidiary occupations could be
found in Table 7*3 of the present chapter.
299
Table 7*3 Average number of weavers following subsidiary
occupations, 1901-1931
District Number of 
male wea­
vers
(D
Number of
female
weavers
(2)
Total
(3)
Percentage of 
(3) to total 
weaving pop. 
of the dt.
(4)
Burdwan 625 27 652 12.18
Birbhum 845 5 850 17.71
Bankura 771 29 800 8.63
Midnapore 2,800 141 2,941 19.33
Hooghly 554 15 569 6.92
Howrah 127 21 148 4.05
24 Parganas 2 78 7 285 5.54
Calcutta 4 nil 4 0.77
Nadia 348 7 355 5.00
Hurshidabad 601 5 606 11.53
Jessore 783 11 793 7.66
Khulna 706 3 709 13.85
Rajshahi 234 7 240 17.39
Dinajpur 208 6 213 9.42
Jalpaiguri 231 1 232 11.99
Darjeeling 4 nil 4 1.48
Rangpur 63 3 66 13.02
Bogra 324 10 334 16.37
Pabna 1,024 17 1,041 9.62
Nalda 365 4 369 7.80
Dacca 1,504 62 1,566 8.96
Hymensingh 1,016 82 1,098 10.58
Paridpur 1,216 33 1,249 9.17
Backhergunj 683 47 730 7.93
Tippera 2,568 58 2,626 20.33
Noakhali 1,614 75 1,689 18.56
Chittagong 563 106 670 4.75
Chittagong
Hill Tracts 1 nil 1 0.02
Source: For (1), (2) & (3); see Appendix V, Table 1.
(4) has been computed.
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Having looked into the size and composition of the 
handloom cotton weaving industry from various aspects, 
one is apt to question oneself whether the number of 
weaving population had actually increased or decreased 
for the period 1901 to 1931* The answer to this ques­
tion could be found by looking into Appendix V, Table 2. 
According to this, the total weaving population of Bengal 
in 1901 was 200,703; whereas in 1931 this figure came 
down to 186,798 or in other words even without taking 
into consideration the figures for cotton spinners and 
sizers for the year 1901 (1901 figures represented only 
actual weavers unlike other years) there had been a net 
decrease of 13*905 weavers or 6.93 per cent over the 
1901 census figures. If allowance is made of the rising 
population during the period under review, the fall 
appears to be all the more dramatic. In 1901 there were 
4 76 weavers per 100,000 persons whereas in 1931 it was 
down to 373* A closer examination of the figures reveals 
that the fall in the weaving population was entirely due 
to large-scale desertion from the industry by male weavers. 
In 1901, the total number of male weavers had been 170,971 
and in 1931 it totalled only 14-9*814- or a net decrease of 
21,157# On the other hand there was an actual increase 
of female weavers from 29,732 in 1.901 to 56*984- in 1931# 
This large-scale desertion of male weavers from their 
hereditary occupation (more so being so conservative in 
character) was perhaps an indication of the amount of 
economic distress prevailing among this section of the 
population. The increasing number of womenfolk practicing
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weaving strengthens the suggestion that their help was 
also enlisted to supplement the family income*
II
Handloom Production and Products 
The next question that needs to be answered is whether the 
handloom production of cloth had increased or decreased 
or remained stationary during the period of our study.
The answer to this question is much harder than one might 
realise for the simple reason that there was no census 
of production for handloom cotton weaving industry in 
Bengal. The alternative that remains is, therefore, to 
estimate the handloom production of cloth from the con­
sumption of yarn. This could be found from the net 
imports of cotton twist and yarn into Bengal by all 
routes and deducting exports and re-exports. We have 
also to take into consideration the net balances of cotton 
mill yarn left after having produced woven goods. It 
may be pointed out that the same method of calculation 
had earlier been used by the IIC; by the Special Tariff 
Board on Cotton Textile Industry, 1936; and also by the 
Fact-finding Committee (Handloom and Mills), 194-2 in
q
estimating the all-India production of handloom cloth.
(1) Report of the IIC (PP XVII of 1919) , p. 4-36; Report 
of the Special Tariff Board on the Enquiry regarding the 
level of duties necessary to afford adequate protection 
to the Indian Cotton Textile Industry against imports 
from the United Kingdom of Cotton piecegoods and yarn, 
artificial silk fabrics and mixture fabrics of cotton 
and artificial silk (ueim, 'i9^ 6), 'iu2; Report of the 
Fact-finding Committee (Handloom and Mills) ^jJeim, 194-2), 
unapter ill7 PP-
f
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The principal routes of imports and exports of 
cotton twist and yarn were by sea, coastwise or by rail 
and river# The net imports (after deducting exports and 
re-exports) have been collected and compiled from various 
sources as could be seen in Appendix V, Tables 3 to 5*
We have also worked out the production and consumption 
of yarn by the Bengal cotton mills for our period#
However, it must be pointed out that our table of hand­
loom production (Table 7*4) suffers from some deficiencies 
of statistics. In the first place, we have been unable 
to get inland trade statistics relating to rail and river 
from 1921-22 to 1932-33 due to the stoppage in the publi- 
cation of such data "for reasons of economy". Hence 
there is a gap of twelve years from 1921-22 to 1932-33 
which cannot be filled up in any other way. Likewise, 
we did not take into account the yarn produced by hand 
spinning. This is because no statistics of the yarn 
supplied by spinners in Bengal is available. But then 
no allowance has also been made for cotton yarn used for 
rope and twine and used in other domestic purposes. We 
did not also take into account land frontier exports and 
imports but even then the calculation would be sufficient­
ly near the mark to indicate the quantity of cotton cloth 
produced by handloom weavers.
(1) Accounts relating to the Inland (Hail and River-borne) 
Trade of India for April, 1933 (Delhi. 1933). P. 1.
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From the total amount of yarn that was internally 
available in Bengal, we have attempted an estimate of 
the total handloom production of cloth (Table 7*4-).
Column (1) of the Table represents the total amount of 
yarn that was internally available each year. This 
figure when multiplied by four (on the assumption that 
one pound of yarn gives a yield of four yards of cloth) 
gives the total amount of handloom production of the 
province and which could be seen in column (2). An 
analysis of the production figures show that the output 
varied greatly from year to year. One of the primary 
reasons was the changing structure of political boun­
daries till 1911-12. Till 1904-05 the production figures 
represent that of Bengal (including Eastern Bengal) and 
Bihar and Orissa; the figure of 1905-06 being not re­
liable as trade statistics had not been even, i.e., 
sea-borne trade of Eastern Bengal and Assam being in­
cluded with Bengal1s figures; the figures of 1906-07 to 
1911-12 do not include the handloom production of 
Eastern Bengal as it had been constituted into a sepa­
rate province with Assam in 1905; and from 1912-15 the 
figures do not include that of Bihar and Orissa for 
similar reasons. Therefore, standard data for the
(1) Report of the Indian Tariff Board (Cotton Textile 
Industry Enquiry), 1927* Vol. 1, Report (Calcutta, 'iy27)9 
Appendix XV, pp. 258-29; Keport of the "Special Tariff 
Board on Cotton Textile Industry, 3b, p. 101; ,and„ also 
luR: Vol. i1%0, BRF (Industries;, October 1932,aj?.'*'8.
The width of the cloths were assumed to be of 44".
Ta
bl
e 
7.
4 
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
of 
ya
rn
 
an
d 
pr
od
uc
ti
on
 
of 
cl
ot
h 
in 
ha
nd
lo
om
s 
an
d 
co
tt
on
 
te
xt
il
e 
in
du
st
ry
, 
19
00
-0
1 
to 
19
20
-2
1;
 
an
d 
19
33
-3
4 
to 
19
38
-3
9
bo •
d  DQ
i—i
H 0
0 Vi
Pi o
Pi Q> xi
© Pi Pd O
d - H  d O  H-PtIO O o
H 3,d* 
cd xJ p  
p o o dO Pi iH *H 
H ftO'-'
r -  GO m t - « # C 0  CT\r- m m m t f t ^ V O  O  m m C O  CM CM
in me— crsr- in vo T-vD^cMCMvDT-mtnc— 
t— incoovoco^inmoinin mvo m  r- o  c—vo m
m o m  m v o  m t n c o c M r - ^ m c M  t—vo ^  in  cm cm t— 
t — o  * -  oO m v o  r -  oo o  c— m oO i n m m i f t ^ i n ^ m
r-CMCMr-r-CMOJr-CMT-T-r-T-r-r-r-T-r-r-
VO
®. A d
bO P  Q0 o h h *H
• P H r H  cd cd P  
C tH  O P  d  O
O Cl 3  
ID -P  ( D d  
rtf P  O
0 ojg U
© *Ho g 
ci© Vi 
Ph O
m ^ m v o v o  vo *— o O '^ c O tn c o c O T — c o c M m c o o c M  c—•cooom inoM ?m cjT-r-T- r-co^i-^CMmc—
o  O  o CM ^ v o  t—VOVO o  co t — cm m i n i n
p - t— r -  t— CM
a p ft
in
d  •o CQ
*H X* V l
P  >> oov^l
O -P o  • 
0 0,0 H O H
o »
§ 3
-p  xJ
P  O 
O Cl O ft *» 0
d
O  d H  •
•H *H *H CQ
•p  _  a x »  
f t  d  h  
g  ci d
3  0  0  0  
03 > » P  o  
d  p  o
O Vi O »  
O  O O ' - '
COc-
^  V l &
II 04iU o
d • rH 
Cl CQ O 
0  X*
t—co mm^vot^-inrntnmmcOooomincM^Kr
vo t~ v o  M * t - o ^ i n r  t—vo m o o O m m c M i n m m  
m v o  c— m o c O v o c M C M C M m m r - c o in ^ c O m m c o
T -C M C n C M L n C O C M C M T - f^ t— ^ t t— r -  CM "M" 
r -  CM CM CM
vo r -  o  t - m c — m e — i n c o ^ ^ - m m c o m m e - i n c o  
c o m t - T - ^ c o e - C M  in v o  O b * h  *— t— m cM vo  co o  
cm m m v o v o  in - r -  c - i n  in  in  m i n t -  ^ m t —^ fv o  cm
r-r-CMCMOJCM C ^ n c M  O J ^ M - M - l A
T - I
d<1) (D
bO O p  
0  p  d
P  *H
d
©  CM pH rH 
O »— * 0  0  
d  p  d  
© V i  O
cm o  p
•  -CQ
^  XJ 
d  r”a 
O
a * H ^ i o  v i
O P  P  o  o
o  O O O
r l  3  pH “ ■ •
x i  xj o  n
d  O d H
d V i Hft O '—'r- - -
CQA 
H
a  >>
o  Ci o  
o p  o  
cd H  CQ o  
03 >»X* 3  
d  d x *  d  
O Vi 0  d  H  
. O  P  -4 .-H  ^
m
O•H
p
o
3xJpoO rH
Cl O
ft
Vi 
d  o  
f t  -
0
CM n
&
V i ,d  
O P  O 
• pH
CQ O X*
}>»
§« •H *H
P  ,
f t  da d
T - l D t - ^ ^ - ^ m C M V O C M i n C M C M m C M C O r - C M O O )  
cm t -  r -  *4- cr\ m v o  m c o c o c o o o p - i n i n t - o m m  • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • « • • • •
mmmcocoaoc—mmcMmmcomT-cM c—vo ■^t*^ mmmmmmmmmmmmcocommcococot-
-^O ^C O O C M C M VD VO C O O C M VO VO C M O C O VO C O C O
co cm o  ^ ^ i n i n i n i n v o v o  m i n m c — o  *>3- m  ^  vf* 
m m * — m o  co cm r - 1 — i n r - c o c — e— e— CM mCM O
CMcocMvomT-moococMCMincM^cMC-p-om
t—• m * — oo m v o  o  co m  in  co c— m C M C M ^ C M m cM C —
T— P-CM'— r~ CM CM P- P“ '— T— t— i—  i— T— t— t— t— r—
vo o  vo t — i n n n M , O N C M O 0  ' t ' t m n w n N  cm 
cTicncvi m c o v o v o v o  m m ■ * m*vo co m t-  -< -vp vo 
o c — o m n c M ’ t o  in v o  vo o  m v o  t-  vo co co O cm
m  m  m v o  c O in c M in c — O M n m m o r - i n ^ - c M O c o  
i n  vo i n ^ ^ m ^ ^ m m m m m m m T -
p c m ^ m - in v o  c— c o ^ O r - w i A ' t  in v o  c— co m o
<? ? <? <? <?<?<?<?<? T T T T T T T T T T <:il
o  r -  cm m - ^ i n v o  t— co m o  t-  cm m ^ m v o  c— co m
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,t~'f”'~T“ “^V"^ “T“'“t-'
m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m
304
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
of 
ya
rn
 
an
d 
pr
od
uc
ti
on
 
of 
cl
ot
h 
in 
ha
nd
lo
om
s 
an
d 
co
tt
on
cn
mI
COm
cn
0
-p
m1
cnm
cn
d
a
cfl
CM
I
O
CM
cn
o
p
o
o
cn
d
pm0
d
a
0)
-p
o>
-p
cn
CM
rH ^
rH Cd •
cd f t  W) cq
d  o d  d
d  , CD t>*
cd d  fd
-P O O
d H  d o m r -  CM 00 CM T - m
•ri P  »H O T- 00 CM H-MO m u n
o  - c o o o d  cnmin
H  d  x l  _
cd d  -p  d C f \ m r  H r-M D  LT\
-P o O *H e-H-mt-MO go m
O d r H ' - ' t- m m m m m H -
H  ft o
<D X I d
t>6 -p o
Cd O rH rH *H
- P H H  cd cd -p
d  h  o  -p  d o
CD *H O d d
o  a  a) -P cd d
d  d  p o
CD ^H cd O d d
ft O ^ - P * H f t
rH
rH d  • CO
•H O  CQ £—
*H Xl d  f t • Xl
• P H  h O  H 'P  P
d  o  o II  ° 3O d  rH O  •
P  d  O O  X3 d  •  o
P  O O H d  CQ
O cd d
o  f t  O '— r -
' •  w  * m m
d  d  h  '*■“*
O *H rH *
•H H  CQ
p  cq a x >
f t  d  H
g  d  d
d  cd o  o
CQ >sP  O
d  p  o
O ft O «*
o  O O '—
m  f+ m <m m
d
CD CD d
M O P  O
cd p  d  *h m
P  *H P  P
d ^  o O
CD CM rH P  rH
O '—  cd d o
d  P H O
<D f t  o  a3 d  ft
pm o  P  d  f t  o
CQ
d  • d
O CQ t>>
d H X d d xl
O P  P  r>3 O M 'P
o
rH
da
cd
o
rH O  •  
O O  X» 
O  H  
f t  «•ft O
a 5d  o  
d
cdf t  
>a O
•H 
■P ,
f t  d  
g  d  
3  cd
CQ
d
038 >%X> 
o d  H
O P  
rH OQ O  
l> jd  d  Od d  o
o  f t  cd d  
O  O Xl H
H*r- m o  lht— m
o  -^ e -c M  cm t -  cn 
• • • • • • •
CM cn r -  t—■ v - O  CM 
r -  CM m  ^3* H*
h r  CM MO CO T - LTl
i n o ^ n r  cnvo 
mo cn r -  v—  m  cm cn
r— o  oo cn cn c—mo 
cm o  m  m  h - lt\ co
O  c n o  a ) como 
m o  o  o  m o  r -  
lt\ t— cn r -  cm cn r -
h * t-  co cn r -  cm cn 
cm cm cm m m m
mo c n t - o  i a o m >  
cn incM  go t— cm o  
• • • • • • •
t - O  00 CM GO c n t -  
co t— m v o  u n tfM n
O  O  O  CM H -O  00 
MO CO 00 r -  H*MO CO
t-  t-  oo cnMO o  m
CO CM CM ^  CM cnco 
i n ^ c n m r -  o j ^
T - CM r -  CM CM CM CM
o  m o  cO r -  m c -
H" H" CM CM MO MO H* 
LP»LT\CM t— r -  CM r -
c n o  oo oo m e — cm 
m v o  M - in in ir iv Q
LT\
«4)
m
CQ
<D
rHXI
cd
EH
A
d
d
CD
ft
ft<
8
o
d
ft
d
CD
-PO
d
d
-p
CQ
do
o
a)
o
ow
r~ ^ m v o  e— co cn 
cm m m m m m m  I I I I l l l
o  m ^ r n v o  c— co 
cm m m m m m m  
cn cn cn cn cn cn cn
305
306
Bengal province could be found from 1912 onwards after 
territorial adjustments.
Although changes in the political boundaries were 
responsible to some extent in the variation of produc­
tion figures for the first decade of the twentieth cen­
tury, it was not the only one. It cannot explain, for 
example, the great increase in the handloom production 
for the period 1905-06 to 1911-^2, the period which 
incidentally coincided with the partition of Bengal.
The explanation lies partly therefore in the Swadeshi 
movement of the period, the object of which was the 
production and manufacture of articles which were of 
general use among the people and the creation of a 
market for those articles in the country by the exclu- 
sion of foreign manufactures. The partition scheme 
"gave a fresh impetus to the Swadeshi movement - an 
impetus which has given rise to tremendous upheaval, 
the like of which has not been witnessed in this coun­
try within the memory of the oldest man living"-
2observed the Bengal Review while another contemporary
reported "a growing desire of the people to patronise
*
indigenous goods" on the eve of partition.^ Government 
reports and research also confirm the impact of this 
movement in stimulating production and creating a demand.
(1) Industrial India, Vol. II, No. 8, 9* August and 
September 1^05, p* 210.
(2; The Bengal Review, Vol. I, No. 10, October 1905* 
p. 2WI ’
(5) Industrial India, Vol. I, No. 4-, April 1904-, p. 56.
(4) J. G. Cumming, Review of the Industrial position and 
prospects, Part II of Special Report, p. bumit 
barkar, The Swadesm hovement m  Bengal, 1905-1908 
(New BelErr'T97'57T"PP.' '121-22.---------------------
However, with the outbreak of the war in 1914, the 
demand for handloom products diminished greatly and con­
tinued to be so till about 1920* This was mainly due to 
three principal reasons - the continuous rise in the 
price of cotton goods in Lancashire; the rise in the 
price of Indian cotton; and the economic condition of 
India. The last one, so far as Bengal was concerned, had 
been accompanied by a large fall in the prices of jute 
and rice which made it very difficult for the cultivators 
and poorer classes generally to pay the abnormally high
price demanded for cloth. In this regard Hon'ble A. K.
Fazl-ul-Huq pointed out:
"... in former years a cultivator could 
purchase at least two pairs of dhotis by 
selling one maund of rice and at least
three pairs by selling one maund of jute.
Roughly speaking, under the present con­
ditions he has to sell about two maunds 
of rice or jute in order to be able to buy 
one pair of dhotis - I am told that even 
two maunds would not be sufficient.
Roughly speaking, the expenses of a cul­
tivator have gone up four times and have 
put an unnecessary heavy burden on his 
otherwise slender resources".
It is quite probable that with the return of nor­
malcy in the 1920*s and the intensification of the 
swadeshi movement, the demand for handloom products 
picked up again. "As a result, however, of the inten­
sive and extensive swadeshi feeling in the country, 
particularly since 1950", wrote the Secretary, Indian
No.n,
(1) IOR: Vol. 10298, BRP (Commerce), September 1918,^p. 19*
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Chamber of Commerce, "the production of cloth on the 
handlooms has increased greatly". The economic problems 
of the 1930's which led to a fall in the general purcha­
sing power of the people must have also diverted the 
demand for cloth from high priced goods and thereby
exerting influence in the same direction as that of
2
Swadeshi movement.
The increased demand of handloom production in the 
twentieth century (excepting inter-war period) was 
supplied, however, without any addition to the total 
number of weavers. On the contrary, as we saw earlier, 
there was rather a decline in the number of professional 
workers. How are we then to explain this increased out­
put per unit of labour? The answer to this question 
lies in the technological changes brought about at this 
time in the methods of production, the most important 
of which was the gradual replacement of the old throw- 
shuttle looms with fly-shuttle looms. Fundamentally of 
course there was not much difference between these two 
types of looms excepting in one motion, viz, picking.
In the Indian handloom, the picking motion was performed 
by the weaver., who threw the shuttle with one hand from 
one side of the loom and hold it with the other when it 
reached the other side of the loom. The chief disadvan­
tage of this loom was that if the width of the cloth
nJos. — 8)
(1) IOR: Vol. 11960, BRP (Industries), October 1932*aP. 15*
(2) Report regarding the grant of protection to the Cotton 
Textile Industry (Calcutta, 1952). p. 174.
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woven was greater than the stretch of a man's arms, 
two operations were necessary, one at each end of the 
loom. Moreover, the weaver had to change his hand 
constantly to hold the lay in heating up the weft.
On the other hand, in the fly-shuttle loom, two boxes 
were placed, one at each end of the lay, for the recep­
tion of the shuttle instead of the weaver's hands which 
had to be held out in the ordinary handloom. In each 
of these boxes a spindle extending the whole length 
of the box was fitted and each carried a shuttle driver 
or picker, as it was technically termed. Between these, 
a cord was extended and attached to each, and affixed 
to this cord in the centre of its length, was the peg 
or handle by means of which the shuttle was jerked from 
one box to the other through the open shed. From this 
description it is clear that in the fly-shuttle loom, 
the necessity of employing two weavers when weaving a 
wide cloth was obviated by the addition of the shuttle- 
boxes, and the weaver had not to change hands, as he 
could now hold the lay with one hand and throw the 
shuttle by pulling the cord with the other, and these 
were no doubt great advantages. J. G. Cumming who made 
a survey of the Bengal industries in 1908 checked the 
weaving in many places and found that the fly-shuttle 
loom averaged sixty-five picks against twenty-two per
(1) Industrial India, Vol. II, 8, 9, August and September 
1905, pp. 189-90.
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1
minute in the country loom* P. C* Mitter speaking m  
the Bengal Legislative Council claimed that a weaver 
could weave 10 to 12 yards of cloth per day by using 
the fly-shuttle loom against five yards with ordinary
p
looms* The Government of Bengal also believed that the 
fly-shuttle looms doubled the output of the worker at 
once.* Moreover, the cloths turned out by these looms 
had also been claimed to be "excellently strong and
IL
durable, better in this respect then the imported cloth"* 
As regards the price, the pit fly-shuttle looms cost from 
Rs. 20 to Rs. 30 including two rollers and the Serampore 
fly-shuttle looms cost from Rs. 4-0 to Rs. 60. The out­
put of the two was the same - about a yard per hour
5
with medium counts of yarn.
(1) J. G. Cumming, Review of Industrial position, p. 8.
This was the effective speed and must not be confused 
with the working speed which was much higher. For an 
arithmetical clearification, see Rao Bahadur B. Patel, 
'Hand-loom Weaving in India’, Report of the Second 
Indian Industrial Conference held at Calcutta, December 
1906 ^Calcutta, 1907),'P. 209.
TTT BLCP. July 3, 1918, Vol. L, p. 726.
(3) toOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1926, p. 14. ^ .,^3,
(4) IOR: Vol. 7861, BGP (Education), December 1908,aP. 1413.
(5) The pit fly-shuttle loom was generally used by 
country weavers in which case pits were dug underneath 
the loom to accommodate the weavers feet operating the 
treadle levers. In the case of the Serampore fly- 
shuttle looms, although the operation was similar to 
the pit-loom it was mounted on a frame and as such no 
pits were required to be dug. These looms could also 
be moved, if necessary, from place to place without 
any difficulty. A. Guha, The Installation of Small 
Weaving Factories (Calcutta, 1924), pp. 3-6.
In spite of its acknowledged advantages, till the 
end of the nineteenth century the fly-shuttle loom 
(which was invented by John Key in 1733) remained con­
fined to Serampore, a Danish Settlement on the river 
Hooghly and by adopting this, and a few simple improve­
ments in the preparing processes of weaving the Serampore 
weavers "had raised themselves into a comparatively 
flourishing and independent position, a striking contrast 
to that of their fellow-workers in other less advanced 
districts" - observed Havell. To spread the use of fly- 
shuttle loom in other parts of the country early in this 
century he took up the matter and was able through 
lectures, letters and advertisements to create an interest 
among the public on the subject. The Swadeshi movement 
which soon followed gave further encouragement to the
movement and by 1908 it was claimed that 10,000 new looms
2were working in the province. The Government of Bengal 
also seemed to have favoured the idea which led to the 
appointment of N. N. Pillai as its Weaving Expert. The 
officer made extensive tours of the weaving centres in 
the province to demonstrate and supply improved apparatus 
and to instruct the people on improved methods of weaving.
(1) E. B. Havell, Essays on Indian Art. Industry and 
Education (Madras, 1910), p. 38*
(2) J. G. Cumming, Review of the Industrial position, p. 8
(3) Prior to 1912, the officer worked as weaving master in 
the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam (Report of the 
Agricultural Department, Bengal, for the year ending 30th 
June, H912, P« ^ . Prom 'I9'l5 to 'i919* he worked under the 
charge ofthe Director of Agriculture when his services 
was transferred to the administrative control of the 
Director of Industries from the 1st of December 1919*
RAB, 1920-21, p. 64.
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An industrial census taken in 1921 showed nearly 30 per 
cent of the looms fitted with fly-shuttles (see Table 7*5)- 
With the establishment of the Industries Department the 
drive to introduce fly-shuttle looms was carried out all 
the more vigorously. In their propaganda for the disse­
mination of the use of fly-shuttle looms and other impro­
ved devices like dobbies and jacquard machines, the 
Peripatetic and District Weaving Schools were of invalua­
ble aid. Up to March 1933* the Government District Weaving 
Schools (numbering nine) had introduced 2,381 improved 
weaving appliances including sleys and the Peripatetic 
Weaving Schools (numbering twenty-five) had introduced
*
no less than 10,157 sleys and other improved appliances.
The Government of Bengal also agreed from around 1928 to
supply effective weaving appliances to the weavers at
cost price and bear the packing and transport charges of
2such appliances. As a result of such activities of the 
Industries Department and due to inter-communication 
among the people themselves; the use of fly-shuttle looms 
and other improved weaving appliances had greatly in­
creased in Bengal. In 194-2, according to the Fact-finding 
Committee, 67 per cent of the handlooms of Bengal were of 
this improved variety. In addition to the introduction of
1 tios. s-y,
(1) IOR: Vol. 12075* BRP (Industries), June 1936,Ap*rA1
(2) IOR: Vol. 11865* BRP (Industries), October 1930,Ap. 11.' 
See, "Rules for the Supply of Weaving Appliances to the 
Hand-loom Weavers of Bengal".
(3) Report of the Fact-finding Committee (Handloom and 
Mills). (Delhi. 1942). p. 32.
Table 7*5 Proportion of looms with fly-shuttles, 1921
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District
Number of looms
With fly-,Without,Total 
shuttles . .
,Handlooms 
,per million 
,of the 
Tpopulation
Handlooms,Propor- 
per sq. ,tion of 
mile ,looms
,with fly~
,shuttle 
, (per cent)
Burdwan
Birbhum
Bankura
Midnapore
Hooghly
Howrah
24-Parganas
Calcutta
Nadia
Murshidabad
J essore
Khulna
Rajshahi
Dinajpur
Jalpaiguri
Darjeeling
Rangpur
Bogra
Pabna
Halda
Cooch Behar
Dacca
Mymensingh
Paridpur
Bakargunj
Tippera
Noakhali
Chittagong
Chittagong
Hill Tracts
Tripura
State
2,011 1,931 3,942 2,739 146 51
1,645 4,199 5,844 6,895 333 28
2,428 5,746 8,174 8,014 311 30
4,314 10,962 15,276 5,728 277 28
3,877 2,111 5,988 5,544 507 65
589 510 1,099 1,102 207 54
967 . 5 972 370 20 99
2,726 2,199 4,925 3,311 177 55
1,656 5,705 7,361 5,830 347 22
5,818 1,114 6,932 4,025 239 84
3,619 143 3,762 2,589 80 96
118 379 497 334 18 24
88 3,841 3,929 2,303 160 3
14 2,531 2,545 2,718 87
- 464 464 1,641 40
3 401 404 161 12 1
274 1,591 1,865 1,779 137 15
2,929 5,693 8,622 6,204 466 34
1,025 903 1 ,928 1,956 102 53
■ - 2,083 2,083 3,516 158
6,375 5,423 11,798 3,774 432 54
958 10,671 11,629 2,404 185 8
6,004 1,958 7,962 3,539 136 75
3,900 3,029 6,929 2,641 198 56
986 11,446 12,432 4,532 486 7826 8,205 9,031 6,132 596 9
6 6,812 6,818 4,231 273
- 29,190 29,190 168,492 568 -
12 31,473 31,485 10,342 765 _
Total 53,168 160,718 213,886 272,846 7,465
Source: Census of India* 1921, Volume V, Bengal, Part I, Report 
(Calcutta, 1925), pp* 400-401.
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Key's fly-shuttle looms, other improved varieties of
looms also came to be in use# Mention may be made of
the Salvation Army loom and the Hattersley automatic
. . 1loom but their number was insignificant.
After having analysed the production figures of 
handloom goods, we now proposed to look into the types 
of fabrics that the weavers generally manufactured in 
Bengal. Broadly speaking, the fabrics were of two kinds 
- coarser goods made from lower counts of yarn for the 
consumption of the poorer classes and fine and super­
fine goods. The relative volume of production of these 
two classes of goods and their money value is however 
difficult to estimate in view of the unorganized nature 
of the industry. According to the Tariff Board on Cotton
Textile Industry (1932), the bulk of the handloom pro-
2ducts consisted of cloth of counts 20s and below.
Another estimate made by the Industries Department of 
Bengal also claimed that over 80 per cent of the Indian 
yarn used by the handloom weavers were of counts in 
between 12s and 32s and the remaining 20 per cent were 
of AQs counts and upwards. "Such development", observed 
the Bengal Industrial Survey Committee "reflect the 
present general standard of living of the people of the
(1) These semi-automatic and automatic looms were used 
by former students of the Serampore Weaving Institute
at their factories and also by unemployed bhadrologs and 
students. See, IIC, Vol. II (PP XVIII of p.” 214;
Star of India, Pbbfuary 12, 1936, p. 3* Wider dissemi­
nation of such looms was impossible in view of their 
prohibitive price. The price of the Salvation Army loom, 
for example, was Rs. 110 and that of Hattersley automatic 
loom about Rs. 600. See, A. Guha, The Installation of 
Small Weaving Factories, p. 6.
(2) Report of the Indian Tariff Board regarding the grant of 
protection to the Cotton Textile Industry (Calcutta. 1,932), p. 171.
(3) IOR: Vol. 11960, BRP (Industries), October 1932'£p. <'12.
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province, majority of whom are engaged in the precarious
q
occupation of under-developed agriculture".
The various products turned out by the weavers were
ordinary saris, special saris, special dhuties, ordinary
dhuties, lungis, mosquito curtains, gamchas or towels,
chadars, etc. According to the provincial government
figures supplied to the Fact-finding Committee, 40 per
cent of these products were saris, 40 per cent lungis,
9 per cent chadars, 6 per cent gamchas and 5 per cent 
2
dhuties. But such figures are open to question as other 
varieties of products like table-cloths, mosquito-nets, 
pardahs, cloth for coats and shirts, cotton petticoat, 
etc., have been left out of account in the estimate.
Although ordinary cotton stuffs were woven in all 
the districts, the finer varieties of products were woven 
only in some of the centres of Dacca, Nadia, Nymensingh, 
Tippera, Hooghly, Howrah, Pabna, Birbhum, Burdwan,
Hidnapore and Noakhali. The most famous of the finer 
varieties were the muslins of Dacca. Although Dacca no 
longer manufactured the exquisite plain muslins like 
sangati (meaning presentation), sharbati (sweet as sarbat), 
abrawan (running water), or shabnam (evening dew); it 
still manufactured figured muslins called jamdani saris. 
The speciality of these saris was that these were hand- 
embroidered with needles of bamboo or tamarind wood and 
by the help generally of a pattern on paper which was
(1) Report of the BISC (Alipore, '1948), p. 43.
(2) Report of the Fact-finding Committee, p. '120.
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pinned, beneath* These had ornamental borders of gold 
and silver thread, with large bold corner pieces. Collin 
reported in 1890 that there were only some five hundred 
families who made these saris in Dacca out of English 
thread while Gupta in 1908 found that its manufacture 
had spread even in the interior of Dacca to such villages 
as Demra, Sidhigunj, Katchpur, Dhamrai, etc., where caste 
weavers combined their occupation with that of agricul­
ture and were undercutting their products compared to 
Dacca town weavers. In 1912, the following fine cloths 
were being manufactured in Dacca:
(1) Mulmul prepared from British yarn, size 20 yards by 
1 yard, cost from Rs. 5 to Rs. 60, exported to Upper 
India and Nepal for wearing apparel.
(2) Saris with borders embroidered in gold thread, size 
5 to 6 yards long by 44" to 50" wide, price from Rs. 5 
to Rs. 40. The best saris were only prepared to order 
costing from Rs. 50 to Rs. 150.
(3) Ordinary saris with coloured thread borders of the 
same size selling for from Rs. 2 to Rs. 1 5a piece.
(4) Dhuties with coloured and white borders 5 to 6 yards 
long by 44” to 50" were generally sold for Rs. 1-8 to 
Rs. 12. A superior kind adorned with gold borders and 
gollabottom fetched from Rs. 5 to Rs. 10.
(5) Urnis of different sizes 5 to 7 cubits long by 1-J to 
3£ cubits wide were sold for from annas 8 to Rs. 16 a 
piece.
(1) Collin, Report on the Existing Arts and Industries in 
Bengal, p. 11; and Gupta, Survey of Industries, p. 12.
(6) Handkerchiefs 18 to 24 inches square were prepared 
and sold per dozen Rs. 3 to Rs. 8.
Next to Dacca, Santipur in Nadia was perhaps the 
most famous place for the manufacture of fine cotton 
goods. Its fine muslin was known as Santipur cloth, 
and was admired for its thin textures, and embroidered 
and flowered work. Banerjei, in his monograph on the 
cotton fabrics of Bengal, published in 1898, estimated 
the outturn of the cotton cloths of Santipur then about
34 lakhs of rupees per annum, but its value had somewhat
2
fallen by 1909. Likewise, production of fine cloths 
for which Kishorgunj and Bajitpur and also the other 
Bajitpur in Tangail were renowed, had fallen. Around 
1917* some 40 families in Bajitpur manufactured muslin 
and the products sold in Dacca. In the Brahmanbana 
subdivision, good cotton cloth suitable for dhuties, 
chadars and saris were made. The weavers of Sarail, 
Brahmanbaria, and Kalikacha made also dhuties and chadars 
of a finer quality which sold for from Rs. 16 to Rs. 20 
a pair.^ Finer varieties of cloth in Hooghly were made 
at Serampore, Haripal, Dhaniakhali and Kalme, as well as 
in French Chandernagore. The cloths made in the first 
and last towns were specially known as Farasdanga.^ In
(1) Eastern Bengal District Gazetteers, Dacca (Allahabad, 
1912), p. 113.
(2) Bengal District Gazetteers, Nadia (Calcutta, 1910), p.
(3) Ibid., Mymensingh (Calcutta, 191?), p. 77.
(4) Eastern Bengal and Assam District Gazetteers, Tippera 
(Allahabad, 1910), p. 36.
(5) Bengal District Gazetteers, Hooghly (Calcutta, 1912), 
p. 183.
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Howrah, finer cloths were woven in thana Dumjor, but 
in very small quantities. Pabna fabrics had also a 
high reputation on account of their fine texture, and 
it was claimed that they challanged comparison with the 
products of Dacca and other historical seats of the 
weaving industry. Fine cloths were made at Sadullapur, 
Nishchintapur.,'- and Amirpur in the Sadar subdivision and 
at Delua, Gachhapur, and Chotadhul in the Serajgunj sub­
division. The chadars and cloths made at Delua were of 
specially fine quality and in good demand among the 
upper classes. The annual outturn of cloth in the Pabna
p
district was reported to be 7*500,000 yards a year.
In Birbhum, finer cloths such as twills, table cloths,
pardahs, bed sheets, and cloth for coats and shirts,
were manufactured at Bolpur, Dubrajpur, Karidha, Tantipara 
*
and Alunda. Fine cloths were also made in a number of 
centres in Burdwan district like Purbasthali, Kalna, 
Manteswar, Bahadurpur, Baje, Itta and their products were 
usually sent to Howrah. The district outturn of cotton 
cloth during 1908-09 was estimated at 2,535*4-00 yards,
h.
valued at Rs. 2,81,578. In Faridpur, bed-sheets of fine 
quality, and checked and striped fabrics suitable for 
coats and shirts, were made in large quantities at
(1) Bengal District Gazetteers, Howrah (Calcutta, 1909)* 
p. 98.
(2) Ibid., Pabna (Calcutta, 1923)* PP. 62-65.
(5) Ibid., Birbhum (Calcutta, 1910), p. 76.
(4) Ibid., fcurdwari (Calcutta, 1910), pp. 122-25.
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Rajbari, the headquarters of the Goalundo subdivision,
the yarn being obtained from the hat held at Kumarkhali
in the Nadia district. At Chandrakhona and Radhanagar
in the Nidnapore district, good quality dhuties, saris,
and urnas were manufactured and exported in considerable
2quantities every week to the Howrah mart. Lungis of
superior quality in fast colours were being made in
Noakhali and competed successfully with those imported
from Holland and Burma. A species of coloured sari,
known as ,jam sari, was made in the district and was much
in demand. The mosquito nets of Chaumuhani, white and
*
coloured, had also a great reputation.^
Nixed fabrics or baftas were woven in a number of 
places. In these cloths the warp was usually tussar and 
the woof cotton. In Hooghly, mixed fabrics known as 
rangina were made at Bali, Diwanganj, Udayrajpur and 
some other villages in the Arambag subdivision. According 
to variations of size and colour, these fabrics were 
divided into different classes, e.g., swaga.ji (red and 
white stripe on an orange ground), muskha (with black and 
orange stripes), selai-khata (black stripes on orange 
ground), phularu (red flowers on yellow or white ground), 
,jarda or su.jasdi (red or white stripes on a yellow ground), 
and shshi (in red and blue checks).^ Nost of these products
(1) Bengal District Gazetteers, Faridpur (Calcutta, 1925)* 
P. 77.
(2) Ibid., Nidnapore (Calcutta, 1911)* p. 126.
(3) Eastern Bengal and Assam District Gazetteers, Noakhali 
(Allahabad, 1911), p. 7^  •
(4) Bengal District Gazetteers, Hooghly (Calcutta, ^912), 
p. 185.
were made for export to the Punjab and the United
Provinces. In Bhagalpore, superior quality bafta
chadars were made which cost Rs. 3-8 to Rs. 15 against
Rs. 0-10 to Rs. 15 in the case of cotton chadars. But
the product was extremely durable and could last at
least five to six years. Dacca used to manufacture a
kind of baftas known as azizi from bleached cotton and
Assamese silk. But Dacca was more famous for its kasida
cloth which was a coloured cotton muslin embroidered with
untwisted muga silk thread (when the cloth was woven, a
pattern was stamped on it which was embroidered). These
were usually used as turbans by Muhammadan gentlemen in
near Eastern countries. Prior to the First World War,
a considerable quantity of these cloths were exported
to North Africa and Constantinople but the industry was
reported to be experiencing difficulty in disposing off
2
their stocks for want of regular markets. It may also 
be mentioned here that there were some fifty to sixty 
varieties of kasida cloth and the prices ranged from 
Rs. 50 to Rs. 80 per piece according to quality.
(1) J. G. Cumming, Review of Industrial position, p. 12.
(2) RAB, 1920-21, p. 75; and POlB; Annual Administration 
Report, 1921, p. 15*
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h i
Cost Structure of Production
After having looked into the handloom production figures 
as well as fabrics produced, we propose to look at the 
cost structure of the industry. A study of the relative 
proportion of costs of production would enable us to 
form a better understanding of the problems of the in­
dustry which we propose to study in the next section.
But it is not always easy to discover the relative costs 
of handloom products. The industry being unorganized 
and scattered, no census of production costs had ever 
been undertaken by the local government, not the least 
because it involved substantial expenditure which the 
provincial government was unable to incur due to finan­
cial difficulties. Government records of the period 
also throw no light on the subject. It was only in the 
1930's when weaving operations became an important 
aspect of government's industrial policy that we come 
across occasional references of actual costs of pro­
duction of particular types of cloths.
The two most important components of the cost of 
production were the cost of materials and that of labour 
charge. Cost of material involved the price of yarn, 
which again depended upon its fineness, the cost of other 
materials such as .jari in the case of fine dhuties and 
saris and also the cost of dyeing and bleaching. On the 
other hand, the most important item in the labour cost 
was the cost of weaving; and other costs in this category
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included the cost of sizing, preparing the warp (inclu­
ding drawing and twisting), cost of winding the weft 
and the cost of finishing. The respective costs of 
materials and labour, however, differed widely from one 
class of goods to another as could be seen in Table 7*6. 
From the table, we find that the cost of yarn was the 
single most important item in the cost of production.
The cost of yarns in the case of gamchas, striped shir­
ting, lungis, chadars, and that of coloured saris repre­
sented over 70 per cent of the cost of production. It 
may also be mentioned that these were the common items 
of mass consumption. In the case of fancy products like 
saris with golden ,jari borders yarn costs, however, 
represented only 19 per cent of the total cost of pro­
duction against 49 per cent being the cost of other 
materials, i.e., ,jaris. In relation to cost of materials, 
the percentage of labour costs, i.e., weaving (and other 
preparatory processes also usually done by the weaver) 
were small. In the case of ordinary common woven goods 
like chadars, coloured saris and lungis, it hovered 
around 25 per cent. However, weaving charges were higher 
in the case of fancy products like fine dhuties and fine 
saris as could be seen from Appendix V, Table 6. But the 
Indian Industrial Commission found that Mon yarn of fine
counts he expends a very much larger amount of labour per
2
lb. of material used than on coarse yarn". Thus when the
(1) Report of the Fact-finding Committee (Handloom and 
Mills). 1942. -p. 133.
(2) Report of the IIC (PP XVII of 1919), p. ^35.
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time factor is taken into consideration, it is probable 
that the average weaving charges in Bengal were more or 
less the same for most products. The average weaving 
charges when translated into money income was, however, 
far from satisfactory in view of the fact that most 
weavers were dependent on mahajans for the materials of 
his products. Thus Gupta found the weavers of the Dacca 
town of whom more than 90 per cent were indebted to 
maha,jans earning not more than 2 to 3 annas a day, while 
those who worked with their own capital admitted earning 
on the average from Rs. 15 to Rs. 20 a month.
IV
Problems of Weavers and Government attempts to solve them
While the preceding section showed the relative percen­
tages of the cost of production of handloom goods, in this 
section we will discuss the problems connected with the 
production and distribution of handloom cloths in Bengal 
vis-a-vis the attempts made by the government to amelio­
rate the economic condition of those engaged in the in­
dustry. Among the problems (other then that of improve­
ments in the mechanical processes which has been discussed 
earlier) were (a) the difficulty of supply of yarn at a 
cheap rate, (b) the dispersal of the finished products at 
the best possible price, (c) lack of finance, and (d) want
(1) G. N. Gupta, A Survey of the Industries and Resources 
of Eastern Bengal and Assam for 1907-08 (Shillong. 1908). 
p. 1A,
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of training of weavers in new designs and patterns, 
texture and finish* It was largely because of these 
problems that the handloom weavers in Bengal were to a 
very great extent at a disadvantageous position in re­
lation to textile mills*
Supply of Yarn
The problem of getting a sufficient supply of cheap yarn 
was the most pressing of all, especially as we found 
earlier that yarn price constituted more than 70 per cent 
of the cost of manufacture in the case of ordinary hand­
loom products of daily use* Unfortunately, the internal 
trade of this important raw material was in the hands 
of a chain of middlemen which necessarily increased the 
yarn price and placed the poor weavers in a disadvanta­
geous position in relation to mills* Such a chain of 
middlemen included the big yarn dealers (mainly Narwaris) 
in Calcutta who procured yarn from mills upon forward 
contract or imported them from abroad; paikars who 
usually bought on wholesale from yarn merchants or 
dealers; the innumerable grades of middlemen called 
farias* who sold yarn in rural hats and bazaars or itine­
rated from village to village. Unfortunately, however, 
there are no statistical figures to show the margin of 
profits that each grade of middlemen earned on their 
transactions but it is believed that the differential 
between the mill price of yarns and the actual amount 
paid by the weavers must have been substantial* Not 
only were the prices high but instances were not rare 
when unscrupulous yarn dealers resorted to unfair means,
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i.e., short reeling, false packing or even over decla­
ration of weight. Hoarding was also a common occurance 
among a section of yarn dealers and speculators which 
occasionally resulted in high and fluctuating price of 
yarns.
To eliminate the profits of the middlemen, the 
Government attempted to solve the problem of yarn supply 
through co-operative methods. It established a number 
of yarn banks or depots at convenient places, i.e., 
at Nadia, Serampore, Zorwargunj, Chapra, Begumgunj,
Mankar and arrangements v/ere also made for the supply of
yarns to these banks at market rates with a number of
1 . . .Calcutta merchants. Members of co-operative societies
could buy their yarn from these places at a cheaper rate 
than prevailing in the local bazaars. However, the number 
of such banks or depots seems to have been very limited. 
Members of co-operative societies affiliated to parti­
cular Industrial Unions could also procure yarns under 
"yarn-sale system". Under this system, the weavers 
through their societies purchased yarn from the Union at 
thirty-five day's sight, disposed of their finished 
products themselves, and paid the Union the actual price
p
of the yarn plus one anna per rupee on the price. But 
such a system of yarn supply could not work satisfactorily 
owing to the inability of the Unions to obtain yarns at
(1) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1922, p. 18.
(2) Annual~&eport on the Working of Co-operative Societies 
in the Presidency of Bengal. 1924-25, p. 20.
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wholesale rates through forward contract with the mills.
As a result the price of the yarn supplied to weavers 
was not always lower than the rate prevailing in the 
local bazaars. In some cases, Industrial Unions (e.g., 
Industrial Union of Chaumohini) even had to purchase yarns 
from local markets for distribution amongst its member
p
societies. This inability to supply yarn at cheap rates 
greatly hampered the successful working of the Industrial 
Unions and disheartened most weavers who saw no benefit 
accruing to them from joining the co-operative movement. 
Problem of ^Marketing
One of the probable reasons for the higher price of hand- 
loom products was the higher costs of marketing the indi­
vidual items of handlooms as contrasted with the bulk 
transactions by which the mill-made fabrics were marketed 
and sold. Not only did the yarn prices go up as it passed 
from the big importing houses to the weaver through 
several middlemen, the same process was also repeated with 
regard to finished article. If he had worked to order, 
he was fortunate; otherwise he had to take his goods to 
one of the nearest hats which were commonly held through­
out rural Bengal at regular intervals usually once or 
twice a week or to daily bazaars. There he would sell 
his products either to retail customers or to farias who 
would usually buy for cash. The farias in their turn
(1) J. P. Niyogi, The Co-operative Movement in Bengal 
(London, 1940), p. 240.
(2) Annual Report on the Working of Co-operative Societies 
in the Presidency of Bengal. 1927-28, p. 28.
sold their goods to oaikars or beparis who had their 
establishments in the principal centres of trade. After 
collecting large quantities of commodities, the paikars 
disposed them off in bulks to the bigger mahajans at 
convenient time when prices were good. Sometimes shop­
keepers would also send their agents to make purchases 
at these hats. In some towns, weavers themselves hawked 
about with their goods from house to house or from shop 
to shop. In marketing their products, handloom weavers 
had relatively little difficulty during the months from 
October to January and June and July when new paddy 
enabled the agriculturists to buy their yearly require­
ments of cloth. But for the remaining six months, the 
weaver was virtually at the mercy of mahajans (who were 
often also yarn dealers and money-lenders) as he had no 
holding capacity and was unable to pay cash for more 
yarns. Under the circumstances, he had no alternative 
but to accept one of the following courses if he wished 
to keep his loom working:
(a) he deposited his finished cloth with the yarn dealer 
against the price of new yarn taken, in the hope that the 
market would improve and enable him to get his full price. 
This was, of course a very temporary expedient;
(b) he could sell the cloth outright to the dealer at a
discount on the usual sale price;
(c) if the yarn dealer was unwilling to buy the cloth,
the weaver was compelled to sell his products to any 
private customer at any price he could get. In some cases, 
when sales were slack, he could get no more than the value
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of the yarn in the cloth.
To tackle the problem, Government encouraged co­
operative methods of sale through Industrial Unions and 
also granted loans and subsidies to different organiza­
tions and associations devoted to the cause of marketing 
the products of cottage industries, i.e., Bengal Home 
Industries Association, Good Companions, etc. The Indus­
trial Unions (which were seven in number in 1934) supplied 
yarn to their respective affiliated societies which worked 
on bani (wages) system and when cloths were woven took 
them for sale. It was up to the Unions to find markets 
for the disposal of finished products. In doing so, 
however, the Unions continually faced difficulties as a 
result of which many Unions suffered financial losses, 
i.e., the Bankura Industrial Union which worked with 77
affiliated societies had to sell its goods at less than
2
the cost price in order to compete in the market. The 
principal reasons for the failure of the Co-operative 
Unions to solve the marketing problem was due, firstly, 
to the high price charged for mill yarns; and secondly, 
to the heavy overhead charges of the Co-operative 
Industrial Unions as a result of which the minimum market 
price of cotton fabrics of the handloom industry was 
found to be much higher than the prices at which the mill 
products of similar quality and attractiveness were sold.
(1) The work of the different private organizations and 
associations which carried out the task of marketing the 
products of the cottage industries has already been 
dealt • with in Chapter II, Part II.
(2) Annual Report on the Working of Co-operative Societies 
in the Presidency of Bengal. 1931-32* pp. 14-15.
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To relieve the Industrial Unions in disposing of their 
finished goods, the Unions were federated into a provin­
cial organization in 1929 called the Bengal Provincial 
Co-operative Industrial Society, Limited. But "for want 
of sufficient funds at its disposal" and because it wor­
ked mainly with borrowed capital for which it had to pay 
a high rate of interest, the provincial organization 
could not be of much help to the Industrial Unions and
maintained only a Sale Depot in Calcutta in which fini-
q
shed goods were displayed. Apart from Co-operative 
methods of marketing which had not been quite satis­
factory for obvious reasons (and grants and subsidies 
to some organizations), no serious attempt, was made by 
the provincial government to solve the problem. This was 
quite in contrast to the Punjab and the United Provinces 
where the provincial governments maintained emporiums for 
stocking and advertising the products of the cottage and 
small industries of those provinces and in charge of each 
of those emporiums there was an officer of gazetted rank
who did the necessary marketing and publicity work and
2
gave marketing advice to cottage industrialists. However, 
as a result of a strong recommendation of the Director of 
Industries, Bengal (G. S. Dutt), the Government in 1933 
decided to appoint a Marketing and Publicity Officer under 
the Unemployment Relief Scheme for facilitating the market­
ing of the products of the cottage and small industries
(1) Bulletins of Indian Industries and Labour. No. 52 
(Proceedings of the Sixth Industries Conference) (Delhi, 
1934), pp. 44-45. Hos.l-1,
(2) IOR: Vol. 11988, BRP (Industries), October 1933,Ap. 3*
1
in Bengal with effect from 1934— 35* But it is unlikely 
that any significant change had been brought by the mere 
appointment of a marketing officer only when the problem 
needed to be tackled in a big way#
Problem of Finance
Handloom weavers needed capital for a variety of reasons# 
Firstly, he needed block capital to purchase his applian­
ces like looms, preparatory machinery and accessories. 
This itself, however, was not sufficient; he also needed 
money to purchase raw materials like yarns to work upon. 
Together with these, he required reserve capital as fini­
shed goods often remained unsold for want of markets, 
especially during slack seasons when he had to purchase 
yarn to keep himself employed. Secondly, he had also to 
maintain his family which often consisted of four to five 
members on the average. Since handloom weavers lived at 
subsistence level, he had virtually no reserve capital 
to fall back upon and had ordinarily to resort to money­
lenders or yarn dealers or cloth merchants who were often 
one and the same person. Once the handloom weaver got 
indebted to the mahajan it was very difficult if not 
impossible for him to get out. The mahajans on their 
part also rather encouraged them in this as a certain 
amount of indebtedness on the part of the weaver was a
considerable safeguard during the months when he was
2likely to become a defaulter. In such a contractual
nI o - 3 ,
(1) IOR: Vol. 11988, BRP (Industries), October 1933,aP. 6 
(2; A. E. Brown, 'The Economic Conditions of the Cotton 
Weavers of the Bankura District1, Bengal Economic Journal 
Vol. I, No. 3 (Calcutta, January 1917;, P* 312*
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relationship, the maha.jan being the dominant partner 
determined the terms and conditions in his own favour, 
leaving only a bare subsistence to the actual worker and 
appropriated to himself all the commercial advantages 
of the processes of buying and selling. Any attempt to 
organize the handloom industry by capitalists was strenous- 
ly opposed by mahajans, and their control over the weavers 
was sufficient to ensure its defeat.
The Government on its turn also did next-to-nothing 
to improve the financial position of the weavers so that 
they could free themselves from the clutches of the middle­
men. It is true that the Bengal Agricultural Debtor's 
Act, 1935 was passed but the cottage industrialists did 
not come within the Act and hence could not claim relief 
from their indebtedness. The All-Bengal Jamiatul Momineen 
(central organization for Bengal weavers) was very bitter 
at the apathy and neglect of the state and complained 
that the weavers of Bengal had not profited by the Co­
operative movement, either for credit or for production 
and marketing and hence they had to depend on the maha.jans 
in consequence of which they were compelled to sell their 
finished goods at a rate less than the market price. It 
called upon the Government to protect and subsidize the 
actual and real weavers with money grant and regulate 
prices of yarn. The state, however, granted loans to the
(1) Star of India. July 24, 1939, p. 7
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Table 7*7 Loans sanctioned to passed students of Govern­
ment Weaving Institutes, 1929-30 to 1938-39
Year No, of students 
receiving loan
Total amount 
sanctioned
1929-30 60 4,949
1930-31 48 3,910
1931-32 71 3,950
1932-33 73 3,975
1933-34 57 3,995
1934-35 57 3,775
1935-36 53 3,680
1936-37 49 3,940
1937-38 46 3,588
1938-39 18 1,800
Sources: DOIB: Annual Administration Report. 1929-30 
(Calcutta, 1930), p# 38 and subsequent annual issues 
till 1938-39.
ex-students of Government Weaving Institutes in order to 
enable them to follow the profession independently. These 
loans were granted against efficient security bearing an 
interest of 6\ per cent per annum repayable in 24 equal 
instalments. But the amount of such annual grants was 
ridiculous both in terms of total amount sanctioned and 
in terms of average loans granted (see Table 7*7). Apart 
from such small loans, no other financial support was 
forthcoming from the Government or from other known 
sources.
Want of Training
Although due to intensive propaganda work carried out by 
the demonstration parties and various . schools like
(1) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1936-37* P. 37-
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Peripatetic Weaving Schools and District Weaving Schools, 
improved Serampore fly-shuttle looms had been introduced 
widely in Bengal; yet there had been little change in 
respect of new designs and patterns, texture and finish 
of the handloom products. This was basically due to 
ignorance and lack of proper training facilities in this 
respect. It was only after 1934 when the Government of 
India decided to assist the handloom industry for a 
period of five years that this aspect of the industry 
was looked into. By November 1935* skilled staff consis­
ting of one weaving expert and a number of weaving super­
visors had been allotted to all important weaving areas 
under the operation of Industrial Unions. The duties 
allotted to the experts and supervisors to the Industrial 
Unions were to train up the weavers in producing fabrics 
of improved and new designs, texture and finish as also
to supply them with dyed yarns and to advise them in the
2
reduction of the cost of production. A designer was also 
attached to the Bengal Provincial Co-operative Industrial 
Society, Limited, to supply new designs to the Industrial 
Unions.^ The Designer, it was claimed at the Ninth Indus­
tries Conference had supplied 120 new designs to the 
different Industrial Unions and weaving organizations 
out of which 80 had been successfully adopted by the
4
weavers and depicted on fabrics. In addition to providing
(1) RAB, 1935-36, p. 126; and Bulletins of Indian Indus­
tries and Labour, No. 59 (Proceedings of the Eighth Indus­
tries Conference) (Delhi, 1937)* P# 96.
(2) Bulletins of Indian Industries and Labour. No. 59*
p. 26.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid., No. 65 (Proceedings of the Ninth Industries 
Conference) (Lellii, 1938), p. 22.
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experts, money was also sanctioned from the Government 
of India fund for the purchase of dobbies, jacquard 
machines, dyeing appliances and other improved machinery 
like sizing machine and calendering machine which defi­
nitely enabled weavers of co-operative societies to weave
fabrics of new designs and fashions and gave them a better 
>1
finish. But unfortunately, the entire process of training
up weavers in respect of developing the artistic value of
their products remained arrested within a narrow fraction
of the weaving population, and no appropriate measures
had been taken to tackle the problem at micro level.
This was a serious flaw in government planning, especially
when they themselves had realized that the future of the
industry lay nin the direction of developing the artistic
value of their products and a continuous living touch with
the market... as to the requirements of the consumers in
2
respect of textures, designs and other particulars". The 
weavers on their part also showed a general reluctance to 
get themselves trained as new designs involved the use of 
improved appliances like dobbies and jacquard machines 
which they were too poor to purchase. Nor could they 
afford to attend the training centres for days together 
at the sacrifice of their daily earnings. Moreover, a 
certain quantity of raw materials was also wasted in the 
process of learning which the Unions were generally unable 
to supply.^
(1) IOR: Vol. 12049* BRP (Industries), November 19 35*/slo-s-
pp. 21-26.
(2) Bulletins of Indian Industries and Labour, No. 50
(Proceedings of the ^ifth Industries Conference) (Delhi,
1933)* p* 66. m o s . ? - 8 ,
(3) IOR: Vol. 12075* BRP (Industries), October 1936,Ap. 18.
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Conclusion
In the context of India's twentieth century industrial 
history, no topic was discussed more frequently and with 
such emotional surcharge than that of handloom cotton 
weaving industry* To nationalist politicians the ques­
tion of its revival and regeneration became almost a 
symbol of India1s economic and political freedom*
Popular sentiment was roused and the public were instruc­
ted to encourage in every possible way the expansion for 
the sake of the ailing country. The efforts of the 
politicians to patronize handloom products did not go 
entirely in vain. After years of decay in the nineteenth 
century, the industry at last began to take off due to 
increased demand for handloom products on the part of the 
people and improvements in the mechanical processes of 
weaving appliances which enabled weavers to meet this 
increased demand. In spite of such increased output, it 
is doubtful whether the economic condition of the actual 
producers had improved in any appreciable manner. The
industry remained, according to the Bengal Industrial
2
Survey Committee:
"... generally under the grip of the 
mahajans who in most of the cases act 
as creditors and suppliers of yarn to 
the weavers and also market the finished 
stuffs. The mahajans1 interposition 
between the weaving community and the 
market is primarily due to the lack of 
any organization amongst the workers, 
whose principal difficulty is want of funds".
(1) Industrial India. Vol. IV, No. 7i July 1907* pp. 211-12.
(2) BISO. p. 45!
To improve weavers1 economic condition no doubt the 
Government made attempts to reorganize the industry 
on co-onerative lines but failed miserably due to in­
adequate resources at its command.
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Chapter VIII
In the previous chapters, we have made a critical review 
of some aspects of the industrial growth and development 
of Bengal during the period 1900 to 1939* Here we intend 
to summarize in brief the trend and extent of industrial 
development during our period of study.
Since there are no agreed criterion by which such 
historical development can be measured and weighed, we 
have arbitarily decided to apply the following standards 
to evaluate the extent of industrial progress in this 
province, firstly, by the shifting distribution of labour 
as registered in the factories reports. An important 
limitation of this standard is that it does not take 
into consideration those factories which do not employ 
at least a certain number of labour-force. As a result, 
cottage industries which employ perhaps the greater 
number of industrial labour-force and the labour-force 
employed in the smaller organized factories of the 
province are excluded. Or, in other words, it records 
only the shifting distribution of labour in the larger 
industrial establishments minus colliery workers and 
also the tea garden labourers (includes, however, those 
who work in the tea factories). Secondly, we can 
measure industrialization by the consumption of power 
as indicated by the growth of electric power for industrial 
purposes. Here, the limitations are two-fold. Firstly,
we do not have the separate statistics of electric 
power used for industrial purposes. The figures are 
that of units sold alike for domestic, industrial or 
public uses. Secondly, the statistics available for 
any continuous period of time are that of the Calcutta 
Electric Supply Corporation, Limited, which covered 
the major industrial belt around Calcutta. These two 
standards, although they suffer from obvious limitations, 
will probably give some indication of the industrial 
growth of Bengal. A third criterion which will be 
used is that of the variations in the aggregate paid- 
up capital of the important manufacturing industries 
of the province. This in our opinion is a much better 
guide than the previous two standards. One defect in 
the statistics is, however, that of absence of proper 
notes so as to show, for example, which companies have 
been classified under *iron, steel and ship-building* 
and which under 1 engineering companies*. But this will 
not alter the total investment figure as both are manu­
facturing companies and perhaps interchangable too.
Coming to the shifting distribution of industrial j 
labour-force in Bengal, we find from Table 4.7 that i 
their numbers had increased nearly three-fold from 
around 200,000 in 1901 to around 57/l*000 in 1939#
During the same period, the number of factories at work 
had also increased by nearly seven-fold from around 250 
to around 1,750. But it should be borne in mind that 
this increase includes many factories which were working 
earlier but had not been brought under the Factories Acts
like the tea factories (which came under the Act in 1922) 
and also m a n y  which were not detected earlier by the 
factory inspection staff.
The increase in the number of workforce and factories 
in Bengal was coupled with the growth of electric power 
used for industrial purposes. Thus in 1924, the consump­
tion of electric power in and around Calcutta was round 
about 55 million units which increased to over 100 million
A
units by 1928. The growth was even more remarkable later
- 171 million units in 1950 which again more than doubled
2
by the end of 1958 to over 365 million units. Here again
one should not forget that the growth of electric power
was not entirely due to power consumed in new ventures.
Some displacement of oil engines, gas engines and in
some cases steam power had undoubtedly taken place in
favour of electricity, but the general trend of the
*
figures support the view expressed.
Capital investment in various industries had also 
increased during the period under review. Thus the 
aggregate paid-up capital of the tea and other planting 
companies at work on 31 March, 1900-01 was Rs. 328 lakhs
Zl
which increased to Rs. 1,236 lakhs in 1935-36. Paid-up
(1) DOIB: Annual Administration Report. 1928-29, see 
graph on page 40.
(2) Annual Report on the Administration of the Indian 
Electricity Act. 1910 in Bengal for the year 1931 
(Calcutta. 1932), p. 26: and Ibid., 1939 (Alipore, 1940), 
p. 32.
(3) DOIB: Annual Administration Report, 1928-29* PP« 8-9*
(4) DOIB: Bulletin No. 83. Report on the Growth of Joint 
Stock Companies in Bengal (Alipore, 1^39)* p. 9.
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capital of jute mills and jute presses during the same 
period increased from Rs. 303 lakhs to Rs. 1,985 lakhs 
and that of mining and quarrying companies from Rs. 151 
lakhs to Rs. 1,035 lakhs and cotton mills from Rs. 78 
lakhs in 1900-01 to Rs. 380 lakhs in 1935-36.  ^A some­
what less spectacular growth so far as aggregate paid- 
up capital of industries was concerned was marked in the 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries, engineering
2companies, iron, steel and ship-building companies, etc.
All these criteria indicate that some progress had 
been made in the industrial development of the province. 
In fact by 1939, Bengal was industrially the most 
advanced province within British India. With 15*5 per 
cent of the population, she accounted for 28.7 per cent
7
of the total number of industrial workers in 1939# Of 
the joint stock companies at work in India at the close 
of the year 1935-36, 49*6 per cent were in Bengal with 
44.2 per cent of the total paid-up capital of India
lL
employed m  them.
In the case of small and cottage industries as well, 
some progress was made. Thus the output of handloom 
cotton cloth had nearly doubled from 136 million yards 
in 1912-13 to nearly 249 million yards in 1938-39 (see
(1) DOIB: Bulletin No. 83. Report on the Growth of Joint 
Stock Companies, pp. 9, 11-^2.
(2) Ibid.. pp."“10-11.
(3) Bimal C. Ghose, Industrial Location (Oxford pamphlet 
on Indian affairs, No. $2) (.Madras, 1^45), pp, 15-16.
(4) DOIB: Bulletin No. 83+ Report on the Growth of Joint 
Stock Companies, p. 16.
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Table 7*4). This great increase was made possible 
by the introduction of fly-shuttle looms and other 
improved accessories in place of primitive looms used 
by the indigenous handloom weavers of Bengal. In the 
field of tanning, the introduction of western processes 
of chrome tanning and an improved process of vegetable 
tanning also led to an increased output of leather.
However, it is doubtful whether any marked progress 
was made in other small and cottage industries, such 
as pottery, cutlery, etc., in view of lack of sustained 
effort by the government in this line.
In spite of some advancement, industrial development
could hardly be said to be adequate. It did not result
in any marked change in the occupational distribution
of the people of Bengal. Thus in 1911, only 7*4 per
cent of the people were engaged in industry and in 1931
>!
it was 8.80 per cent. The large majority of the people 
remained engaged in the agricultural pursuits with 
virtually no growth in that sector as well. Not unnaturally, 
economic progress, if at all was slow and halting.
Moreover, the entire development was unrelated and patchy 
as examplified by the regional distribution of industries 
within Bengal and the inadequate development of certain ^ 
vital industries like chemical works, iron and steel,and 
engineering. ’’The lack of a strong metallurgical industry,
(1) Census of India, 1911, Vol. V, Bengal, Bihar and 
Sikkim, fart 1, Keport (Calcutta, 1913), P« 560; and 
Census of India, 19319 Vol. V, Bengal and Sikkim, Part 
JT, Report (uaicutta, 1933), P« 261.
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and of subsidiary and auxiliary industries to cater to 
the needs of the established major industries, explains 
the weakness of Indian industrialization"*
Various reasons could be ascribed for this slow 
and unsteady growth of industries in Bengal. But probably 
the most important factor was the lack of state patronage 
in this direction. The laissez-faire policy followed in 
the nineteenth century was continued till the end of the 
First World War. In the midst of fierce foreign competi­
tion and the virtual absence of markets for manufactured 
goods within the country and outside (largely brought 
about by the Government of India's 'Stores Rules') 
industrial development with the exception of export- 
oriented industries and collieries was almost nil. It 
was only during the First World War when Indian industries 
got natural protection and in the subsequent period when 
discriminatory protection was afforded to certain 
industries and stores rules modified that industrial 
development went ahead but only to be interrupted in the 
1930's by the world-wide depression. As for the 
Department of Industries, Bengal, it was ill-suited 
from the beginning to foster the development of industries 
due to lack of funds and concentrated thus on the small 
and cottage industries of Bengal where too it met with 
only a limited success due to the same reason.
(1) P. S. Lokanathan, Industrialization (Oxford pamphlets 
on Indian affairs, No. *iu), p. 'iu. No“"date of publication 
is indicated but India Office catalogue mentions this to 
be 2nd Edition, Bombay, 194-4.
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In the absence of state patronage, capital funds 
flowed towards the more profitable and secure avenues 
of investment which included with the exception of few 
industries, trade and commerce, money-lending and invest­
ment in land. The few entrepreneurs who went to promote 
untried and new industrial ventures were thus from the 
beginning starved of adequate and cheap sources of 
capital supply. Banks would not also give long term 
loans nor would they accommodate generous working capital 
as their business was geared towards export trade in 
agricultural commodities. The provincial government was 
too poor to be of any considerable help as could be seen 
from the amount of state-aid to industries (see Table 4.8).
In the absence of adequate and cheap sources of capital 
supply many nascent industries failed to take root in 
Bengal. It not only discouraged potential entrepreneurs 
from launching into new and untried ventures but also 
sapped the confidence of the investing public who so often 
found such projects coming to grief for want of fresh 
capital supply. However, some reputable managing agents 
by virtue of their good-will were able to raise the 
required amounts but very often they chose to follow 
traditional lines of businesses in which profit was 
assured rather than embarking into new and hence risky 
undertakings.
Another contributary factor which considerably slowed 
down the rate of industrial progress was the lack of 
proper facilities for technical and commercial education 
as well as for acquiring practical business experience.
In the absence of such training and experience little 
regard was paid to costs, transport and market facilities, 
and to the relation of demand to the existing supplies. 
Sometimes companies were floated with insufficient funds 
or with obsolete machinery. No wonder many industrial 
ventures failed which on its turn chilled the ardour of 
many, who might otherwise have ventured to establish new 
industrial enterprises.
There were also certain inherent limitations within 
the economy which restricted the fuller development of 
industries in Bengal. In the first place, although it 
had many valuable raw materials, it did not produce all 
that was needed to meet the demand for various sorts of 
industries. Thus Bengal did not produce sufficient raw 
cotton, the natural advantage of which lay with Bombay. 
Similarly, she did not produce enough sugar-cane and was 
at a disadvantage as regards its cost of production with 
the northern Indian provinces. Likewise, the province 
did not have sulphur for the manufacture of sulphuric 
acid, nitrate for the production of nitric acid or salt 
for the production of hydrochloric acid. Moreover, its 
colliery deposits were awkwardly located on one corner 
of the province which made power supply very costly for 
most regions of Bengal, especially in the Eastern Bengal. 
These together with undeveloped transport system pre­
cluded the establishment of some important consumer good 
industries for which there was an internal demand. 
Furthermore, the over-all size of the internal market 
for various manufactured goods was itself extremely 
limited in view of the poverty of the people. The
situation was made worse in the 1930's due to the fall 
in the purchasing power of the ryots as a result of
'I
world-wide depression.
When all these shortcomings are taken into 
consideration, the reasons for the slowness of Bengal's 
industrialization becomes obvious. Only those industries 
which could counteract the above mentioned disadvantages 
succeeded in establishing themselves to the exclusion 
of others. Yet most of these difficulties were removable 
evils and could have been obviated by the adoption of 
a systematic planned action on the part of the state in 
co-operation with private enterprise. At least that was 
what the civilized governments in Japan, Germany and in 
most other European countries were doing at this period 
of time. But in India, the government played a diametri­
cally opposite role - choosing not to co-operate but to 
confront in matters industrial whenever imperial interests 
clashed with India's, Under such circumstances, it is 
not to be wondered why Bengal should remain economically 
one of the world's poorest regions after about two 
centuries of British rule in that area.
(1) Social factors are also sometimes blamed for the 
retarded growth of industries. But it should be pointed 
out that social factors cannot be separated from political 
life. Since Indians were totally cut off from any 
effective participation in the process of political 
decision making, the whole conscious development of social 
aspirations remained emasculated.
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APPEHDIX I
Growth of Expenditure for the Department of Industries,
Bengal, 1917-18 to 1938-39
Year
«
fDirection Ind. Dev. Ind. Edc.
..!'
Sericulture (Dotal
1917-18  
(from 29 
Oct 51917
V
» _ 
*
«
- — -
V
V
*
*
44,746
1918-19 * _ — — — f 87,787
1919-20 t _ - - - It 1,50,461
1920-21 1 _ - — — t 2,70,415
1921-22 * _ — — — t 4,08,614*
1922-23 •2,85,000 77,000 4,67,000 - t 8 ,29,000
1923-24 *2 ,57,000 81,000 4,09,000 — t- 7 ,41,000
1924-25 *2 ,00,000 84,000 3,36,000 — 1 6,20,000
1925-26 •1,90,000 79,000 4,63,000 - * 7 ,32,000
1926-27 *1,67,600 77,000 5,42,000 — t 7,27,600
1927-28 *1,87,000 77,000 4,83,000 — t 8 ,06,000
1928-29 •1,70,000 87,000 5,55,000 — t 8 ,12,000
1929-30 *1,74,000 95,000 5,02,000 - * 7,71,000
1930-31 *1,79,000 1,06,000 5,32,480 - t 8,17,480
1931-32 *1,62,800 86,200 5,03,900 — » 7,52,900
1932-33 *1,48,000 85,000 4,59,000 - 6,92,000
1933-34 *1,48,000 1,89,000 4,02,000 — t 7 ,30,000
1934-35 *1,29,000 2,01,000 4,06,000 — f 7,36,000
1935-36 *1,37,000 2,23,000 4 ,72,800 1,60,000 * 9,93,100
1936-37 *1,37,600 2,25,300 4,77,100 1,32,500 t 9,72,500
1937-38 •1,29,600 2,50,600 5,62,200 2 ,05,600 1 11,48,000
1938-39 *1,34,900 *t 13,64,300 6,19,400 1,95,300
«
»
13,13,900
* Upto^December
Sources: Figures from 1917-18 to 1920-21 obtained from the 
BLCP, July 4, 1921, Vol. Ill, p. 49; 1921-22 figures from 
IOR: Vol. 11155, BRP (Industries}, April 1922,^.^'6 5 and the 
rest from BISC. Appendix XVIIA, p. 320. Breakdown figures 
are not available for the years 1917-18 to 1921-22 and 
Sericulture Section was not transferred to the Industries 
Department till 1935-36.
APPEHDIX II
Table 1 Average Humber of Persons Employed in the Jute Mill
Industry, 1900-01 to 1939
Year Men Women
900-01 1 — v |r t 111 272 (a)
901-02 — 114 795
9Q2-Q3 t t t 118 904
903-04 If t * » 123 869
904-05 88,301 21 793 21 792 (b) 131 886
905-06 * 96,978 * 23 218 * 23 233 t 143 429
906-07 * 112,159 t  27 435 t 26 098 * 165 692
907-08 126,190 30 009 29 708 185 907
908-09 1 129,005 * 30 620 *' 30 263 * 189 888
909-10 r 135,012 • 32 417 , 34 829 202 258
910-11 140,314 33 762 40 431 214 507
912 * 145,389 • 31 329 1 23 007 1 199 725
913 r 158,261 t 34 010 t 24 106 t 216 377
914 167,858 36 800 25 969 230 627
915 1 181,445 * 40 674 * 26 606 t 248 725
916 » 191,036 * 42 145 1 27 606 t 260 787
917 192,667 41 395 27 320 261 382 -
918 r 199,977 * 43 278 * 27 709 t 270 964
919 , 201,009 * 43 112 , 28 628 > 272 749
920 207,255 44 545 28 521 280 321
921 * 207,908 * 4 4 705 » 29 235 » 281 848
922 , 239,660 t 49 257 t 28 26 7 t 317 184
923 242,652 51 495 28 400 322 547
924 * 252,107 t  54 801 * 27 823 t 334 731
925 1 256,312 t  55 511 * 26 474 t 338 297
926 253,935 52 827 20 785 327 547
927 * 253,681 * 52 935 * 19 249 t 325 865
928 , 260,342 t 53 678 it 17 879 » 331 899
929 267,717 54 670 17 278 339 665
930 f 264,417 * 52 114 * 11 646 t 328 177
931 t 222,573 t 42 254 » 3 462 » 268 289
932 212,505 40 294 1 515 254 314
933 * 208,246 t 3? 337 * ‘ 1 134 • 246 717
934 * 213,894 t 36 932 t 915 » 251 741
935 223,449 37 520 2 430 (c) 263 399
936 * 231,401 * 38 050 * 2 295 t 271 746
937 • 246,775 * 37 564 , 3 404 t 287 743
938 241,271 36 537 1 226 279 034
939 ’ 241,976 » 37 534 * 1 719 t 281 229
Children Total
a) Till 1903-04 figures represent that of India,
b) Includes 1young persons* till 1910-11.
c) Figures till 1939 include that of •adolescents*.
Sources: Statistical Abstract relating to British India from 
1900-01 ter 1909—10 (45th Humber) (London, 1911), P* 263; 
Statistics of British India for 1906-07 & preceding years. Part
I. Industrial (Calcutta. 19081. p. 42. and its succeeding annual 
issues. The data from 1912 onwards obtained from AFR.
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Table 2 Daily average number of persons employed in the tea 
and coal industries of Bengal, 1900-1939
Year
No.
tea
employed in the 
industry 
_(1)
No. employed in the 
coal industry 
(2)
1900 176 469 (a) 58 081
1901 114 813 74 0301902 106 714 83 290
1903 108 349 73 928
1904 38 246 75 749
1905 41 095 74 071
1906 39 422 82 885
1907 36 997 96 301
1908 36 868 112 219
1909 36 968 102 253
19*0 37 837 98 268
1911 40 847 99 183
1912 124 412 36 828
1913 133 731 38 553
1914 130 438 38 879
1915 133 341 42 093
1916 132 514 43 040
1917 138 401 38 585
1918 132 808 46 149
1919 161 382 48 642
1920 151 008 43 782
1921 141 421 45 813
1922 136 503 44 893
1923 146 330 44 251
1924 158 394 43 621
1925 166 985 42 781
1926 170 966 43 506
1927 181 849 44 285
1928 185 399 43 855
1929 196 899 44 303
1930 190 313 46 592
1931 185 811 44 642
1932 182 943 43 423
1933 185 594 43 651
1934 194 757 44 619
1935 205 428 49 913
1936 203 398 51 061
1937 199 712 51 077
1938 202 609 59 364
1939 204 981 59 632
(a) The figure of tea industry for the year 1900 is obviously 
wrong as it puts the labour-force of Chittagong alone at 
58,191 (permanent plus temporary). Correct statements appear 
in the later issues.
Sources: Por column (1), see IOR. V/14/272, Production and 
Cultivation of Tea in India, Reports 1900-1920; Supplement to 
the Indian Trade Journal (relevent issues) from 1921 to 1929; 
and the annual publication, Indian Tea Statistics from 1930 to 
1939# Por column (2), see AMR*. 1900 to 1939
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APPENDIX IV
Table 1 Sterling tea companies operating in Bengal in 
1937-38 which had over 500 acres under tea cultivation
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Managing Agent/Agent/ 
Secretary,etc.
Name of the Company Acreage under 
cultivation
Darjeeling
(I) Amalgamated Tea Estates 
Company Limited ..•
C2) Assam Consolidated Tea 
Estates Ld. ...
(3) British-Darjeeling Tea 
Company Ltd. ...
(4) Consolidated Tea and 
Lands Co. Ltd. ...
(5) Darjeeling Co. Ltd. ...
(6) Darjeeling Consolidated 
Tea Co. Ltd. ...
(7) Lebong Tea Co. Ltd. ...
(8) Marybong and Kyel Tea 
Estates Ltd. ... 
Dooars (Jalpaiguri)
T9) Aibheel Tea Co. Ld. ...
(10) Assam-Dooars Tea Co...
(II) Bagracote Tea Co. Ltd.
(12) Buxa Dooars Tea Co. Ld
(13) Cachar and Dooars Tea 
Company Ltd. ...
(14) Chulsa Tea Co. Ltd.
(15) Consolidated Tea and 
Lands Co. Ltd. ...
(16) Dangua Jhar Tea Co. Ld
(17) Dima Tea Company Ltd.
(18) Dooars Tea Co. Ltd.
(19) Empire of India and 
Ceylon Tea Co. Ltd. ...
(20) Hope Tea Co. Ltd.
(21) Imperial Tea Co. Ltd.
(22) Lankapara Tea Co. Ld.
(23) Leech River Tea Co. Ld
(24) Malabarrie Tea Co. Ltd
(25) Meenglas Tea Co. Ltd.
(26) Redeem Tea Co. Ltd.
(27) Northern Dooars Tea 
Company Limited ...
6,286 James Finlay & Co. Ld.
1,745 Andrew Yule & Co. Ld.
1,200 Duncan Bros. & Co. Ld.
574
2,092
James Finlay & Co. 
Begg, Dunlop & Co.
Ld.
Ld.
2,840
1,517
Balmar Lawrie & Co 
Balmer Lawrie & Co
. Ld.
. Ld.
670 Duncan Bros. & Co. Ld.
884
5,260
2,701
3,016
Williamson, Magor & Co. 
Duncan Bros. & Co. Ld. 
Duncan Bros. 8c Co. Ld. 
Shaw V/allace & Co.
856
5,389
Jardine, Skinner & 
Duncan Bros. & Co.
Co.
Ld.
6,739 
1,000 
1,628 
8,163
James Finlay & Co. Ld. 
Duncan Bros. & Co. Ld. 
Shaw, Wallace 8c Co. 
Gillanders, Arbuthnot & Co
3,018 
3,258 
8,045 
2,690 
1,819 
610 
2,360 
10, 177
McLeod & Company, 
Duncan Bros. & Co. 
McLeod & Company, 
Duncan Bros. 8c Co. 
Duncan Bros. & Co. 
Duncan Bros. & Co. 
Duncan Bros. & Co. 
Gctavious, Steel 8c
Ltd.
Ltd.
Ltd.
Ltd.
Ltd.
Ltd.
Co. Ld.
2,319 Mcneill 8c Company.
Total acreage: 86,856
Source: Compiled from the Thacker1s Indian Directory. 1937-38, 
(Calcutta, n« _d*) Industries Section, pp. 156-167.
APPENDIX IV
Table 2 Bengal tea companies/estates having more than 500 
acres under tea cultivation in 1937-38
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Name of the Company/Estate»Acreage under Managing Agent/Agent/
cultivation Secretary, etc.
Chittagong
(1) Kaiyachhra Tea Estate
(2) Kornafuli Asso. Ltd. 
Darjeeling
(3) Darjeeling Tea and 
Cinchona Association, Ltd
(4) Garodia & Periwal Tea 
Company ...
(5) Gielle Tea Estate ...
(6) Jalpaiguri-Duars Tea 
Company Ltd. ...
(7) Lingia Tea Company Ld,
(8) Longview Tea Co., Ld.
(9) Margaret’s Hope Tea 
Company Limited ...
(10) Mohurgong & Meethibarl 
Tea Estates ...
(11) Nagri Farm Tea Co.Ld. 
(12; Okayti Tea Co., Ltd.
(13) Pashok Tea Co., Ltd.
(14) Poobong Tea Co., Ltd.
(15) Pusaimbing Tea Co.Ld.
(16) Rungmook Tea Estate
(17) Sahabad Tea Co., Ltd.
(18) Simulbarie Tea Co. Ld
(19) Singell Tea Co., Ld.
(20) Singtom Tea Co., Ltd.
(21) Soom Tea Co., Ltd.
(22) Sukna Tea Co., Ltd.
(23) Teesta Valley Tea Co.
(24) Tukvar Company, Ltd. 
Dooars (Jalpaiguri)
(25V Ambari Tea Co., Ltd.
(26) Anjuman Tea Co., Ltd.
(27) Atiabari Tea Co., Ld.
(28) Banarhat Tea Co., Ld.
(29) Baradighi Tea Co., Ld
(30) Batabari Tea Co., Ld.
(31) Bijoynagar Tea Co., Ld
(32) Birpara Tea Co., Ltd.
527
896
1,001
725
533
504 
1,306
670
541
609
646
505 
802 
500 
562 
712 
558 
560 
747 
632
534 
500 
718
1,635
1,001 
1,300 
1,052 
2,442 
1,078 
608
812
1,321
R. K. Roy & Company Ltd 
and P. K. Das (Props.) 
Kilburn & Company
Kilburn & Company
Gangadhar Nathalmal 
Davenport & Co., Ltd.
Davenport & Co., Ltd. 
Williamson, Magor & Co. 
Planters’ Stores and 
Agency Co., Ltd.
Begg, Dunlop & Co.
A. Palchaudhuri (Prop.}' 
Williamson, Magor & Co. 
Duncan Bros. & Co., Ltd. 
Kilburn & Company 
Duncan Bros. & Co. 
Davenport & Co., Ltd.
N. A.
Bahubal1abh Saha (Secy.) 
National Agency Co., Ld. 
Hoare, Miller & Co., Ld. 
Andrew Yule & Co., Ltd. 
Williamson, Magor & Co.
N. A.
Davenport & Co., Ltd. 
Williamson, Magor & Co.
Bahuballabh Saha (Secy.) 
R. K. Moitra (Secy.) 
Davenport &. Co.
Andrew Yule & Co.
Jardine, Skinner & Co. 
Directors: Nawab Mushraff 
Hus so in, Mir Mukhlesur 
Rahman & others. Agents: 
Andrew Yule & Co.
Ghose & Sons (Agents) 
Duncan Bros* fit Co., Ld.
APPERDIX IV Table 2 (continued)
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Name of the Company/Estate*Acreage under 
cultivation
Managing Agent/Agent/ 
Secretary, etc.
(33) Bullabarie Tea Co. Ld 1 738 H. A.
(34) Carron Tea Co., Ltd. * 602 Duncan Bros. & Co.
(35) Chamurchi Tea Co. Ld. 900
(36) Choonabhutti Tea Co. 867 Andrew Yule & Co., Ltd.
(37) Chuniajhora Tea Co. Ld* 575 Directors: Miv. M.
Rahman; W. Rahman & others
(38) Despara Tea Co., Ltd. * 986 R. Chakrabarty (Secy.)
(39) Diana Tea Co., Ltd. * 763 Directorst Rahman & others
(40) Duars Union Tea Co. Ld^ 549 N.A.
(41) Eastern Tea Co., Ltd. 555 M. S. Dass Gupta (Secy.)
(42) Ellenbarrie Tea Estate* 506 Duncan Bros. & Co., Ltd.
(43) Gairkhata Tea Co., Ld 1,256 Gillanders, Arthutnot & Co,
(44) Gopalpur Tea Co., Ltd 948 Ghose 8c Sons
(45) Hantapara Tea Co., Ld * 2,414 Duncan Bros. 8c Company
(46) Easimara Tea Co., Ld. 3,762 Davenport & Company
(47) Huldibari Tea Asso. Ld 1,386 Davenport & Co., Ltd.
(48) Jalpaiguri Tea Co.. Ld* 850 K. M. Eeyogi (Secy.)
(49) Jaybirpara (Dooars) %
Tea Company Limited ... 607 Andrew Yule & Co.
(50) Kadambini Tea Co. Ld. * 787 Ghose 8c Sons
(51) Katalguri Tea Co., Ld#| 953 Directors: Tarini Prasad
Roy; Waliur Rahman;
Muklesur Rahman & others
(52) Khayerbari Tea Co. Ld. 600 Davenport & Company
(53) Killcott Tea Company 934 Duncan Brothers & Co.
(54) Kohinoor Tea Company * 558 N. A.
(55) Malhati Tea Syndicate 813 Ghose 8c Sons
(56) Moraghat Tea Co., Ld. 830 Macneill & Company
(57) Nagaisuree Tea Co. Ld.* 1,125 Duncan Bros. & Co.
(58) Nangdala Tea Co., Ltd % 963 Macneill & Company
(59) Hew Dooars Tea Co. Ld. 1,065 Andrew Yule Sc Co.
(60) northern Bengal Tea *
Corporation, Limited ... 641 C. K. Roy (Secy.)
(61) Nuddea Tea Co., Ld. 682 Davenport & Co.
(62) Qodlabari Co., Ld. » 560 Octavious Steel & Co.
(63) Rahimia Lands & Tea Cq 671 W. S. Cresswell & Co.
(64) Rajahbhat Tea Co., Ld. 764 McLeod 8c Co., Ltd.
(65) Ramjhora Tea Estate * 806 H. A.
(66) Rangpur Tea Asso. Ld. , 651 J. C. Sen (Secy.)
(67) Ranicherra Tea Co. Ld. 1,720 Begg, Dunlop & Co., Ltd.
(68) Rydak Tea Syndicate Ld* 1,735 Jardine, Skinner & Co.
(69) Saroda Tea Co., Ld. t 1,160 S. B. Bose (Secy.)
(70) Sarugaon Tea Co., Ld 631 Andrew Yule 8c Co.
(71) Shikarpur Tea Estate * 1,000 Raja Prasunna Deb Raikut
Bahadur
Terai (Darjeeling)
(72) Atal Tea Co., Ltd. * 701 McLeod & Co.
(73) Gangaram Tea Co., Ltd f 1,622 Duncan Bros. 8c Co.
(74) Gya Ganga Tea Co., Ld. 789 Duncan Bros. & Co.
(75) Eansqua Tea Co., Ltd. 562 Duncan Brothers & Co.
APPENDIX IV^ Table 2 (continued)
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Name of the Company/Estate,Acreage under
cultivation
Terai (continued) j
(?6) Kamala Tea Co., Ltd. 700
(77) Marionbarie Tea Estatfe 528
(78) Merryview Tea Co., Ld 500
(79) New Terai Association* 972
(80) Pahargoomiah Tea Asso! 970
(81) Tirrihannah Co., Ltd., 762
Managing Agent/Agent/ 
Secretary, etc.
K. C. Dhar (Secy.)
H. A. Davy (Prop.)
N. A.
Kilburn & Company 
Kilburn & Company
Dunlop & Co., Ltd.
Note: N. A.= Not available
Source: Compiled from the Thacker*s Indian Directory. 1937—38 
(Calcutta, n.d.), Industries Section, pp.15^-1^7, 178-79*
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APPENDIX 17
Table 4 Private collieries producing over 25,000 tons of coal 
in 1938 with the names of their owners
Production*Name of the colliery
1) Baraboni Khas
South East) 1 120,459
2) Govindpur (Samia) , 54,737
3) Kajora 83,642
4) Nimcha * 51,376
5) Baidyanathpur t 32,136
6) Begunia 37,890
7) Chalbalpore. • 30,694
8) Chalbalpore (Khas) , 26,081
9) Chapui (Khas) 32,212
10) Jambad (Selected) 1 47,073
11) Jamehari (East) , 42,930
12) Jote Janoki (Khas) 33,178
13) Kajora (Upper) * 32,141
14) Kajora f 32,710
15) Madhabpur 41,950
16) Monoharbahal * 42,807
17) Nandi t 31,162
18) Parascole 40,779
19) Samia (Manderbani)f 25,705
20) Santoria f 29,990
21) Sathgram (Khas) 28,378
*Nandi, Maharaja S. C. 
tSamla, Govindpur Cl. Co.
Boy, Dutt & Co.
*R. S. Chandan Mull Indra Kumar 
tBhagwandas Agarwalla 
Thapar, K. C.
*K. L. Selected C. C.
,Panday, U. N.
Nandi, Maharaja S. C.
'Devji, Ghelabhai & Bros. 
fHursookhdas Balkissendas 
Banerj i, Sant an 
*Bhowsinga, C. 
i, Pal Chawdhuary, K. C.
R. S. Chandan Mull Indra Kumar 
’'R. S. Chandan Mull Indra Kumar 
,Mondol Brothers 
R. S. Chandan Mull Indra Kumar 
fSamia Mandarbani Cl. Co. 
,Mondol & Co; B. N.
L. A. Creet
Source: Indian Coal Statistics. 1938 (Delhi, 1940), pp. 41-45.
APPENDIX IV
Table 5 List of general engineering companies operating in 
Bengal and employing over 250 workers in 1937
Chairman/Managing Dir/Man• Agent
U)
Name of the Company * Number
TiT (2)
(1) Jessop & Co, Ld;
Dum Dum Structural Works\
North Barrack Road, *
Dum Dum Cant, 24 Parganas 468
(2) Jessop & Co, Ltd; *
Dum Dum Mechanical Worksf 
11, Jessore Road, Dum
Dum Cant, 24 Parganas * 376
(3) Jessop & Co., Dum «
Dum Wagon Works, 11 
Jessore Road, Dum Dum 1 
Cant, 24 Parganas , 265
(4) Jas. Alexander & Co.fs 
Engineering Works, 15 * 
Watgunge St., Kidderpore,
24 Parganas 350
(5) Britannia Engineering 
Works, Titaghur, 24 f 
Parganas 803
(6) Clive Works, Hide 1 
Road, Kidderpore, 24 »
Parganas 833
(7) Hukumchand Electric f 
Steel Works, 8 Swinhoe r 
Street, Ballygunge, 24 
Parganas f' 864
r
(8) Saxby & Farmer^s 
Railway Signal Works, 17* 
Covent Road, Entally,
24 Parganas  ^ 672
(9) Equitable Coal Co.fst 
Neamatpur Engineering 
Workshop, Sundarchak, ’ 
Sitarampur, Burdwan » 274
(10) Remington Rand Inc.
285, Bowbazar St., 1
Calcutta f 419
(11) Indian Standard v
Wagon Co.rs Santa Works, 
Burnpur, Po. Asansol, * 
Burdwan » 1,303
Chairmans C. I. Roddick
Ditto.
Ditto.
Managing Director: J. A. Leslie 
Managing Agents: McLeod & Co.
H. A.
Managing Agents: Sir 
Sarupchand Hukumchand & Co.
Managing Director: T. J. 
Hornblower
N. A.
Director and Genegal Sales 
Manager for India, Burma, Ceylon 
Sc Malaya: W. A. Lewis
Managing Agents: Burn & Co.
APPENDIX IV, Table 5 (continued)
372
Name of the Company Number Chairman/Man. Dir/Man* Agent, etc,
(D (2) (3)
(12) Eastern Light Casting 
Co.fs Works, Kulti, Po. ? 
Burdwan ... 1,153
(13) Port Engineering *
Works, Nazirgung, Howrah , 1,125
(14) Bridge & Hoof Coj’s * 
Structural Works (New t 
Premises), 422 Grand 
Trunk Road, Howrah ... 1 349
(15) B. P. Atta’s Iron 
Foundry, No. 1, 171 Grand1 
Trunk Road, Salkia, Howrah 400
(16) Thakurdas Surekha*s 
Pan Factory, 8/1, Goho *
Road, Salkia, Howrah •• * 41 &
(17) Guest, Keen, Williams 
Ltd., Railway Appliance 1 
Works, 97 Andul Road,
Howrah ••• 1,389t
(18) Britannia Building ,
& Iron Workshop, 286 
Grand Trunk Road, Salkia,1 
Howrah ... 255
(19) Angus Engineering f 
Works, Bhadreswar, Hooghly 284
N. A.
Managing Agents: Andrew Yule 
and Company
Managing Agents: Balmer 
Lawrie & Company Limited
N. A.
N. A.
Managing Director: A. H. 
Bishop
Managing Agents: Holmes, 
Wilson & Company Limited.
Managing Agents: Thomas Duff 
& Company Limited.
Note: Those owned by the Government, local authorities, and the 
railways have not been taken into'account.
Sources: Column (1) & (2) compiled from Large Industrial 
Establishments in India. 1937 (Delhi, 1939), PP* 18—20. Column
(3) from Thackers Indian Directory. 1937-38, Industries Section, 
pp. 41-44, and from "Calcutta" commercial.
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APPENDIX V
Table 4 Estimated balances of foreign yarn available for 
consumption in handloom weaving, in Bengal, 1900-01 to 1920 
-21, 1933-34 to 1938-39 (in thousands of pounds)
Year
(1)
t
Overseas»
»
. (2)
t
Coastwise*
t
(3)t
Rail and 
River
! (4)
»
Total Balancet
(5)t
1900-01 10,718
K
- 563 - 2,656 7,499
1901-02 * 12,369 1 - 650 1 - 2,827 * 8,892
1902-03 t 8,973 , - 684 t - 2,565 , 5,724
1903-04 6,911 - 543 - 1,660 4,708
1904-05 * 7,922 * - 628 * - 711 1 6,583
1905-06 t 14,397 t — 606 , - 552 » 13,239
1906-07 10,399 - 796 - 9,399 204
1907-08 f 11,931 1 - 795 1 -8,777 1 2,359
1908-09 t 9,359 , - 717 , - 7,824 , 818
1909-10 10,544 - 712 - 8,267 1,565
1910-11 1 8,667 f - 505 1 - 7,927 * 235
1911-12 t 11,770 • - 538 , - 8,627 , 2,605
1912-13 15,224 - 667 - 3,839 10,718
1913-14 1 11,045 ’ - 787 ’ - 4,515 ’ 5,743
1914-15 . 13,159 , - 330 , - 4,459 , 8,370
1915-16 . 9,162 - 128 - 3,790 5,244
1916-17 1 7,745 • - 378 1 - 701 * 6,666
1917-18 » 5,558 , -1988 , - 48? . 4,057
1918-19 8,584 -2988 - 1,109 4,487
1919-20 f 3,338 1 - 981 r - 2,708 f- 351
1920-21 t 12,865 , -1043 , - 3,220 , 8,602
1933-34 . 15,351 - 342 - 2,912 12,097
1934-35 1 11,377 * -229 * - 2,828 » 8,320
1935-36 . 16,376 , - 315 t - 3,371 , 12,690
1936-37 t 6,236 - 401 - 2,187 3,648
1937-38 * 4,886 * - 19 f - 1,518 ’ 3,349
1938-39 , 10,896 
, 
t
• 35
t
i
» - 1,794 1 9,137
t
t
Sources: Data for column (2) compiled from the Annual 
Statement of the Sea-Borne Trade and Navigation of British 
India with British jfcmpire and foreign Countries in the 
year ending March 3l/ljo5 and the four preceding years* 
Yol« 1 ICalcutta, 1906) and the subsequent relevant issues; 
column (3) from the Annual Statement of the Trade and 
navigation of British India with Foreign Countries and of 
the Coasting 'Erade in the year ending March « 1901« VoT* 
IT, Coasting Trade and Trade of fcach Port in Each Province
APPENDIX V, Table 4
(continued)
(Calcutta, 1901) and the subsequent annual issues (title 
varies) till 1921. Data for the years 1933-34 to 1938-39 
from Accounts relating to the Coasting Trade and Naviga­
tion of British India, for March. 1935 (Delhi. 1935): Ibid,, 
March. 1936: and Ibid.. March 1939. Data for column (4) 
compiled from Accounts of the Trade carried by Rail and 
River in India in the official year 1903-04 and the four 
preceding years (Calcutta. 1904) and subsequent annual 
issues (title varies) till 1920-21. Data for the years 
1933-34 to 1938-39 from Accounts relating to the Inland 
(Rail and River-borne) Trade of India for March. 1935 
(Delhi. 1935): Ibid.. March 1937: and Ibid.. March 1939.
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